



Bundesministerium  
des Innern



# **Evaluation Report: The National Security Strategy for the 2006 FIFA World Cup**

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## I. Preface by the Federal Minister of the Interior

It is with great joy that we look back on the 2006 FIFA World Cup. We saw a wonderful festival of football with 64 matches, Italy was the winner of the World Cup and our own team was met with great enthusiasm because of its outstanding performance.



*“We found, in the most wonderful way, that light-heartedness and security are not mutually exclusive, but instead depend on each other.”*

Throughout the entire tournament we experienced a unique atmosphere of happiness and openness to the world in our country. We thus succeeded in breathing life into the World Cup’s motto, “A Time to Make Friends” in many different ways, something which had been hard to imagine beforehand. The citizens of our country, who were good and kind hosts, made a decisive contribution to this success. The participants and guests from around the world were equally important for this achievement. They were of crucial importance for creating the specific atmosphere we will always associate with the public gatherings, events and celebrations of the 2006 World Cup.

Particularly in security we achieved what some had considered impossible before. We found, in the most wonderful way, that light-heartedness and security are not mutually exclusive, but instead depend on each other. The spectators in stadiums and fans from all over the world were able to celebrate in a happy and joyful atmosphere throughout Germany, because they felt welcome and safe at the same time.

This was the result of the national and international security strategy developed prior to the 2006 World Cup, which particularly focused on prevention and comprehensive communication. The National Security Strategy drawn up by the Federal Government and Länder Committee, which included both public security measures and the comprehensive security tasks of the host, the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing

Committee Germany, proved to be extremely useful. Close international cooperation with participating countries and neighbouring and transit states which were relevant for the security of the 2006 World Cup ensured that threats and security risks were recognized at an early stage and, with a few exceptions, did not result in serious troubles.

In this respect, I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to all national and international partners who, with their creativity and team spirit, actively contributed to the practical implementation of the government guarantee on security.

The present evaluation report describes the essential elements of this process before and during the 2006 FIFA World Cup and focuses in particular on the consequences to be drawn for national and international security preparations for major events of a similar nature. Germany illustrates and assesses its experience of the 2006 FIFA World Cup, which, of course, only serves as a starting point for other countries to find their own way.



Dr Wolfgang Schäuble MP  
Federal Minister of the Interior

## **II. Aims and procedures of the evaluation**

The aim of the present evaluation is to learn the right lessons from the preparation and implementation of the security measures for the 2006 FIFA World Cup and to use this experience for future tasks at national and international level. Summarizing the results in an evaluation report offers the opportunity to present the findings in a structured way and make them available to national and international partners.

Cooperation between authorities at federal and Länder level and the fact that both public authorities and the private host, the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany, were responsible for security tasks required a form of organizing and implementing the project in line with the specific event and its framework conditions. For this reason it may prove to be difficult to transfer the present findings to a different context. Given the complexity of tasks and the great variety of activities involved, it is possible, however, to draw specific conclusions for day-to-day work and the organization within and between authorities from the lessons learnt from the 2006 FIFA World Cup.

At international level, the Federal Government is bound by an international obligation to share its findings gained from the 2006 FIFA World Cup with other European and non-European countries. The host countries of the next major sport events, such as Austria and Switzerland (UEFA EURO 2008), the People's Republic of China (Olympic Games 2008), South Africa (2010 FIFA World Cup) or the United Kingdom (Olympic Games 2012) have repeatedly expressed their wish to draw on Germany's experience of the 2006 FIFA World Cup for their security preparations. Furthermore, this kind of information sharing as part of international cooperation already proved to be very helpful in the past. In this context, Germany was able to benefit considerably from the experience of past major sport events (such as UEFA EURO 2000 and 2004, the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games 2004) for preparing its security measures for the 2006 FIFA World Cup.

The evaluation procedure was implemented consistently and close to the end of the 2006 FIFA World Cup. It is mainly based on data and assessments provided by the security partners. For this purpose, a structured questionnaire was sent to all participants in the evaluation procedure while the World Cup was still taking place. The participants in Germany included all Federal ministries involved in the security preparations for the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the relevant divisions at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, its subordinate authorities responsible for World Cup security tasks and

the members of the Federal Government and Länder Committee, which, similar to the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee or the Central Sports Intelligence Unit, ZIS (the German National Football Information Point), were closely involved in security measures or had been assigned specific responsibilities by Federal authorities. In contrast to the evaluation report commissioned by the IMK (the Standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany) on the National Security Strategy following the Confederations Cup 2005, this time it was agreed with the Federal Länder that the police security measures that were the exclusive responsibility of the Länder, would not be included so as to avoid possible overlaps with other evaluation studies. The measures laid down in the Framework Strategy for Policing during the 2006 FIFA World Cup are analyzed in the evaluation report on the Framework Strategy for Policing. This report was drawn up by the IMK's Project Group on a Framework Strategy for Policing the 2006 World Cup in cooperation with the Federal Government.

At international level, structured questionnaires were sent to the contacts of all 36 participating, neighbouring and transit states, with which Germany agreed its National Security Strategy and the necessary security measures prior to the 2006 FIFA World Cup and implemented them in practice during the tournament. Furthermore, the international organizations involved in international cooperation, EUROPOL, INTERPOL and EUROJUST, were also included in the evaluation procedure.

Whole-day evaluation visits paid by the staff of the Office of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner at the Federal Ministry of the Interior to matches at all venues during the 2006 FIFA World Cup were another source of information for the various areas studied. The matches and evaluated areas in the cities were selected both on the basis of potential threats involved and the priorities of the present evaluation procedure.

The structure of the report follows the sequence of events of the planning and implementation stages of the project. A special priority were the national security measures during the 2006 FIFA World Cup and international cooperation. The systematic structure of the national security measures corresponds with the situations and topics of the National Security Strategy for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. Each item of the evaluation reports concludes with an assessment; specific events that occurred in the course of the 2006 World Cup are found under the relevant fields of action (e.g. hooliganism and comparable phenomena of group violence, public viewing etc.).

### III. Brief description of the 18<sup>th</sup> FIFA World Cup

The 2006 FIFA World Cup was the second time Germany hosted this event, following its first World Cup in 1974.

A total of 64 matches were played in the following twelve stadiums in nine Federal Länder from 9 June until 9 July 2006. The opening ceremony and the subsequent opening match in Munich and the final match in Berlin were outstanding events at the beginning and the end of the tournament also in terms of security.

Berlin	Olympic Stadium	66,021
Dortmund	FIFA World Cup Stadium	60,285
Frankfurt (Main)	FIFA World Cup Stadium	43,324
Gelsenkirchen	FIFA World Cup Stadium	48,426
Hamburg	FIFA World Cup Stadium	45,442
Hanover	FIFA World Cup Stadium	39,297
Kaiserslautern	Fritz Walter Stadium	41,513
Cologne	FIFA World Cup Stadium	40,590
Leipzig	Central Stadium	38,898
Munich	FIFA World Cup Stadium	59,416
Nuremberg	Franken Stadium	36,898
Stuttgart	Gottlieb Daimler Stadium	47,757

Table 1: Venues, stadiums and seating capacity

The 32 participating national teams were subdivided into eight groups in the group stage:

Group A	Group B	Group C	Group D
Germany	England	Argentina	Mexico
Poland	Paraguay	Ivory Coast	Iran
Costa Rica	Trinidad and Tobago	Netherlands	Angola
Ecuador	Sweden	Serbia and Montenegro	Portugal
Group E	Group F	Group G	Group H
Italy	Brazil	France	Spain
Ghana	Croatia	Switzerland	Ukraine
USA	Japan	Korea	Tunisia
Czech Republic	Australia	Togo	Saudi Arabia

Table 2: Division into groups of participating teams

More than 3.2 million of the available tickets were sold, of which more than 1 million went to guest from all over the world. The stadiums were filled to a capacity of 99.8 per cent. On average, each match attracted 51,000 spectators to the stadium. More than 14 million people attended the numerous public viewing events in Germany. This means that more than 17.3 million guests from Germany and abroad came to participate in the various events or watch the matches in the stadiums during the 2006 FIFA World Cup.

On average, 20 million viewers in Germany watched the World Cup on TV. Worldwide, the matches of the 2006 FIFA World Cup were transmitted by 21,000 accredited media representatives to an estimated 32 billion people.

More than 4.2 billion hits of online reports were registered during the World Cup. This is more than twice the number of hits registered during the 2002 FIFA World Cup.

The Press Centre and the 2006 World Cup headquarters of FIFA and the national 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee were in Berlin. The International Media Centre was located in Munich.

On match days, an average of 18,540 police officers were on duty to guarantee security. When no matches were played, an average of 1,160 officers were on duty.

Each match day some 9,488 staff were on duty to prevent other non-police related threats.

Furthermore, the Federal Government had drawn up a hosting strategy to ensure the World Cup's success. In Germany and abroad, people's anticipation of the 2006 FIFA World Cup was raised by a comprehensive and diverse artistic and cultural programme. With its many projects staged both in Germany and Europe, America, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, this element of the hosting strategy presented football not only as a sport event, but also as a cultural and social experience to those interested.

#### **IV. Preparation of the 2006 FIFA World Cup security measures National security preparations**

##### **1. Structural basis**

The idea to bid for the 18th FIFA World Cup hosted in reunited Germany came up at a board meeting of the DFB (the German football association) as early as in November 1992. Since that time, the former President of the DFB, Egidius Braun, campaigned for support both in Germany and at partner federations. In late 1996 Franz Beckenbauer was appointed World Cup Ambassador, and in 1998 he became head of the German bidding committee.

In the run-off against South Africa, Germany was awarded the World Cup at the final vote in Zurich on 6 July 2000.

The motto of the World Cup final round was announced on 19 November 2002: "A time to make friends". It was intended to express Germany's hospitality and joy to be able to present itself to visitors from all over the world in the context of the World Cup.

Right from the start, hosting the World Cup was perceived as a responsibility of the whole country. For this reason, the former Federal Chancellor and the heads of Länder governments adopted the following decision in Berlin on 26 June 2003 (excerpt):

"The heads of the Federal and Länder governments underline the national importance of hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup successfully. ... The heads of governments will commit themselves to supporting the public government guarantees to host the World Cup to the maximum extent possible and to ensuring that cooperation between the public authorities involved will pursue this objective. In this context, they emphasise the high priority accorded to public security. ..."

## **1.1 The government guarantee on security**

One requirement for Germany's successful bid was the Federal Government's obligation to give 14 government guarantees. Essentially, the government guarantee on security included the obligation to provide a common security standard for hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup, which ensured maximum protection of players, referees, delegations, spectators and all other guests before, during and after the matches, both inside and outside the stadiums, hotels, training camps, press centres and on their journeys by car, rail or plane.

This required a targeted public security structure at federal, Länder and local level, particularly at match venues.

The organizer was also required to set up a specific security structure at the national 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee and the local Organizing Committees at the twelve venues to fulfil its security tasks.

The remaining government guarantees were concerned with issues such as "banking and foreign exchange transactions", "telecommunications", "medical services" and "customs and VAT". Some of these guarantees were indirectly related to security, e.g. the visa procedure in the context of "entry and exit permits", and the promise to set up a transport infrastructure that complied with World Cup requirements.

The importance of these government guarantees for security can be illustrated by the example of some 3,200 fans from Ecuador. Their visas had been issued only for the World Cup's group stage. When their team qualified for the Round of 16, some fans did not have a valid visa. Thanks to the World Cup's accompanying foreigners law strategy it was possible to extend the validity of their visas in cooperation with local foreigners authorities at short notice.

## 1.2 Implementation by the parties involved

### 1.2.1 State level

#### *Standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (IMK)*

The basis for joint cooperation between the Federal Government and the Länder in security matters was a decision taken by the Standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder (IMK) and the Federal Minister of the Interior including their working groups and sub-committees.


At its 167<sup>th</sup> meeting in Schierke/Harz on 10 May 2001, the IMK adopted a decision implementing its provisional decision of 11 June 1999 (at the IMK's 157<sup>th</sup> meeting in Dresden) taken in case Germany would win the bid for hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup. In this decision they stated that

“... The Federal Government shall chair the Federal Government and Länder Committee specifically set up for the World Cup security preparations to draw up a National Security Strategy for the 2006 World Cup ...“

At the proposal of Working Group II, which prepared the IMK meeting, the following tasks of this new body were specified as follows:

- *Drawing up and updating a coordinated National Security Strategy for the 2006 World Cup on the basis of sub-strategies developed as part of the originary tasks and responsibilities of the Federal Government and the Länder;*
- *Coordinating the National Security Strategy at international level between Germany as the host and all participating, neighbouring and transit states;*
- *Ensuring the coordination of media and public relations work with regard to security policy.*

Organizational chart of the IMK:



*Federal Government and Länder Committee on the 2006 FIFA World Cup*

In accordance with this decision, the first and constituent meeting of the Federal Government and Länder Committee was held on 22 January 2002. The idea behind the selection of representatives for this central body responsible for the World Cup's security preparations was that all public and private institutions, which played an important role for the World Cup's security, should be actively involved and integrated into the process of drawing up and updating the national security basis right from the beginning.

Chaired by the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the ten meetings before the start of the World Cup were regularly attended by representatives of the following ministries/senate departments and institutions, organizations and agencies:

<b><i>Committee member</i></b>	<b><i>World Cup security tasks/responsibilities</i></b>
1. Federal Chancellery	Responsible for the general guidelines of policy
2. Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth	Employment of volunteers, possible event-related forced prostitution/trafficking in human beings
3. Federal Ministry of Health / Robert-Koch Institute	Prevention of health risks
4. Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development	Security-related transport management
5. Federal Länder Spokesperson on Transport	Security-related transport management
6. Federal Ministry of Defence	Technical assistance, logistics, NATO support
7. Federal Foreign Office	Visa strategy
8. Representatives of the interior ministries/senate departments of the 16 Federal Länder	Representing the Federal Länder in the preparations for the 2006 FIFA World Cup by police forces and other agencies (in particular those responsible for disaster response)
9. 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany (OC)	Performing ordinary security tasks in stadiums, team hotels, training camps, accreditation, ticketing
10. Federal Ministry of the Interior and relevant divisions	Basic policy issues, supervisory control over subordinate authorities
11. Federal Police (BPOL)	Performing ordinary border police, aviation security and railway police tasks during the World Cup, special units, tasks as a central office
12. Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)	Sharing information on politically motivated crime, general and organized crime, threat assessment/level, state guests, tasks as a central office, special units
13. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)	Procuring information within the framework of its legislative tasks
14. Federal Intelligence Service (BND)	Procuring information within the framework of its legislative tasks

15. Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBK)	Non-police risk prevention
16. Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)	Technical assistance, logistics, non-police risk prevention
17. Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB)	Civic education in the context of the 2006 FIFA World Cup
18. Fan Project Coordination Centre	Representing the fans' interests together with security agencies and the organizer; preparing national and international fan initiatives during the 2006 FIFA World Cup
19. Representatives of the Project Group on a Framework Strategy for Policing the 2006 World Cup	Coordinating the conceptual work of the Federal Government and Länder Committee with the work of the Project Group
20. Central Sports Intelligence Unite (ZIS)	Responsible national central office (NFIP – National Football Information Point) for football-related risks/hooliganism
21. Police Academy (PfA)	Advanced training offers in the context of the World Cup
22. German Association of Cities	Organizing events for World Cup visitors at local level
23. Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG, German railways)	Security-related transport management
24. Deutsche Lufthansa AG (DLH)	Security-related transport management, aviation security tasks

## Federal Government and *Länder* Committee on the 2006 FIFA World Cup



This chart shows the project structure of the Federal Government and Länder Committee. The committee has 56 members.

