Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and Human Rights Protection in the Transnistrian Region:

Regional and International Perspectives

Distinguished colleagues, dear friends,

Mă bucur că am ajuns în sfârșit la Chișinău și că pot contribui la importanta voastră conferință.

It is a privilege to address this gathering of Moldovan lawyers and human rights defenders.

Today, I want to speak about a topic that sits at the very heart of your work and at the core of Europe’s human rights system: the execution of the ECHR judgments and the protection of human rights in the Transnistrian region. I should stress that any views expressed in this intervention are personal.

This is not only a legal challenge, but a test of our shared values, of the resilience of international law, and of our collective belief that no territory – and no person – should fall into a legal vacuum.

Ladies and gentlemen, for over three decades, the Transnistrian region has existed in a constitutional and legal limbo. It is controlled by a de facto authority – the so‑called “MRT” – which has never been recognised as a state by the international community. Yet despite this lack of recognition, the de facto authorities, with the help of the Russian army, exercise control over territory and people.

This creates a paradox: how do we ensure human rights protection where the constitutional order of the Republic of Moldova cannot fully operate?

You already discussed the relevant ECHR case law in a previous panel. The European Court of Human Rights has been clear: human rights obligations do not disappear when a government loses effective control over part of its territory. Article 1 of the Convention – the obligation to secure the rights and freedoms of everyone under a state’s jurisdiction – applies even in difficult, fragmented, or contested territorial situations. In such circumstances, a territorial state retains positive obligations: it must use every legal, diplomatic, and political means available to safeguard the rights of individuals living in areas outside its direct control.

This principle was articulated powerfully in the landmark judgment of Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia. The Court recognised that Moldova retains jurisdiction, even if reduced, because it remains the lawful sovereign. Moldova’s responsibility is therefore not one of physical control but of sustained diplomatic action. At the same time, the Court held that Russia exercises effective control through military, political, and economic support to the separatist regime – creating a continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility for violations suffered by applicants in the region.

This dual‑jurisdiction doctrine has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases: Ivanţoc, Catan, Mozer. The legal message is clear: more than one state may bear responsibility, but victims must not be left without protection. In this sense, the Court has safeguarded the integrity of the Convention system, ensuring that political realities do not undermine the universality of human rights.
 

But the Court has gone further. It has made clear that de facto regimes, while unlawful from the perspective of international law, cannot be allowed to create a legal vacuum. The Court, drawing on the ICJ’s Namibia principle and its own case law on Northern Cyprus, has held that some acts of de facto authorities – If they offer guarantees of independence and impartiality and fairness of proceedings – may be recognised to protect the individuals concerned.

Yet at the same time, the Court has refused to legitimise judicial institutions that do not meet minimum Convention standards, as seen in the Ilaşcu judgement and later clarified in Mozer. The core criterion is always the same: does the system actually protect human rights?

This jurisprudence is not only doctrinally important. It has profound consequences for the women, men, and children living in Transnistria – people who deserve the same protection as any other person in Europe. Take the example of Catan and Others v Russia. The judgment was delivered in 2012, which means that children could have started school at the age of four, gone through all levels of education and left at the age of 18, all without access to education in their national language and Latin script.

But colleagues, recognition of violations is only the first step. The second – and arguably more difficult – step is execution of the Court’s judgments.

Without execution, rights remain abstract; justice remains incomplete.

We all know the challenges: the Russian Federation has not implemented key judgments concerning Transnistria, nor has it paid the just‑satisfaction awards ordered by the Court in cases such as Catan, Mozer, and others.

With Russia’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe, the question of execution has become even more urgent. Russia currently accounts for the highest number of ECHR judgments pending implementation – some 3,000 in total – representing over 40% of all cases awaiting execution.

Here lies an opportunity – perhaps even a responsibility – for the Council of Europe and its member states. At the request of the Committee of Ministers, the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (‘CAHDI’) prepared an indicative overview of possible options under international law aimed at securing the payment by the Russian Federation of just satisfaction awarded by the ECtHR.

Three possible mechanisms have been identified to ensure that just‑satisfaction awards are not left unpaid:

• The creation of an escrow account within the Council of Europe;
• The establishment of an ad hoc compensation fund, modeled on successful trust funds;
• Or a more institutionalised solution through a partial agreement, providing a stable legal framework for enforcement.

Each mechanism shares a common purpose: to ensure that victims are compensated, and that the authority of the Court is preserved.

Such possible mechanisms have to be seen today in the broader context of the future international claims commission and the reparation loan for Ukraine proposed by the European Commission.

L’union fait la force. It would make perfect sense to connect CoE and EU initiatives regarding accountability and reparation, as proposed in a recent study presented to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. The EU instrument could be directly connected to the claims commission’s trust fund allowing for the payment of reparation claims adjudicated upon by the commission.

I am aware that these are not immediate solutions for the judgments concerning Transnistria, since both the EU & CoE instruments are directly linked to the full-scale invasion by the RF of Ukraine

This brings me to a second avenue, the enforcement of ECHR judgments in domestic courts, assimilating them to final domestic judgments. When enforcing such judgments through courts in third countries, the process requires that the domestic courts accept the ECHR judgment as res judicata, that enforceable Russian assets exist in their jurisdiction, and that those assets are not protected by state immunity.

The Convention system, under article 46, obliges countries to comply with the Court’s final judgments. There are however very few precedents recognising ECHR judgments as directly enforceable in domestic courts of a third state, which is not the respondent. For example, an ECHR judgment rendered against Türkiye was held to be directly enforceable in Cyprus.

These questions are closely related to the wider debate on state immunity and its exceptions – particularly in cases where a state has voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of an international tribunal and then refuses to comply with its judgments. Some scholars argue that article 46 of the Convention implies a waiver of immunity for the purposes of executing judgments.

Another option is the use of countermeasures as a lawful response to the persistent, serious breach of international obligations. Judicial practice remains however scarce, even in countries like Belgium, where national law explicitly stipulates that state immunity is ‘subject to the application of mandatory supranational and international provisions.’

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognised the legitimacy of such countermeasures in Resolution 2539 (2024). This is significant: it reflects a growing understanding that the integrity of the Convention system depends not only on finding violations – but on ensuring that they are remedied. The Parliamentary Assembly, in particular through its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights as well as the Sub-Committee for the implementation of ECHR judgments is pursuing its work on this topic.

Whatever the merits of these discussions, there are certain state assets that may not benefit from state immunity, in particular those used for commercial purposes.

There is an emerging practice of executing against assets held by a state’s sovereign wealth fund. Recent judgments by courts in Sweden,^[1] Belgium,^[2] and France^[3] have found that assets or investments related these funds are not immune where they are used for commercial purposes.

Colleagues, the Republic of Moldova stands at the forefront of this debate. Not as a passive subject but as an active contributor – a state that has navigated difficult constitutional realities while maintaining a principled commitment to European values and human rights law.

Moldovan lawyers and human rights defenders play a critical role: documenting violations, representing victims, calling for accountability. Your work strengthens not only Moldova’s democratic resilience but the entire European human rights system. You ensure that victims are not forgotten, that violations are not normalised, and that the Convention remains a living instrument – capable of responding to the world’s most complex territorial and political challenges.

Human rights protection in Transnistria is not only a regional issue. It is a test case for Europe’s commitment to justice in contested spaces. And it is a measure of our collective resolve to ensure that every individual – regardless of which side of the Dniester river they live on – remains under the shield of the Convention.

Let us continue this work with determination, creativity, and courage.