Case law database
Welcome to the new case law research platform of the Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE). This platform is an advanced research tool offering targeted access to the ATCE’s decisions. It complements existing information tools, in particular the web-based search interface (“Search”).
The platform is administered by the registry of the Tribunal, in co-operation with the Directorate of information technology. It currently comprises all decisions on appeals delivered by the former Appeals Board, as well as decisions of the ATCE from case n° 408/2008 to the present.
This new tool allows users to explore the case law through predefined themes and relevant keywords. The themes reflect the main subject of the appeal, as described in the appellant’s submissions, while the keywords highlight the key elements of the legal reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in its decision. To facilitate keyword-based navigation, the keywords are grouped into keyword families, representing different conceptual domains.
Further information on how to use the platform’s features is available via the information bubbles displayed next to each feature.
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 75: “[T]here is case law reflecting the emergence of [a general principle of international law imposing upon an Organisation the duty to endeavour reassignment in case of the abolition of a post] with a tendency to extend the duty to seek alternative employment irrespective of the grade or contractual status of staff members affected by termination of employment (ILOAT, judgment No. 4097 of 6 February 2019, N. (No. 2) v. WHO, consideration 10; ILOAT, judgment No. 4935, cited above, consideration 21). However, this case law does not impose upon the Organisation a duty which would apply in all circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that the existence of such a principle is established, the Tribunal considers that in any event, in certain situations, there are exceptions to such a principle."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Job suppression
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 75: “[T]here is case law reflecting the emergence of [a general principle of international law imposing upon an Organisation the duty to endeavour reassignment in case of the abolition of a post] with a tendency to extend the duty to seek alternative employment irrespective of the grade or contractual status of staff members affected by termination of employment (ILOAT, judgment No. 4097 of 6 February 2019, N. (No. 2) v. WHO, consideration 10; ILOAT, judgment No. 4935, cited above, consideration 21). However, this case law does not impose upon the Organisation a duty which would apply in all circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that the existence of such a principle is established, the Tribunal considers that in any event, in certain situations, there are exceptions to such a principle."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
General principles of law
Duty of care
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 54: “It is well established that, while the decision to abolish a post, including in the context of a restructuring, falls within the Organisation’s discretionary authority, such a decision must nevertheless « be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority” (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT), judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Misuse or abuse of authority
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 54 and 59: “It is well established that, while the decision to abolish a post, including in the context of a restructuring, falls within the Organisation’s discretionary authority, such a decision must nevertheless « be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority” (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT), judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4).
(...)
[T]he Tribunal considers that the reform appears to have been motivated by objective considerations, not contested as such by the appellant, that were aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and impact of the Organisation’s activities, rather than by the intention to remove the appellant. Accordingly, even assuming that the termination of the appellant’s job was a welcome side effect of the reform, it cannot be concluded that this was either the sole or the principal purpose of the restructuring. The replacement of the appellant’s directorate by a department rendered the job of director redundant, and in such circumstances the abolition of the appellant’s job cannot be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable. In any event, where there are more reasons than one for the abolition of a post and one of them is improper, provided the other reason is a lawful one, the abolition of the post cannot be questioned on the grounds of abuse of power (ILOAT, judgment No. 346 of 8 May 1978, in re Savioli, consideration 2)."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 63 and 64: “The (...) duty of care implies that when the Administration takes a decision concerning the situation of a staff member, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision, and when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the staff member concerned (EU Civil Service Tribunal, judgment of 18 May 2015, Hartwig Bischoff v European Commission, F-36/14). Moreover, the duty of care demands that international organisations treat their staff with due consideration in order to avoid causing them undue injury; an employer must consequently inform officials in advance of any action that may imperil their rights or harm their rightful interests (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 587 and 588/2018, Jannick Devaux (II) and (III) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 9 October 2018, § 108 and cited case law).
(...)
In the particular case of a restructuring exercise entailing the suppression of a post, it is further inherent to the Organisation’s duty of care to communicate the decision to abolish the post to the staff member occupying the post in a manner that safeguards that individual’s rights, i.e. by giving proper notice of the decision as well as of its reasons, and by affording the staff member concerned an opportunity to contest the decision (ILOAT, judgment No. 4935, cited above, consideration 4)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 67: “[T]he Tribunal considers that the appellant’s allegations that they were deprived of the opportunity to defend their interests in view of the prospect of the abolition of their job in the context of the restructuring at issue are ill-founded . While it is true that the appellant was not involved (...) in the reflection process concerning the restructuring itself, they were nevertheless informed, in due time, of the implications of that restructuring for their personal situation, so as to be able effectively to defend their interests as a member of the Organisation’s staff."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Duty of care
General principles of law
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 55: “As with any discretionary decision, the exercise of such authority remains subject to review by the Tribunal, whose task it is “to ascertain whether (…) decisions [concerning restructuring within an international organisation, including the abolition of posts] are taken in accordance with the relevant rules on competence, form or procedure, whether they rest upon a mistake of fact or law, or whether they constitute abuse of authority. The Tribunal will not rule on the appropriateness of the restructuring, as it will not substitute the organisation’s view with its own" (ILOAT, judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Scope of judicial review
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 54 and 59: “It is well established that, while the decision to abolish a post, including in the context of a restructuring, falls within the Organisation’s discretionary authority, such a decision must nevertheless « be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority” (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT), judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4).