Representatives responsible for the security of Euro 2008 in Switzerland and Austria were invited to participate as guests in the committee’s meetings to be able to get an insight into the committee’s practical work.

### *2006 World Cup Security Commissioner*

The Office of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner and Head of the Federal Government and Länder Committee was set up at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the ministry responsible for top-level sport and the Federal Government’s lead ministry for the World Cup preparations.

At first, security preparations were the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land stand-by police forces (IBPdL); the first office, then called Security Office 2006 World Cup, was only set up on 1 September 2004 and, as a special staff unit, directly reported to the Ministry's top-level management (State Secretary).

This office was assigned the following tasks:

- Advising the Ministry's top-level management on all 2006 World Cup security issues;
- Chairing the Federal Government and Länder Committee to draw up the National Security Strategy for the 2006 World Cup;
- Coordinating the security tasks assigned by the Security Strategy to the Federal Ministry of the Interior;
- Representing the Federal Ministry of the Interior in national, international and particularly European bodies in consultation with the Ministry's relevant divisions;
- Drawing up a plan and preparing the ground for a functioning National Information and Cooperation Centre (NICC).

In a communication of 12 April 2005 the office was renamed "Office of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner" and became an independent office within the 2006 World Cup Office. The number of staff was increased from originally six to ten staff members. There were also minor changes in the office's tasks; in particular, its responsibility for the NICC was withdrawn and assigned to the independent NICC Project Group.

At the same time, the second unit of the Office of the 2006 World Cup at the Federal Ministry of the Interior was renamed "Office of the Federal Government Co-ordinator for the 2006 World Cup". This office was responsible for the coordination of all non-security government guarantees.

#### *National Information and Cooperation Centre at the Federal Ministry of the Interior (NICC)*

Based on the experience of host countries of past World Cups or European tournaments or, most recently, of the Summer Olympics 2004 in Greece, the Federal Minister of the Interior requested the creation of a national centre responsible for meeting the federal political decision-makers' need for information on the current security situation before

and during the World Cup and for ensuring that the Federal Government was able to comment on any given situation any time.

The creation of the NICC, however, was not intended to change existing operational structures, tasks and responsibilities of gathering and sharing information at federal and Länder level, but to supplement them.

### 1.2.2 The organizer's level

#### *2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany*

In November 2003, the organizer set up the Security Division at the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee responsible for drawing up and implementing the World Cup organizer's and host's security strategy. This strategy included individual security strategies for stewards in stadiums and the surrounding area, team hotels, training camps, venue hotels, headquarters and VIP hotels, fan coaching and assistance for guests, the International Media Centre in Munich, accreditation and ticketing, as well as comprehensive security coordination of the 2006 World Cup on the part of the organizer. An essential task of the Security Division was to make contractual preparations for the measures agreed with private security services (e.g. the company "Securitas" as the main security services provider in team hotels and training camps) and monitor their implementation.

In addition to this division at the headquarters of the Organizing Committee, security commissioners were appointed for the twelve field offices at the venues.

#### Assessment of the structural security preparations

In the overall assessment, the parties involved considered the 2006 World Cup's preparatory stage as generally good or even very good. This is true not only for the central institutions at federal, Länder and local level, but also for the preparatory measures taken by the individual national security partners.

In retrospect, all parties agreed that in relation to the dimension of the 2006 World Cup, the problems that occurred in the security preparations were rather marginal (e.g. at the beginning, the responsibilities and competences for overlapping areas were sometimes unclear, sometimes planning progressed at different speeds in various areas).

Since the IMK and the representatives of the IMK's working groups had recognized the need to set up central units and special offices for the World Cup at an early stage, these specific organizational units were created at ministries, subordinate authorities and other offices at federal and Länder level without further delay.

Setting up the Federal Government and Länder Committee was welcomed by the cooperation partners represented in this body. Cooperation between all parties concerned was effective, even though the size of this body in terms of representatives and institutions involved was considered an obstacle for drawing up and updating the National Security Strategy, at least to some extent. It was clear that the fact that the Federal Government and Länder Committee included such a great variety of institutions was in conflict with the need to concentrate on specific objectives and the effectiveness of the work to be done.

However, according to the evaluation's results it was possible for the committee's chairman to solve this conflict by pursuing a comprehensive approach for the National Security Strategy, which, in the end, was not detrimental to the quality of the committee's conceptual work.

At the beginning, cooperation with the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee was difficult and unusual for some security agencies. Once this first orientation stage was over, they cooperated as equal partners in a collaborative and trusting atmosphere in the whole period before and during the World Cup.

## **2. Basic principles**

### **2.1 National Security Strategy for the 2006 World Cup**

#### **2.1.1 Chronology**

The Federal Government and Länder Committee's task was to prepare a coordinated draft of the National Security Strategy and submit it to the IMK well in time so that the Confederations Cup (CC) held in Germany in June 2005 prior to the World Cup could be used as a practical test run.

Particularly in the area of football-related crime, the serious incidents at the football match between Slovenia and Germany on 26 March 2005 triggered a far-reaching political debate on additional police measures to combat hooliganism. In order to discuss the incidents at Celje and possible additional measures, the Federal Ministry of the Interior organized a "round table" with representatives of the DFB, the OC and federal and Länder experts in early April. The results were integrated into the draft security strategy. This draft was unanimously adopted by the Federal Government and Länder Committee at its 7<sup>th</sup> meeting on 14 April 2005. The draft was then forwarded to the IMK, which adopted it at a special meeting in Stuttgart on 25 May 2005 together with the request that the strategy be tested during the two weeks of the CC 2005 in Germany (15 to 29 June 2005) and that the results and any potential need for updating the strategy for the 2006 World Cup be reported at the IMK's meeting in autumn.

At its meeting on 8 and 9 December 2005, the IMK took note of the "Evaluation report on the National Security Strategy for the 2006 World Cup on the occasion of the CC 2005" and its conclusions for the 2006 World Cup drawn up by the committee following the CC and requested the committee to submit the strategy's final version at the IMK's spring meeting 2006, directly before the start of the World Cup.

On 3 February 2006 the Security Strategy Project Group (a representative working group of 14 committee members) drew up an updated version of the National Security Strategy, which was then adopted by the Federal Government and Länder Committee at its 9<sup>th</sup> meeting on 14 February 2006.

At its 180<sup>th</sup> meeting in Garmisch-Partenkirchen on 4 and 5 May 2006, the IMK adopted the updated National Security Strategy (as per 20 March 2006). It also confirmed that in

addition to the framework strategy of the federal and Länder police forces, the present strategy would serve as the basis for the security measures to be taken by the federal and Länder police forces on the occasion of the World Cup.

### 2.1.2 Structure and contents of the National Security Strategy

Right from the beginning, a strategic approach was chosen allowing the security strategy to be updated whenever necessary.

This procedure was based on the following reasons:

- The draft security strategy should be tested in practice during the Confederations Cup 2005 to be able to use the practical experience gained for updating the strategy for the 2006 World Cup;
- Since the proposed measures were based on the threat situation at the time the draft was prepared, they had to be updated in a flexible manner and, if required, be adapted at short notice in case the threat assessment changed;
- As a working framework document for national decision-makers and cooperating security officials, the National Security Strategy had to concentrate on the main fields of action and be clear and easy to understand;
- It was agreed at the beginning that details of security partners should be laid down and further elaborated in specific sub-parts.

The National Security Strategy is sub-divided into 14 parts. Parts I to III include preliminary remarks, the description of the contents and aims as well as guidelines.

The guidelines were drawn up to focus on the central motto of the 2006 World Cup describing Germany's hospitality towards its guests, "A time to make friends". The guidelines were intended to raise awareness among staff members with security tasks for their responsibilities and provide a framework of action for the federal and Länder security agencies involved. At the same time they underlined the strategic priority of a security strategy based on prevention and comprehensive communication. The reference to the World Cup's motto also highlighted the way the security officials defined their role: Security measures were intended to help realize the World Cup's motto and bring it to life in many different ways throughout the entire country.

Part IV deals with the type of event and the various areas of crime:

The description of the type of event and the related areas of crime is intended to illustrate the threats which are typical for such an event and need to be taken into account in the preparations and which, because of their threat potential, have to be included in any conceptual considerations. Given current incidents before the World Cup, the area of hooliganism was assigned a specific priority among football-related crime. Conceptual preparations were also made for the areas of politically motivated crime/terrorism and event-related general and organized crime on the basis of current and expected threat assessments for the World Cup.

Part V, the main part of the strategy, provides specific answers concerning the measures taken by Germany in order to prevent any threats in the individual areas of crime or to minimise any damage caused.

This part was also intended to make the security strategy more transparent for press and public relations work and to convince a broad majority of the need of the security measures proposed.

Part VI deals with a specific element, the National Information and Cooperation Centre (NICC). It underlines the special role of the NICC, which was set up to pool information as the central office responsible for gathering and analyzing news and providing it to all stakeholders at national and international level. One of its tasks was to draw up a daily national situation report for the 2006 World Cup and to coordinate the public relations work of all the 21 national and international partners represented at the NICC on a 24/7 basis.

The description of preparations at international level in Part VII of the National Security Strategy underlines the approach to integrate partner countries into the security work, thus creating a first threat filter already outside Germany.

The joint declarations on cooperation in security-related matters concluded with participating countries as well as the neighbouring and transit states that were relevant for security matters served as a basis for effective international security cooperation in line with specific threat scenarios.

By describing the security in World Cup stadiums and the security cooperation with the organizer and host in Part VIII, the updated National Security Strategy also took up the ongoing discussion about the security of stadiums in early 2006. A consumer organization had raised doubts about the security of German World Cup stadiums and

received great media attention both in Germany and abroad. It was pointed out in the National Security Strategy that not only all national provisions on the security and physical construction of stadiums as well as administrative regulations, but also the guidelines of the FIFA rule book had been fully taken into account and complied with. Parts VIII and IX of the strategy illustrate how the organizer and host of the 2006 World Cup comply with their specific and various obligations to ensure the security of all participants and spectators in those areas they are responsible for (stadiums, team hotels and training camps). This part is dedicated both to individual security measures, such as stadium controls, the accreditation procedure and ticketing, but also to basic organizational decisions concerning private security services employed.

Given the large number of expected visitors travelling to venues, a special Part X was concerned with security-related transport management. The measures presented were also intended to serve the strategy's preventative approach. A safe, comfortable and easy journey for all World Cup visitors would support the aim of creating favourable conditions for a happy and secure event.

A disruption of the World Cup's security was also conceivable through unauthorized access to data flows, e.g. within the framework of the electronic ticket ordering procedure. For this reason, the security strategy was updated to include the issue of "IT security" (in Part XI). The conceptual approaches to ensure the security of electronic data processing were presented on a case-by-case basis, and the various possibilities of support provided by the BSI, the competent Federal Office for Information Security, were illustrated in this context.

Part XII dealt with press and public relations work, which was an additional request of the IMK to the Federal Government and Länder Committee. The main topic of this part were the objectives of active public relations work of all parties involved and basic agreements on organizational procedures.

## **2.2 Sub-strategies of the National Security Strategy**

The following paragraphs of the evaluation report are restricted to the sub-strategies presented in the National Security Strategy. Additionally, nearly all parties involved also developed their own sub-strategies to fulfil their World Cup security tasks.

### *“Framework Strategy for Policing during the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany”*

By drawing up the “Framework Strategy for Policing the 2006 World Cup in Germany” of 5 February 2006, the responsible project group implemented another decision taken by the IMK as early as 10 May 2001 (cf. paragraph IV.1.2.1). This framework strategy takes up the experience of past international tournaments, particularly EURO 2004 in Portugal, and, on this basis, includes a detailed description of all operational police measures of the 2006 World Cup in Germany.

An independent evaluation report was drawn up for this framework strategy.

### *“Model strategy on disaster response”*

The model strategy on disaster response of 26 February 2004 and its update of 13 April 2006 were based on a decision of the IMK’s Working Group V of 21 and 22 October 2003. The aim here was to ensure optimum care for all World Cup visitors and guests affected by a potential disaster. The Länder, which bear the main responsibility for fire brigades, rescue services and disaster response, were supported by the Federal Government to prepare themselves for disasters of a dimension beyond what is usually required by rescue services in their day-to-day work and by fire brigades in fire fighting and providing technical assistance. This was particularly relevant for all venues and public viewing events so as to provide fast and comprehensive assistance in case of a major disaster and to ensure optimum medical and other necessary care in case of mass casualties. Another important element of the updated version of this sub-strategy was to ensure that each Land would be responsible for transmitting personal information in case of a major disaster.

### **3. Confederations Cup 2005 and evaluation**

The main result of the National Security Strategy’s evaluation on the basis of practical experience gained during the CC 2005 was that the strategy as a whole was sustainable.

It was updated to take the public viewing events planned for the World Cup into account. It was impossible to rule out completely that public viewing events posed a special risk or that they served as a target threatening the security of spectators.

With regard to politically motivated crime, it was thoroughly analyzed whether it was necessary to adapt and update the strategy in the field of terrorism based on the evaluation of the terrorist attacks in London and Sharm el Sheik in summer 2005. The result of this analysis fully confirmed the draft National Security Strategy for this area. This was especially true for the particularly sensitive area of protecting public local transport during the World Cup.

#### **4. Evaluation of the National Security Strategy and its sub-strategies**

The participants of the evaluation procedure unanimously agreed that the National Security Strategy was extremely appropriate to reach the desired objectives and was generally considered to have a major added value for the implementation of the government guarantee on security.

A particularly positive aspect was that all necessary areas of action were taken into account by the strategy. The relevant authorities responsible for operational measures confirmed that during the World Cup operations they were not faced with any new, so far unknown areas of action.

According to the assessment of the members of the Federal Government and Länder Committee the relationship between the individual issues of the security strategy was appropriate. The representatives of non-police agencies responsible for risk prevention complained, however, that sometimes there was an excessive focus on the police part of the National Security Strategy to the detriment of those areas they represented.

Concerning the strategy's individual subjects, the parts on all police issues and the area of international cooperation were considered to be very good for practical work. The same was true for the "guidelines" preceding the individual parts, which were regarded as important for defining one's role and tasks in the security area.

The users' assessment of the parts on the "Security of World Cup stadiums" and the "Security cooperation with the organizer and the host" was nearly as positive.

With regard to the quality of the content of individual topics, the assessment of the parts on "Disasters and major damage" and "Advanced training and exercises" is not generally positive without, however, damaging the overall positive image.

Of the sub-strategies, particularly the “Framework Strategy for Policing during the 2006 World Cup” in its version including public viewing events as well as “Security-related transport management” received very positive assessments by the evaluation participants.

Finally, all security partners involved in the National Security Strategy unanimously confirmed that they appropriately figured in the security strategy, even though some members of the Federal Government and Länder Committee would have preferred to present their tasks or those involved in greater detail.

## **5. International security preparations**

### **5.1 The starting situation**

At a very early stage, the German security agencies were aware of the fact that hosting such a major international sport event like the FIFA World Cup was impossible without international partners. Furthermore, past experience had shown (EURO 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands, EURO 2004 in Portugal and the Olympic Games 2004 in Greece) that international cooperation on the occasion of major sport events proved to be successful and considerably increased security.

