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Speech by Alain Berset, Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Rector of the University of Lausanne,
President of the Jean Monnet Foundation,
State Councillor,
Ladies and gentlemen,

Introduction

It is a pleasure to be back at the University of Lausanne campus with you today. The last time I was here was in November 2023 with President Emmanuel Macron. It was almost a different era for the European continent and for Switzerland, and I was serving in a different capacity from the one I hold today. But already the theme was: “Let’s talk about Europe”.

Our meeting today comes at a time when I have been Secretary General of the Council of Europe for a year and a half. A time when history seems to be speeding up, and the world seems to be becoming a more dangerous and less predictable place, at least when viewed from Switzerland. A time when the challenge is to recognise these changes for what they are: evolution, rupture or fracture.

I will begin by sharing with you some of my thoughts and experiences from the last eighteen months, and I look forward to our conversation.

Ukraine

To begin this story, I suggest we go back exactly four years, to 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale military offensive against Ukraine. On the front page of Le Monde read: “Ukraine under Russian bombs”. The Swiss daily Le Temps ran the headline “Ukraine collapses”.

On that day, announcements of economic sanctions followed one after another. Joe Biden wanted to make Vladimir Putin an international “pariah”. Boris Johnson declared that Putin “will never be able to wash the blood of Ukraine from his hands”. At the same time, a meeting of the United Nations Security Council opened in New York, chaired by Russia. In fact, it began twenty minutes before the war broke out. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on Putin to “give peace a chance”. At the end of the meeting, an ABC reporter disclosed a message from the Pentagon received a few hours earlier: “You are likely in the last few hours of peace on the European continent for a long time to come. Be careful.”

From a “perfect storm” to a geopolitical turning point in three phases

One crisis after another

Let us now return to the present, 24 February 2026. The last few months, and especially the last few weeks, have seen a major turning point in international geopolitics as we experience it from our continent. A turning point that will mark a generation. Some, myself included, have described this moment as a rupture in the world order.

Europe is not the catalyst for this rupture. Rather, it is the target, and sometimes even the victim, as the rupture unfolds along lines of force that do not start from us but  strike at the heart of our security, our institutions and our cohesion. I am one of those people who have been sounding the alarm for a long time, because none of this happened overnight. By the time Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney talked about a rupture in Davos a few weeks ago, however, no one could pretend any longer that the international order was intact.

Let’s rewind the film together. There have always been crises and difficult times. But something new began, in my view, with the 2008 financial crisis, whose global scope we failed to sufficiently grasp and whose consequences we could not fully imagine.

Then came a series of shocks: the debt crisis in the major economies, the explosion of inequality, the euro crisis, the first phase of the war in Ukraine in 2014, the return of forms of populism that we thought were a thing of the past, the Covid-19 pandemic, and throughout it all, the climate crisis. We believed these were simply repeated setbacks, but nothing more. And then Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, just eight years after Crimea.

These shocks were not separate events. Rather they were multiple deep cracks in the security architecture. An uninterrupted series of self-reinforcing crises. What I have described as a “perfect storm” for the international order.

The acceleration

And it did not stop with the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It kept accelerating. The security and humanitarian situation in Gaza exposed the paralysis of multilateral institutions. What happened in Venezuela resurrected the old Cold War notion of spheres of influence. But it was ultimately the tensions surrounding Greenland that put an end to any illusion of distance. Because the threat of military action against a territory that is part of the Council of Europe, and this by one of our closest allies, was the tipping point.

It was in this particularly tense context that I spoke out in the pages of the New York Times a few weeks ago, reminding both sides of the Atlantic that alliances are based on predictability, expectation and the requirement that power remain bound by law. That international law cannot be subject to any one leader’s morality.

That is why I called on Europe to protect its legal framework. Because if we fail to articulate a legal and political vision, then others will fill the void. And let us be under no illusion: they will shift security away from a system based on law and rules to one based on force and power.

Ultimately, it all boils down to one sentence: international law is either universal or it is meaningless.

Dismantling

We are in the third phase of this dismantling of international law. I must make a confession. When I took office just over a year ago, I thought that the issue in Europe was about how to improve the international order, not whether it still existed.

This third phase in which we find ourselves is leading us towards a world without rules, where relations are governed solely by the impulses and might of the powerful. This world has no real legal order. It has only force. And this is not limited to relations between states. When the law is weakened externally, the politics of power creeps into the very heart of our democracies. In other words, the weakening of international law heralds the weakening of the rule of law at national level.