(...)
[T]he Tribunal considers that the reform appears to have been motivated by objective considerations, not contested as such by the appellant, that were aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and impact of the Organisation’s activities, rather than by the intention to remove the appellant. Accordingly, even assuming that the termination of the appellant’s job was a welcome side effect of the reform, it cannot be concluded that this was either the sole or the principal purpose of the restructuring. The replacement of the appellant’s directorate by a department rendered the job of director redundant, and in such circumstances the abolition of the appellant’s job cannot be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable. In any event, where there are more reasons than one for the abolition of a post and one of them is improper, provided the other reason is a lawful one, the abolition of the post cannot be questioned on the grounds of abuse of power (ILOAT, judgment No. 346 of 8 May 1978, in re Savioli, consideration 2)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Job suppression
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 60: “[A]s the appellant’s job of director was suppressed in the framework of a different organisational set-up, the appellant was not in the situation of holding a job which was merely downgraded following a job evaluation procedure. While a certain continuity may be observed between the former job of director and the newly created job of head of department, the two jobs differed in the scope of their respective functions and in their respective positions within the hierarchical structure and reporting lines of the Organisation. The appellant was therefore not entitled to maintain their category and grade in pursuance of paragraph 330.1 of the Staff Rule on classification of jobs, which was not applicable to their case."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Job suppression
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 69: “The Tribunal accepts that the circumstances relied upon [by the appellant whose job was abolished] may have generated a personal feeling of marginalisation and may have been perceived as hurtful. However, the Secretary General has provided objective explanations for these decisions, which do not appear unreasonable or implausible. In any event, the conduct complained of does not reach the threshold of seriousness required to establish an infringement of the appellant’s right to respect for their dignity. The elements invoked by the appellant do not demonstrate that they were subjected to behaviour that was abusive, offensive, humiliating, degrading or intimidating, notwithstanding the stress and discomfort that the loss of their job may have caused."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Protection of dignity
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 73 and 76: “[I]n accordance with paragraph 660.8 of the Staff Rule on termination of service, only staff members who hold an indefinite-term or open-ended contract are eligible for redeployment in case of termination of their contracts. As a senior manager who had been recruited externally at grade A6 on fixed-term contracts that were not convertible into open-ended appointments, irrespective of their overall period of employment in the Organisation, the appellant was therefore not entitled to be considered for redeployment in pursuance of the applicable rules.
(...)
[T]he Tribunal acknowledges the objective reasons for excluding senior management posts at grades A6/A7 from the scope of the rules requiring the Organisation to seek alternative employment for staff members affected by the abolition of their job. Such positions are limited in number within the Organisation and are subject to specific appointment procedures requiring highly specialised competences and qualifications. Moreover, these jobs are inherently time-bound, as they cannot be converted into open-ended appointments, by way of derogation from the general rule set out in Articles 4.4 and 4.5 of the Staff Regulations. The Tribunal also cannot disregard the fact that the strategic nature of A6/A7 posts makes them particularly susceptible to restructuring measures reflecting the strategic vision of the Secretary General in respect of the sector headed by the director concerned."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Redeployment
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 40, 42, 48 and 49: “As to the appellant’s request for disclosure of the assignment of test 3, the Tribunal notes that he has obviously seen and read that assignment during the test. He is thus able to reconstruct the substance of the assignment on the basis of his own recollection and his answers to the assignment (…). In any event, on the basis of the appellant’s answers and the comments given by the correctors on these answers (…), the Tribunal is able to assess whether or not the assessment was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. There is therefore no need, in the circumstances of the present case, to order the disclosure of the assignment.
(...)
As to the appellant’s allegations about a lack of uniform marking criteria in the assessment of part 2 of test 3, the Secretary General objects to those allegations and has presented a confidential document which according to him contains such criteria (…). The appellant in turn requests disclosure of that document “to further substantiate … that [his] answers were not measured consistently against the same objective standards”, which, in the Tribunal’s view, appears more like an invitation to re-assess his answers to part 2 of test 3. The Tribunal reiterates that it finds the conclusions of the correctors to be corroborative and not contradictory, and that there is nothing to suggest that their assessment is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence that the assessment was manifestly erroneous, and taking into account that it is not for the Tribunal to make its own assessment of the appellant’s test paper, the Tribunal rejects the appellant’s request for disclosure of the marking criteria used for the assessment of part 2 of test 3, as the said documents are not necessary for examining the appellant’s allegations under this head.
(...)
As regards the appellant’s allegation that additional materials were necessary to achieve a better performance at the test, it is devoid of any substantiation. (…) In the documents submitted by the parties to the present proceedings, namely the vacancy notice and the invitation of 13 November 2024 to participate in tests 2 and 3 (…), as well as the publicly available Council of Europe Project Management Methodology Handbook of 2016, there is nothing to suggest that the test was designed to assess knowledge so specific to the Council of Europe’s project management methodology as to transform an external competition into a de facto internal one. The vacancy notice clearly distinguished between the required competencies of “good knowledge of project management methods and tools”, without any further specification, and “knowledge of the standards and activities of the Council of Europe” (…). None of the documents referred to any specific Council of Europe project management standards. Furthermore, nothing in the test assessments by the correctors (…) suggests that knowledge specific to the Council of Europe’s internal project management tools was required, or that the absence of such knowledge affected the evaluation of the appellant’s performance. Therefore, the appellant’s allegation under this head is equally unfounded.
