MULTICULTURALISM AND INTEGRATION: STRUGGLING WITH CONFUSIONS

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Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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David Cameron’s declaration, ‘multiculturalism is dead’ has a long pedigree and by no means confined to the Right. Multiculturalism has always had its left as well as right wing critics, but the obituaries probably began in 1989 with Fay Weldon: ‘Our attempt at multiculturalism has failed. The Rushdie Affair demonstrates it’ (Weldon, 1989). Whatever our views on the novel, *The Satanic Verses*, the Salman Rushdie Affair crisis made clear that minority-majority faultline was not going to be simply about colour-racism; and that multiculturalism could not be confined to ‘steelbands, saris and samosas’. For some liberals that meant the end of their support as angry Muslims muscled in on something that was only meant for secular ‘transgressives’ like gays and black youth. Earlier street disturbances were hailed as ‘right on’ politics but a passionate religious identity was too ‘multicultural’ for many liberals.1

Yet, actually political multiculturalism flourished as Labour came to accept ethno-religious communitarianism as it had previously accepted other assertive identity movements. Muslim faith schools, religious discrimination legislation, incitement to religious hatred, bringing Muslims into the networks of governance, including a religion question in the Census – all of these have happened well after the original ‘death of multiculturalism’. Indeed, some of them after 9/11 and 7/7, two other events that were meant to have killed off multiculturalism. One of the very last acts of New Labour was the passing of the Equality Act, which for the first time put the claims of the religion and belief strand on the same level as race. Initially having religious equality legislation because of an EU directive, Labour left office with legislation that went well beyond anything found in Europe (on race as well as a religion).

One of the reasons that multiculturalism does not seem to die despite having its last rites continually read out by successive government Ministers, like David Blunkett, Ruth Kelly and Hazel Blears, is that when you think about it there are very few policies at stake. This is clear from David Cameron’s speech (Cameron, 2011), which despite its emphatic rhetoric has very little policy content. Many people worry about residential segregation and inward looking communities. But these are not the result of policies and population distribution could only be achieved by, to coin a phrase, muscular illiberalism. Residential concentrations have resulted more from poverty, fear of racism, natural growth and ‘white flight’ than self-ghettoisation. Research shows that all minorities – including Muslims – want to live in mixed neighbourhoods and ghettos are created by those who move out. This is not ‘state multiculturalism’ and could only be reversed by state racial and religious quotas on where people could live. Unless by ‘muscular liberalism’ Cameron means that groups such as Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims are not to be included in the delegation of public responsibilities and resources that are the central idea of the Big Society.

It is individual or institutional choices, then, that create outcomes, multiculturalist or otherwise. Schools that choose their pupils, like faith schools, are less ethnically mixed than where pupils are allocated places by local authorities. The expansion of faith schools and indeed the Big Society concept in general so far as it hands over resources and decision-making to neighbourhoods, communities, charities and organised religion should see the development not the decline of ethno-religious communitarianism.

Unlike Cameron I call such state-community partnerships ‘multiculturalism’ and I am in favour of them, with certain conditions. One is that it must be within a context of robust individual rights. John

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1 Originally published in H. Mahamdallie (ed), *Defending Multiculturalism: A Guide For The Movement*, Bookmarks, London, 2011. It is based on my longer contribution to the British Academy 'New Paradigms in Public Policy' project. I would like I would like to thank my colleagues in the project, especially its chair, Peter Taylor-Gooby, and two anonymous referees for their comments; and also to Bhikhu Parekh, Geoff Levey, Nasar Meer, Varun Uberoi and Aleksandra Lewicki.
Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’: one person’s freedom – whether in the name of multiculturalism or anti-multiculturalism – has to be limited when its clear that others are being harmed. Muslim men demanding conformity from their womenfolk (eg., the wearing of modest dress) is one example where individual rights may be squashed. Legislatures forbidding Muslim women from wearing modest clothes of their choice is an even more egregious example.

Yet, society cannot be reduced to individuals and so integration must be about bringing new communities, and not just new individuals, into relations of equal respect. This means challenging racism and Islamophobia and so on, not by denying that there are groups in society but developing positive group identities and adapting customs and institutions that enable that.

Equally importantly, we have to talk up what we have in common. We cannot take for granted what we have in common but work hard to ensure all varieties of citizens see themselves in our shared conceptions of citizenship. Such citizenships are imaginatively shaped by our sense of country, about who we are, where we are coming from and where we are going – by our ‘national story’. An out of date story alienates the new post-immigration communities, who want to be written into the story – backwards as well as forward. So, multiculturalism is incomplete and one-sided without a continual remaking of national identity.

This is an aspect of multiculturalism that has been understated and so the inattentive assume that multiculturalism is all about emphasising difference and separatism. In fact its about creating a new, ongoing ‘We’ out of all the little, medium-sized and large platoons that make up the country.

