Appeals Nos. 782 and 784/2026 – M. G. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 12 August 2026

Paras. 45 and 47: “To be translated.”

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Interest in the proceedings
Annulment
Liability of the Administration
Stay / Stay of execution
Damage / Harm

Theme: Termination of service

Appeals Nos. 782 and 784/2026 – M. G. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 12 August 2026

Paras. 45 and 47: “To be translated.”

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Annulment
Interest in the proceedings
Liability of the Administration
Stay / Stay of execution
Damage / Harm

Theme: Termination of service

Appeals Nos. 782 and 784/2026 – M. G. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 12 August 2026

Para. 94: “To be translated.”

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Damage / Harm
Interest in the proceedings
Annulment
Liability of the Administration
Stay / Stay of execution

Theme: Termination of service

Appeals Nos. 782 and 784/2026 – M. G. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 12 August 2026

Para. 46: “To be translated.”

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Stay / Stay of execution
Interest in the proceedings
Annulment
Liability of the Administration
Damage / Harm

Theme: Termination of service

Appeals Nos. 782 and 784/2026 – M. G. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 12 August 2026

Para. 46: “To be translated.”

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Liability of the Administration
Interest in the proceedings
Annulment
Stay / Stay of execution
Damage / Harm

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 776/2025 – I v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 36 and 37: "[T]he contested decision of the DHR must be deemed to have been notified to the appellant, within the meaning of paragraph 1450.3.3 of the Staff Rule on grievance procedures, on the date that they were in a position to acquaint themselves meaningfully with the content of that decision, that is to say, on 28 July 2025, when they could have opened the email containing the decision (General Court of the European Union, judgment of 23 October 2024, cited above, point 28).

The Tribunal does not consider that the circumstance that the email containing the reasons of the contested decision was diverted to the appellant’s spam folder was such as to justify, exceptionally, a departure from the mandatory nature of the time limits applicable to internal means of redress."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Time-limits
Exhaustion of internal remedies / Management review / Administrative complaint
Admissibility

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 776/2025 – I v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 30 to 32: "In order to determine whether (…) the 30-day time limit for filing an administrative complaint with the Secretary General has been complied with, it is first necessary to establish the starting date for its calculation, namely whether this time limit began to run from 4 July 2025 when the appellant was informed that their mark did not qualify them to be shortlisted, or from the later date of 28 July 2025 on which they were informed of the criteria used for determining their mark.

The Tribunal recalls its case law according to which the time limit for filing an administrative complaint must be calculated from the date on which the complainant obtained the information required to meaningfully exercise their right of complaint. Complainants must have access to at least a basic explanation of the reasons underlying the disputed decision. Failing this, they cannot validly substantiate their administrative complaint, nor provide the elements necessary to support their allegations (ATCE, Appeal No. 415/2008, Oreshkina v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 31 March 2009, § 43; ATCE, Kowalczyk-Kedziora v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, cited above, § 35).

In the [context of an external recruitment procedure], the information provided to the appellant (…) limited to the indication of the mark obtained, did not suffice to enable them to assess whether to challenge the decision not to shortlist them."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Time-limits
Exhaustion of internal remedies / Management review / Administrative complaint
Admissibility

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 776/2025 – I v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 28 and 29: "[A]ccording to Article 7.1 of the Tribunal’s Statute, the admissibility of an appeal is conditional upon the proper exhaustion of the internal means of redress ¬ namely the management review and/or, as the case may be, the administrative complaint ¬, and compliance with the time-limits that apply to such a procedure.

The prior exhaustion of internal means of redress within the applicable time limits conditions the admissibility of an appeal (see, for example, Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILOAT), judgment No. 5112 of 10 February 2026, S. v. Energy Charter Conference, consideration 6 and case law quoted). Compliance with such time limits is essential for the observance of the principle of legal security, in the interests of both the Organisation and its staff (Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), Appeal No. 672/2020, Kowalczyk-Kędziora v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 21 October 2021, §§ 30 and 31, with further references). Such compliance constitutes a fundamental requirement in order to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (General Court of the European Union, judgment of 23 October 2024, Anastasia Lianopoulou v. European Commission, T 1136/23, point 16)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Exhaustion of internal remedies / Management review / Administrative complaint
Admissibility
Time-limits

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 776/2025 – I v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 28 and 29: "[A]ccording to Article 7.1 of the Tribunal’s Statute, the admissibility of an appeal is conditional upon the proper exhaustion of the internal means of redress ¬ namely the management review and/or, as the case may be, the administrative complaint ¬, and compliance with the time-limits that apply to such a procedure.