(...)
In the light of the above findings, the Tribunal also dismisses the appellant’s request for disclosure of “the confidential, non-public portions of the Council of Europe [Project Management Methodology (PMM)] Handbook 2016 and related internal materials that were used by item writers and correctors” (…) as it does not consider that recourse to those materials is necessary for deciding the present case."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Disclosure of confidential documents
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 39: “[T]he guarantee of objectivity and lack of arbitrariness lies inter alia in the choice of competent and impartial correctors and in the conditions for the marking of papers, which ensure that the same rules are equally applied to everyone (see, as regards the latter aspect, Court of First Instance of the European Union, judgment of 14 July 2005, Vincenzo Le Voci v Council of the European Union, T-371/03, §§ 118-119)."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Partiality / Bias
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 47: “[T]he Administration must provide all candidates with the amount of information it deems necessary for participation in the impugned examination. It is indeed for the competent authorities to decide which information is indispensable and which documents are relevant for the purpose of the test (ATCE, appeal No. 712/2022, Kirbas v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgement of 31 January 2023, § 32; appeal No. 759/2024, D. S. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgement of 30 January 2025, § 54)."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Competition
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 38 and 43: “[W]ith regard to competitions, competent administrative authorities have wide discretion in determining how competitive examinations are conducted and managed, as well as how candidates and their performance are assessed (Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), appeal No. 736/2023, A. A. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 30 November 2023, § 18; ATCE, appeal No. 763/2024, M.-S. F. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 3 June 2025, § 36).
(...)
Insofar as the appellant criticises the practice that the re-assessment of papers is ordered only if there is a variance of 10% between the marks of the two correctors, the Tribunal takes note of the explanations provided by the Secretary General as to the objective of such a practice – which is to avoid inconsistencies in the assessment of the tests by correctors - and of the fact that no reassessment was necessary in the appellant’s case as there were no inconsistencies in assessments of his test. In the Tribunal’s view, setting the threshold for an automatic re-assessment falls within the discretionary power of the administrative authority, and setting it at 10% cannot be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 51 and 52: “[T]he Tribunal (…) has recognised the concept of “inherent inequality” in relation to an advantage enjoyed by some candidates over other candidates in the context of recruitment procedures. It has accepted that such a de facto situation between candidates does not necessarily amount to unequal treatment (ATCE, appeal No. 455/2008, Musialkowski v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 30 October 2009, § 37; appeal No. 712/2022, Kirbas v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 31 January 2023, § 34).
(...)
In such a situation of “inherent inequality”, it is for the Administration to take appropriate measures to mitigate any negative effect of that situation, in order to ensure that all candidates are treated on an equal footing. In the circumstances of the present case, this required the Administration to make sure that the information provided and available to internal and external job candidates was sufficient to pass the test successfully without recourse to any additional sources. In the [present case], there is nothing to suggest that this requirement was not fulfilled."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 45: “[A]lthough the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio - according to which the burden of proof in relation to an allegation lies on the party making such allegation - cannot be strictly applied in all instances (see, mutatis mutandis, European Court of Human Rights [GC], judgment of 16 September 2014, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, 29750/09, § 49) given that the Administration possesses considerably more information than what an appellant, especially an external job applicant could possibly obtain, it nevertheless remains incumbent on the party making allegations to demonstrate that they have at least a minimal factual basis."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Burden of proof
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 50: “[A]lthough a person may seek access to statistical information which is ready and available, it does not mean that he or she shall be entitled to seek from the Administration to process and summarise information using specific parameters. (…) [I]t is not suggested that any document containing such statistics has ever existed or has to exist. Whether such statistical information should be collected and assessed, the Tribunal considers that in the light of the above findings and given the wide variety of variables that may influence an individual candidate’s performance in an examination, there is no reason to resort to statistical data, as suggested by the appellant."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Access to information
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 38: “Discretion [in determining how competitive examinations are conducted and managed] is not exempt from judicial review. The Tribunal can thus ascertain whether the challenged decision was taken by a competent authority, that it was in due form and that it was adopted following the applicable procedure. It is also for the Tribunal to assess, with regard to the internal legality, whether the administrative authority’s assessment took account of all relevant facts and whether it was not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (ATCE, appeal No. 765/2024, L. Y. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 23 September 2025, § 38). However, it is not for the Tribunal to substitute its assessment for that of the examination authority."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 38: “Discretion [in determining how competitive examinations are conducted and managed] is not exempt from judicial review. The Tribunal can thus ascertain whether the challenged decision was taken by a competent authority, that it was in due form and that it was adopted following the applicable procedure. It is also for the Tribunal to assess, with regard to the internal legality, whether the administrative authority’s assessment took account of all relevant facts and whether it was not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (ATCE, appeal No. 765/2024, L. Y. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 23 September 2025, § 38). However, it is not for the Tribunal to substitute its assessment for that of the examination authority."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Manifest error of assessment
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 78 and 79: “The discretionary nature of the authority of the Organisation which is in play here is not disputed. There is no doubt that the main considerations which the 2024-2025 departure scheme brought to bear were those connected with the Organisation’s strategic interests. As explained in document CM(2023)123, which was submitted to the Committee of Ministers during the budget approval stage, the scheme was seen as a means of implementing the ongoing reform process being conducted in the light of the aims of the human resources strategy, which include the renewal of staff profiles and skills, a change in culture and mindsets, a rejuvenation of the age structure among staff, striking the right balance between staff stability and staff turnover, and increased geographical representation and diversity among staff members.