In Britain we have made some progress on a number of fronts. In terms of everyday inter-racial and inter-ethnic mixing cities like London are quite remarkable. Yet we have have also made progress in relation to the communitarian and the national identity fronts. If this does not seem so in relation to the latter its because of Britain’s elusive, understated and misstated national identity. That goes back to the exigencies and contingencies of the Union and of running an Empire and certainly predates multiculturalism. Even today, ethnic minorities are more likely to say they are British than white people. It is more white reticence than minority separatism that is an obstacle to an inclusive national identity and without overcoming which multicultural nation-building is difficult.

Identifying and responding to ‘Difference’

It will be clear from what I have said so far that there is a lot of confusion about what multiculturalism is and what it is not. This is partly because ‘multiculturalism’ is too often defined by its critics, whose sole purpose is to create a straw man to knock down. But its also because there is more than one form of multiculturalism and they relate to integration in different ways. I would like to use the rest of my chapter to clarify the key terms of assimilation, integration, diversity and multiculturalism². I hope this helps us better to debate properly, to have a clear idea of what is being said or objected to. I would like to think that my analysis will bring people closer to my own advocacy of multiculturalism, but it will have succeeded if it increases understanding of what the issues are.

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² The concern here is not primarily in relation to socio-economic integration, for which see Loury, Modood and Teles (2005) and Heath and Cheung (2007). The bigger challenge – for another occasion - is to connect the socio-economic with the issues discussed in this chapter. I would insist however the issues of ‘difference’ are as important as the socio-economic in relation to equal citizenship and have to be understood in their own terms.
Assimilation, integration, diversity and multiculturalism each offers their own distinctive take on freedom, equality and civic unity (what, might be called, ‘fraternity’), namely, some of the core values of European democracy. The issue or ‘problem’ that all four of these paradigms are addressing is post-immigration ‘difference’ (Modood 2007). Large scale immigration into Europe from outside Europe has been by people marked by ‘difference’. The ‘difference’ is not confined to the fact of migration, or how long the migrants and their families have been in Europe or the fact that they come from less economically developed parts of the world – namely aspects which can be stated structurally and quantitatively. ‘Difference’ primarily refers to how people are identified: how they identify themselves (eg., as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Muslim’), how they identify others (again, as ‘white, ‘black’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Muslim’ etc) and how they are identified by others (‘white’ etc). These identities fall (not necessarily unambiguously or discretely) within the fields of ‘race’, ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality, what I will call the forms of difference . They will no doubt be classed or gendered in specific or generalisable ways but the important point from which everything else follows is that these identities are not reducible to – or, stronger still – are not primarily socio-economic or ‘objective’ in classical sociological terms. The relevant interactions cannot be explained, the position of different actors predicted or even guessed at, political preferences expressed and so on without the explicit or implicit use of the forms of difference.

Assimilation is where the processes affecting change and the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way, where the preferred result is one where the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible. By smothering difference it is also thought that the occasion for discrimination and conflict are not allowed to take root. From the 1960s onwards, beginning with Anglophone countries and spreading to others, assimilation as a policy has come to be seen as impractical (especially for those who stand out in terms of physical appearance), illiberal (requiring too much state intervention) and inegalitarian (treating indigenous citizens as a norm to which others must approximate). It was as early as 1966 that Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary at the time, declared that in the view of the British government integration is ‘not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins 1967, 267). While ‘assimilation’ as a term has come to be dropped in favour of ‘integration’, yet even today when some politicians use the term ‘integration’, they actually, consciously or not, mean what here has been defined as assimilation, so the use of these terms in public discourse must not be taken at their face value but critically inspected.

Integration is where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing to or not trying to integrate. The established society is the site of institutions - including employers, civil society and the government – in which integration has to take place, and accordingly they must take the lead. The new (prospective) citizens’s rights and opportunities must be made effective through anti-discrimination laws and policies. We need, however, to distinguish between individualist-integration and multiculturalism. The former sees the institutional adjustments in relation to migrants or minorities as only individual claimants and bearers of rights as equal citizens (Barry 2001). Minority communities may exist as private associations but are not recognised or supported in the public sphere.

Multiculturalism is where processes of integration are seen both as two-way and as involving groups as well as individuals and working differently for different groups (CMEB 2000; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the ‘multi’). The ‘culturalism’ – by no
means a happy term either in relation to ‘culture’ or ‘ism’ – refers to the explicitness that the groups in question are likely not just to be marked by newness or phenotype or socio-economic location but by certain forms of group identities. The integration of groups is in addition to, not as an alternative to the integration of individuals, anti-discrimination measures and a robust framework of individual rights.