The prior exhaustion of internal means of redress within the applicable time limits conditions the admissibility of an appeal (see, for example, Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILOAT), judgment No. 5112 of 10 February 2026, S. v. Energy Charter Conference, consideration 6 and case law quoted). Compliance with such time limits is essential for the observance of the principle of legal security, in the interests of both the Organisation and its staff (Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), Appeal No. 672/2020, Kowalczyk-Kędziora v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 21 October 2021, §§ 30 and 31, with further references). Such compliance constitutes a fundamental requirement in order to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice (General Court of the European Union, judgment of 23 October 2024, Anastasia Lianopoulou v. European Commission, T 1136/23, point 16)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Admissibility
Exhaustion of internal remedies / Management review / Administrative complaint
Time-limits

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 776/2025 – I v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 38 and 40: "[E]xceptions to the requirement to abide by the time limits for lodging a complaint are allowed, inter alia, “where the complainant has been prevented by vis major from learning of the impugned decision in good time, or where the organisation, by deliberately misleading the complainant or concealing some paper from her or him, has deprived that person of the possibility of exercising her or his right of appeal, in breach of the principle of good faith” (ILOAT, judgment No. 3829 of 28 June 2017, R. v. Eurocontrol, consideration 7).
(...)
[W]here a candidate in a selection procedure is informed that all official communications concerning their participation in that procedure will be sent to their email address, it is incumbent upon them to take the necessary personal organisational measures to ensure access thereto (see, mutatis mutandis, ATCE, Appeal No. 416/2008, Švarca v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 24 June 2009, §§ 34 and 36). A fortiori, where a candidate has unimpeded access to their personal email account, as was the case for the appellant, nothing could exempt them from the diligence required to monitor its contents with due care."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Time-limits
Exhaustion of internal remedies / Management review / Administrative complaint
Admissibility

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 775/2025 – P.R. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Para. 41: "[i]f the appellant, who is an experienced lawyer, believed that she had already satisfied the requirement to have lodged an administrative complaint beforehand and was unsure as to whether the Secretary General would respond to it, she should have been aware that the Secretary General had 30 days in which to reach a decision on her complaint, pursuant to paragraph 1450.5 of the Staff Rule on grievance procedures – a time limit whose expiration may, furthermore, determine the admissibility of the appeal (ATCE, Appeal No. 466/2010, Kravchenko v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 28 January 2011, § 93 and the case law cited). In this instance, however, the appellant did not wait for that time limit to expire before bringing the matter before the Tribunal."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Appeal No. 775/2025 – P.R. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 34, 35, 37 et 41: "The Tribunal notes that “prior to bringing an appeal (…), an appellant must submit an administrative complaint to the Secretary General, thereby affording the latter the opportunity to redress the matter if the grievances prove to be well-founded (see, mutatis mutandis, ATCE, Appeal No. 673/2021, C v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank, judgment of 27 January 2022, §§ 54 to 56, and case law quoted). The purpose of the exhaustion rule in administrative disputes involving the Organisation is to enable the Secretary General to prevent or put right potential violations for which the Organisation may bear responsibility (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 561-564, Kacsandi (I, II, III, and IV) v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank, decision of 26 April 2016, § 112).” (Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), Appeal 763/2024, judgment of 3 June 2025, M.-S. F. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, § 50).
In the context of participation in an external competition, it follows from Article 14.10.3 of the Staff Regulations that the internal remedy which must be exhausted before lodging an appeal with the Tribunal is an administrative complaint to the Secretary General.
(...)
For the purposes of determining whether an appellant has in fact previously lodged the requisite administrative complaint, the fact that they did not expressly state such an intention is not decisive. In effect, “for a letter addressed to an organisation to constitute a complaint, it is sufficient for the person concerned to clearly express in it his or her intention to contest the decision complained of, for the request thus formulated to be meaningful and for it to be likely to be accepted, irrespective of whether the complaint is formally accompanied by an explicit statement of reasons in law or in fact (ILOAT, Judgment 3067, 8 February 2012, MEEEA v. Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), paragraph 16).” (ATCE, Appeal No. 665/2020, Yuksek (II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 12 February 2021, § 56). A degree of flexibility is therefore called for in determining whether the conditions of form and substance for filing such a complaint have been met.
(...)
[I]f the appellant, who is an experienced lawyer, believed that she had already satisfied the requirement to have lodged an administrative complaint beforehand and was unsure as to whether the Secretary General would respond to it, she should have been aware that the Secretary General had 30 days in which to reach a decision on her complaint, pursuant to paragraph 1450.5 of the Staff Rule on grievance procedures – a time limit whose expiration may, furthermore, determine the admissibility of the appeal (ATCE, Appeal No. 466/2010, Kravchenko v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 28 January 2011, § 93 and the case law cited). In this instance, however, the appellant did not wait for that time limit to expire before bringing the matter before the Tribunal."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Exhaustion of internal remedies / Management review / Administrative complaint

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 774/2025 – H v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Para. 66: "No other reference, whether explicit or implicit, is made in the Pension Scheme Rules to the regulations governing the social security scheme. In particular, there is no mention of the procedure to be followed in the event of a work accident or occupational disease, as described in paragraph 920.5 of the Staff Regulations, which provides, in particular, that in these circumstances it is the insurance company that assesses whether the incident was work-related (paragraph 920.5.1). Once an employee has suffered permanent invalidity, the social security scheme (medical and social system) gives way to the pension scheme."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Work accident / Industrial disease
Interpretation of the law
Invalidity Board
Disability / Invalidity
Admissibility