(...)
In the light of these organisational requirements, staff who volunteer for such a departure scheme cannot claim any right to benefit from it (see, among others, International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), judgment No. 2142 of 15 July 2002, P. B., A. P. and V. R. v. WHO, consideration 18; ILOAT, judgment No. 4662 of 7 July 2023, H. v. Interpol, consideration 9). The staff concerned do nonetheless have a legitimate interest in their application being examined lawfully and are entitled in this respect to a correct procedure that complies with the applicable rules and the criteria announced and, more broadly, with general principles of law such as the guarantee to be treated on an equal footing with other candidates."
Full judgment text:
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Français
Keywords:
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Theme: Administrative power
Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Para. 80: “[A]s with all discretionary powers, the Tribunal has the duty to review the legality of any decision taken in the context of a departure scheme. It is for the Tribunal to “check whether the contested decision was made by a competent authority, was in due form and was adopted in line with the applicable procedure. It is also for the Tribunal to assess, with regard to the internal legality, whether the administrative authority’s assessment took account of all relevant facts and whether it was not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment” (see, mutatis mutandis, Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), Appeals Nos. 768/2025 and 772/2025, C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 22 January 2026, § 61)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
General principles of law
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Theme: Administrative power
Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 83 to 86: “The Tribunal points out firstly that reasons are considered sufficient provided that they disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure. They must enable the persons concerned to ascertain the justifications for the measure taken and enable the competent court to review its legality. The requirement to provide reasons must be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the act, the nature of the grounds relied on and the interest which the addressees of the act or other persons directly and individually concerned by it may have in receiving explanations (CJEU, European Commission v. Di Bernardo, cited above, points 29 and 54; EGC, judgment of 18 December 2024, TB v. ENISA, point 75).
(...)
While, therefore, the reasons given may vary in how detailed they are according to the type of measure concerned, it is still the fact that compliance with this obligation is especially crucial where a large degree of discretion is granted and that it is the main means of ensuring that the exercise of administrative discretion is free of any arbitrariness (Court of First Instance of the European Communities, judgment of 8 September 2009, Landgren v. ETF, T-404/06 P, point 163; similarly, EGC, JR v. European Commission, cited above, point 85).
(...)
The Tribunal points out secondly that the reasons for a decision must, in principle, be communicated to the staff member at the same time as the decision adversely affecting them (ATCE, Cosset v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, cited above, § 73). At the same time, in some circumstances, it may be sufficient to provide reasons only at the request of the person concerned, for example where the Organisation is required to choose between candidates during a promotion procedure or when appointing someone to a specific post (see ILOAT, judgment No. 4960 of 6 February 2025, W. (No. 2) v. Eurocontrol, consideration 11). This approach may be justified, in particular, where there are a large number of candidates for a position and providing detailed reasons to each rejected candidate would result in an excessive workload for the Organisation (EGC, TB v. ENISA, cited above, §§ 94 to 96).
(...)
It is also acceptable for the beginnings of a statement of reasons to be supplied as a first step, provided that adequate reasons are given when any complaint against the decision is dismissed (see ATCE, Appeal No. 743/2024, B. S. v. Governor of the Development Bank of the Council of Europe, judgment of 25 November 2024, § 56). When there is no possibility of filing an administrative complaint, adequate reasons must be provided in good time following the notification of the decision for the staff member concerned to be able to make effective use of their right of appeal to the Tribunal."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Theme: Administrative power
Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 95 to 97: “Without it being necessary to rule on whether the factual tenor of these explanations was sufficient, the Tribunal notes that the communication of the aforementioned items during the feedback session occurred belatedly. As stated above (...), if adequate reasons are not given at the same time as a decision, they must be provided at the latest when any related administrative complaint is dismissed, or, if it is impossible to file an administrative complaint, within good time following the notification of the decision for the staff member to be able to exercise their rights, in particular their right to appeal to the Tribunal and to defend their interests in full knowledge of the facts (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 761/2024 and 762/2024, L. D. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 25 March 2025, § 102).
(...)
In the present case, the decision could only be contested through a direct appeal to the Tribunal. The fact that these subsequent reasons were not communicated to the appellant earlier, either when she first requested them or, at any event, before she lodged her appeal, is sufficient to conclude that the Administration failed to meet its obligation to give reasons for its decision concerning the appellant.
(...)
The Tribunal does not see any justification for this delay in the circumstances in which the contested decision was adopted. In this connection, it points out that there is neither a right of the Organisation to remedy before the Tribunal their insufficiently reasoned decisions, nor an obligation for the latter to take into account additional explanations provided only during the proceedings in order to assess whether the obligation to state reasons has been satisfied (CJEU, European Commission v. Di Bernardo, cited above, point 35; EGC, JR v. European Commission, cited above, point 49)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Theme: Administrative power
Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 90 to 93: “In the case [of the decision to reject her application under the 2024–2025 departure scheme], the Tribunal considers that giving sufficient reasons entailed providing the appellant with information through which she could identify the factors linked to her personal and professional circumstances which were taken into account when awarding each of the scores she obtained. Simply giving the separate scores may reflect the result of an assessment process, but, on its own, it does not reveal anything about the factual elements on which this assessment was based.
