From 1 August to 31 October 2026, the Administrative Tribunal registered four appeals.

• Appeal No. 789/2026 – A. A. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe

On 7 August 2026, the Tribunal registered Appeal No. 789/2026 – A. A.
v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The appellant is a member of the Organisation's staff, employed at grade L4 under an indefinite-term contract. She challenges a series of administrative decisions concerning the modification of her working-time arrangement, which resulted in the application of a part-time working arrangement and in the implementation of a purchase of leave for the period from 11 March 2026 to 31 December 2026, subject to automatic annual renewal by tacit reconduction.

The dispute originated when the appellant took steps to obtain a part-time working arrangement upon her return from unpaid leave on 11 March 2026. At the time of those steps, the appellant did not have access to her Council of Europe computer account, which prevented her from completing the relevant form herself through the multiservice assistant (AMS). On 10 April 2026, the appellant's personal circumstances having changed, she expressed to the Administration her wish to be able to withdraw her request to move to part-time work. The appellant's return to a full-time working arrangement was refused on the ground that the regulatory framework (paragraph 9120.26 of the Staff Rule on Social Security) does not allow a staff member to modify their part-time working arrangement during sick leave.

The appellant challenges the decision rejecting her administrative complaint, submitting that there was no genuine, impartial and thorough examination of the irregularities raised in her complaint, which allegedly resulted in a violation of her right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, having regard to the general principles of law and to the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Articles 6, 13 and 14.

As regards the irregularities in question, the appellant submits that the decision authorising her to work part-time, dated 16 March 2026, is unlawful, in the absence of her formal, free and informed consent and without full notification. She further contends that this decision distorted the intention she had expressed, that it was not duly notified to her, and that her challenge to it was not genuinely examined.

The appellant then alleges that the decision taken on 24 April 2026 by the Directorate of Human Resources in response to her wish to be able to work full-time is vitiated, in that it is tainted, in particular, by a manifest contradiction and a serious breach of good faith.

She further criticises the Organisation for having adopted, in response to her request for hierarchical review, a decision that is insufficiently reasoned and contradictory and that fails to address her arguments concerning the irregularities of the earlier decisions.

It would follow that the part-time working arrangement imposed on her is devoid of purpose, disproportionate and contrary to the principles of good administration, legal certainty, the interest of the service and the duty of care, and that it would also entail a breach of legitimate expectations. Moreover, the appellant invokes a manifestly erroneous and discriminatory application of the Staff Rule on Social Security, in particular paragraph 9120.26, whose interpretation by the Administration she contests on several counts.

On these grounds, the appellant seeks the annulment of the contested decisions, the retroactive restoration of her statutory and financial rights with effect from 11 March 2026, and full compensation for her losses, comprising reimbursement of the deduction made from her salary, the regularisation of her pension rights, and the award of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

• Appeal No. 790/2026 – L v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe

On 1 October 2026, the Tribunal registered Appeal No. 790/2026 – L v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The appellant was a candidate in the external recruitment procedure No. 1150/2026 to fill the post of Executive Director of Eurimages (grade A5). The appellant challenges the decision, notified by the Directorate of Human Resources on 2 April 2026, to exclude them from that procedure because the mark they obtained in the eliminatory written test was considered insufficient. The appellant also challenges the decision of 3 September 2026 rejecting their administrative complaints against that decision.

In support of the claim that the contested decision is unlawful, the appellant submits that the statement of reasons for that decision is inadequate. They consider that, notwithstanding the comments of the two markers communicated in the decision of 3 September 2026, the information available does not enable them to understand and verify how the marks awarded were arrived at. In particular, the appellant relies on the absence of a breakdown of marks by question or criterion, of the weightings applied and of the full marking grid. They also dispute the significance of the general professional conclusions communicated to them, which they consider difficult to verify in the absence of the details of the marking.

The appellant further submits that the assessment of their test should have taken into account the particular circumstances in which they had to sit it: from a significantly different time zone, at a particularly early local time.

The appellant also contends that the eliminatory mechanism was neither sufficiently clear nor proportionate to its objective. They argue this, having regard to the purpose of the procedure and to the competencies sought, which had a strong strategic and leadership dimension.

On these grounds, the appellant asks the Tribunal to annul the contested decisions, order the production of the marking materials needed for judicial review, and if effective reinstatement in the procedure is no longer possible, award them appropriate compensation for the loss of a real chance of progressing to the later stages of the procedure of the competition, and for the professional and moral damage they sustained.

• Appeal No. 791/2026 – M. D. R. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe

On 26 October 2026, the Tribunal registered Appeal No. 791/2026 – M. D. R. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The appellant is a former Council of Europe staff member who, at the time her employment with the Organisation ended, held a grade B4 job.