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 774/2025 – H v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Para. 66: "No other reference, whether explicit or implicit, is made in the Pension Scheme Rules to the regulations governing the social security scheme. In particular, there is no mention of the procedure to be followed in the event of a work accident or occupational disease, as described in paragraph 920.5 of the Staff Regulations, which provides, in particular, that in these circumstances it is the insurance company that assesses whether the incident was work-related (paragraph 920.5.1). Once an employee has suffered permanent invalidity, the social security scheme (medical and social system) gives way to the pension scheme."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Disability / Invalidity
Interpretation of the law
Invalidity Board
Work accident / Industrial disease
Admissibility

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 774/2025 – H v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Para. 55: "[In order to resolve the issue regarding the interpretation of regulatory texts raised by the appealent], [i]t will be recalled that “it is a basic rule of interpretation that words which are clear and unambiguous are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning and that words must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose” (ATCE, Appeal No. 766/2024, L. D. (III) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 24 June 2025, § 60 and cited case law)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Interpretation of the law
Invalidity Board
Work accident / Industrial disease
Disability / Invalidity
Admissibility

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 774/2025 – H v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Paras. 63, 64, 68 et 69: "[A combined reading of Instruction 13/2 and Article 14.2 of the Pension Scheme to which this instruction refers] cannot be construed as making the insurer’s involvement a prerequisite for the Invalidity Board’s competence in such matters.

A combined reading of the relevant provisions suggests, rather, that the recognition in question rests with the Bank and is administrative in nature. On this reading, the Bank’s recognition does not involve a medical assessment but is intended to inform the Board about the legal scope of application – with the Invalidity Board retaining sole competence to assess the medical evidence.
(…)
Consequently, the Invalidity Board must first determine whether the staff member is suffering from invalidity, and secondly, if so, whether that incapacity is the result of a work accident or occupational disease, terms to be understood in accordance with the definitions set out in the aforementioned paragraph 910.7, or from a public-spirited act; the Board must also determine to what extent the incapacity is the result thereof. Verifying the existence of such a link requires a medical assessment. On the basis of, and in accordance with, the Board’s findings, the Governor will either recognise the staff member to be suffering from invalidity and grant them an invalidity pension, increased where appropriate as stipulated in Article 14.2 of the Pension Scheme Rules, or not recognise the staff member as an invalid (Instruction 13/3, (i)).

In other words, it is the Bank which has the power to determine, by means of a regulatory decision, which “incidents” (accidents and illnesses) may be regarded as constituting work accidents and occupational diseases (or “as falling within the scope of Article 14, paragraph 2”, to quote Instruction 13/2 (i) (b)). It then falls to the Invalidity Board to decide whether the invalidity in question is in fact the result of such accident or disease. Lastly, it is for the Governor to decide what administrative consequences should attach to the Board’s medical findings."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Invalidity Board
Interpretation of the law
Work accident / Industrial disease
Disability / Invalidity
Admissibility

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 774/2025 – H v. Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank
Judgment of 4 June 2026

Para. 67: "[T]he rules governing the Pension Scheme do not refer to] the system for resolving disputes between a principal beneficiary and the administrator concerning medical matters, as set out in Appendix 1 on the “medical and social system” (2.g of Appendix 1 to the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules). The plea of inadmissibility raised for failure to exhaust the arbitration procedure referred to in the aforementioned provision is without legal basis, therefore, and must be dismissed."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Admissibility
Interpretation of the law
Invalidity Board
Work accident / Industrial disease
Disability / Invalidity

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 49: "[I]t is not for the Tribunal, within the scope of its powers, to take the place of the Organisation in assessing the appropriateness or fairness of the rule defining the conditions under which spouses or partners of retired staff members may access primary cover under CEMSIS. In particular, the appellant’s request that the Tribunal order the Secretary General to revise Articles 2 and 5 of Rule No. 1398 falls outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to Articles 2.5 and 14.2 of its Statute, the Tribunal may only annul administrative decisions that are detrimental to appellants and has no authority to annul or amend general regulatory provisions (see, in this connection, ATCE, Appeal No. 557/2014, Hedman v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 10 December 2015, § 63). This claim must be dismissed, therefore."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Patere legem
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Paras. 46 and 47: "[Pursuant to Rule No. 1398, which excludes the recognition of ‘dependent’ status in the case of a spouse who receives an income], the Organisation had no margin of discretion, was bound by the principle of tu patere legem quam ipse fecisti to apply the rules it had itself laid down and could not accord differential treatment to the appellant’s spouse. It thus acted in strict accordance with the letter of the applicable regulatory provisions, with no scope to temper their application through a discretionary assessment or by having regard to the specific circumstances in which the appellant’s spouse found herself (see, in this connection, European Civil Service Tribunal, judgment of 30 November 2009, Voslamber / Commission, F-86/08, paragraphs 52, 54-55, 60, 75-76).