(...)
It is true that in the context of a competition, communication of the marks obtained in the various tests may constitute an adequate statement of reasons as it enables candidates to know the value set on their performance and to ascertain, if such is the case, that they have not in fact obtained the number of marks required by the notice of competition (Court of Justice of the European Communities, judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v. Innamorati, C-254/95 P, points 31 and 32; EGC, JR v. European Commission, cited above, point 57). However, the analogy drawn by the Secretary General between selection in a competition and selection for a departure scheme is only of limited relevance. Whereas in a competition, selection depends on a technical assessment in specific tests, selection for a departure scheme results from an overall assessment of a person’s professional situation. In the latter case, the score obtained is less self-explanatory because it does not reflect the candidate’s performance in an identifiable test, known to the candidate, but the application of strategic and organisational criteria.
(...)
The Tribunal also notes that in the context of competitions, candidates generally have access, on request, to markers’ assessments of their tests, with due regard for the secrecy of deliberations, so that they can understand the reasons for the marks they are given. However, initially, the appellant was not given access to the assessments of her personal situation (...).
(...)
It follows that, when she lodged her appeal on 20 April 2025, the appellant had not received sufficient reasons, i.e. reasons enabling her to understand why her application was rejected."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Theme: Administrative power
Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026
Paras. 81 and 82: “[T]he principle that reasons must be provided for all administrative decisions that are unfavourable to staff applies even when this obligation with respect to the Organisation is not explicitly provided for in the Council of Europe’s Staff Regulations (ATCE, Appeal No. 606/2019, Cosset v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 30 October 2019, § 69).
(...)
The obligation to give reasons is a general principle of the international civil service, which must be respected for staff to enjoy the right to effective judicial protection and review. The purpose of this obligation is, firstly, to provide the staff member concerned with sufficient information to enable them to ascertain whether the decision adversely affecting them is well founded and whether it is worth bringing the case before the Tribunal and, secondly, to enable the Tribunal to review the lawfulness of the decision (ATCE, ibid, § 72; ATCE, Appeal No. 721/2022, Izyumenko v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 12 June 2023, § 45; Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), judgment of 11 June 2020, European Commission v Danilo Di Bernardo, C-114/19 P, point 51; EGC (EGC), judgment of 22 September 2021, JR v. European Commission, T-435/20, point 46). The obligation to provide reasons is therefore connected with the transparency of administrative measures and is a prerequisite for trusting relations between the administrative authority and staff members (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 231-238/1997, Fuchs and Others v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 29 January 1998, § 64; ILOAT, judgment No. 1054 of 26 June 1990, Chetcuti v. CERN, consideration 21)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
General principles of law
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Theme: Administrative power
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 130, 131 and 133: “[T]he Tribunal has already had occasion to outline the extent of the right of complainants to be heard before the body responsible for investigating allegations of harassment. It has stated that at that stage, the complainant’s role consists essentially in helping to establish the facts, through their statements and any other evidence that they may furnish (ATCE, Appeal No. 766/2024, cited above, § 67, and the case law cited).
(...)
The Tribunal also considers that it is for the investigators to judge, in exercising their mandate and meeting the requirements of the investigation, whether there is reason to conduct one or more interviews with the person who filed the harassment complaint. The appellant’s argument with some of the items in the investigation report and the conclusions the investigators reached cannot in themselves give her the right to be heard again in the context of the investigation. The right to be heard cannot be interpreted as implying that the investigators are under any obligation to submit their conclusions to the person concerned or to propose a new hearing to enable her to dispute their assessment of the facts.
(...)
As to the right to be heard before the authorities called on to rule on the complaint pf harassment, the exercise of this right must enable presumed victims to have access to the investigation report and to present their views on matters liable to affect the impending decision. The right to be heard guarantees everyone the possibility of expressing their viewpoint during the administrative procedure, before the adoption of any decision liable to adversely affect their interests. In the instant case, this means that this right should have been guaranteed before the Director of Human Resources, at the latest before she took a decision and where appropriate in the course of a re-examination of the complainant’s request (ATCE, Appeal No. 765/2024, cited above, § 44).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 61: “The Organisation’s discretionary powers must always be exercised lawfully. While it is true that the Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Administration, it has the duty to ascertain whether the disputed decision was taken lawfully. Accordingly, the Tribunal must “check whether the contested decision was made by a competent authority, was in due form and was adopted in line with the applicable procedure. It must also determine, with regard to the legality of the decision under the Organisation’s own rules, whether the administrative authority’s decision took account of all the relevant facts and is not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (see, in particular, ATCE, Appeal No. 765/2024, L. Y. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 23 September 2025, § 38).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Discretion / Discretionary power
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 69: “With regard to the appellant’s argument that her probationary period should have been extended by six months, the Tribunal would point out that under paragraph 4130.2.3 of the staff rule on entry into service, an extension of this sort will be recommended only “where it has not been possible to determine the staff member’s suitability for the job and international civil service”. As it lies within the Administration’s discretion to judge whether this has been the case, the Tribunal will censure it only in the event of a manifest error.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Scope of judicial review
Probationary period
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 73 and 74: “As to the delays in the assessment procedure, the Staff Regulations and Rules do not set precise time limits for goal setting or for the finalisation of assessment reports on staff members during probationary periods. However, paragraph V of the Guide to performance assessment does stipulate that goal should be set within two weeks. Although this guide does not have the same regulatory status as the Staff Regulations and Rules, it is an official document governing the assessment process and should therefore be taken into account by the Tribunal as an expression of the Organisation’s administrative practice (ATCE, Appeal No. 764/2024, A. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Judgment of 15 October 2025, § 48).