Moreover, the development of the international security situation since 1974, when Germany hosted the World Cup for the first time, clearly illustrated that potential threats had become more diverse and complex over the past three decades, their roots had generally become more intricate and had gone far beyond national borders. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, but also the attacks in Madrid and London demonstrate a new form of international terrorism both in terms of quality and quantity, which can only be met with closer cooperation and stronger information sharing between security agencies at international level. Also in the areas of “football-specific threats” and “organized crime”, new forms of crime and international strategies of action have developed over the past few decades requiring a joint approach by all countries at risk to fight these phenomena.

These were the reasons why it was imperative to develop a coordinated approach for security cooperation beyond Germany's national borders on the occasion of the World Cup and use existing or, if necessary, create new structures for this and develop them further.

## **5.2 Preparation in existing international forums**

### **5.2.1 European Union**

The provisions of the EU Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension which concern at least one member state based on the Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 were taken into account in the preparations.

Its working methods and provisions on

- Information management by police forces,
- Preparations by police forces,
- Organizing cooperation between police forces,
- Cooperation between police forces and stewards,
- Media policy and communication strategy and
- The role of the organizer

were taken up by the conceptual preparations from the beginning.

The National Football Information Points (NFIP), the central offices set up in the Member States on the basis of the Council Decision of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension, were contacted by ZIS, Germany's NFIP, for sharing information and drawing up topical situation reports before and during the World Cup.

The Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 was the basis for the request to all Member States to examine whether it was possible to introduce stadium bans on a national basis and to provide sanctions in case stadium bans were not complied with. Furthermore, they were also requested to find out whether an appropriate initiative could be taken to ensure that national stadium bans would also be applicable in other Member States.

Against this background, Germany examined whether national stadium bans imposed by EU Member States participating in the World Cup could be used for preventive purposes for the upcoming World Cup.

At regular expert meetings of the Police Co-operation Working Group, Germany's preparations for the World Cup were presented and problems, for which individual Member States could provide support, were discussed.

In these preparatory expert meetings, Germany was particularly interested in discussing travel restrictions imposed on violent offenders.

On the basis of the "Handbook for cooperation between Member States to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and other comparable sporting events", German security agencies cooperated with the security agencies of other European countries to prevent any terrorist threats.

In this context, the provisions on information management, which structured the exchange of information on persons or organizations and ensured that relevant terrorist information obtained by EU countries were transmitted to the competent German authorities without further delay, were of particular importance.

On this basis, as requested by the Handbook, threat assessments of the World Cup as a whole, the individual participating countries and specific matches were drawn up at regular intervals.

Furthermore, Germany invited counter-terrorism experts from a large number of countries to serve as liaison officers in line with the requirements of the Handbook.

The BKA served as the coordinating central office in Germany to prepare and implement this form of joint international cooperation.

### 5.2.2 Council of Europe

#### *Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events (Standing Committee)*

On the basis of the "European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches" of 19 August 1985, the Council of Europe discusses, as part of a continuous process at the Standing Committee, how outbreaks of violence at major sport events can be contained and panicking be prevented. The legal and political obligations of the Convention's signatory states to take specific preventive, protective and security measures also served as a basis to support Germany's preparations and hosting of the 2006 World Cup.

Against this background, Germany took action particularly in the areas of

- Intergovernmental co-operation,
- Construction and organizational measures to prevent violence at sport venues,
- Restricting alcohol consumption in the stadiums,
- Deploying sufficient numbers of security personnel,
- Exerting a positive influence on fans before the World Cup and on their journey to and from match venues and
- Separating rival fans.

These measures corresponded with the standards requested by the Council of Europe and made a considerable contribution to the World Cup's security.

At the Standing Committee's meetings, Germany regularly reported about its preparations for the 2006 World Cup and discussed problems with the Member States.

### 5.2.3 International Organizations

A number of international organizations also served as important partners in the security preparations for the World Cup.

At a first information meeting with representatives of Interpol, Europol and Eurojust, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the BKA at the Federal Ministry of the Interior in March 2005, the international organizations illustrated their possible support. Planned cooperation was further specified at a second expert meeting in October 2005. The aim of joint cooperation on the occasion of the World Cup was to integrate the international organizations into the security preparations as effectively as possible by using existing structures and maintaining proven forms of cooperation.

Europol and Interpol were requested to transmit their intelligence on "politically motivated crime" and "event-related general and organized crime" to the BKA which used it for its national situation reports. Thus, it was possible to prevent any double work in international information sharing.

Eurojust offered its support for legal assistance in the context of cross-border criminal prosecution. Furthermore, Eurojust helped to establish important contacts with public prosecutors liaison in the preparatory stage. At the last preparatory meeting in October 2005, a public prosecutor liaison from the UK illustrated the possibilities of prevention also in the field of judicial cooperation. These ideas were taken up in the negotiations on “Joint Declarations” with partner countries, specifically in the area of “judicial cooperation”, and implemented with some participating countries of the World Cup.

All three organizations promised that they would deploy one liaison officer each to the NICC; furthermore, Interpol and Europol would also deploy liaison officers to the BKA’s 2006 World Cup situation room at Meckenheim.

### **5.3 Conceptual preparation of event-related international cooperation with partner countries**

#### **5.3.1 International expert meetings and security conferences**

In the last four years, the Federal Ministry of the Interior held a number of international expert meetings and conferences on the security preparations for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. The first international symposium was held in 2002 with representatives of countries that had already hosted major sport events. Until the final security conference in Berlin on 30 and 31 March 2006, another 20 bi- or multilateral meetings were held. While the Conferences with Neighbouring and Transit States in 2003 and 2004 focused on a general overview of different legal possibilities for preventive police measures (issuing warnings to potential troublemakers, obligations to report regularly to police authorities, entry and exit bans, transit controls, custody), the meetings as of September 2005 closely studied the specific areas of joint cooperation. This was also an opportunity to review whether specific areas at national level still required legislative action. In this respect, the legal possibilities in Germany and in the partner countries marked the framework for international cooperation.

The series of international conferences was concluded by the “International Security Conference on the 2006 FIFA World Cup” hosted by the Federal Ministry of the Interior

on 30 and 31 March 2006. Seventy days before the kick-off at the opening match in Munich, more than 320 guests from more than 30 nations and 200 national and international press representatives participated in this conference. This event served not only to provide information on the security measures planned for the 2006 FIFA World Cup, but also raised public attention for the finalization of Germany's security preparations. Furthermore, all participants were given a forum to discuss specific questions with the security agencies involved. Moreover, the security representatives and associations of countries participating in the final World Cup round had the opportunity to get in touch with one another and talk to the security officials of World Cup cities present. At the beginning of the conference, the Federal Ministry of the Interior was honoured to welcome FIFA President Joseph S. Blatter, the President of the German Organizing Committee, Franz Beckenbauer, and the first Vice-President of the Organizing Committee, Horst R. Schmidt, as special guests.

### Assessment

The early integration of partner countries into the preparations of security measures for the World Cup was of vital importance for Germany and proved to be extremely useful both from a national and international point of view. In nearly all cases, the representatives of ministries and police forces of partner countries were able to follow the invitations of the Federal Ministry of the Interior; in many cases, the first multilateral meetings led to a number of close bilateral contacts. For representatives of German security agencies, these meetings were an opportunity to get personally in touch with their contacts, to discuss specific questions and ideas and to benefit from the manifold experience which other countries had gained in hosting major (sport) events. At the same time, these international meetings offered Germany the possibility to explain specific German characteristics resulting from the country's federal structure and to specify Germany's ideas of event-related cooperation.

The majority of international partners felt that they were integrated into the preparations of international cooperation at an early stage. There were only a few cases in which representatives on non-European countries would have wished to be contacted earlier, since it was not possible to include costs incurred by this cooperation (particularly travel expenses for the secondment of liaison officers) in their regular decision-making procedure for the state budget in 2006, which, consequently, created administrative difficulties. In most cases, the reason why these partners were contacted rather late was

that it was not clear for some time who the competent contacts in the individual countries were. In the end, however, all questions were solved to the satisfaction of all parties involved before the start of the World Cup.

All countries praised the ample opportunity to present their own legal, political and country-specific aspects in the discussions. A particularly positive factor was that the various follow-up conferences provided the possibility to permanently review all potential options of international security cooperation for the World Cup. In some cases, partner countries were able to strengthen legislative measures before the World Cup, which may lead to a long-term increase in security (e.g. Italian legislation on stadium bans). One difficulty for the international partners, however, was Germany's division of responsibilities between the Federal Government and the 16 Federal Länder in security matters, particularly with regard to the specific security preparations in the individual Federal Länder or the World Cup venues. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, France and Poland, solved this problem by getting directly in touch with the contact partners at the relevant levels.

### 5.3.2 “Joint declarations” on event-related international cooperation

#### *Letters by the Minister and bilateral agreements*

In July 2005, the former Federal Minister of the Interior decided that existing instruments should be complemented and further specified in bilateral agreements outside the scope of international law concluded with participating, neighbouring and transit states of the 2006 FIFA World Cup. A two-stage procedure was initiated, which started with a letter by the Minister requesting support for the World Cup security preparations. The aim of these letters was to reach an understanding on close cooperation on the occasion of this event at highest political level and to exchange information on the competent contacts at the ministries for this project. In response to the letters by the German Minister, twenty-two colleagues of those addressed confirmed their willingness to cooperate closely in security matters in writing and designated a responsible contact in their ministries. This procedure made it much easier to get in touch with competent partners and share information in negotiations at working level as well as conclude agreements with the above-mentioned countries.

In another letter by the Minister of December 2005 / January 2006, the ZIS, the Central Sports Intelligence Unit, was designated as the central contact office for European partner countries for operational questions on the secondment of foreign support officers

for the 2006 World Cup. The central contact office for non-European countries was the BKA. The aim of this letter was to underline that the operational preparation of security measures should run in parallel with the negotiations on bilateral agreements. Furthermore, the intention was to present foreign partners a clear and uncomplicated procedure with clear responsibilities. Following these letters, the two central offices sent letters to the partner countries specifying the requirements and the envisaged area of deployment of foreign support officers.

#### *The coordination procedure at national and international level*

In late August 2005, the first draft joint declaration was agreed at national level between all relevant divisions at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Chancellery, other relevant ministries (the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Ministry of Finance) and the central offices (the BKA, the Federal Police World Cup Task Force and the ZIS), the head of the Project Group on a Framework Strategy for Policing the 2006 World Cup and other representatives of Federal Länder. This draft served as the basis for drawing up and finalizing all other declarations, taking country-specific characteristics into account. This draft was first sent to the partner countries as a first proposal with the request for further comment. The Federal Ministry initiated negotiations with 37 partner countries; until the start of the World Cup, a total of 33 agreements were signed by exchange of letters. With regard to the remaining four countries, it was possible to reach an agreement on cooperation during the 2006 World Cup through letters by the Minister or in operational agreements between security agencies.

#### *Characteristics of the bilateral agreements: Instrument and security philosophy*

The “Joint Declarations on Cooperation in Security-Related Matters on the Occasion of the 2006 Football World Cup” were drawn up within the framework of applicable legislation in the relevant countries – taking into account the first results of the Conferences with Neighbouring and Transit States. As a political agreement at ministerial level, they did not generate any rights and obligations under international law, but only described the joint wish and endeavour to cooperate on the occasion of the World Cup. As a framework, they contained abstract and general areas, which were not finalized in detail. The detailed implementation was the issue of operational meetings and agreements.

The bilateral agreements were intended to serve the joint objective of the Federal Government and the Länder to increase security by reaching an agreement on international cooperation and implementing it in practice. For this reason, each signed declaration was regarded as “added value” for security. In contrast to existing bilateral agreements and instruments of the EU and the Council of Europe, they were tailored to the needs of a specific major sport event. Particularly for those countries which were not bound by EU Council decisions and recommendations or conventions of the Council of Europe and so far had only little experience with international cooperation at major sport events, the bilateral agreements served as a guideline for joint cooperation. Furthermore, the joint declarations made it necessary to review a country's legal framework and the practical possibilities of implementing the political will to cooperate in World Cup security matters at an early stage.

#### *The fields of cooperation*

The priority of the joint declarations' fields of cooperation was preventive police cooperation through

- Personnel support

In all bilateral agreements, at the request of the competent German security agencies (i.e. the ZIS, the BKA, the Federal Police and sometimes also Land police forces), the partner countries declared their readiness to deploy during the 2006 Football World Cup, as required by the situation, police officers of their country, such as liaison officers, spotters and police officers in uniform intended to advise and support police authorities at the Federal and Länder levels in Germany in their work. This form of personnel support corresponded with the provisions of the EU Handbook; it did not imply any transfer of sovereign powers to foreign police officers.

Furthermore, a number of joint declarations envisaged a form of personnel support by foreign police officers, which had been unparalleled before in this dimension. A total of 13 European states (United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Spain, France, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands) declared their readiness to deploy police officers in uniform, as required by the situation, who take joint operational and

intelligence-led and targeted measures together with the Federal Police at German airports, railway installations and in the border region at the request of the competent authority. The legal basis for assigning law enforcement officers from EU countries tasks within the remit of the Federal Police is Section 64, para. 4, sentence 3 of the Act on the Federal Police in conjunction with Section 63, paras. 2 to 4 of the Act on the Federal Police. For uniformed police officers from Switzerland, the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation on cross-border police and judicial cooperation of 27 April 1999 was applied. In accordance with Section 63, para. 3 of the Act on the Federal Police, the foreign law enforcement officers are generally authorized to fully exercise the powers of the Federal Police. In particular, they may stop, question and search persons, and possibly even take them into custody.

- Information sharing

In line with the EU Handbook and taking the Handbook for cooperation between Member States to avoid terrorist acts into account, information sharing in the areas of football-specific threats, event-related general and organized crime and terrorism / politically motivated crime was considered one of the most important areas of international cooperation. It was laid down explicitly that the transmission of personal data was subject to national law. Specific agreements to share information in practice were reached by the central offices and their partner organizations directly.

- Accompanying and monitoring of fans

The cooperation area of “accompanying and monitoring fans” is closely related to information sharing. Foreign, (potentially) violent fans should be monitored early on, fans travelling in groups even be accompanied by police officers up to their own national borders, and relevant information on the number of fans, their behaviour, travel routes or destinations transmitted to the ZIS and the Federal Police well in time.

- Measures to prevent persons from leaving their home country

One of the bilateral agreements’ main purposes was also to envisage preventive security measures already in the partner countries. On the basis of existing residence law and police measures, the Federal Ministry of the Interior tried to prevent persons constituting a threat to public order and security in Germany

from entering the country already ahead of the 2006 World Cup. The discussions on this objective with partner countries showed that there were different legal possibilities in the countries' national law, which prevented a standardised provision in the individual agreements. There were only a few countries, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, which were able to prevent a person from leaving the country on the basis of a valid stadium ban. Other countries have no legal possibilities of preventing their citizens from leaving the country, if there is only the risk that they may pose a threat to the public order and security of another country, but no specific intelligence on any criminal activities.

- Measures to control the transit of fans

Since not all foreign fans were expected to travel directly to Germany, it was agreed with countries that would possibly serve as transit states that preventive police measures (particularly gathering and sharing information) should also be taken to monitor the transit of fans who had their ordinary or habitual residence in another country.