Consequently, the principle of proportionality, which may play a role in mitigating the effects of a discretionary power, was not applicable in this case. The basis of the complaint alleging that the contested decision was disproportionate cannot be accepted, therefore, since no margin of discretion existed at the time of its adoption. It also follows that, in taking the contested decision, the Organisation could not usefully consider the personal circumstances of the appellant’s spouse, relating to her advanced age and state of health, and the practical difficulties she encountered before being admitted to the Barmer health insurance fund, however trying those difficulties may have been."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 50: "The Tribunal recognises the broad discretion enjoyed by the Organisation in establishing the social and medical protection scheme for staff members and persons claiming through them, particularly in view of the budgetary and financial stability considerations that come into play. It also recognises the regulatory autonomy enjoyed by the Council of Europe in relation to European Union institutions: the Organisation may draw inspiration from the regulations in force at other comparable bodies, taking into account its own specific circumstances and constraints, but it is under no obligation to do so."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Insurance
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 51: "[i]t is settled case law that international administrative tribunals may decide not to give legal effect to a piece of secondary legislation derived from the Organisation’s constituent instrument in cases brought before them, if they consider that such legislation is incompatible with a general principle, even in the absence of an express provision to that effect (see Thévenot-Werner, Rapport de synthèse sur les principes généraux tels qu’appliqués par les tribunaux administratifs internationaux, March 2026, pages 47 and 48). The Tribunal has taken a similar position (see, for example, Appeals Board of the Council of Europe, Appeal No. 8/1972, Artzet (I) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 10 April 1973)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: General principles of law
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 49: "[I]t is not for the Tribunal, within the scope of its powers, to take the place of the Organisation in assessing the appropriateness or fairness of the rule defining the conditions under which spouses or partners of retired staff members may access primary cover under CEMSIS. In particular, the appellant’s request that the Tribunal order the Secretary General to revise Articles 2 and 5 of Rule No. 1398 falls outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to Articles 2.5 and 14.2 of its Statute, the Tribunal may only annul administrative decisions that are detrimental to appellants and has no authority to annul or amend general regulatory provisions (see, in this connection, ATCE, Appeal No. 557/2014, Hedman v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 10 December 2015, § 63). This claim must be dismissed, therefore."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: The Tribunal’s powers
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 51: "[i]t is settled case law that international administrative tribunals may decide not to give legal effect to a piece of secondary legislation derived from the Organisation’s constituent instrument in cases brought before them, if they consider that such legislation is incompatible with a general principle, even in the absence of an express provision to that effect (see Thévenot-Werner, Rapport de synthèse sur les principes généraux tels qu’appliqués par les tribunaux administratifs internationaux, March 2026, pages 47 and 48). The Tribunal has taken a similar position (see, for example, Appeals Board of the Council of Europe, Appeal No. 8/1972, Artzet (I) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 10 April 1973)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Scope of judicial review
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 47: "Consequently, [since the application of Rule No. 98 to the present case precluded any margin of discretion on the part of the Organisation], the principle of proportionality, which may play a role in mitigating the effects of a discretionary power, was not applicable in this case. The basis of the complaint alleging that the contested decision was disproportionate cannot be accepted, therefore, since no margin of dscretion existed at the time of its adoption. It also follows that, in taking the contested decision, the Organisation could not usefully consider the personal circumstances of the appellant’s spouse, relating to her advanced age and state of health, and the practical difficulties she encountered before being admitted to the Barmer health insurance fund, however trying those difficulties may have been."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Proportionality
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 50: "The Tribunal recognises the broad discretion enjoyed by the Organisation in establishing the social and medical protection scheme for staff members and persons claiming through them, particularly in view of the budgetary and financial stability considerations that come into play. It also recognises the regulatory autonomy enjoyed by the Council of Europe in relation to European Union institutions: the Organisation may draw inspiration from the regulations in force at other comparable bodies, taking into account its own specific circumstances and constraints, but it is under no obligation to do so."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Discretion / Discretionary power
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 54: "[T]he rule of non-discrimination is one of the general principles of law which prevails in the legal system of the Council of Europe where it is enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This rule protects individuals, placed in analogous situations, from discrimination and prohibits different treatment for which there is no objective and reasonable justification. A breach of the principle of equal treatment is deemed to have occurred when two categories of persons whose situations in fact and in law display no essential differences are treated differently and there is no objective justification for such difference in treatment (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 739/2023, 740/2023 and 741/2023, E. T. and Others v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 22 March 2024, § 71; ATCE, Appeal No. 719/2022, Gurin v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 31 January 2023, § 59; ATCE, Appeal No. 557/2014, cited above, § 64)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 773/2025 – J. C. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 5 June 2026

Para. 54: "[T]he rule of non-discrimination is one of the general principles of law which prevails in the legal system of the Council of Europe where it is enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This rule protects individuals, placed in analogous situations, from discrimination and prohibits different treatment for which there is no objective and reasonable justification. A breach of the principle of equal treatment is deemed to have occurred when two categories of persons whose situations in fact and in law display no essential differences are treated differently and there is no objective justification for such difference in treatment (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 739/2023, 740/2023 and 741/2023, E. T. and Others v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 22 March 2024, § 71; ATCE, Appeal No. 719/2022, Gurin v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 31 January 2023, § 59; ATCE, Appeal No. 557/2014, cited above, § 64)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Patere legem
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Proportionality
The Tribunal’s powers
Discretion / Discretionary power
Insurance
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law