Tipping point

The post-war period: when courage rebuilt Europe

This third phase, which I have described as the “dismantling of the rules-based international order”, is a tipping point. It is a situation that requires a bold vision for Europe, one that is clear and grounded in values.

Our continent has been through such situations before.

Let me take you back 80 years. To a time when the founding fathers of Europe had radical ideas for the continent. How can we forget Jean Monnet? Or Churchill and his speech in Zurich, exactly 80 years ago this year.

It was there that he called for the creation of a Council of Europe. For Churchill realised earlier than many of his peers that Europe had to rebuild itself through reconciliation between former enemies. And he was clear-sighted about the failure of the League of Nations, which did not fail because of its own principles, but because states stopped defending those principles and governments refused to see and act while there was still time.

Picture the scene in 1950. Jean Monnet promoted ideas such as a United States of Europe, as Churchill did as well. And also the idea of a European army. Under Monnet’s initiative, the Pleven plan proposed the creation of a European Defence Community with an integrated European army. Adenauer was in favour of it. In August 1950, Winston Churchill addressed the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and called for the creation of a unified European army under European democratic control. The motion was adopted by a very large majority: 89 votes in favour, 5 against and 27 abstentions.

Munich 2026: back-of-an-envelope plans

Let’s return to 2026. Here we are, 80 years later, debating the same ideas. A European army. Or rather, a rearmament effort on the part of several European countries. It is not the same thing. But what are we really hearing from the leaders of the major European countries today?

The recent Munich Security Conference gave them a platform to present their visions for Europe. The least we can say is that they lack the boldness and ambition of those of the post-war generations. Three major trends emerge from these plans, hastily drawn up on the back of an envelope.

The Coué method

The first trend is psychological. Whereas post-war generations proposed concrete policies, structures and institutions, many European leaders today talk mainly about mindset.

There are calls for a change in mentality. The German chancellor calls for a mental transformation. The French president speaks of the need to regain confidence and pride. The British prime minister also talks of a fundamental change in mentality, reminding us that in the 1930s, leaders waited too long to tell their societies the truth.

One cannot help but think that this language is more akin to the Coué method than to a genuine political vision for Europe. The transformations facing Europe cannot be achieved through positive thinking. They require policy choices, structures and strategies. Above all, they require a break with certain models inherited from the past.

It is only a short step from pride to populism, or even nationalism. And when the ambition becomes to make the Bundeswehr “the most powerful conventional army in Europe”, are we still talking about European security, or national power?

The semantics of sacrifice

The second trend is semantic. There is talk of hard-to-hear truths and sacrifices to be made. Behind this cliché, however, lies a simple reality: rearmament requires major budgetary sacrifices.

That much became clear when the British and German military leaders issued a joint statement in the wake of Munich, calling on European societies to accept the need for rearmament and to face up to these “difficult truths”. They are difficult because the sacrifices in question primarily affect spending in the social sectors. The German Foreign Minister made this clear in an op-ed in Le Monde, describing French defence efforts as insufficient and calling for cuts in social spending.

A multi-speed Europe

The third major trend to emerge from Munich is the persistent idea of a multi-speed Europe. There were numerous references to the E3 group – France, the United Kingdom and Germany.

These formats can make sense. Sometimes they provide a way to move forward more quickly on sensitive issues. We have seen this with the “coalition of the willing” in Ukraine, even though it has no legal status, no decision-making power and not even a secretariat.

The unfinished episode in Greenland showed that in times of crisis, Europe often speaks through national capitals rather than with a single political voice. But when this unity falters, multilateralism weakens – and with it Europe’s credibility. It is precisely at such times that legal institutions with a collective mandate, such as the Council of Europe, become essential.

When values become a matter of variable geometry

Even more worrying is the apparent willingness of some to compromise our values in the name of pragmatism, rejecting foreign policies deemed “over-prescriptive”, moralising or idealistic.

For them, partnership is no longer absolute. It no longer requires agreement on values. Such thinking is in line with the middle powers approach put forward by the Canadian Prime Minister in Davos. When the rules no longer protect you, you have to protect yourself. This is where the order is reconfigured. First, we relativise principles. Then rules give way to transactions. And before we know it, co-operation is being done on a “variable geometry” basis and, eventually, the rule of law itself becomes an adjustment variable.