- Cooperation with the media

Experience from media reporting before and during the Confederations Cup 2005 showed that it is both reasonable and necessary to ensure a coordinated information policy between a competent representative of the foreign police delegation and the German police. For this reason, such cooperation was also provided for in the bilateral agreements.

- Judicial cooperation

In the context of EURO 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands and EURO 2004 in Portugal, Germany had already seconded a public prosecutor liaison to the host countries. During the preparations for the World Cup in Germany, there were major discussions as to the added value for security generated by such a secondment. Particularly because of the UK's great interest in this form of cooperation, a proposal was made to the European partner countries to second public prosecutor liaisons which would inform German judicial authorities about the legal situation in their countries and receive information on offences committed by their nationals and relevant prosecution measures. The aim of this form of cooperation, beyond traditional legal assistance in criminal matters, was

to provide foreign authorities with information and material on persons who committed an offence in potential riots in Germany, which may serve as a basis for a national stadium ban. Again, this measure was intended to strengthen the preventive aspect of judicial cooperation - also in view of future major sport events, such as EURO 2008 in Austria and Switzerland.

In addition to the United Kingdom, Sweden also agreed to such a provision in the joint declaration.

### Assessment

This was the first time that such joint declarations on international cooperation in security-related matters on the occasion of a major sport event were concluded with nearly all participating countries and some neighbouring and transit states. During past sport events (e.g. EURO 2000), the host countries concluded similar agreements with only a few selected countries.

Even though some international partner countries were rather sceptical about the conceptual preparations at the beginning, they considered them extremely positive in retrospect. The negotiations on the document raised the national and international security agencies' awareness for the specific characteristics of cooperation during this major sport event, and it was possible to discuss and define country-specific aspects of cooperation. Many countries noticed a positive effect for their own strategic basis of international cooperation. For some countries, such as Serbia, the joint declaration was the first formal document on police cooperation in security matters. Since the declaration was not legally binding, its added value was considered to be mainly the fact that the joint political will of close and intensive cooperation was publicly declared in an agreement signed by the competent ministers at the highest political level. Thus, the agreements expressed the important political support for specific implementation and operational measures.

In retrospect, the majority of international partners were of the opinion that all important fields of cooperation were covered by the joint declarations, though the following aspects should have been given greater weight / should have been made clearer:

- Principle of reciprocity within the framework of information sharing (exchange of situation reports);

- Description of information channels (designation of one central office also at international level – which was then done in the operational implementation);
- Description of police cooperation of each Federal Land with the foreign spotter teams.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior's coordination procedure was sometimes criticized, because at times deadlines were very tight. Furthermore, it was, of course, not possible to comply with all the requests for amendments of participating authorities. In general, however, communication proved to be uncomplicated and the cooperation of all authorities involved to agree on one common national proposal was in most cases constructive. The international partners generally considered the procedure to be very uncomplicated, direct and effective; they particularly praised active and excellent communication. In some cases, agreeing on different language versions caused some delay. For this reason, it was suggested that in future there should be direct meetings with lawyers, security experts and interpreters to agree on technically and linguistically correct versions.

Furthermore, the fact that the Federal Ministry of the Interior got in touch with the contacts at international level to agree the joint declarations well in time was very useful, because most competent partners also had to involve other authorities in their home countries (e.g. the government and/or parliament, other ministries, police forces or public prosecutor offices) and agree the draft with them.

In general, many countries were in favour of using the instrument of a political declaration also in future as an appropriate means to describe cooperation in major international (sport) events and to permanently update the contents on the basis of practical experience. Without going into greater detail, one suggestion was that the procedure to agree on and sign these declarations should be faster to ensure greater publicity and public attention through a signing procedure on the occasion of joint meetings of ministers. For the conclusion of a similarly large number of bilateral agreements as for the 2006 FIFA World Cup, however, this proposal seems to be rather impractical.

## **V. National security measures during the 2006 FIFA World Cup**

### **1. Threat prevention by the police in the individual fields of action**

#### **1.1 Hooliganism and similar types of group violence**

During the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the number of spectators in the 12 World Cup stadiums totalled roughly 3.2 million, 1 million of them visitors from abroad. In their preparations, those responsible for security assumed that the overwhelming majority would be peaceful, while a small but significant number of fans could become violent depending on the situation (category B fans) or could be willing to use violence (category C fans). In view of Germany's own national and international league matches and the hooligan scene in some other countries, it was not possible in advance to rule out the threat of such groups. This applied in particular to the German hooligan scene, which had gained attention the previous year above all due to violent clashes at matches in Celje, Slovenia, and Bratislava, Slovakia.

Further, during the run-up to the World Cup there was a noticeable trend towards confrontations away from match venues, in which opposing hooligan groups agreed to meet and fight each other outside stadiums and sometimes completely separate from football matches.

As a result the IMK agreed on additional concrete measures to contain hooliganism at the national level. These included giving high priority to collecting intelligence well ahead of time on violent offenders in conjunction with sport events and optimizing record-keeping in the hooligan data file as the basis for preventive measures by the police. According to the Central Sports Intelligence Unit (ZIS), there were 10,335 data records on 8,200 persons in May 2006; on 7 July 2006, there were 13,600 data records on about 11,100 persons. Nation-wide, about 3,000 data records were added to the hooligan data file during the World Cup. This does not include personal data on known troublemakers from other countries; these data were temporarily added to the hooligan data file.

The existing range of preventive police measures, such as reporting requirements (affecting 910 persons nation-wide, with threat of fines), were to be used to the fullest extent already before the World Cup. By the end of the World Cup, a total of 8,450 persons had been given warnings at home or at work. A total of 3,200 violent offenders nation-wide were banned from match venues or World Cup events. To prevent their

participation in hooligan-type confrontations, 210 persons were taken into custody for up to several days.

Before and during the World Cup, the field of hooliganism was subject to special monitoring and reporting in connection with national and international events. Information-sharing played a major role in drafting the overall situation report. Six months ahead of the World Cup, ZIS produced a situation report on hooliganism, assessing the fans of the participating teams and estimating the threat level for each match-up. This was intended to provide an overview of the situation well in advance of this major sporting event, making it possible to take early action in response to last-minute developments as needed in individual cases. This situation report was constantly updated. During the tournament, ZIS produced an event-related report twice a day.

#### 1.1.1 Special situations in Dortmund, Cologne and Stuttgart

##### *Match in Dortmund on 14 June 2006.*

Although numerous violent Polish fans had been prevented from entering Germany, a rather large group of violent Poles gathered in Dortmund city centre before the match. At the same time, violent German fans displayed great interest, as had been predicted. To prevent clashes, the state police took German and Polish fans into custody already hours ahead of the match. Nonetheless, about 120 German category C fans gathered in Dortmund city centre, forming larger groups. While police conducted checks in the vicinity of the main public viewing event at Dortmund's Friedensplatz, hooligans threw tables and chairs at officers and set off pyrotechnical devices. There were also clashes between German and Polish groups. The police ultimately took 442 persons into custody or temporary arrest; 32 of the rioters and one police officer sustained minor injuries. The police succeeded in keeping the violence from spreading.

In the overall assessment, the police operations in Dortmund city centre were conducted in a controlled fashion and prevented a further escalation of violence. Potential violent troublemakers were quickly identified and taken into custody. The situation calmed down rapidly; further rioting was effectively quelled, in particular thanks to the good cooperation between German officers and Polish police spotters. The Polish liaison officers also helped remove certain hooligans from larger groups of fans. Contrary to

expectations, particularly in connection with this match, there were no confrontations between Polish and German hooligans away from match venues.

#### *Sweden v. England on 20 June 2006*

Extensive intelligence on the arrival of Swedish and British hooligans had been transmitted for the match between Sweden and England. Checks at the German borders were used to sift out known Swedish and British hooligans, who were not permitted to enter Germany. Several hundred England fans began celebrating in Cologne city centre already on the evening before the match. Later that night, there were clashes between British hooligans and the police which left 15 officers injured. The mood among the England fans became increasingly aggressive due to their excessive consumption of alcohol. Overall, 24 people were taken into custody, including 14 British nationals, nine Swedish fans and one German. Effective, rigorous police intervention prevented the violence from escalating further. On the day of the match, 200,000 fans gathered in Cologne city centre, including about 20,000 Swedes and up to 70,000 England fans. To prevent conflicts between the two groups, an additional public viewing venue was opened in the Deutz district of Cologne to accommodate about 35,000 spectators. The entire match was unmarred by disturbances. However, additional information indicated the possibility of confrontations between German and British fans after the match. As a result, a number of German hooligans were taken into preventive custody.

During the police operations in Cologne, a total of 137 persons were taken into custody: 99 Germans, 24 British nationals, 4 Swedes and 10 persons of other nationalities.

Targeted action by the police against violent German hooligans in connection with the England v. Sweden match prevented provocation by British hooligans and larger disturbances. Preventive police measures such as reporting requirements, warnings and banning violent persons prevented more serious incidents. During the operations, British liaison officers and uniformed police played a special role: They identified ringleaders of the problematic British fans, who could then be targeted and isolated. Germans who were inciting violence were taken into custody, preventing larger-scale rioting after the match.

### *Match in Stuttgart on 25 June 2006*

Ahead of the second-round match in Stuttgart between England and Ecuador, there were repeated clashes between fans of the England national team and police officers in Stuttgart city centre following attempts by England fans to provoke other groups of people. There was rioting already on the night of 24 June 2006: A group of intoxicated British nationals taunted other football fans and threw bottles, glasses, tables and chairs at innocent passers-by. Due to their highly aggressive behaviour and to prevent further incidents, 122 British nationals and two Germans were taken into custody. Most of the troublemakers were detained until after the post-match phase. Despite a large police presence, again on the evening of 24 June 2006 there were clashes between about 600 violent British and German fans throwing tables and chairs. On 24 June, a total of 419 persons were taken into custody, including 400 England fans, 14 Germans and five persons of other nationalities. A total of 372 British fans were banned from entering the Stuttgart city centre until 26 June 2006; another 122 fans were banned from entering or staying in Gelsenkirchen, where the England national team was to play its quarter-final match.

The UK liaison officers categorized the great majority of British troublemakers as typical event rowdies who tended to become violent when under the influence of large quantities of alcohol. Only a few of these persons were already known to the police. All those who came to the attention of the police were temporarily added to the INPOL police database as having been involved in sport-related violence.

Forceful police intervention and detention of troublemakers until after the post-match phase stabilized the situation and prevented it from escalating.

### Assessment

In the field of hooliganism, the German police authorities were particularly successful in applying preventive police measures in connection with potentially violent troublemakers. The measures used most often were targeted warnings, reporting requirements and banning orders; further, in certain justified cases, persons were taken into custody. Thus the existing option to order preventive custody, as allowed under numerous police laws, proved particularly useful. In sum, a rapid, firm response in every case prevented major escalation of violence among Germans and foreigners.

Further, the precise assessment of risks associated with the matches and good international cooperation, including the joint operations of German and foreign security

authorities, was decisive in keeping rioting from spreading. As allowed by law, the Federal Police prevented foreigners from entering the country who posed a threat to Germany's security and order, turning them back already at the national borders. Massive disturbances predicted ahead of the Germany v. Poland match in Dortmund, the England v. Sweden match in Cologne, and England v. Ecuador in Stuttgart turned out to be much smaller than feared. Here, too, violent troublemakers were unable to affect the relaxed atmosphere of the 2006 World Cup.

## **1.2 Politically motivated crime/terrorism**

Given the general security situation and threat of international terrorism, the possibility that extremist or terrorist groups or individuals might try to use the 2006 World Cup as a stage for propaganda or violent actions could not be ruled out.

In its preparations, Germany took into account possible threats to the 2006 World Cup from both left- and right-wing extremist politically motivated crime.

Special priority was given to the field of politically motivated crime by foreigners, particularly in the form of terrorism. It was also noted that emerging regional conflicts could pose a threat to individual participating teams, to the event and to Germany as the host of the 2006 World Cup. The preparations also had to deal intensively with the possibility of Islamist terrorist attacks.

Starting in January 2006, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) produced a situation report on politically motivated crime/terrorism, which was updated at regular intervals. The report also contained threat analyses for the entire event, for the participating national teams and for individual match-ups.

Although the right-wing scene had announced various campaigns and events intended to gain media and public attention, most of them did not take place. There were no concrete indications of threats to the tournament by politically motivated individuals or terrorist groups, neither during the run-up to the World Cup nor during the event itself. As was discovered after the World Cup, one planned attack (suitcase bombs placed on regional trains) was postponed by the attackers due to the high level of security during the tournament.

## Assessment

Early acquisition of intelligence in the area of politically motivated crime/terrorism at national and international level, as well as the resulting risk assessments for certain countries, their teams, accommodations and movements, and for the individual match-ups, served as an important basis for determining which operational security measures were necessary.

The BKA also proved its value as the national contact point for international partners in connection with the security measures taken for the 2006 World Cup. To the extent that it was not possible to use existing structures in this field, this made communication simple and effective for the international partners.

The new Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre was also helpful in acquiring relevant intelligence. Information-sharing between federal and state authorities functioned without problems within the existing structures.

### **1.3 Event-related general and organized crime**

Experience shows that, given the number of visitors expected for an event such as the World Cup, it is also necessary to anticipate a major increase in various kinds of general and organized crime.

In addition to an increase in typical offences such as pickpocketing and counterfeiting associated with large-scale events, a possible event-related rise in human trafficking and forced prostitution was also taken into account.

As part of early intelligence-gathering efforts by all responsible security authorities, the BKA as central unit therefore also gathered and assessed event-related intelligence in Germany and abroad and made it available to those responsible. To fight human trafficking and forced prostitution connected with the World Cup, the state police authorities worked with the local expert advisory agencies for victims of human trafficking and with youth welfare offices on the basis of existing strategies and cooperation agreements.

In the field of general crime, offences involving fraud and counterfeit money in connection with ticket sales in particular were reported during the 2006 World Cup. The BKA confiscated a total of 191 counterfeit World Cup tickets and seven counterfeit credentials. A total of 255 counterfeit €50 banknotes were reported in connection with ticket sales. In general, however, the number of criminal offences remained low.

There are no indications of a rise in forced prostitution, as some had predicted before the World Cup. There is no evidence that anyone was forced into prostitution or was a victim of human trafficking in connection with the 2006 World Cup.

### Assessment

Thorough implementation of existing crime-prevention strategies by federal and state police forces and the resulting pressure of enforcement was the most likely factor that prevented any significant increase in event-related general and organized crime.

#### **1.4 Public viewing**

During the 2006 World Cup, Germany planned a large number of public viewing events for football fans unable to get tickets to the matches. The overwhelming majority of people at public viewing venues were expected to be peaceful and indeed only wanted to publicly express their support for their teams in a party-like atmosphere. However, it could not be ruled out that violent persons would seek out such venues in order to cause trouble, or that the incidence of crime (e.g. pickpocketing) would greatly increase while matches were being broadcast in public areas. Further, it was not possible to rule out the possibility that these venues could pose a special risk to the crowds of visitors. Here, the specific security measures had to take into account both aspects of threat prevention and deal with them effectively.

At the level of operational preparations, the Project Group on a Framework Strategy for Policing the 2006 World Cup (PG UA FEK) drafted a special sub-strategy on security measures for public viewing. This strategy included specific security standards for measures taken by the organizer and by the security authorities. In implementing this strategy, the organizer had to fulfil requirements set by the responsible order authorities, such as intensive access checks for all visitors, fences surrounding all venues, restrictions on stadium capacities and extensive video surveillance.