Theme: Pensions and social security / Retirement

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Paras. 54 and 59: “It is well established that, while the decision to abolish a post, including in the context of a restructuring, falls within the Organisation’s discretionary authority, such a decision must nevertheless « be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority” (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT), judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4).
(...)
[T]he Tribunal considers that the reform appears to have been motivated by objective considerations, not contested as such by the appellant, that were aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and impact of the Organisation’s activities, rather than by the intention to remove the appellant. Accordingly, even assuming that the termination of the appellant’s job was a welcome side effect of the reform, it cannot be concluded that this was either the sole or the principal purpose of the restructuring. The replacement of the appellant’s directorate by a department rendered the job of director redundant, and in such circumstances the abolition of the appellant’s job cannot be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable. In any event, where there are more reasons than one for the abolition of a post and one of them is improper, provided the other reason is a lawful one, the abolition of the post cannot be questioned on the grounds of abuse of power (ILOAT, judgment No. 346 of 8 May 1978, in re Savioli, consideration 2)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Restructuring / Reorganisation
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 75: “[T]here is case law reflecting the emergence of [a general principle of international law imposing upon an Organisation the duty to endeavour reassignment in case of the abolition of a post] with a tendency to extend the duty to seek alternative employment irrespective of the grade or contractual status of staff members affected by termination of employment (ILOAT, judgment No. 4097 of 6 February 2019, N. (No. 2) v. WHO, consideration 10; ILOAT, judgment No. 4935, cited above, consideration 21). However, this case law does not impose upon the Organisation a duty which would apply in all circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that the existence of such a principle is established, the Tribunal considers that in any event, in certain situations, there are exceptions to such a principle."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Job suppression
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 75: “[T]here is case law reflecting the emergence of [a general principle of international law imposing upon an Organisation the duty to endeavour reassignment in case of the abolition of a post] with a tendency to extend the duty to seek alternative employment irrespective of the grade or contractual status of staff members affected by termination of employment (ILOAT, judgment No. 4097 of 6 February 2019, N. (No. 2) v. WHO, consideration 10; ILOAT, judgment No. 4935, cited above, consideration 21). However, this case law does not impose upon the Organisation a duty which would apply in all circumstances. Therefore, even assuming that the existence of such a principle is established, the Tribunal considers that in any event, in certain situations, there are exceptions to such a principle."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: General principles of law
Duty of care
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 54: “It is well established that, while the decision to abolish a post, including in the context of a restructuring, falls within the Organisation’s discretionary authority, such a decision must nevertheless « be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority” (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT), judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Misuse or abuse of authority
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Paras. 63 and 64: “The (...) duty of care implies that when the Administration takes a decision concerning the situation of a staff member, it must take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision, and when doing so it should take into account not only the interests of the service but also those of the staff member concerned (EU Civil Service Tribunal, judgment of 18 May 2015, Hartwig Bischoff v European Commission, F-36/14). Moreover, the duty of care demands that international organisations treat their staff with due consideration in order to avoid causing them undue injury; an employer must consequently inform officials in advance of any action that may imperil their rights or harm their rightful interests (ATCE, Appeals Nos. 587 and 588/2018, Jannick Devaux (II) and (III) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 9 October 2018, § 108 and cited case law).
(...)
In the particular case of a restructuring exercise entailing the suppression of a post, it is further inherent to the Organisation’s duty of care to communicate the decision to abolish the post to the staff member occupying the post in a manner that safeguards that individual’s rights, i.e. by giving proper notice of the decision as well as of its reasons, and by affording the staff member concerned an opportunity to contest the decision (ILOAT, judgment No. 4935, cited above, consideration 4)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 60: “[A]s the appellant’s job of director was suppressed in the framework of a different organisational set-up, the appellant was not in the situation of holding a job which was merely downgraded following a job evaluation procedure. While a certain continuity may be observed between the former job of director and the newly created job of head of department, the two jobs differed in the scope of their respective functions and in their respective positions within the hierarchical structure and reporting lines of the Organisation. The appellant was therefore not entitled to maintain their category and grade in pursuance of paragraph 330.1 of the Staff Rule on classification of jobs, which was not applicable to their case."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Job suppression
