The European Convention on Human Rights and The European Social Charter in the Context of AI
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- Effective protection of rights
- Subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation
- Evolutive Interpretation and the ‘Living Instrument’ Doctrine
- Positive Obligations
- Human Dignity
- Personal Autonomy and Self-Determination
- Lawfulness, Legitimate Aim, Necessity, Proportionality, and Fair Balance
Effective Protection of Rights
The ECHR and the ESC are intended to guarantee rights that are not merely theoretical or illusory but practical and effective.[1] National authorities must ensure that rights holders can effectively enjoy their rights, which may involve adopting legislation, ensuring its effective application, providing adequate resources, and establishing appropriate operational procedures. Accordingly, States should safeguard the effective protection of human rights against harms related to activities within the lifecycle of AI systems through measures which may include adopting or implementing laws, providing resources, establishing, or designating existing national human rights structures, such as national human rights institutions (NHRIs), as independent oversight mechanisms, and ensuring effective cooperation between such mechanisms and other national human rights structures.
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Subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation
Subsidiarity means that the States bear the primary responsibility to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR.[2] The Court authoritatively interprets the ECHR and acts as a safeguard for individuals whose rights and freedoms are not secured at the national level.[3]
National authorities may enjoy a “margin of appreciation” in how they apply and implement the ECHR, depending on the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms engaged. This reflects that the ECHR system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of human rights at national level and that national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions.[4] Under the ESC, States Parties also have discretion in determining the steps to comply with its provisions, balancing general interests with the needs of specific groups and available resources. With respect to new technologies, in particular, any State claiming a pioneer role in their development bears special responsibility for striking the right balance between the potential benefits of their extensive use against protected rights.[5]
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Evolutive Interpretation and the ‘Living Instrument’ Doctrine
The ECHR and the ESC are "living instruments", interpreted dynamically in the light of present-day conditions to address evolving societal and technological issues.[6] The Court’s past rulings on issues like data interception,[7] biometric data,[8] the internet and digital tools,[9] or facial recognition technology[10] highlight its capacity to adapt the application of existing rights to modern challenges. Likewise, the ECSR has addressed the right to privacy in the context of emerging new technologies.[11] By applying this doctrine, both the Court and the ECSR are expected to apply the ECHR and the ESC to AI-related cases in the future.
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Positive Obligations
States have a duty under both the ECHR and the ESC to refrain from unjustified interference with human rights (“negative obligations”) and to ensure their effective realisation and protection (“positive obligations”). Substantive positive obligations require the basic measures needed for full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed (e.g., proper rules governing intervention by the police or prohibiting ill-treatment). Procedural positive obligations require domestic procedures to ensure the protection of rights holders (e.g. conducting an effective investigation).
Positive obligations can apply even in cases where threats originate from private individuals or entities beyond direct state control as these instruments can address both vertical relationships – between national authorities and individuals – and horizontal relationships[12], between individuals or entities. States may be required to protect human rights in the sphere of the relations between individuals themselves (horizontal effect). This duty becomes particularly important in the context of the deployment of AI systems, where public-private partnerships and procurement from private actors are prevalent.
States must act diligently and reasonably, taking appropriate measures within their resources and capacities. Positive obligations may require the State to ensure the existence of adequate and effective mechanisms under which sanctions may be imposed in particular cases, enact specific legal rules, and/or take operational steps to protect individuals from foreseeable risks to their rights.[13]
States’ positive obligations[14] therefore may require them to take the necessary measures to safeguard human rights, including where necessary to assess the relevant risks and potential impacts to human rights that may be posed by AI systems and consider measures to address those potential harms effectively, and/or to implement measures to mitigate identified risks. The Framework Convention contains a dedicated provision prescribing the need to identify, assess, prevent and mitigate ex ante and, as appropriate, iteratively throughout the lifecycle of the AI system the relevant risks and potential impacts to human rights, democracy and the rule of law by following and enabling the development of a methodology with concrete and objective criteria for such assessments.[15]
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Human Dignity
In the ECHR system, human dignity is invoked by the Court to affirm individuals' intrinsic worth and equality.[16] The Court has held that “[r]espect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the Convention”.[17] The ESC system too recognises that human dignity is the fundamental value and indeed the core of positive European human rights law – whether under the European Social Charter or under the European Convention of Human Rights.[18]
The Framework Convention also requires that the respect for human dignity be among the principles that govern artificial intelligence.[19] Activities within the AI lifecycle must not dehumanise individuals, undermine their autonomy, or reduce them to data points, and AI should not be anthropomorphised in ways that infringe on human dignity.[20
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Personal Autonomy and Self-Determination
Personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of ECHR guarantees.[21] It is an important aspect of human dignity and refers to the capacity of individuals for self-determination; that is, their ability to make choices and decisions, including without coercion, and live their lives freely. In the context of AI, individual autonomy requires that individuals have control over the use and impact of AI technologies in their lives, and that their agency and autonomy are not thereby diminished.[22] The Framework Convention also specifically requires that the respect for individual autonomy is among the principles that govern AI.[23]
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Lawfulness, Legitimate Aim, Necessity, Proportionality, and Fair Balance
Certain ECHR rights are absolute and cannot be subject to derogations in times of emergency, exceptions, or permissible interference. However, States Parties are allowed to restrict certain rights in the ECHR[24] and the ESC,[25] known as “qualified rights”, which allow for a balance between individual and general interests. There are some general requirements in both the ECHR and the ESC which must be satisfied for an interference to be justified. The interference must be (i) ‘prescribed by law’ or ‘in accordance with the law’ (requirement of lawfulness).[26] This means that it must have a clear basis in domestic law, ensuring it is rooted in established legal frameworks. Additionally, the legal basis must be accessible to the public, meaning individuals can know and understand the laws that affect their rights.[27] The interference must also be foreseeable, allowing people to anticipate how and when their rights might be restricted.[28] Lastly, it must be free from arbitrariness and implemented with proper procedural safeguards to ensure fairness and due care.[29] The interference with the right must (ii) pursue a legitimate aim[30] and it must be (iii) necessary (in a democratic society) to achieve the legitimate aim pursued.[31] The test of necessity requires that the limitation is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, responds to a pressing social need, and uses the least restrictive means.
States will have to ensure that any restrictions on qualified ECHR or ESC rights resulting from activities within the AI systems lifecycle satisfy all of these requirements.
[1] Airey v Ireland, No. 6289/73, 9 October 1979, § 24; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) v. Portugal, Complaint No. 1/1998, decision on the merits of 9 September 1999, §32; European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. Slovenia, Complaint No. 53/2008, decision on the merits of 8 September 2009, §28.
[3] Explanatory Report, Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 213), para 8.
[5] S. and Marper v. UK [GC], Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008, § 112: “The Court considers that any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard.”
[6] Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, No. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, § 31; Transgender-Europe and ILGA-Europe v. Czech Republic, Complaint No. 117/2015, decision on the merits of 15 May 2018, §75; Defence for Children International (DCI) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008, decision on the merits of 20 October 2009, §29.
[7] Big Brother Watch and Others v. United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15, 25 May 2021.
[8] S. and Marper v. United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008.
[9] Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, No. 3111/10, 18 March 2013; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], No. 18030/11, 8 November 2016.
[10] Glukhin v. Russia, No. 11519/20, 4 July 2023.
[12] The Court has recognised States' duty to protect human rights in these horizontal contexts, such as the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR), see X and Y v. Netherlands, No. 8978/80, 26 March 1985, § 23; freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), see Platform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, No. 10126/82, 21 June 1986, § 23; and freedom of association (Article 11 ECHR), see Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, No. 23883/06, 16 December 2008, § 32; Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (No. 2), No. 25196/04, 2 February 2010, § 25.
[13] For the ECHR see e.g., Osman v. The United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 87/1997/871/1083, § 115. For the ESC see, e.g., ECSR, Conclusions 2020, Albania on Article 1§2, Conclusions 2005, Statement of Interpretation on Article 11, International Planned Parenthood Federation – European Network (IPPF EN) v. Italy, Complaint No. 87/2012, decision on the merits of 10 September 2013, §66; see also Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint No. 91/2013, decision on the merits of 12 October 2015, §162 and 190.
[14] See the section on Positive obligations under the ECHR and the ESC.
[16] Lăcătuş v Switzerland, application, No. 14065/15, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 19 January 2021.
[17] Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary [GC], No. 18030/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 November 2016 at para 155.
[18] International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) v. France, complaint No. 14/ 2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, §31.
[21] Pretty v. United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, § 61, 29 July 2002, and [GC] judgment of 11 January 2006, Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99, 11 January 2006, § 54. See also the preamble to the data protection Convention 108, as it will be amended following the entry into force of the amending protocol.
[24] No derogation in time of emergency is permitted from certain provisions of the ECHR and its protocols: the right to life under Article 2 (except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war); the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3; the prohibition of slavery and servitude under Article 4 (but not the prohibition on forced or compulsory labour under Article 4(2)); the prohibition on punishment without law under Article 7; the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace (Protocol No. 6, Article 1); the right not to be tried or punished twice (ne bis in idem) (Protocol No. 7, Article 4); and the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances (Protocol No. 13, Article 1). The Convention provides for exceptions in relation to certain rights, such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty under Article 5. In such cases, the Court has clearly established that the list of exceptions in a given article is exhaustive and that only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that article.
[25] States Parties are allowed to restrict the rights enshrined in the ESC. The conditions for the restriction are laid down in Article 31 of the ESC and Article G of the RESC.
[26] Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], Application No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005, § 88; Biržietis v. Lithuania, Application No. 49304/09, 14 June 2016, § 50.
[27] The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), Application No. 6538/74, 26 April 1979, § 48.
[29] R.Sz. v. Hungary, Application No. 41838/11, 2 July 2013, § 36.
[30] S.A.S. v. France [GC], Application No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], No. 72508/13, 28 November 2017, §§ 295-296.
[31] Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], Nos. 47621/13 and 5 others, 8 April 2021, § §§ 273-275; Association internationale Autisme-Europe (AIAE) v. France, Complaint No. 13/20002, decision on the merits of 4 November 2003, §52.
- European Convention on Human Rights - ECHR Official Texts - ECHR - ECHR / CEDH
- ECHR Explanatory Report, Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 213)
- The Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence
- Framework Convention Explanatory Report