Planned police measures included above all a visible police presence in line with a policy of graduated response, while having more riot police nearby, possibly under cover, to intervene if needed.

Nation-wide, there were about 2,000 public viewing events with various viewer capacities during the World Cup. The largest of these took place in connection with the fan celebrations in the host cities.

For example, the Berlin Fan Mile was enlarged during the tournament to accommodate up to 1 million spectators. Overall, more than 14 million fans attended public viewing events.

In sum, the countless public viewing events, which were an essential part of the unique atmosphere during this World Cup, remained peaceful. Due to the huge influx of fans from Germany and abroad, numerous cities expanded their public viewing areas during the tournament.

### *Incident at one public viewing venue in Berlin*

On the afternoon of Sunday, 2 July 2006, a 33-year-old male drove his car through the barriers enclosing the Berlin fan mile, where giant screens and food and souvenir stalls were set up, aiming for the main stage in front of the Brandenburg Gate, where his car was stopped by a fence. Not many people were at the fan mile, as no matches were being played that day. But the car hit several pedestrians, and others were injured while getting out of the way. A total of 26 persons were injured.

This was the most serious incident at a public viewing venue during the 2006 World Cup. Following this incident, there was some discussion of the security strategy for the public fan areas. The Federal Ministry of the Interior and the responsible authorities of the city-state of Berlin agreed that the existing security measures did not require substantial revision due to this incident, which was regarded as the irrational act of an individual, and as such could not be completely ruled out during an event of this size. Police vehicles were subsequently placed at the entrances to the fan areas as an additional, mobile barrier.

## **2. Non-police threat prevention**

In Germany, the states (Länder) are responsible for rescue services and civil protection. Their strategies for civil protection and non-police threat prevention, including plans for emergency medical services related to the 2006 World Cup, were incorporated into the National Security Strategy. The civil protection authorities and organizations have prepared the necessary medical measures to take in case of a major disaster. Additional

workers set up an examination and treatment area in the immediate vicinity of each stadium which was able to provide initial paramedical treatment to up to 50 injured persons at a time. Any further treatment required could be provided by state and local medical and clinical facilities.

An interministerial, interstate crisis management exercise specifically modelled on major sporting events (LÜKEX 05) was held in December 2005 and gave the authorities responsible for crisis management an opportunity to practice working together. The exercise focused in particular on cooperation and information-sharing, as well as managing a large-scale emergency using a task force. Federal and state security authorities also carried out joint exercises at stadiums, which included evacuation drills and rescue and removal of injured persons.

If there had been a major crisis during the 2006 World Cup, the federal and state authorities would have coordinated crisis management operations using tried and tested structures and procedures. The Federal Ministry of the Interior crisis management staff would have been responsible for coordinating operations by the federal ministries. While including non-government institutions in federal and state crisis management operations was generally nothing new, due to the scale of the World Cup, communications and decision-making structures for an event-related crisis were tailored specifically to the framework conditions of this event.

In spring 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) worked with the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee (OC) to develop the structures necessary to cooperate on crisis management. The core element of this cooperation was liaison between OC and BMI crisis management personnel: In the event of a World Cup-related crisis, the two sides agreed that a member of the Office of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner would serve as a liaison to the Crisis Management Group at the OC's Main Operation Centre, and that a representative of the OC presidium or security division would be assigned as a "special adviser" to the BMI's crisis management office.

This procedure was practised during exercises. Under the direction of the state secretary responsible for security and together with the subordinate security authorities and the head of the OC security division, the BMI crisis management office conducted a special planning meeting in April 2006 using selected World Cup scenarios. At this meeting, the BMI's crisis management procedures were explained to the OC using checklists and recommendations for action. A month before the World Cup, a staff member of the Office of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner took part in a crisis simulation exercise carried out by the OC. During the exercise, crisis scenarios from the

perspective of FIFA and the OC were simulated and organizational processes were tested under “real-life conditions”. This made FIFA’s crisis management and further structures of decision-making and communications transparent. and was crucial to mutual understanding on action to be taken.

All conceivable/realistic civil protection and rescue service scenarios were repeatedly practised at all match venues before the 2006 World Cup.

For example, a full-scale decontamination exercise was held in Berlin on 13 August 2005 with the participation of all specialized services involved, and an evacuation drill was conducted in Berlin’s Olympic Stadium on 26 November 2005. Starting in March 2005, Hamburg conducted six exercises to test its strategies for examinations, cooperation in the case of mass injuries, personal identification, transport, decontamination and treatment area.

To prepare for the Confederations Cup and the 2006 World Cup, a total of 36 exercises were carried out around the country and in every state; civil protection and police authorities tested football-related scenarios.

Valuable insights were also gained from regular exercises not related to the World Cup (e.g. those of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)).

The LÜKEX 05 exercise in which six states and various federal ministries took part also helped prepare for the 2006 World Cup. It focused on the policy/administrative-organizational level, federal-state coordination, coordination of police and non-police threat prevention and civil-military cooperation.

The BBK and Joint Reporting and Situation Centre (GMLZ) carried out six regular training exercises between January and June 2006, e.g. with the scenarios “storm tide”, “bio-terrorist attack on NATO member states” and “outbreak of an epidemic in animals”.

### Assessment

In assessing the exercises in this field, it became obvious that, in addition to cooperation between the federal and state levels, cooperation with the organizer of a major sporting event is crucial to ensure that event-related crisis management functions properly.

Developing step-by-step procedures for dealing with certain conceivable event-related scenarios proved valuable as the only way to recognize the specific needs for preventing threats. Doing so also made it possible to modify organizational structures as

needed to deal with the upcoming major event and thus to respond appropriately and effectively to foreseeable special situations.

*The Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBK)*

The BBK provided support in the field of non-police threat prevention for the 2006 World Cup. For example, it carried out three preparatory events for the World Cup host cities and offered courses in dealing with special situations. The BBK carried out basic and advanced training for the World Cup host cities, trained the staff of all twelve crisis management and command and control centres as well as specialists in the fields of health care, disaster medicine, NBC protection, crisis communications and emergency counselling.

The joint federal-state reporting and situation centre GMLZ within the BBK added extra staff in order to mediate in case of bottlenecks at national and international level and to provide expertise as needed. Germany's emergency preparedness information system deNIS II plus went into operation ahead of the 2006 World Cup. It was used successfully during the tournament to share information between the command and control centres in the federal and state ministries of the interior. The BBK also drafted a framework strategy to deal with mass injuries and the decontamination of injured persons; made available recently acquired NBC detection vehicles (371), decontamination vehicles (373) and personal NBC suits (36,000) delivered before the World Cup; and set up four task forces for chemical analysis.

The BBK held a concluding event on 11-12 September 2006 with 170 participants representing the World Cup host cities, supervisory authorities, aid organizations, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), the Federal Police and Bundeswehr, as well as the hosts of EURO 2008, Austria and Switzerland. This event was intended to evaluate experience drawn from the 2006 World Cup, to identify areas needing further improvement, and to draw up recommendations and instructions that could be used for future major sporting events.

### *Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)*

According to the National Security Strategy, the primary role of the THW was to provide support to the responsible civil protection authorities in case of mass casualties. In addition to THW units nation-wide, the THW provided for this purpose units for command support, lighting, setting up and running staging areas, guiding/barrier services, logistics and various kinds of specialized staff. THW staff set up and ran staging areas, provided lighting and electricity for treatment areas, support for rescue operations and meals for operational staff. In certain areas, the THW provided command support, in some cases supervised local staff and dispatched expert advisers.

The THW also provided specialists to run emergency communications, to track electronic devices and secure buildings in complex threat situations. Outside the stadiums, THW volunteers were on duty at fan and public viewing events and assisted the Federal Police.

During the 64 matches, more than 260 local THW units were involved in operations just at the 12 host cities. Thus out of the total of 669 local units, about 40% were brought in from other regions just to help carry out the National Security Strategy requirements in the host cities.

During the World Cup, an average of 700 staff worked every day a match was played, for a total of 17,473 staff days worked.

In addition to its operations, the THW also helped bring to life the World Cup motto, "A Time to Make Friends". The THW and BBK invited an international delegation of high-ranking civil protection experts to Berlin from 7 to 9 June 2006. Their programme included informational visits with a focus on internal security. During their visit, these experts from Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Sweden Switzerland and the Czech Republic, representatives of NATO and the European Commission were able to find out more about the THW's operations during the World Cup as well as those of other federal organizations like the Federal Police and BBK. This information about the German security measures was especially relevant for the partners from Austria and Switzerland, the co-hosts of the European football championships, EURO 2008.

## Assessment

Overall, early coordination with the states and communities concerned played a significant role in ensuring a high level of non-police threat prevention on the ground. The National Security Strategy which covered civil protection and the THW and was distributed as early as May 2005 provided an early framework for all involved in this field. Despite regional differences, all twelve host cities were able to maintain the same high standards.

Cooperation between the THW, Bundeswehr and Federal Police was excellent at every level; it should be kept up to deal with daily tasks and/or intensified through joint training and staff work.

Cooperation at the state and local level was also successful and collegial. Only their sometimes late planning, which delayed the THW's internal operations, left room for improvement with regard to major events in future. Regarding cooperation between the BBK and FIFA, there was some criticism that OC representatives were sometimes unavailable for crisis management training in the host cities.

In general, the role of non-police threat prevention should be increased. This also applies to the field of international cooperation: It would have been helpful to integrate the international partners into the strategy for non-police threat prevention early on.

It would be a good idea to draw up an interstate exercise plan and risk strategy for expert consultation and training. With regard to setting up staging areas, the World Cup offered a unique chance to add to existing expertise and gain new experience.

### **3. Security cooperation with FIFA and the DFB**

#### **3.1 Background**

Ensuring security for the 2006 World Cup required close cooperation with organizer FIFA and host DFB. Security provided by the police and that provided by the organizer, that is, security measures based on private law, were closely linked and interdependent. The German Football Association (DFB), the event's host, designated a central security commissioner to serve as contact person for the federal and state security authorities.

This official was responsible for dealing with all the DFB's security-related issues and for working with FIFA, the German security authorities and the security commissioner of all the football associations that qualified for the World Cup. The DFB security commissioner headed the security division of the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee (OC). As a result, the close and trusting cooperation between FIFA, the OC, and all security authorities and preparation committees at federal and state level had extremely high priority.

The OC drafted its own security strategy for the Confederations Cup 2005 and the 2006 World Cup; this strategy is an important component of the National Security Strategy.

The OC's overall strategy was to ensure the highest level of protection possible for the players, referees, officials, delegations, FIFA partners, VIPs, media representatives and spectators before, during and after the matches, inside and outside the stadiums, hotels, training facilities and media centres, and while travelling within Germany.

The strategic planning and arrangements were approved by the relevant government agencies and jointly checked for feasibility and compatibility.

The overall strategy also included numerous individual issues, including stadium security, credentialing and ticketing.

## **3.2 Selected areas of action**

### **3.2.1 Credentialing process**

The OC was responsible for overseeing the credentialing procedures for the 2006 World Cup. In order to carry out such procedures properly and collect the necessary data, federal and state security authorities assisted the OC from the beginning with the background checks required for the credentialing process. The 2006 World Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK) coordinated this effort and served as the OC's direct point of contact.

Given the potential threat of someone seeking a credential in order to carry out an attack from within the organization, the security authorities insisted from the very start on background checks for everyone receiving a credential.

Already for the 2005 Confederations Cup, everyone with access to the entire stadium (e.g. security and order personnel, caterers, etc.) was required to go through the credentialing process and thus undergo a background check. About 28,000 data records were checked; of these, the police recommended rejecting about 550 requests for credentials. Up to 250,000 applications were expected for the 2006 World Cup.

Based on the experience from the Confederations Cup, two key changes were made to the background check procedures for the 2006 World Cup: First, the BKA was designated the technical single point of contact for the OC; second, the offices for the protection of the Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) were also involved in conducting background checks (the BND for foreign citizens living outside Germany).

Applicants for credentials had to submit a statement granting the authorities permission to conduct a security check using data supplied by the organizer. This statement complied with the requirements listed in Section 41 (1) of the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG).

The OC, PG UA FEK and the Federal Ministry of the Interior jointly drafted a data protection declaration that applicants could access on the Internet.

In total, the federal and state security authorities conducted background checks on 148,351 data records.

They recommended that the OC reject 2,055 applications (1.39%); 1,334 applications were rejected due to incorrect information given in the application. The authorities recommended approval in 144,926 cases. The Federal Ministry of the Interior was not aware of any significant difficulties in processing the data.

This was the first time such comprehensive and thorough background checks were conducted as part of the credentialing process for an event of this size.

### Assessment

The credentialing process – in particular the background checks – can be regarded as a success. Taking advantage of experience gained during the Confederations Cup allowed the process to be further technically refined, resulting in enhanced security.

### 3.2.2 Ticketing

Based on Recommendation 1/2001 of the Council of Europe Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and on the EU Council Decision of 6 December 2001, the Federal Ministry of the Interior recommended as early as 19 September 2003 that the OC, which was responsible for ticketing, personalize all tickets by collecting personal data from ticket buyers. Doing so made it possible to identify and prevent ticket sales to persons who had been issued stadium bans, thus serving as an effective deterrent to potential troublemakers.

The ticketing procedure was also intended to prevent ticket touting and ticket fraud, and to aid in identifying and separating rival fan groups.

The OC acted on this recommendation and had drafted a ticketing strategy by 16 September 2005. The ticket-holder's personal data (including name, date of birth, nationality, passport or ID card number, preferred national team) could be accessed at terminals placed at the stadium entrances by reading the code stored on the RFID chip embedded in the ticket. In some cases, tickets that could not be personalized at the time of purchase (e.g. those to be given away in prize drawings; sponsor, hospitality and association tickets) could be personalized later via the Internet.

In late May 2006, the OC informed the Federal Ministry of the Interior of the likelihood that a significant number of World Cup tickets would not be able to be personalized.

Out of the total of 3,327,504 World Cup tickets (100%), 3,326,747 were sold (99.98%). About 625,000 tickets were distributed to the national football associations and about 470,000 tickets were distributed to World Cup sponsors, together accounting for about one-third of the total number of tickets.

One can only speculate on the reasons why some of the tickets were not personalized: Apparently, both the hospitality agency ISE and FIFA, both of which had been informed about all aspects of the ticketing process from the very beginning, failed to inform certain ticket recipients that their tickets also needed to be personalized.

Joint efforts by the OC and government authorities succeeded in significantly reducing the number of non-personalized tickets.

With up to 2,500 random checks conducted per match, in each case about 50 ticket-holders were found whose tickets had been issued to someone else. These persons were allowed into the stadium only after presenting valid identification; those without ID were not allowed inside.

This affected a number of fans who had bought their tickets at Internet auctions or from ticket touts.

A total of 587 ticket orders were rejected after would-be buyers' personal data were checked against records of national and international stadium bans. The RFID chips also provided added protection against forgery, and only 135 counterfeit tickets were found. Most of those found holding counterfeit tickets were British.

At each match, there were 200-500 cases of spectators inside the stadium trying to pass their cancelled tickets through the stadium fence so that additional fans without valid tickets could use them to enter the stadium; however, the electronic access control system prevented such attempts.

Even though, as planned, random checks of ticket-holders' identity only covered a small proportion of ticket-holders at the stadiums, simply publicizing and carrying out such checks had a deterrent effect and helped enhance security.