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 67: “[T]he Tribunal considers that the appellant’s allegations that they were deprived of the opportunity to defend their interests in view of the prospect of the abolition of their job in the context of the restructuring at issue are ill-founded . While it is true that the appellant was not involved (...) in the reflection process concerning the restructuring itself, they were nevertheless informed, in due time, of the implications of that restructuring for their personal situation, so as to be able effectively to defend their interests as a member of the Organisation’s staff."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Duty of care
General principles of law
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Paras. 54 and 59: “It is well established that, while the decision to abolish a post, including in the context of a restructuring, falls within the Organisation’s discretionary authority, such a decision must nevertheless « be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority” (Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT), judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4).
(...)
[T]he Tribunal considers that the reform appears to have been motivated by objective considerations, not contested as such by the appellant, that were aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and impact of the Organisation’s activities, rather than by the intention to remove the appellant. Accordingly, even assuming that the termination of the appellant’s job was a welcome side effect of the reform, it cannot be concluded that this was either the sole or the principal purpose of the restructuring. The replacement of the appellant’s directorate by a department rendered the job of director redundant, and in such circumstances the abolition of the appellant’s job cannot be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable. In any event, where there are more reasons than one for the abolition of a post and one of them is improper, provided the other reason is a lawful one, the abolition of the post cannot be questioned on the grounds of abuse of power (ILOAT, judgment No. 346 of 8 May 1978, in re Savioli, consideration 2)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Job suppression
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 55: “As with any discretionary decision, the exercise of such authority remains subject to review by the Tribunal, whose task it is “to ascertain whether (…) decisions [concerning restructuring within an international organisation, including the abolition of posts] are taken in accordance with the relevant rules on competence, form or procedure, whether they rest upon a mistake of fact or law, or whether they constitute abuse of authority. The Tribunal will not rule on the appropriateness of the restructuring, as it will not substitute the organisation’s view with its own" (ILOAT, judgment No. 4935 of 6 February 2025, A. v. IOM, consideration 4)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Scope of judicial review
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Paras. 73 and 76: “[I]n accordance with paragraph 660.8 of the Staff Rule on termination of service, only staff members who hold an indefinite-term or open-ended contract are eligible for redeployment in case of termination of their contracts. As a senior manager who had been recruited externally at grade A6 on fixed-term contracts that were not convertible into open-ended appointments, irrespective of their overall period of employment in the Organisation, the appellant was therefore not entitled to be considered for redeployment in pursuance of the applicable rules.
(...)
[T]he Tribunal acknowledges the objective reasons for excluding senior management posts at grades A6/A7 from the scope of the rules requiring the Organisation to seek alternative employment for staff members affected by the abolition of their job. Such positions are limited in number within the Organisation and are subject to specific appointment procedures requiring highly specialised competences and qualifications. Moreover, these jobs are inherently time-bound, as they cannot be converted into open-ended appointments, by way of derogation from the general rule set out in Articles 4.4 and 4.5 of the Staff Regulations. The Tribunal also cannot disregard the fact that the strategic nature of A6/A7 posts makes them particularly susceptible to restructuring measures reflecting the strategic vision of the Secretary General in respect of the sector headed by the director concerned."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Redeployment
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Protection of dignity
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 771/2025 – G v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 69: “The Tribunal accepts that the circumstances relied upon [by the appellant whose job was abolished] may have generated a personal feeling of marginalisation and may have been perceived as hurtful. However, the Secretary General has provided objective explanations for these decisions, which do not appear unreasonable or implausible. In any event, the conduct complained of does not reach the threshold of seriousness required to establish an infringement of the appellant’s right to respect for their dignity. The elements invoked by the appellant do not demonstrate that they were subjected to behaviour that was abusive, offensive, humiliating, degrading or intimidating, notwithstanding the stress and discomfort that the loss of their job may have caused."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Protection of dignity
Duty of care
General principles of law
Right to be heard / Rights of the defence during investigation and disciplinary proceedings
Restructuring / Reorganisation
Job suppression
Redeployment
Misuse or abuse of authority
Scope of judicial review