(...)
In the present case, it is not disputed that the appellant’s goals for the first reference period were set on 21 February 2024 and those for the second reference period on 10 June 2024, i.e. five and four weeks late respectively. The question therefore is whether these delays could have harmed her. According to the relevant case law, failure to meet deadlines laid down for an evaluation procedure does not amount to an irregularity capable of making the contested decision unlawful if the delay has not caused the staff member injury (ATCE, Appeal No. 747/2024, M.-L. L. v Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Judgment of 30 January 2025, § 51).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Time-limits
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 72: “As to the revision of the appellant’s goals, the performance requirements which a staff member must satisfy to be confirmed in their appointment lie within the discretion of the Organisation, and the Tribunal may not substitute its assessment for that of the Organisation in this respect.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Discretion / Discretionary power
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 115, 117 and 123: “An investigation such as the one in this case on a complaint of harassment must be objective, thorough and detailed, in that it must be conducted in a way that enables all the relevant facts to be looked into (ILOAT, Judgment No. 5022 of 3 July 2025, T. (Nos. 7 and 8) v. Interpol, consideration 6 and the judgments cited).
(...)
[T]he role of investigators is not to verify and take a position on each allegation in the complaint but solely to assess which facts are liable to constitute harassment as defined by the applicable regulations. For this purpose, they are expected to identify which of the allegations fall within this legal scope and to focus their assessment on these items.
(...)
[T]he duty to investigate relates to facts that may be regarded as harassment and that are capable as such of causing harm to the presumed victim. It does not require investigators to conduct an indeterminate search for the possible causes of the alleged malaise of a presumed victim of harassment.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Investigation
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 138: “As to the one month’s notice with which the decision not to confirm the appellant’s appointment was issued, the Tribunal notes that this time period is compatible with the applicable provision (...). There is therefore no basis for the appellant’s assertion that she should have been given longer notice because her first appointment was supposed to run until March 2026. As soon as this appointment had expired when she was awarded a new CDD of one year, (...) the appellant was subject to the conditions that applied to this new appointment and cannot claim to have suffered any form of harm in this respect.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Notice period
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 86: “[T]he relevant case law does not grant staff members who have not met the Organisation’s expectations during their probationary period the right to demand that they be assigned to another job. The duty of care cannot extend to such an extent as to entail an obligation for the competent authority to consider the possibility of reassigning staff members to new tasks and functions before deciding not to renew their contract (General Court of the CJEU, judgment of 4 June 2025 (in French only), EZ v. European Commission, T‑450/24, §79).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty of care
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 86: “[T]he relevant case law does not grant staff members who have not met the Organisation’s expectations during their probationary period the right to demand that they be assigned to another job. The duty of care cannot extend to such an extent as to entail an obligation for the competent authority to consider the possibility of reassigning staff members to new tasks and functions before deciding not to renew their contract (General Court of the CJEU, judgment of 4 June 2025 (in French only), EZ v. European Commission, T 450/24, §79).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Redeployment
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 69: “With regard to the appellant’s argument that her probationary period should have been extended by six months, the Tribunal would point out that under paragraph 4130.2.3 of the staff rule on entry into service, an extension of this sort will be recommended only “where it has not been possible to determine the staff member’s suitability for the job and international civil service”. As it lies within the Administration’s discretion to judge whether this has been the case, the Tribunal will censure it only in the event of a manifest error.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 71: “[S]ince the appellant’s absence for illness did not exceed one month, there was no reason to extend her probationary period under paragraph 4120.5 of the above-mentioned rule. The Organisation was required to respect the rules which it itself had enacted. On the other hand, by virtue of its duty of care, it was for the appellant’s superiors to take this circumstance into account when assessing her performance. This was the case however, as witnessed by the comments made by her N+1 in the first assessment report drawn up during her second probationary period.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty of care
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 64: “The Tribunal points out that “for performance to be rated differently from one reporting period to the next is not necessarily contradictory” (International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), judgment No. 2836 of 8 July 2009, consideration 13).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Performance
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 59 and 60: “[I]t is essential that during the probationary period, the Organisation be vested with the power both to define its own needs, requirements and interests, and to decide whether, judging by the staff member’s performance during the probationary period, they have the abilities and qualities required to be confirmed in their employment at the Council of Europe. These determinations necessarily lie within the responsibility and discretion of the respondent (see World Bank Administrative Tribunal, Decision No. 10 of 8 October 1982, Salle v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), § 27).
(...)