### Assessment

In retrospect, the complex ticketing procedure can be considered a success, despite the difficulties that arose. Even though it is in principle difficult to measure the preventive effect of security measures, the security gap associated with not personalizing tickets is unacceptable. The German side therefore recommends using the ticketing procedure described for similar events in future.

#### 3.2.3 Pitch invaders and fireworks

##### *Pitch invaders*

During the 2005 Confederations Cup in Germany, which was viewed as the dress rehearsal for the World Cup, there were a few incidents in which unauthorized persons went out on the football playing field, so-called pitch invaders.

As a result, the OC revised its security strategy with a view to the World Cup, in particular by significantly increasing the number of stewards in the stadiums.

The revised security strategy also allowed for erecting temporary barriers in certain cases. In Berlin, barely visible mobile barrier strips were set up to protect the pitch without preventing spectators from enjoying the match as more visible barriers would have done.

During the 2006 World Cup, a total of three persons invaded the pitch, one each during the matches between Brazil and Croatia in Berlin, Tunisia v. Saudi Arabia in Munich, and Switzerland v. Togo in Dortmund.

In every case the person was banned from all twelve World Cup stadiums for the remainder of the tournament; they were also fined.

Throughout the World Cup, security staff successfully prevented further persons from entering the pitch.

In the case of Cornelius Horan, the Irishman who disrupted a Formula 1 race at Silverstone in 2003 and the men's marathon at the Athens Olympics in 2004, the Berlin-Tiergarten local court issued an arrest warrant on 6 July 2006. Horan was arrested on 9 July and was thus prevented from carrying out his plan of disrupting the final World Cup match by displaying posters glorifying the Nazi regime.

### *Fireworks*

Another recurring phenomenon at regular league matches and international football tournaments is fans' illegal use of fireworks and pyrotechnical devices before, during and after matches. Out of a total of 131 stadium bans issued by the OC during the 2006 World Cup, eleven were for setting off fireworks.

According to FIFA, more than 800 pyrotechnical devices were confiscated inspections at stadium entrances over the course of the World Cup.

### Assessment

In May 2005, the Federal Ministry of the Interior again assessed its plans for inspections at stadium entrances and subsequently discussed further options for improvement with

the OC and the 2006 World Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK). And in spring 2006, the OC signed contracts with the private security firms responsible for carrying out the plans at each stadium and the licensed stadium area.

The contracts defined the required standards in binding form. The OC had also developed its own strategy for basic and advanced training, and had sent 14,000 staff of the private security firms to training courses given by a single private provider (DB AG) with the aim of achieving uniform standards of quality and security.

An average of 1,370 security personnel were on duty at each World Cup match (from a minimum of 900 to a maximum of 2,300). A total of 16,000 security staff from eleven different firms were under contract.

The main priority at the stadiums was the intensive access checks at the 200-350 checkpoints along the outer security perimeter. As was required by FIFA, it was possible in every case for the stadiums to be completely filled within 60 minutes without significant impact on the quality of security inspections.

In its overall assessment, the OC concluded that the private security firms were very well prepared for their duties and that their overall performance was more than satisfactory.

#### **4. Cooperation with fans and fan representatives**

##### **4.1 Basic strategy**

The fans were the most important partner for the organizer and host of the 2006 World Cup as well as the security authorities, as they created a positive atmosphere that made the tournament a happy and peaceful event. For this reason, the football fans and their representative organizations were intensively involved in the World Cup preparations from the very beginning. In the field of football-related threats, an ongoing dialogue between the security authorities and fans was intended to reduce support for football-related violence and to give football fans an active role in creating favourable conditions for the World Cup. To this end, measures used by professional fan coaching organizations at EURO 2004 in Portugal (including mobile and stationary fan embassies, international cooperation, fan guides, anti-racism projects and websites) were to be used also at the 2006 World Cup. The OC funded a fan and visitor coaching programme including the measures mentioned above and tasked the Fan Project Coordination Centre (KOS) with implementing it. The extensive network of fan projects in Germany,

which base their work on the national strategy for sport and security, and the football clubs' fan ambassadors constitute a professional foundation on which the many additional volunteer fan initiatives were able to build. In Germany, the KOS served as the point of contact for the security authorities with regard to strategic cooperation.

These initiatives had a widespread impact and significantly contributed to the success of the 2006 World Cup. Without them, the fantastic atmosphere during the tournament would have been missing and the World Cup would not have created such a positive impression of Germany around the world.

Fans of the participating teams were also an important factor in producing international harmony at this large-scale event. Many of them began preparing well in advance for their stay in Germany, creating original costumes, signs and the like. They were always active participants and thus welcomed wherever they went.

The security authorities regarded the fans as an important partner in their security efforts and intensified their dialogue with the fans. This philosophy of a security partnership was conveyed within the various fan groups by the fan coaching organizations involved in the official fan and visitor coaching programme, both national (KOS, local fan projects, football clubs' fan ambassadors) and international (Football Supporters International (FSI)). In this way, the security authorities were able to explain the planned measures to the fans and emphasize their intent to take a friendly and service-oriented approach and to respond flexibly as the situation required.

## **4.2 Individual measures**

In addition to this specific involvement of fan groups, improvements to the overall cooperation between fan coaching organizations and the security authorities was planned. For example, the Federal Ministry of the Interior initiated a meeting between the KOS and the staff of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner in October 2005 with the aim of presenting the German security measures to fan experts from Germany and abroad at joint events. This effort was based primarily on experience and recommendations from the UK Home Office.

At an international fan convention organized by the KOS in December 2005 and attended by members of fan coaching organizations from countries participating in the World Cup, representatives from the Office of the 2006 World Cup Security

Commissioner presented the security measures planned for the World Cup and their objective: only as much security as truly necessary. The fan representatives welcomed these signs of openness and unbiased attitudes towards working together. This dialogue between security authorities and fan coaching organizations was subsequently nurtured and expanded at the national and international level.

Shortly before the World Cup, the Federal Ministry of the Interior put on a host forum; participants included local fan representatives, representatives of the individual host cities and local representatives of the security authorities. The forum's aim was to create transparency in the interaction between security authorities, fans and city representatives and to improve coordination of measures planned by the participants. Two additional host forums had been planned but had to be cancelled due to lack of time before the event. When planning similar large-scale sporting events in future, organizers should consider holding forums of this kind at an early stage, as the additional benefit of doing so can be considerable.

At the international level, KOS met with representatives of the security authorities and fan organizations in Kiev, Ukraine; Warsaw, Poland; and London. A meeting at the Federal Ministry of the Interior with the responsible fan representatives of the Dutch football association KNVB was even initiated by the Dutch side. At this meeting, topics discussed included specific World Cup security issues, advice on strengthening fan coaching structures, and general security and safety issues at football matches and in stadiums.

### Assessment

Intensive dialogue and cooperation with fans at a number of national and international levels was a key element of the preventive security strategy and laid the groundwork for a peaceful and happy World Cup. Given the anticipated football-related threats and the World Cup motto, "A Time to Make Friends", it was important to ensure that the fans would accept the necessary security measures and would show understanding for the security efforts in general.

To this end, the police worked hard to convey the message that everyone needed to work together to achieve their common goal: a peaceful, happy and relaxed 2006 World Cup. The fans did their part in reaching this goal. Confrontations between police and fans were avoided, because fans regarded the security authorities as being there to help

rather than looking for trouble. German and foreign fans and media confirmed that the police performed their duties with tact and a high level of social awareness.

It was also very important to distinguish between fans and potentially violent troublemakers, and making it clear to the latter that they would not be regarded as fans.

Overall, the great majority of fans did not see themselves as the target of security measures or the reason for threat scenarios; instead, they found acceptance and recognition. This also helped keep peaceful fans separate from potential violence and reinforced the fans' own rejection of violent persons.

It also kept violent persons from gaining a forum which they could exploit for their own ends. On the contrary, anyone causing trouble would have likely faced disapproval from the majority of peaceful spectators. This was confirmed on the few occasions when violence did break out during the 2006 World Cup. It is worth noting that such violence did not occur while the matches were actually being played. The rioting ahead of the matches demonstrates that, during the matches themselves, violent troublemakers did not find conditions in the stadiums and at the public viewing areas conducive to their actions.

German and foreign fans and other World Cup visitors were aware of the security authorities' efforts at greater transparency and regarded the police as helpful and service-oriented. This created a positive atmosphere and attitude among fans. The security efforts took advantage of existing positive structures. It is evident that the basic idea of reinforcing positive structures and thus preventing threats before they have a chance to develop was more effective than taking repressive action.

## 5. Individual issues

### 5.1 Traffic management

Some additions were made to Germany's efficient traffic and transport infrastructure in order to ensure that the large numbers of visitors anticipated would have no trouble arriving and departing. A traffic information and routing system was also set up specifically for the World Cup, not least for security reasons.

The Standing Conference of Transport Ministers (VMK) of the states repeatedly addressed traffic and transport needs associated with the World Cup in the process of fulfilling the government guarantees. The VMK supported federal activities to enhance infrastructure and create standardized signage and a comprehensive traffic information system.

Over several years, more than €3.7 billion was invested as part of regularly scheduled maintenance and expansion of the federal trunk road network and on planned measures that were moved up because of the World Cup. All these measures were intended to improve the flow of traffic to the host cities and stadiums.

It was also important to make sure that there were no road works on federal trunk roads in the vicinity of the host cities during the World Cup. The Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development asked the states' top-level highway authorities to refrain from carrying out anything but brief construction work on all autobahns within a radius of 50 km of the World Cup host cities from 4 June to 16 July 2006.

Massive investment in the German rail network in recent years also significantly reduced travel times, for example:

<b>Route</b>	<b>Travel time</b>
Cologne - Frankfurt	70 minutes
Leipzig – Berlin	66 minutes
Munich - Nuremberg	78 minutes
Hanover - Berlin	96 minutes
Hamburg – Berlin	93 minutes

The central train stations in Leipzig, Nuremberg, Cologne, Hanover, Kaiserslautern and Gelsenkirchen were modernized, as was Berlin's Ostbahnhof. The north-south rail line went into operation at Berlin's new main train station, the largest rail hub in Europe, shortly before the World Cup.

State-of-the-art dynamic displays with traffic information (dWiSta) were installed at key junctions in the autobahn network. These continue to have a positive impact even after the World Cup. In addition, special colour-coded signs directed spectators to their seats in the stadium via the most appropriate route: Each World Cup stadium was divided into four sectors designated by different colours. Each ticket was marked with one of these colours, so that ticket-holders could easily see in which sector their seat was located. The same colour-coding was used to identify the appropriate routes for spectators travelling by public and private transport. This made it possible to offer separate routes for different groups of spectators. Stadium traffic moved more quickly and smoothly the earlier arriving and departing spectators were separated according to the colour of their tickets. The nation-wide standards and the traffic routing concepts were intended to help direct spectators to the different stadium sectors in an innovative way, reducing traffic congestion before and after matches. This was also important for security reasons, and was called for in the National Security Strategy.

For the first time at a sporting event of this kind, tickets to matches also entitled ticket-holders to use all means of public transport (combination ticket). Along with the investments in public transport, the combination ticket encouraged the large majority of spectators to travel to the stadiums on public transport. Most of the World Cup host cities far exceeded their goal of having at least half of the spectators use public transport. In Berlin, the proportion of spectators using public transport was 90% (including park and ride traffic). In Cologne, Hanover, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Nuremberg and Munich, the proportion was as much as 70%. Deutsche Bahn and the local public transport networks offered numerous special-event trains and buses. Despite heavy passenger demand, Deutsche Bahn, the local public transport networks and their staff provided exemplary service and did their best to make sure that travel was comfortable, fast and stress-free.

Those travelling to and from the many public viewing events almost exclusively used public transport. As a result, the percentage of persons using public transport in all World Cup host cities was nearly 90%.

## Assessment

The traffic management objectives for the 2006 World Cup were achieved in full:

- Visitors experienced a transport system that was in every way efficient, high-performance, innovative, environmentally friendly and able to cope with the great number of passengers.
- This also satisfied one of the basic requirements for a safe and successful tournament and ensured that visitors were able to enjoy their stay in Germany without worrying about transport.

The outstanding role of public transport should be stressed; the combination ticket led to greater use of public transport than expected. Local public transport networks made additional capacity available in all host cities, especially after the matches to move spectators quickly away from the stadiums. This was the only way to make sure that the stadiums were completely empty only an hour after the end of the match. All spectators from Germany and abroad thus had a comfortable, fast and environmentally friendly way of getting to the stadium or public viewing area.

Those travelling in private cars were directed by different routes to the various car parks; after the matches, traffic flowed as smoothly back to the autobahn junctions. There were only isolated cases of traffic jams immediately after matches at the stadium car park exits.

## **5.2 The National Information and Cooperation Centre (NICC)**

Major sporting events like the 2006 World Cup require special information systems. The information needs of policy-makers, national security authorities and security partners in Germany and abroad can be met only if there is a single, central body to collect, assess and direct all the relevant information to those who need it.

Based on Portugal's experience as host of EURO 2004 and the experience of Greece in hosting the 2004 Olympic Games, the National Information and Cooperation Centre (NICC) was set up within the Federal Ministry of the Interior and as part of the ministry's

Communications, Command and Control Centre. The NICC was in operation from 18 May until 10 July 2006. A test run was conducted for the 2005 Confederations Cup and demonstrated its ability to function.

The NICC was responsible for collecting, processing and transmitting all event-related information (not only with regard to security) to those who needed it in the form of a 2006 World Cup national situation report.

Representatives of the following 22 cooperating partners were on duty at the NICC:

- 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany
- Federal Chancellery (Federal Intelligence Service (BND))
- Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS)
- Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF/Customs)
- Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg)
- Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV)
- Federal Ministry of Health (BMG)
- Federal Police Directorate-General, Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI)
- Directorate-General for Police Affairs and Counter-Terrorism (BMI)
- Directorate-General for Internal Security (BMI)
- Office of the 2006 World Cup Security Commissioner
- Press Office (BMI)
- Central Sports Intelligence Unit (ZIS)
- Federal Ministry of Justice (BMJ)
- Eurojust
- Europol
- Interpol
- Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)
- Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)
- Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)
- The Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBK)
- Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)

## Assessment

The idea of a national centre was based on the Federal Government's goal of being able to respond in detail and at all times to security issues, as promised in the security guarantee made to FIFA and as part of making information available to the necessary parties at national and international level. The NICC achieved this goal during the 2006 World Cup. Because the World Cup went off without major disruptions, however, the NICC was unable to fully test the limits of its stability and performance.

There was some criticism that participation in the NICC demanded significant personnel resources of the cooperating partners. Some agencies noted that information in the NICC's 2006 World Cup National Situation Report had already been provided in other situation reports from central police agencies.

The situation reports attained the appropriate level of abstraction for its target international audience, for the BMI executive and for coordination within the Press Office. The 2006 World Cup was the first large-scale event for which it was possible to collect all information at federal level. As a result, the NICC can be regarded as having satisfied the basic expectations.

### **5.3 Assistance from the Bundeswehr and NATO**

The Federal Ministry of Defence contributed personnel and funding resources to the National Security Strategy. Its contribution was based on the measures called for under the terms of technical administrative assistance.

Federal and state agencies submitted more than 100 applications for assistance. Most of these applications were for assistance from the medical corps. Other applications were mainly requests for accommodation and meals for federal and state police officers, and advice and technical support from NBC defence experts and staff.

The Federal Minister of Defence approved all requests for technical administrative assistance on condition of reimbursement for the resulting expenses, and ordered planning and implementation in cooperation with those requesting assistance.