Theme: Termination of service

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Paras. 40, 42, 48 and 49: “As to the appellant’s request for disclosure of the assignment of test 3, the Tribunal notes that he has obviously seen and read that assignment during the test. He is thus able to reconstruct the substance of the assignment on the basis of his own recollection and his answers to the assignment (…). In any event, on the basis of the appellant’s answers and the comments given by the correctors on these answers (…), the Tribunal is able to assess whether or not the assessment was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. There is therefore no need, in the circumstances of the present case, to order the disclosure of the assignment.
(...)
As to the appellant’s allegations about a lack of uniform marking criteria in the assessment of part 2 of test 3, the Secretary General objects to those allegations and has presented a confidential document which according to him contains such criteria (…). The appellant in turn requests disclosure of that document “to further substantiate … that [his] answers were not measured consistently against the same objective standards”, which, in the Tribunal’s view, appears more like an invitation to re-assess his answers to part 2 of test 3. The Tribunal reiterates that it finds the conclusions of the correctors to be corroborative and not contradictory, and that there is nothing to suggest that their assessment is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence that the assessment was manifestly erroneous, and taking into account that it is not for the Tribunal to make its own assessment of the appellant’s test paper, the Tribunal rejects the appellant’s request for disclosure of the marking criteria used for the assessment of part 2 of test 3, as the said documents are not necessary for examining the appellant’s allegations under this head.
(...)
As regards the appellant’s allegation that additional materials were necessary to achieve a better performance at the test, it is devoid of any substantiation. (…) In the documents submitted by the parties to the present proceedings, namely the vacancy notice and the invitation of 13 November 2024 to participate in tests 2 and 3 (…), as well as the publicly available Council of Europe Project Management Methodology Handbook of 2016, there is nothing to suggest that the test was designed to assess knowledge so specific to the Council of Europe’s project management methodology as to transform an external competition into a de facto internal one. The vacancy notice clearly distinguished between the required competencies of “good knowledge of project management methods and tools”, without any further specification, and “knowledge of the standards and activities of the Council of Europe” (…). None of the documents referred to any specific Council of Europe project management standards. Furthermore, nothing in the test assessments by the correctors (…) suggests that knowledge specific to the Council of Europe’s internal project management tools was required, or that the absence of such knowledge affected the evaluation of the appellant’s performance. Therefore, the appellant’s allegation under this head is equally unfounded.
(...)
In the light of the above findings, the Tribunal also dismisses the appellant’s request for disclosure of “the confidential, non-public portions of the Council of Europe [Project Management Methodology (PMM)] Handbook 2016 and related internal materials that were used by item writers and correctors” (…) as it does not consider that recourse to those materials is necessary for deciding the present case."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Disclosure of confidential documents
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Para. 39: “[T]he guarantee of objectivity and lack of arbitrariness lies inter alia in the choice of competent and impartial correctors and in the conditions for the marking of papers, which ensure that the same rules are equally applied to everyone (see, as regards the latter aspect, Court of First Instance of the European Union, judgment of 14 July 2005, Vincenzo Le Voci v Council of the European Union, T-371/03, §§ 118-119)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Partiality / Bias
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Paras. 38 and 43: “[W]ith regard to competitions, competent administrative authorities have wide discretion in determining how competitive examinations are conducted and managed, as well as how candidates and their performance are assessed (Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), appeal No. 736/2023, A. A. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 30 November 2023, § 18; ATCE, appeal No. 763/2024, M.-S. F. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 3 June 2025, § 36).
(...)
Insofar as the appellant criticises the practice that the re-assessment of papers is ordered only if there is a variance of 10% between the marks of the two correctors, the Tribunal takes note of the explanations provided by the Secretary General as to the objective of such a practice – which is to avoid inconsistencies in the assessment of the tests by correctors - and of the fact that no reassessment was necessary in the appellant’s case as there were no inconsistencies in assessments of his test. In the Tribunal’s view, setting the threshold for an automatic re-assessment falls within the discretionary power of the administrative authority, and setting it at 10% cannot be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Para. 47: “[T]he Administration must provide all candidates with the amount of information it deems necessary for participation in the impugned examination. It is indeed for the competent authorities to decide which information is indispensable and which documents are relevant for the purpose of the test (ATCE, appeal No. 712/2022, Kirbas v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgement of 31 January 2023, § 32; appeal No. 759/2024, D. S. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgement of 30 January 2025, § 54)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Competition
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Paras. 51 and 52: “[T]he Tribunal (…) has recognised the concept of “inherent inequality” in relation to an advantage enjoyed by some candidates over other candidates in the context of recruitment procedures. It has accepted that such a de facto situation between candidates does not necessarily amount to unequal treatment (ATCE, appeal No. 455/2008, Musialkowski v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 30 October 2009, § 37; appeal No. 712/2022, Kirbas v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, decision of 31 January 2023, § 34).
(...)
In such a situation of “inherent inequality”, it is for the Administration to take appropriate measures to mitigate any negative effect of that situation, in order to ensure that all candidates are treated on an equal footing. In the circumstances of the present case, this required the Administration to make sure that the information provided and available to internal and external job candidates was sufficient to pass the test successfully without recourse to any additional sources. In the [present case], there is nothing to suggest that this requirement was not fulfilled."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Para. 38: “Discretion [in determining how competitive examinations are conducted and managed] is not exempt from judicial review. The Tribunal can thus ascertain whether the challenged decision was taken by a competent authority, that it was in due form and that it was adopted following the applicable procedure. It is also for the Tribunal to assess, with regard to the internal legality, whether the administrative authority’s assessment took account of all relevant facts and whether it was not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (ATCE, appeal No. 765/2024, L. Y. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 23 September 2025, § 38). However, it is not for the Tribunal to substitute its assessment for that of the examination authority."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Para. 38: “Discretion [in determining how competitive examinations are conducted and managed] is not exempt from judicial review. The Tribunal can thus ascertain whether the challenged decision was taken by a competent authority, that it was in due form and that it was adopted following the applicable procedure. It is also for the Tribunal to assess, with regard to the internal legality, whether the administrative authority’s assessment took account of all relevant facts and whether it was not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment (ATCE, appeal No. 765/2024, L. Y. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 23 September 2025, § 38). However, it is not for the Tribunal to substitute its assessment for that of the examination authority."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Manifest error of assessment
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Para. 50: “[A]lthough a person may seek access to statistical information which is ready and available, it does not mean that he or she shall be entitled to seek from the Administration to process and summarise information using specific parameters. (…) [I]t is not suggested that any document containing such statistics has ever existed or has to exist. Whether such statistical information should be collected and assessed, the Tribunal considers that in the light of the above findings and given the wide variety of variables that may influence an individual candidate’s performance in an examination, there is no reason to resort to statistical data, as suggested by the appellant."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Access to information
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Burden of proof
Competition
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 770/2025 – G. T. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 22 January 2026