At the same time, staff on probation enjoy the rights and guarantees recognised by the applicable regulations. Some of these guarantees may also be based on general principles of law, which include, in particular, “transparency, effective and sufficient communication of information and mutual respect between the appraiser and the appraisee” (Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), Appeals Nos. 561-564/2015, Kacsandi (I, II, III and IV) v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank, decision of 26 April 2016, § 115). Compliance with these principles and conditions is all the more important given that the probationary period marks a difficult time in the professional career of the staff members concerned, both in terms of adapting to the needs and policies of the Organisation and because of the inherently precarious nature of their situation (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 761-762/2024, L. D. (I and II), judgment of 25 March 2025, §§ 92 to 95).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 71: “[S]ince the appellant’s absence for illness did not exceed one month, there was no reason to extend her probationary period under paragraph 4120.5 of the above-mentioned rule. The Organisation was required to respect the rules which it itself had enacted. On the other hand, by virtue of its duty of care, it was for the appellant’s su]periors to take this circumstance into account when assessing her performance. This was the case however, as witnessed by the comments made by her N+1 in the first assessment report drawn up during her second probationary period.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Absence for reasons of health
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Harassment
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeals Nos. 768 and 772/2025 – C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 126: “[A] complaint of harassment can have neither the purpose nor the effect of replacing the existing means of contesting the merits of a work assessment. It should be reiterated that the task of investigators is confined to examining alleged specific facts which are capable, by their nature or their context, of amounting to behaviour which constitutes harassment. It was not therefore for the investigators to assess the appellant’s performance or ascertain whether her superiors may have committed an error of assessment when exercising their powers of evaluation.”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Harassment
Probationary period
Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Performance
Duty of care
Absence for reasons of health
Redeployment
Time-limits
Investigation
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Notice period
Theme: Termination of service
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 72 and 73: “[T]he decision not to initiate an investigation under the disciplinary rules is distinct from the decision not to investigate the acts of harassment complained of. In the present case, the subject matter of this appeal concerns only the decision of the Director of Human Resources not to pursue an investigation into the appellant’s harassment complaint (a procedure in which the appellant is a party), and not any decision regarding a possible inquiry into conduct that might justify the opening of disciplinary proceedings against X (a procedure in which the appellant would not be a party).
(...)
In this respect, the case law has established that disciplinary relations between an organisation and one of its staff members do not directly concern other staff members or affect their legal position. Consequently, a decision concerning a disciplinary inquiry or a disciplinary measure relating to a staff member will not, as a rule, adversely affect other staff members, who therefore have no cause of action to challenge such a decision (ILOAT, judgment No. 5084 of 3 July 2025, D. M. (No. 8) v. EPO, consideration 6)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Interest in the proceedings
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Interpretation of the law
Harassment
Duty of care
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 77: “It is settled case law that non-compliance with procedural time limits does not render a decision unlawful in the absence of demonstrable prejudice (ATCE, appeal No. 747/2024, M.-L. L. v. Secretary General, judgment of 30 January 2025, § 51)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Interpretation of the law
Harassment
Duty of care
Interest in the proceedings
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 66: “[T]he appellant cannot rely on the duty of care to assert that the Administration was under an obligation to investigate their harassment complaint, in the absence of any such obligation arising under the Organisation’s duty to ensure a safe working environment. The Tribunal recalls that in principle, the duty of care which an international organisation owes to its officials does not extend to the obligation to grant them a benefit to which they are not entitled or to take special steps to exempt them from the normal application of rules (see ILOAT, judgment No. 4882 of 8 July 2024, K. (No. 7) v. UNESCO, consideration 6)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty of care
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Interpretation of the law
Harassment
Interest in the proceedings
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 55 and 56: “[U]nder the Staff Regulations, the Council of Europe’s obligation in the area of harassment prevention is framed as a corollary of its duty to ensure a healthy and safe working environment (emphasis added), as set out in Article 2.1.1 of the Staff Regulations. As for any employer, the safety obligation incumbent on the Council of Europe is aimed at preventing occupational risks and at ensuring both the safety of staff members and the protection of their health. This is clearly an obligation rooted in the employment relationship and one which operates in relation to staff members’ performance of duties or in connection thereto. As regards harassment, the Organisation’s safety obligation entails the duty to maintain working conditions free from harassment and, where harassment occurs, to react promptly and to take appropriate protective measures for the victim.
(...)
Insofar as the provisions of the Policy relate to the Organisation’s safety obligation, their scope of application must be understood as concerning the working environment, as well as any disrespectful behaviour which may occur in connection thereto."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Interpretation of the law
Harassment
Duty of care
Interest in the proceedings
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 59, 72 and 73: “In the light of the foregoing, the Tribunal considers that acts of harassment falling within the scope of the Policy are those that display a substantial connection with the employment relationship. It is such acts alone that fall within the ambit of the Organisation’s duty to ensure a safe and healthy working environment and are, as a consequence, capable of engaging its responsibility under its safety obligation towards its staff members. If one were to adopt a strictly literal reading of paragraph 4.6 of the Policy, the Council of Europe would find its responsibility engaged with regard to any act of harassment affecting the dignity, integrity or well-being of those concerned, including acts bearing no connection whatsoever to the working environment within the Organisation. Such an interpretation would not only render it materially impossible for the Council of Europe to discharge its safety obligations but would also run counter to the very object of the safety obligation, which concerns only the working environment.