About 1,700 troops from more than 50 bases were actively involved; another 5,300 troops and civil staff were on call in case of major emergencies during the World Cup.

This reserve personnel did not have to be called up due to the lack of major disruptions during the World Cup.

In principle, all Bundeswehr troops not assigned to duty abroad were available to provide the planned assistance.

Further, a high-performance command and control organization was on call 24 hours a day at every level of command and would have been able to respond quickly and in consultation with the states, even in difficult or unpredictable situations. Bundeswehr liaisons were set up at the match venues, with the NICC, the Federal Police and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). An additional liaison with the joint federal/state communications and situation centre (GMLZ) was in place and on call at all times.

The preparations by the German Luftwaffe to secure airspace in coordination with the other ministries involved in the National Security Strategy also went according to plan. To this end, the Federal Minister of the Interior had requested approval to deploy AWACS aircraft for the World Cup. The deployment of AWACS aircraft and of Luftwaffe air defence forces amply satisfied the BMI's request for assistance with aviation security during specific periods of heightened threat.

### Assessment

Logistical support provided by the Bundeswehr for the 2006 World Cup went largely unnoticed by the general public, but it represented a key prerequisite for the tournament's success. The Bundeswehr provided accommodations for 3,900 federal and state police officers at 40 Bundeswehr facilities and produced approx. 75,000 meals.

Important elements of assistance included in particular an emergency care centre in Kaiserslautern with emergency surgery facilities, and two transport helicopters on reserve in Laupheim and Bückeberg, which had sufficient range to cover all of Germany. The Bundeswehr would have been able to play a significant role in dealing with a large-scale emergency, due to the specially trained staff at its disposal.

Designating restricted airspace and deploying NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft over the host cities also had a deterrent effect that was confirmed by the relatively small number of airspace violations by aircraft of all types.

#### **5.4 Press and Public Relations**

The Conference of Interior Ministers (IMK) committee on internal security (AK II) tasked the Federal Government and Länder Committee on the 2006 FIFA World Cup (BLA) with managing and coordinating media and public information related to security policy. The aim was to agree on specific procedures in order to ensure that, in the event of incidents with nation-wide or international significance, the various parties concerned would coordinate their contacts with the national and international media.

Already during the years of preparing for the World Cup, it was obvious that those responsible for overall and security policy found media communication about the World Cup, with its positive associations, very attractive. Because of Germany's federal structures, in particular with regard to security tasks, the following practice was quickly established and largely adhered to until the World Cup was over: Federal, state and local officials each responded to the enquiries related to their own areas of responsibility. At federal level, officials worked closely with the OC to determine whether particular security issues were of a private nature or whether they fell under the government's security guarantees, and thus whether the OC or the press office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior should handle the relevant enquiries.

In spring 2006, the BMI Press Office developed a broad strategy to be applied during the World Cup, based on the following principles:

1. Communication with the media to continue to be handled by the relevant areas of responsibility
2. Creation of a communication network of official spokespersons at federal and state level
3. Daily conference calls during the 2006 World Cup
4. Bilateral problems to be dealt with bilaterally.

In view of the high media profile and the need for coordinated media relations, especially in case of crisis, the federal security authorities found this overall strategy very useful. Implementation proved difficult, however, as some representatives of the state interior ministries feared that the security specialists would not be sufficiently integrated into the coordination of media relations. The BMI strategy was subsequently modified in that telephone conference calls were to be held only as events required. In a test run, all participants were successfully connected via conference call. Fortunately, there were no crises during the World Cup requiring telephone conferences on a large scale beyond this purely technical test run.

### Assessment

The lack of a detailed, overall strategy for the BLA to manage and coordinate media and public relations was criticized, as was the occasional lack of internal coordination. It should be noted, however, that all those concerned within the BLA were aware of the expectations set by the IMK and were therefore willing to contribute to their practical implementation. There was apparently no real interest in managing media and public relations, as the federal, state and local areas of responsibility were regarded as being too diverse to fit within a uniform media strategy. It was assumed that, in case of a security-related incident during the World Cup, the Federal Ministry of the Interior would anyway have acted as spokesperson, even at an early phase of an unfolding emergency or crisis, as the national and international media would have contacted the federal ministry responsible for coordinating the Federal Government's World Cup contributions.

## **VI. International cooperation during the 2006 FIFA World Cup**

### **1. Forms and assessment of cooperation with the international partner states**

#### **1.1 Personnel support**

On the basis of the EU handbook, national law and the Joint Declarations on Co-operation in Security-Related Matters on the Occasion of the 2006 Football World Cup, foreign police officers assisted the federal and state police in their work. The BKA, ZIS and the Federal Police requested the partner countries for assistance; they responded by sending individual liaison officers and/or police delegations made up, for example, of liaison officers, delegation leaders, operations coordinators, spokespersons, police spotters and uniformed officers. Foreign uniformed officers also assisted the Federal Police with their responsibilities. Some German states sent separate requests for assistance from foreign officers. In total, 590 foreign police officers were on duty in Germany during the 2006 World Cup.

Foreign police officers on duty during the 2006 World Cup

	ZIS			Total	BKA	Federal Police			Total
	LO	Delegations (e.g. spotters, spokespersons)	of which uniformed		LO	LO	Uniformed police & pickpocket investigators	Other	
<b>Europe</b>									
UK	2	22	4	24	1	1	46		72
France	1	13	0	14	1	1	43	8	67
Italy	1	11	2	12	1	1	20		34
Croatia	1	6	0	7	1	0	0		8
Netherlands	2	16	4	18	1	1	44	4	68
Poland	1	11	2	12	1	1	52	10	76
Portugal	1	6	2	7	1	1	11		20
Sweden	1	8	2	9	1	0	10		20
Switzerland	2	11	2	13	1	1	22	11	48
Serbia and Montenegro	1	6	0	7	1	0	0		8
Spain	1	6	2	7	1	1	11		20
Czech Republic	1	10	2	11	1	1	22		35
Ukraine	1	3	0	4	1	1	0		6
<b>Africa</b>									
Angola	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		2
Ivory Coast	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		2
Ghana	1	0	0	1	1	1	0		3
Togo	1	0	0	1	0	0	0		1
Tunisia	1	3	0	4	1	1	0		6
<b>Asia</b>									
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
Japan	1	9	0	10	1	0	0		11
South Korea	1	6	2	7	1	0	0		8
Saudi Arabia	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		2
<b>North and Central America</b>									
Costa Rica	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		2
Mexico	1	5	0	6	1	0	0		7
Trinidad & Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0
USA	1	5	0	6	1	1	0		8
<b>South America</b>									
Argentina	1	7	0	8	1	1	0		10
Brazil	1	7	0	8	1	0	0		9
Ecuador	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		2
Paraguay	1	0	0	1	1	0	0		2
<b>Oceania</b>									
Australia	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		1
<b>Neighbouring and transit states</b>									

Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	6
Austria	1	0	0	1	0	2	23	26
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>590</b>

The assistance provided by the foreign officers was very valuable in all areas.

The police delegations sent to ZIS and the liaison officers provided to the BKA and Federal Police supported the work of the German officers through good and effective information-sharing. The police spotters in particular were extremely helpful in identifying potential threats in the crowds of German and foreign fans, and their efforts were highly effective in preventing disturbances by violent football fans.

This was the first time in Europe that such a large number of police officers had been granted police powers in a country other than their own. The uniformed officers assigned to the Federal Police area of responsibility accompanied their German counterparts in identifying and warning troublemakers, conducting searches of persons and property, removing troublemakers from certain areas, questioning witnesses and suspects and taking persons into custody. Joint operations by German and foreign officers to catch and investigate pickpockets were also effective, leading to the arrest of 103 suspects in 461 reported thefts by pickpockets.

Some German officers were also sent abroad: 14 regular and five additional Federal Police document advisers and 18 officers to assist with border policing at foreign airports and land borders. The document advisers rejected approximately 2,000 visa applications made to German embassies, most of them on suspicion of fraud. Two Federal Police liaison officers helped out at the British Football Policing Unit, and four other officers were assigned to joint operations in checking departing passengers at UK air- and seaports.

National and international partners alike regarded the joint operations by German and foreign police officers as a key aspect of implementing the strategies for international cooperation on security issues.

In the German view, the deployment of foreign liaison officers at the central units was an unqualified success and added value as had been hoped. Information-sharing with partner agencies abroad functioned efficiently. This was especially important with regard to the neighbouring states, as it allowed border and rail policing measures in Germany, the neighbouring states and the border areas during travel to and from the World Cup to be directly coordinated via the liaison officers. The deployment of police delegations and

the uniformed police assigned to the Federal Police area of responsibility was also very successful.

The international partners praised the outstanding practical implementation of this cooperation on the ground and stressed its exceptional effectiveness. They also noted that granting foreign uniformed officers certain specific executive powers was important for crime prevention.

For foreign visitors, an especially positive aspect was the presence of police officers from their own countries. The presence of police spotters sent an early signal to potentially violent fans that they had been identified and were under surveillance. The participation of foreign police officers also significantly raised acceptance levels for police measures and had a highly preventive effect. Foreign visitors easily recognized the uniformed police officers from their home countries and readily turned to them for information, using their native language.

Overall, police cooperation at the international level found a high level of acceptance among all concerned, World Cup visitors and the media, and significantly contributed to the safe, peaceful and happy atmosphere during the tournament.

## **1.2 Information-sharing**

Another priority of international cooperation was information-sharing among the responsible security authorities on the various fields of action. Here, football-related threats such as hooliganism, similar types of group violence, general spectator behaviour and travel routes, means and destinations were of particular importance. A number of countries did not sign a Joint Declaration on Co-operation in Security-Related Matters on the Occasion of the 2006 Football World Cup until spring 2006. As a result, some countries did not submit an initial situation report on football-related threats until after signing the joint declaration, rather than six months ahead of the World Cup, as originally agreed. And some countries did not submit any relevant information until just before the World Cup, via their liaison officers at the central units. But this did not result in any serious information gaps for the German security authorities. All available information was used as the basis for risk analyses and situation reports which were regularly updated; contributions from the liaison officers enhanced the quality of these products.

Sharing personal data was of major importance: Two neighbouring countries and seven participating countries transmitted a total of 8,998 personal data records that were temporarily added to the hooligan data file, allowing early recognition of potentially violent troublemakers. These data have since been removed from the German systems.

According to reports from all the World Cup central units, international information-sharing in their various areas of responsibility proved to be an important component of prevention efforts. The fundamental decision to use existing information channels and structures rather than creating new ones proved without exception to have been correct.

Overall, the partner countries also assessed information-sharing with the German security authorities as excellent, efficient and professional. Only the following points were singled out for criticism:

- There was uncertainty regarding proper channels of information regarding areas of overlapping responsibility between ZIS and the Federal Police.
- ZIS data sometimes differed from those of local police authorities.
- One partner country complained that its liaison officers were unable to produce situation reports for its own use, limiting the information available to the authorities in that country. This country stated that no real exchange of information was possible in this way.

### **1.3 Measures to prevent persons entering or leaving the country; monitoring persons in transit**

Before the World Cup, measures to prevent persons from travelling out of their home country if they posed a threat to public security and order, and to prevent such persons from entering Germany were seen as an important element of preventive security preparations, and they proved highly effective in practice. This was especially true in the case of countries such as the UK, which have the option of confiscating passports of persons who have been issued a stadium ban, thus preventing them leaving the country. This measure kept more than 3,200 British hooligans from leaving the UK.

The temporary reinstatement of checks at the Schengen internal borders for the World Cup kept another 370 persons (violent fans in particular), including 270 EU citizens with

the right to freedom of movement, out of Germany. The following measures were carried out as part of checks at the Schengen internal borders:

- 436,500 persons were checked
- 102,500 vehicles were inspected
- 900 checks were carried out on trains
- 3,000 Schengen flights were checked
- 96 persons were arrested
- 615 narcotics-related offences were prosecuted
- alerts were issued to establish the location of 70 persons

The measures carried out in the field for the 2006 World Cup completely fulfilled the desired purpose of filtering out potential threats.

#### **1.4 Judicial cooperation**

On the basis of the joint declaration, the UK sent a seven-person prosecutor liaison team (four public prosecutors, three police officers), and Sweden sent two public prosecutor liaisons to Germany for the 2006 World Cup.

In its assessment, the British Crown Prosecution Service described this cooperation as very successful. And the Swedish view was that public prosecutor liaisons should in future perform a necessary role complementary to that of police cooperation.

The team sent by the Crown Prosecution Service had a two-fold function: First, it assisted the responsible German prosecutors in the host cities where the England national team played (Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Cologne, Stuttgart, Gelsenkirchen) by means of information-sharing without exercising executive powers. Second, German police officers, public prosecutors and courts provided the British team with information and files on UK nationals arrested in Germany, allowing the British team to quickly determine whether the persons concerned should be issued a stadium ban in the UK.

A total of 25 British nationals were arrested for football-related offences ("football-related disorder"). The following example illustrates the positive effects of the excellent cooperation between the British prosecution team and the German authorities: A British national arrested in Frankfurt on 10 June returned to the UK on 12 June. On the basis of the extensive material collected by the prosecutor liaison team, he had to go before a magistrate, and on 13 June he was given a 25-month stadium ban. This in turn gave the

police the power to confiscate his passport, prevented him returning to Germany for England's next World Cup match, and will also prevent him leaving the country for EURO 2008 in Austria and Switzerland.

Another 559 persons were taken into preventive custody. Evidence gathered by German and UK police officers in this context is currently being assessed by the UK football policing unit and the Crown Prosecution Service to see whether there are grounds for issuing stadium bans.

The German judicial authorities remained critical of the usefulness of foreign public prosecutor liaisons throughout. By contrast, the partner countries involved regarded the international cooperation ahead of the World Cup as necessary and in retrospect as very positive and successful. According to these partner countries, the speed and high quality of information-sharing as part of mutual legal assistance set new standards which in some cases could have a far-reaching preventive impact in the field of security and might be applied also in other areas of judicial cooperation. This form of cooperation, which was new for Germany, also benefited from good public relations and was positively portrayed in the media, leading to a favourable public image.

The British Crown Prosecution Service plans to establish a training programme based on the experience gained in Germany and share these insights with others working in this field. It also plans to send prosecutor liaisons to the EURO 2008 host countries Austria and Switzerland should one of the UK's national teams qualify for the tournament.

## **2. Cooperation with international organizations**

### **2.1 Fields of activity**

For the 2006 World Cup, Interpol made its world-wide information network available to the BKA as National Central Bureau. Interpol's Command and Coordination Centre (CCC) links the Interpol General Secretariat, National Central Bureaus in all 186 member countries and regional offices. It operates round the clock in all of Interpol's four official languages and helps with the processing of police intelligence for law enforcement operations. Interpol provided the German security authorities with information and threat assessments in the following areas: terrorism, violent demonstrations, money laundering and other forms of organized crime. Interpol liaison

officers were also integrated as required by events into the organizational structures of the NICC and the BKA in Berlin and Meckenheim.

Similarly, Europol sent a liaison officer to the NICC in Berlin and to the BKA in Meckenheim for the 2006 World Cup. In this way it was able to contribute additional intelligence through direct and immediate information-sharing with the central units.