Rearmament and democracy

Rearmament as a test

In Munich, as in recent months, there has been much talk of defence spending. And that is only natural. Russia is more aggressive. America is less present. Europe no longer has a choice.

So Europe is rearming on a scale not seen since the Cold War. Germany is investing €650 billion over five years. France is planning to spend more than €400 billion by 2030. Poland already spends 4.5% of its GDP on defence, the highest level in NATO. And the European Commission has announced an €800 billion defence plan.

These figures matter. But they are not fundamental. The key question lies elsewhere: what exactly are we defending?

Let’s put the question another way. What would happen if weakened institutions on our continent became authoritarian? What if these regimes came to control and use these massive arsenals within ten years?

This is not fiction. Weimar Germany in the early 1930s and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s are there to remind us.

What we are defending are our democracies. Stability. Our freedoms. Our values. These are what protect us from the arbitrariness of power. And let me be clear: this is not an argument against rearmament. Rearmament is necessary. It is urgent. But military power only protects a democracy if that democracy remains strong enough to control it.

What disappears when we talk about security

There are, however, other truths that are difficult to hear, spoken of far less often, yet just as profound.

One is the slow erasure of the word democracy from our vocabulary. I have looked closely at the speeches in Munich. The contrast between security and democracy is striking. In the British Prime Minister’s speech, the word democracy appears only once, compared with fifteen references to security. In the German Chancellor’s speech, there are four mentions of democracy, compared with more than twenty references to security. The order of priorities has become visible in the words themselves.

Then there are the challenges facing democracy. Elections are becoming easier to influence and their results harder to trust. AI-driven disinformation now shapes debates long before people vote. Civic space is shrinking rapidly under the impact of new “foreign influence” laws. Courts are being sucked into politics, including the European Court of Human Rights. And disillusionment with the democratic model is being fuelled by stagnant wages, inflation and the cost of living.

After the chaos, the quest to define a new balance

After a series of crises such as those we are currently experiencing, a new balance must be found. But what kind of balance? And on what do we want to base it?

This is where Europe must pick up the thread and avoid two pitfalls.

The first pitfall is sentimentality. eloquent talks about values, a proliferation of statements, and a gradual detachment from reality. The other pitfall to avoid is what I would call atrophy. Clinging to structures that no longer work and mistaking continuity for strength.

Neither will protect us.

What Europe needs is security based on democracy and on established and predictable rules.

Democratic security: our first line of defence

That is why we need to rethink our concept of security. Europe needs a common approach to democratic security. And we must invest in it with the same determination and urgency that we bring to military security.

For too long, Europe has thought of security as if military power and democratic strength belonged to separate worlds. We heard this again in Munich, where some said that hard power, meaning military power, is the currency of our age.

This distinction between “hard” and “soft” security is outdated. It belongs to the last century. It no longer fits the Europe we live in.

Today, real security begins with institutions people can trust: independent courts, transparent elections, clear limits on emergency powers, and free media able to challenge those in power. But it also means building a security architecture capable of protecting us from cyberattacks, terrorism and foreign information manipulation.

Today’s front lines no longer run along borders or battlefields. They run online, on our streets and on our screens. And they have turned democratic security into our first line of defence.

The force of law, not the law of force

The Council of Europe was not created for the easy times in history. It was designed for times when the rules of the established order cease to be self-evident, even to those who wrote them. For times when the balance is shifting. When it is the force of law that must take precedence, not power relations.

What other organisation in Europe exists precisely for this purpose?

Not to guarantee security through force. Not to organise economic power or market integration. But to define the legal and democratic framework without which there can be no lasting European security.

This uniqueness imposes a heavy responsibility on us.

At a time when the European security architecture is being reshaped, our role is to uphold what cannot be compromised: democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Towards a European Security Council

In stable times, multilateral organisations can seem secondary. In times of upheaval, they either disappear or become pivotal. The Council of Europe has made a clear choice: to remain faithful to its principles and act accordingly.

This clarity stems from its ability to make decisions without a paralysing veto or a requirement for unanimity that impedes collective action.

This translates into concrete security functions. Judging violations and regulating the use of force. Establishing legal responsibility after conflicts to stabilise societies. Organising the post-war period and rebuilding institutions. Protecting against disinformation and foreign interference. Providing a common legal framework for operations, sanctions and collective action, so that European security can be maintained.