Para. 45: “[A]lthough the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio - according to which the burden of proof in relation to an allegation lies on the party making such allegation - cannot be strictly applied in all instances (see, mutatis mutandis, European Court of Human Rights [GC], judgment of 16 September 2014, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, 29750/09, § 49) given that the Administration possesses considerably more information than what an appellant, especially an external job applicant could possibly obtain, it nevertheless remains incumbent on the party making allegations to demonstrate that they have at least a minimal factual basis."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Burden of proof
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
Manifest error of assessment
Partiality / Bias
Disclosure of confidential documents
Competition
Access to information
Equal treatment / Prohibition of discrimination

Theme: Recruitment procedure / Competition / Career

Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Paras. 78 and 79: “The discretionary nature of the authority of the Organisation which is in play here is not disputed. There is no doubt that the main considerations which the 2024-2025 departure scheme brought to bear were those connected with the Organisation’s strategic interests. As explained in document CM(2023)123, which was submitted to the Committee of Ministers during the budget approval stage, the scheme was seen as a means of implementing the ongoing reform process being conducted in the light of the aims of the human resources strategy, which include the renewal of staff profiles and skills, a change in culture and mindsets, a rejuvenation of the age structure among staff, striking the right balance between staff stability and staff turnover, and increased geographical representation and diversity among staff members.
(...)
In the light of these organisational requirements, staff who volunteer for such a departure scheme cannot claim any right to benefit from it (see, among others, International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), judgment No. 2142 of 15 July 2002, P. B., A. P. and V. R. v. WHO, consideration 18; ILOAT, judgment No. 4662 of 7 July 2023, H. v. Interpol, consideration 9). The staff concerned do nonetheless have a legitimate interest in their application being examined lawfully and are entitled in this respect to a correct procedure that complies with the applicable rules and the criteria announced and, more broadly, with general principles of law such as the guarantee to be treated on an equal footing with other candidates."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons

Theme: Administrative power

Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Para. 80: “[A]s with all discretionary powers, the Tribunal has the duty to review the legality of any decision taken in the context of a departure scheme. It is for the Tribunal to “check whether the contested decision was made by a competent authority, was in due form and was adopted in line with the applicable procedure. It is also for the Tribunal to assess, with regard to the internal legality, whether the administrative authority’s assessment took account of all relevant facts and whether it was not vitiated by a manifest error of assessment” (see, mutatis mutandis, Administrative Tribunal of the Council of Europe (ATCE), Appeals Nos. 768/2025 and 772/2025, C. V. (I and II) v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, judgment of 22 January 2026, § 61)."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Scope of judicial review
Discretion / Discretionary power
General principles of law
Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons

Theme: Administrative power

Appeal No. 769/2025 – M.-F. G. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Judgment of 23 March 2026

Paras. 90 to 93: “In the case [of the decision to reject her application under the 2024–2025 departure scheme], the Tribunal considers that giving sufficient reasons entailed providing the appellant with information through which she could identify the factors linked to her personal and professional circumstances which were taken into account when awarding each of the scores she obtained. Simply giving the separate scores may reflect the result of an assessment process, but, on its own, it does not reveal anything about the factual elements on which this assessment was based.
(...)
It is true that in the context of a competition, communication of the marks obtained in the various tests may constitute an adequate statement of reasons as it enables candidates to know the value set on their performance and to ascertain, if such is the case, that they have not in fact obtained the number of marks required by the notice of competition (Court of Justice of the European Communities, judgment of 4 July 1996, Parliament v. Innamorati, C-254/95 P, points 31 and 32; EGC, JR v. European Commission, cited above, point 57). However, the analogy drawn by the Secretary General between selection in a competition and selection for a departure scheme is only of limited relevance. Whereas in a competition, selection depends on a technical assessment in specific tests, selection for a departure scheme results from an overall assessment of a person’s professional situation. In the latter case, the score obtained is less self-explanatory because it does not reflect the candidate’s performance in an identifiable test, known to the candidate, but the application of strategic and organisational criteria.
(...)
The Tribunal also notes that in the context of competitions, candidates generally have access, on request, to markers’ assessments of their tests, with due regard for the secrecy of deliberations, so that they can understand the reasons for the marks they are given. However, initially, the appellant was not given access to the assessments of her personal situation (...).
(...)
It follows that, when she lodged her appeal on 20 April 2025, the appellant had not received sufficient reasons, i.e. reasons enabling her to understand why her application was rejected."

Full judgment text: English - Français

Keywords: Duty to provide reasons / No or insufficient reasons
Discretion / Discretionary power
Scope of judicial review
General principles of law

Theme: Administrative power