The European judicial authority Eurojust coordinates the work of the national judicial authorities with regard to cross-border organized crime and facilitates information-sharing between the national judicial and police authorities. It was also represented at the NICC and included in the flow of information at the interface between the national and international levels. During the preparatory phase and the tournament itself, the Eurojust representative maintained close contact with the foreign public prosecutor liaisons and public prosecutors abroad that already had extensive experience with the issue of hooliganism.

## **2.2 Assessment of cooperation**

All the international organizations involved praised the open sharing of information with the German security authorities before, during and after the World Cup. They said that the experience once again showed how important it was to use the existing global information systems at international level. In their view, there was no need to duplicate, modify or replace the existing structures.

They regarded the cooperation overall as effective and good, and the deployment of liaison officers proved very valuable. In their assessment, the overall very positive experience attested to the applicability of tried and tested forms of cooperation for major international events also in future.

## **VII. Summary of the main findings**

- The necessary structural and strategic groundwork for successful implementation of the government guarantees on security was laid jointly by all security partners already during the preparation phase.
- The Federal Government and Länder Committee on the 2006 FIFA World Cup (BLA), as the central coordinating body tasked by the Standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder (IMK), had a special role in drafting and updating the National Security Strategy for the 2006 World Cup and in coordinating international cooperation with the participating, neighbouring and transit states. Representatives of the federal and state security authorities, of the organizer and host and additional security partners were all represented on this committee.
- As a modifiable framework filled out in greater detail by numerous sub-strategies, the National Security Strategy proved highly effective during the 2006 World Cup. It covered all the relevant fields of action; even in retrospect, no areas were overlooked.
- The 2005 Confederations Cup served as a key deadline for the strategic preparations and as a practical rehearsal for important parts of the National Security Strategy ahead of the World Cup. When planning security for similar major events, the opportunity to carry out a test on the largest possible scale is highly desirable.
- In addition to existing structures and forms of international cooperation, the joint declarations on event-related international cooperation with partner countries which were used for the first time in this way provided an important foundation and further enhanced the international security preparations for the 2006 World Cup.
- The additional preventive police measures in the field of football-specific violence which were agreed by the IMK in 2005 contributed significantly to keeping the number of violent incidents during the 2006 World Cup at a low level.
- Around the world, the public's image of the 2006 World Cup was largely determined by the nearly 2,000 public viewing events during the tournament. Visitors felt comfortable and safe, and there were no major disturbances in connection with

public viewing. The security standards developed by the 2006 World Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK), adopted by the IMK and consistently implemented in the form of legal requirements for event organizers were a key to the success of public viewing events.

- Efforts in the field of politically motivated crime depended above all on the constant availability of current threat assessments provided by participating national and international agencies under BKA supervision which made it possible to take appropriate security measures.
- The field of non-police threat prevention was comprehensively prepared and tested in a variety of exercises in every World Cup host city. Fortunately there were no major emergencies or large-scale disasters during the 2006 World Cup. The participating authorities performed impressively in dealing with typical event-related incidents.
- The close and trusting cooperation with the private organizer, the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany (OC), was important to ensure that the event remained peaceful and safe. Experience gained with regard to “partnership on security” should be applied in other suitable fields of action.
- In retrospect, credentialing and ticketing procedures also proved to be important and effective components within the National Security Strategy.
- Ongoing cooperation with fan coaching and fan representative organizations in Germany and abroad from the earliest planning phase resulted in greater understanding for and acceptance of security measures. In this way, it was possible to carry out in a variety of ways the shared aim of the security efforts: bringing to life the World Cup motto, “A Time to Make Friends”.
- On behalf of the security authorities, the police made a decisive contribution to the overall positive atmosphere. Serving the public remained a priority, and the comprehensive security measures were appropriate and not perceived as bothersome.

- Germany's traffic management planning for the 2006 World Cup also had a strong security dimension: Visitors were able to travel to and from the stadiums and public viewing events quickly and safely. This stress-free mobility contributed significantly to the overall atmosphere.
- The NICC, set up in conjunction with 22 cooperating partners, successfully performed its tasks of gathering, compiling and channelling information. This ensured that the Federal Government was able to respond to security issues at all times, as promised in its security guarantee.
- The logistical and technical support provided by NATO and the Bundeswehr greatly helped the World Cup take place without major disruption; the need for such support is evidenced by the more than 100 requests for technical assistance.
- The many different forms of international cooperation during the 2006 World Cup not only correspond to the global significance of this sporting event; they also demonstrate that, despite the host country's clear responsibility for security, preparing and carrying out security measures for an event of this kind must be coordinated internationally and jointly undertaken in order to be truly successful. Extensive personnel support and comprehensive, rapid information-sharing were priorities of the classic forms of cooperation during the 2006 World Cup. Innovative elements were granting executive powers to foreign police officers serving with the Federal Police and deploying foreign public prosecutor liaisons from two countries participating in the World Cup. The resulting experience suggests that these forms of cooperation could be intensified for similar large-scale events or could even become part of regular international security cooperation.

## **VIII. Conclusions**

### **1. Conclusions for future major sporting events/large-scale events**

#### **1.1 Support from policy-makers**

Major international events like the FIFA World Cup require early and concentrated support from policy-makers for security preparations. In Germany, political decision-makers early on declared the 2006 World Cup to be a national effort, thus producing consensus throughout the federal system on the outstanding importance of this major sporting event for the entire country and on expectations of the government agencies responsible for security.

#### **1.2 Cooperation between the organizer, host and the security authorities**

Preparing and carrying out event-related security measures for major international events is not the exclusive responsibility of the security authorities. Because the security tasks to be carried out by the government and those to be carried out by the organizer intersect in so many places, close cooperation on the basis of mutual trust is essential for a major event to take place peacefully and trouble-free. To this end, quality standards for security for the event as a whole need to be agreed on and individual issues need to be clarified at an early stage, in order to avoid having to revise the security strategy later on, possibly to the detriment of the overall strategy. Constant and direct discussion of security issues and to joint committee work during the entire preparatory phase generated the necessary understanding among all participants to take a common approach. It also helped the organizer and the security authorities to coordinate their positions with regard to media coverage of individual problems. Different attitudes on details were discussed in committee and the consensus achieved was subsequently supported by all.

### **1.3 Dialogue between the security authorities and the participants before and during the tournament**

The successful dialogue on security and transparency of the necessary security measures between the security authorities and those affected was a basic prerequisite for the happy and relaxed atmosphere during the tournament, which also had a highly preventive effect. For future major sporting events, this means that the security authorities should make clear that their efforts are event-related and not just for the sake of security itself. In particular, the service role of the police should be emphasized, in order to convey to all visitors the positive orientation of police operations. The police see their role above all as being friendly, knowledgeable and ready to aid all guests.

Operational strategy must be flexible enough so that officers can keep a low profile wherever possible but are present and able to take firm action wherever necessary. Each police officer must demonstrate a high degree of social sensitivity. Targeted training can help prepare officers to deal with event visitors, which in turn increases visitors' acceptance of security measures. Before and during the World Cup, this resulted in a high level of approval among German and foreign visitors, which also effectively prevented aggression from building up.

### **1.4 Early cooperation between government agencies and organizations in areas where responsibilities intersected**

The various strategies made up a complex structure: The National Security Strategy provided the overarching framework for the different sub-strategies, such as the Framework Strategy for Policing during the 2006 World Cup drafted by the 2006 World Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK), the security strategy of the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany and a number of others. The only way to make sure these varied strategies were coordinated and oriented on a common goal was by including all those involved in the preparations from an early stage and constantly working together in joint committees. Areas of intersection were rapidly identified and possible problems arising from them were dealt with and solved already as the strategies were being drafted.

The Federal Government and Länder Committee on the 2006 FIFA World Cup set up by the IMK played a decisive role in achieving a common understanding of the tasks and

objectives among all public and private security partners. For similar major events in future, a similar committee should be formed and start working on the project well ahead of the event.

### **1.5 The preventive aspect of public viewing**

There were more public viewing venues in Germany during the 2006 World Cup than for any previous event, and public viewing had an outstanding significance for security during the tournament. Not only did public viewing take some of the burden off the police and stewards in and around the stadiums, it was also a key factor in the successful interaction of security and the spirit of the World Cup motto, “A Time to Make Friends”.

Here, the consistently applied security standards played a significant role by ensuring that those at public viewing venues enjoyed the highest level of protection possible and that the venues did not pose a threat to public security and order.

For this reason, public viewing during major international events should also be regarded and implemented as a preventive security measure.

### **1.6 International cooperation as a key component of security architecture**

Effective preparation and implementation of security measures for major international events requires comprehensive and ongoing international cooperation. As well as countries participating in the event, neighbouring and transit countries should also be included.

As far as possible and appropriate to the specific demands of the event, existing structures and forms of cooperation can and should be used for this purpose. However, the problem of different legal possibilities based on the relevant national law often arises, making further harmonization essential in order to achieve uniform security standards. As in the case of the joint declarations for the 2006 World Cup, it may be necessary to develop and put into practice new forms of cooperation related to specific events.

Early and regular information-sharing is especially important for the operational implementation of international cooperation, as is personnel support. Taking advantage of others' information, skills and know-how adds value to one's own security planning. Doing so can also increase acceptance for security measures, particularly on the part of

international visitors. International cooperation should be strengthened not only to fight internationally active criminals; it also promotes international understanding at international sporting events.

## **2. Conclusions for inter-agency cooperation in major emergencies and in routine tasks, where applicable**

### **2.1 Setting objectives and drawing up guidelines are prerequisites for a common approach**

The security authorities in Germany began working in inter-agency and inter-organizational committees and project groups to draw up objectives for preparing and implementing security measures for the 2006 World Cup well in advance. Objectives describing the quantity and quality of security to be attained and the extent of security measures must be formulated at an early stage in order to develop coordinated framework strategies and sub-strategies. Further, guidelines for operations were drafted at federal level in the National Security Strategy and at the strategic operational level in the Framework Strategy for Policing during the 2006 World Cup, developed by the 2006 World Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK). These guidelines provided orientation for all security partners and made it possible to set priorities for conducting operations. Policy committees and event-related project groups are especially useful for the process of setting objectives and drafting guidelines, in order to achieve consensus and acceptance of a common approach.

### **2.2 Event-related international cooperation should be taken advantage of for routine international cooperation**

During the 2006 World Cup, joint event-related security measures with international partners were more comprehensive and intensive than for any similar event in the past. In addition to extensive information-sharing and to consulting by liaison officers from participating and relevant neighbouring and transit countries, more than 300 uniformed police officers from certain partner countries even exercised executive powers on German soil. This highly effective form of cooperation should serve as a model not only for similar sporting events in future, but also for routine operations. All visitors to

Germany for the World Cup stressed that the deployment of uniformed police officers from other countries was a very positive element. In terms of policing, this deployment had a highly preventive effect. It is worth examining whether such cooperation could be extended to routine patrol and surveillance activities along the borders or in joint operations for football matches with an international dimension.

### **2.3 Creating possibilities for standardized data sharing at international level**

Sharing information, especially personal data, proved extremely important for threat prevention during the 2006 World Cup. The exchange of personal data in particular is subject to a variety of different data protection regulations in the participating countries and relevant neighbouring and transit countries. As a result, the possibilities for transmitting personal data to Germany varied greatly between the different countries. In some cases, liaison officers were able to make up for Germany's lack of direct access to data. In order to simplify and streamline the sharing of personal data in particular, data protection laws should be harmonized in order to create similar possibilities for data exchange in the various countries. Those responsible for security in the host country and the participating partner countries could greatly benefit from such possibilities, especially when preparing for major international events.

### **2.4 Bringing special databases up to a common standard**

International cooperation also showed that databases which provide an important foundation for security efforts, such as the hooligan data file operated by the security authorities and the DFB's database of persons issued stadium bans, have not been set up in certain countries or do not conform to the same standards. These databases should be further developed on the basis of experience gathered during the 2006 World Cup. From an expert viewpoint, participating countries should have access to data files that are internationally coordinated and conform to common standards.

### **2.5 Using the World Cup as an engine for committee work at EU/Council of Europe level**

There are various handbooks and recommendations for EU and Council of Europe member states on preventing terrorist threats and football-related threats in association with major sporting events of international significance. These provisions and recommendations focus in particular on information-sharing, creation of databases and international cooperation. There is still room for improvement with regard to standardized joint databases and the use of common procedures. During the German EU presidency and through its representation in the Council of Europe, Germany can report on its experience as host of the 2006 World Cup and push for progress in the above-mentioned fields.

## **2.6 Good cooperation with fans: Applying this experience to regular league play**

During the 2006 World Cup, federal and state police operations were marked by friendliness and courtesy towards all World Cup visitors. Fans at all levels noted this with approval and agreed that officers had behaved in a sensitive, friendly and appropriate manner at all times. Fans said they hoped that police would continue to display this type of behaviour at regular league matches. Whether the same police tactics that were used during the World Cup can be successfully applied to league matches must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Due to differences in their overall structure and nature, the experience of the 2006 World Cup does not appear transferable in every case to regular league play. Nonetheless, the de-escalation strategy used by the police during the 2006 World Cup should continue to be used for regular operations, dialogue with the Fan Project Coordination Centre (KOS), fan projects and fans in general should be further strengthened, and security measures should remain transparent.

## **3. Conclusions for project management**

### **3.1 Setting up project groups/offices at an early stage**

A complex task such as planning security for the 2006 World Cup requires extensive strategic preparation. Setting up event-related project groups and project offices has proved effective. Further, the federal security commissioner, the chair of the 2006 World

Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK) and the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany (OC) all agreed that it is absolutely necessary. This is the only way to make sure that all the security partners' coordination responsibilities are addressed at the same time and that information to this effect is centrally available.

Personnel and other resources devoted to these special structures must be commensurate to the event and its importance, and must be available from the start of the project. Having these project groups report directly to the highest executive level proved essential, as it is the only way to ensure that the top level is kept informed and that measures are implemented rapidly by the security partners.

### **3.2 The “learning project” as a prerequisite for success**

Experience gained from project efforts needs to be “invested” in subsequent stages of the project. The 2005 Confederations Cup in particular offered a good opportunity to test the feasibility of the security strategies, gain important experience and make the necessary modifications for the 2006 World Cup.

It is therefore important for the project management of similar major events to test theoretical strategies under conditions as close to reality as possible. Such tests may be smaller, specialized events at the same location. Another possibility is to consider testing the individual modules in the context of routine organization and processes or during exercises.

### **3.3 Clear delineation of tasks, responsibilities and priorities**

For effective project management, tasks, responsibilities and priorities must be clearly defined. In this way, the efforts of the Federal Government and Länder Committee on the 2006 FIFA World Cup (BLA) profited from the description of tasks drafted by the IMK and the subsequent revisions.

A clear delineation of responsibilities is especially helpful and necessary when the tasks of various security partners overlap. With regard to the security measures for the 2006 World Cup, this was demonstrated particularly in the area of police central units and the relationship of the BLA to the 2006 World Cup Project Group (PG UA FEK), which coordinated efforts at the state level. During the 2005 Confederations Cup, there were still differences of opinion over the national and international tasks as well as the

evaluation of security measures with regard to the World Cup preparations. These difficulties were avoided completely during the 2006 World Cup and the follow-up assessment of event-related security measures.

Priorities must be absolutely clear in order for the special and regular organizational units to work effectively, i.e. low priority tasks may have to be given up or performed with the least amount of effort possible. This may be required when management personnel are concentrated on this central management task. To support management, however, it is also important and helpful for the special structures (BAO) to be relieved of the duties of the regular structures (AAO).