(...)
[T]he decision not to initiate an investigation under the disciplinary rules is distinct from the decision not to investigate the acts of harassment complained of. In the present case, the subject matter of this appeal concerns only the decision of the Director of Human Resources not to pursue an investigation into the appellant’s harassment complaint (a procedure in which the appellant is a party), and not any decision regarding a possible inquiry into conduct that might justify the opening of disciplinary proceedings against X (a procedure in which the appellant would not be a party).
(...)
In this respect, the case law has established that disciplinary relations between an organisation and one of its staff members do not directly concern other staff members or affect their legal position. Consequently, a decision concerning a disciplinary inquiry or a disciplinary measure relating to a staff member will not, as a rule, adversely affect other staff members, who therefore have no cause of action to challenge such a decision (ILOAT, judgment No. 5084 of 3 July 2025, D. M. (No. 8) v. EPO, consideration 6)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Harassment
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Interpretation of the law
Duty of care
Interest in the proceedings
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Para. 52: “In the present case, the Director of Human Resources justified the decision on the ground that, based on information set out in the complaint, the acts in question did not qualify as harassment within the meaning of the applicable provisions of the Policy and therefore did not warrant opening an investigation. In circumstances such as these, the Tribunal must determine whether the Organisation erred in its assessment of the facts in the light of the definition of harassment referred to in those provisions. Indeed, the case at hand raises a question of interpretation of the relevant norms and is therefore subject to the Tribunal’s full review (Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), judgment of 6 December 2023, QI v. European Commission, T‑807/21, § 105)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Scope of judicial review
Protection of dignity
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Interpretation of the law
Harassment
Duty of care
Interest in the proceedings
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 50 and 51: “It is well established that an international organisation has a duty to provide a safe and adequate working environment for its staff members, and that such a duty extends to protecting them against acts of harassment (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILOAT), Judgment No. 4207 of 10 February 2020, G. M. v. IAEA, consideration 15).
(...)
In the Council of Europe, this duty is enshrined in Article 2.1 of the Staff Regulations. That provision states that the Organisation must act at all times with fairness and due care in its relations with staff members, and that it must protect their human dignity at work and provide them a workplace free from harassment. The scope of this duty is further specified in the Policy, whose primary aim is to prevent any form of disrespectful behaviour, including harassment, in relations between staff members."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Interpretation of the law
Harassment
Duty of care
Interest in the proceedings
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 767/2025 – F v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026
Paras. 57 and 58: “When interpreting the notion of harassment contained in paragraph 4.6 of the Policy, that notion must therefore be understood in the light of the context of the Policy, which - as noted above - is linked to the Council of Europe’s safety obligation towards its employees.
(...)
In this respect, the Tribunal recalls that, as regards the interpretation of legal norms, it is a primary rule of interpretation that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (ILOAT, judgment No. 5071 of 3 July 2025, S. (No. 2) v. EPO, consideration 7; ATCE, Appeal No. 766/2024, L. D. (III) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 24 June 2025, § 60)."
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Interpretation of the law
Protection of dignity
Scope of judicial review
Duty to ensure a safe working environment
Harassment
Duty of care
Interest in the proceedings
Procedural flaw / Procedural irregularity
Appeal No. 766/2024 - L. D. (III) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 24 June 2025
Paras. 103 and 106: “[A]ccording to paragraph 4.6 of the Policy on Respect and Dignity in the Council of Europe, harassment is, inter alia, conduct or behaviour which is “repeated, sustained or systematic” and which “is prejudicial to the dignity, integrity, well-being or job security of the person to whom it is directed, and/or creates a humiliating, intimidating or hostile work environment”. In accordance with paragraph 4.4 of the Policy on Respect and Dignity in the Council of Europe, however, legitimate application of the Organisation’s policies, fair and reasonable management practices or justified and constructive criticism do not amount to disrespectful behaviour. It is clear from the relevant case law (in particular ATCE, Appeal No. 673/2021, C v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank, decision of 27 January 2022, § 90; General Court of the European Union, judgment of 19 June 2024, P. V. v. European Commission, T-89/20, paragraphs 324-325; General Court of the European Union, judgment of 9 April 2025, HF v. European Parliament, T-565/22, paragraphs 186 and 195), that professional disagreements, conflictual relations or unfavourable assessments of performance are not in themselves sufficient hallmarks of harassment, in the absence of a pattern of abusive behaviour that is repeated, sustained or systematic.
(...)
[While dismissing any characterisation of harassment] (…) the investigation report finds “evidence of a distinct lack of communication” on both sides (the appellant and her line manager). As far as the appellant is concerned, the report refers in particular to a “lack of flexibility”, which “could have been construed by her manager as defiance”. The appellant’s conduct was a legitimate consideration for the investigators in seeking to understand the context of the acts of which her line manager stands accused and the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the latter (see General Court of the European Union, judgment of 9 April 2025, HF v. European Parliament, T-565/22, paragraph 198).”
Full judgment text:
English -
Français
Keywords:
Harassment
Interpretation of the law
Right to an effective remedy and a fair trial
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Investigation
The Tribunal’s powers
Scope of judicial review
Lack of authority of decision maker / Incompetence of author of decision
Discretion / Discretionary power
Adversarial proceedings
Right to bring evidence
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