All these functions are based on three inseparable elements: a stable legal framework, recognised decision-making capacity and institutional permanence. However, much of Europe’s action in the field of security is still based on ad hoc formats, without a common legal basis, without permanent decision-making authority, and without a structure to ensure continuity.

This may be acceptable in an emergency, but it is no basis on which to build a stable security order. Europe needs to have a forum where its collective security can be conceived, decided and guaranteed within the framework of the law: a genuine European Security Council, which must defend both its territory and its values.

Inaction is not an option. Europe is not faced with a choice between changing or remaining itself. It must change to remain itself.

Conclusion

I began with Ukraine, and I will end with Ukraine. For it is there, at the heart of a European country fighting for its survival, that our responsibility takes on its full meaning.

Kyiv, four years on: an ordinary day in a city that no longer sleeps

Four years on, peace has still not returned to Europe.

Last week, I travelled to Kyiv. On this anniversary, I want to share with you what I saw there. Because it is there that European security is being played out in real life.

In Kyiv, people go to bed around 10 or 11 p.m. But the day begins in the middle of the night, when we are woken by an air raid siren. We go down to the lower basement of the hotel. We have a few minutes to take shelter. At around 7 a.m., the alert is lifted. At 9 a.m., we meet with the US ambassador. We talk about peace negotiations, reforms and international support.

Then we visit an emergency shelter. Tents where people come to warm up, recharge their phones and let their children study in the warmth. These are islands of survival in a city under constant pressure.

Nearby is a thermal power plant that supplies more than half of Kyiv. Over 1 200 civilians work there around the clock. It is regularly targeted, including just four days before our visit. Between the alert and the impact, employees have only two minutes to react. Someone must always remain at the command centre, a tiny steel capsule their only defence against the missiles.

We meet with several Ukrainian ministers, including the Prime Minister. The Foreign Minister welcomes us in the ministry’s entrance hall, which has been turned into an exhibition of weapons and drones. The windows have been blocked with sandbags. In the corridors, silhouettes move like ghosts.

At the end of the day, we meet with the staff of the Council of Europe, our largest representation abroad. In their own apartments, it is minus seven degrees. There are sleeping bags everywhere. The staff are exhausted. But determined.

This is how a European capital lives today.

Law and accountability

When Russia launched its war of aggression, the Council of Europe did not let force triumph over law. We excluded Russia. And since then, we have kept working to ensure that accountability prevails where it was denied.

Very quickly, we documented the destruction. The Register of Damage for Ukraine was created in record time. Forty-four states and the European Union have already joined. More than 110 000 claims have been registered. Every piece of evidence is verified, every testimony examined, every loss recorded.

Already this work is helping to create a legal memory of the war. For without legal memory, there is only oblivion. And oblivion is the first ally of impunity.

In December, we took a decisive step forward with the creation of the International Claims Commission. Its objective is clear: to turn documented losses into recognised rights, and recognised rights into compensation. We are making rapid progress, moreover.

At the same time, we are working to establish the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression. Because international law must apply to everyone — without exception and without double standards.

And let us not forget the European Court of Human Rights. Today, it is the only international court adjudicating human rights violations arising from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

The Council of Europe's teams are working on the ground to reform the justice system, prepare for future elections, fight corruption, and much more. This work has real, often tricky consequences. We are a long way from armchair diplomacy. We are taking action every day, working closely with local authorities, wherever there is a need for institutions to stand firm.

What kind of world do we want to live in?

As Europeans, we have a choice to make. It must be made in Ukraine, but it must also be made in each of the member states of the Council of Europe. It is a choice to live in a world governed by transparent and predictable rules, rules chosen in accordance with democratic principles. A world where peaceful relations, dialogue and accountability prevail over force, violence, brutality and impunity.

The ongoing crisis we have been experiencing for nearly twenty years has caused a great deal of damage and narrowed our perspectives. Today, it is the international order, that pillar of stability, which is under pressure. And if there is one thing to remember, it is that what we are experiencing is not normal. We must not get used to it.

There is another way forward besides cynicism, fragmentation and every country for itself. It requires us to refuse to remain stuck in the past and to work together to forge a Europe, built on democratic values and principles, capable of meeting the challenges of this century.