Since 2014, the appellant has held local elected office in the municipality where she resides and, in that capacity, has received an allowance since 2020. Following her re-election in the municipal elections of March 2026, discussions took place from June 2026 onwards between the appellant, her line management and various representatives of the Administration regarding a possible date for her resignation in light of Article 1.9 of the Staff Regulations. That provision, which entered into force on 1 January 2023, provides that any staff member who stands as a candidate for elective office of a political nature, including at local level, shall be placed on unpaid leave and must resign if elected and if they accept the office.

On 13 July 2026, the appellant was informed by a memorandum from the Directorate of Human Resources (DHR) that she was deemed to have resigned from the Council of Europe with effect from 31 July 2026. Her request that her resignation take effect on 30 September 2026 was rejected by the DHR on 17 July 2026.

The appellant challenges the DHR decision of 13 July 2026 deeming her to have resigned from the Council of Europe with effect from 31 July 2026, as well as the Secretary General’s decision of 27 August 2026 rejecting her administrative complaint against that decision.

In her appeal, the appellant disputes the compatibility of Article 1.9 of the Staff Regulations with several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as the arbitrary and disproportionate manner in which it was applied in her case.

In particular, the appellant argues that the contested decision constitutes an unlawful and disproportionate interference with the exercise of her right to respect for private life and infringes her freedom of association, in breach of Articles 8 and 11 of the ECHR respectively. She further contends that, by depriving her of her legitimate expectation of continuing her career and receiving a full pension, the contested decision also infringes her right to property as protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. Lastly, she alleges that the decision was taken in disregard of her right to be heard and in breach of the Administration’s duty of care.

On these grounds, the appellant asks the Tribunal to annul the contested decision, as confirmed by the decision rejecting her administrative complaint, and to award compensation for the non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage she considers she has suffered, as well as reimbursement of her costs.

• Appeal No. 792/2026 – D. H. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe

On 30 October 2026, the Tribunal registered Appeal No. 792/2026 – D. H. v. Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The appellant has been a member of staff of the Council of Europe since 1 September 2017. He currently holds a job at grade A3 under an open-ended contract.

He challenges the decision of the Deputy Secretary General of 31 July 2026 imposing on him a written warning, together with accompanying measures.

In support of his appeal, the appellant raises several procedural irregularities arising from alleged violations of provisions of the Organisation’s regulatory framework, as well as of general principles of law.

The appellant first contends that the investigation was not conducted in an objective, rigorous and thorough manner. He criticises the investigators for having given undue weight to incriminating evidence, disregarded exculpatory evidence, and relied on indirect or unverified testimony without assessing its credibility. He adds that the investigators did not hear any of the witnesses whose hearing he had requested, without giving reasons for that refusal, thereby failing to meet the standards of proof required in international civil service law.

The appellant further submits that the Joint Advisory Committee on Discipline (the “Committee”) interpreted its competence too restrictively by declining to rule on his objections concerning the regularity of the investigation procedure. He also argues that the Committee’s opinion is vitiated by a contradiction, in that the Committee found certain facts difficult to establish while nonetheless holding as proven those relating to the “managerial dysfunction” of which he was accused.

The appellant also argues that the Deputy Secretary General did not properly apply paragraph 1230.1 of the Staff Rule on Discipline. He objects to the Deputy Secretary General’s recourse to paragraph 1230.1.3, which provides for the imposition of a written warning, after he had previously referred the matter to the Committee under paragraph 1230.1.4 with a view to imposing one of the disciplinary measures provided for in Article 12, paragraphs 1.2 to 1.6, of the Staff Regulations. According to the appellant, paragraphs 1230.1.3 and 1230.1.4 provide for alternative procedures which cannot be applied cumulatively. The appellant further alleges a violation of paragraph 1250.2 of the same Rule, on the ground that the Director of Human Resources made no recommendation to the Deputy Secretary General and merely took note of the Committee’s opinion.

According to the appellant, the procedural irregularities on which he relies infringed the presumption of innocence.

Lastly, the appellant claims that the Organisation failed on several counts to comply with the principle of good administration and its duty of care. In particular, he refers to incorrect information he was allegedly given regarding the available means of redress, which he says caused him harm. He considers that the Organisation failed to carry out an individual assessment weighing the misconduct found against the mitigating circumstances, and that the contested decision therefore breaches the principle of proportionality.

On these grounds, the appellant asks the Tribunal to annul the contested decision, to award him compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered and to reimburse his costs.

The indication of the subject matter of the appeals is established by the Registry, under its responsibility, on the basis of the information provided by the appellants; it is not binding on the Tribunal.

This information is given to enable those who so wish to exercise their right to intervene under Article XI of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal.