


Evaluation & Certification of (Internet) Voting Systems regarding Security Requirements



Melanie Volkamer



Evaluation and Certification Approach



Common Criteria for voting software

IT Grundschatz (includes ISO 27001)
for operational environment

→ Outside threats

k-resilience value → insider threats

Existing international standards
Research

Common Criteria - Overview




The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) is an international standard (ISO15408) for the evaluation and certification of security critical software.

- users *specify security functional and assurance requirements plus the trust model*
- vendors *implement* and/or make claims about the security of their products, and
- testing laboratories *evaluate* products to determine if they actually meet the claims.
- certification authorities observe the evaluation process & certify products after successful evaluation

Common Criteria – Protection Profile





- ... is a document, typically created by users/community, which identifies **security functional requirements** and evaluation assurance requirements plus the trust model for a class of security critical products




<http://www.bsi.de/zertifiz/zert/reporte/pp0037a.pdf>

Common Criteria - SFRs

- Threat Analyses
- KORA-Approach
 - Konkretisierung rechtlicher Anforderungen
- Literature Research




Common Criteria - SFRs



Common Criteria – Protection Profile



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


https://www.bsi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480286/publicationFile/29305/pp0037b_engl_pdf.pdf

Common Criteria – SAR & Trust Model

- Evaluation Assurance Requirements
 - EAL 2+ (EAL1-7)
 - Formal methods for EAL6/7
 - e.g. PI-Calculus for voting protocols (→Mark Ryan)
- Trust Model
 - Intruder's Capability
 - Basic (basic, enhanced-basic, moderate, high)
 - Set of Assumptions to the Organisation Environment
 - A.ElectionServer, A.Availability, A.ServerRoom, ...

IT-Grundschutz - Overview



Standard safeguards to evaluate typical organizational Environment (incl. IT infrastructure)

- Includes ISO 27001
- Methodology (simplified):
 - Description of IT structure
 - Mapping to ITGS modules
 - Showing how assigned safeguards are met
 - Evaluation
 - Certification

IT-Grundschutz – „Template“


„Work in Progress!!“



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- Template of ITGS modules

 - ToDo's:
 1. Defining requirements to the operational environment of remote voting software
 2. Mapping to ITGS modules and thus safeguards


IT-Grundschutz – Requirements to the operational environment



IT-Grundschutz - Safeguards

- **Protection of the software (A. Election Server)**
 - S 2.17: Entry regulations and controls
 - S 1.58: Technical and organisational requirements for server rooms
 - **Availability (A.Availability)**
 - S 2.314: Use of high-availability architectures for servers
- **Secure storage**
 - S 4.168: Selection of a suitable archive system
 - S 1.60: Appropriate storage of archival media
 - **Assistance and training**
 - S 3.5: Training on IT security safeguards
 - S 2.198: Making staff aware of IT security issues
 - **Personnel**
 - S 3.2: Commitment of staff members to compliance with relevant laws, ...
 -

k-resilience Value




The k-resilience value helps to understand the power of possible insider threats; that is which people/ component needs to be trusted.

- (k out of N)-resilient
- $(k_1 \bigwedge \dots \bigwedge k_m)$ out of (N_1, \dots, N_m) - resilient
- $(k_1 \bigvee \dots \bigvee k_m)$ out of (N_1, \dots, N_m) - resilient

→ Propositional logic term

→ Conjunctive normal form

Future Work



Common Criteria


- Experiences with Basis Protection Profile
- Integration of verifiability

IT-Grundschutz

- voting specific moduls

k-resilience

- standardization



Other Approaches

- Evaluation regarding
 - cryptographic protocols
 - data protection issues
 - usability issues

Integration in

- legal context
- election observation context

Questions to be answered

- who's doing the evaluation/certification?
- who pays?
- how often/re-certification

Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

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