The concept of equality is central to multiculturalism as well as to other conceptions of integration. The key difference between individualist-integration and multiculturalism is that the concepts of group and of ‘multi’ are essential to the latter. Post-immigration minorities are groups differentiated from the majority society or the norm in society by two kinds of processes. On the one hand, by the fact of negative ‘difference’: with alienness, inferiorisation, stigmatisation, stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination, racism and so on. On the other hand, by the senses of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves. The two together are the key data for multiculturalism. The differences at issue are those perceived both by outsiders or group members – from the outside in and from the inside out – to constitute not just some form of distinctness but a form of alienness or inferiority that diminishes or makes difficult equal membership in the wider society or polity. Multicultural accommodation of minorities, then, is different from individualist-integration because it explicitly recognises the social reality of groups, not just of individuals and organisations. There may, however, be considerable complexity about what is meant by social reality of groups or groupness here, and ideas of groups as discrete, homogeneous, unchanging, bounded populations are not realistic when we are thinking of multicultural recognition (Modood 2007, 93-7). This leads us to diversity.

Further unpacking Multiculturalism and Integration

**Cosmopolitanism** emerges by accepting the concept of difference while critiquing or dissolving the concept of groups. Disagreement about the extent to which post-immigration groups exist and/or ought to exist and be given political status means that there are two kinds of multiculturalism (Modood 1998; Meer and Modood 2009a). While in public discourse as well as in academia one or both are referred to as multiculturalism, and often without a full recognition that two different ideas are being expressed, I will reserve the term ‘multiculturalism’ for the sociological and political position in which groups are a critical feature. Where ‘difference’ is positively valorised (or pragmatically accepted) but it is denied that groups exist or, alternatively, exist but should not be politically recognised, I shall call diversity. The contention is that in the early stages of migration and settlement, especially in the context of a legacy of racism, colonialism and European supremacism, forms of social exclusion created or reinforced certain forms of groupness such as white and black, but as a result of social mixing, cultural sharing and globalisation in which dominant identities of modernity, such as of race and nation, are dissolving, people have much more fluid and multiple identities, combine them in individual ways and use them in context-sensitive ways (Hall 1992). For example, the ways that Caribbean-origin Britons have socially blended into a ‘multiculture’ and have sought conviviality and sociability rather than separate communities may perhaps not be fully captured as a form of individualistic integration (Gilroy 2000). While remaining economically marginal and over-represented in relation to the social problems associated with deprived inner cities, they have become leaders of popular culture in terms of music, dance, youth styles and sport, in all of which they have become significantly over-represented (Hall 1998). To the extent that football teams, Olympiads and television programmes such as ‘The X Factor’ are central to popular and national identities, Caribbean-origin people are placed at the centre of British national imaginaries. Moreover, Britain and most other countries in western Europe have recently experienced and are experiencing a new wave of immigration and will continue to do so, including from within the European Union.
### Table 1: Four Modes of Integration*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Individualist-Integration</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objects of Policy</strong></td>
<td>Individuals and groups marked by ‘difference’</td>
<td>Individuals marked by ‘difference’, especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society</td>
<td>Individuals marked by ‘difference’, especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society, and societal ideas, especially of ‘us’ and ‘them’</td>
<td>Individuals and groups marked by ‘difference’, especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society, and societal ideas, especially of ‘us’ and ‘them’</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Liberty</strong></td>
<td>Minorities must be encouraged to conform to the dominant cultural pattern</td>
<td>Minorities are free to cultivate their identities in private but are discouraged from thinking of themselves as minority, but rather as individuals.</td>
<td>Neither minority nor majority individuals should think of themselves as belonging to a single identity but be free to mix ‘n match</td>
<td>Members of minorities should be free to assimilate, to mix ‘n match or to cultivate group membership in proportions of their own choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equality</strong></td>
<td>Presence of difference provokes discrimination and so is to be avoided</td>
<td>Discriminatory treatment must be actively eliminated so everyone is treated as an individual and not on the basis of difference</td>
<td>Anti-discrimination must be accompanied by the dethroning of the dominant culture</td>
<td>In addition to anti-discrimination the public sphere must accommodate the presence of new group identities and norms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fraternity</strong></td>
<td>A strong, homogeneous national identity</td>
<td>Absence of discrimination and nurturing of individual autonomy within a national, liberal democratic citizenship</td>
<td>People should be free to unite across communal and national boundaries and should think of themselves as global citizens</td>
<td>Citizenship and national identity must be remade to include group identities that are important to minorities as well as majorities; the relationship between groups should be dialogical rather than one of domination or uniformity.</td>
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*In all cases it is assumed that a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values are operative to a large degree and what is highlighted here is in addition or interaction with them.
Given the diversity of the locations from whence migrants are coming, the result, it is argued, is not communities, but a churning mass of languages, ethnicities and religions, all cutting across each other and creating a ‘superdiversity’ (Vertovec 2007). This may be setting a pattern for the future, and it may be allied to a further argument that globalisation, migration and telecommunications have created populations dispersed across countries that interact more with each other, and have a greater sense of loyalty to each other, than they might to their fellow citizens.

In what ways does diversity go beyond individualist-integration? Primarily not as a politics but as an ethos: we should value diversity and create the conditions where it is individually chosen. We should oppose all forms of imposition of group identities on individuals and therefore the social imaginaries and prejudices by which individuals are inferiorised or portrayed as threatening and so excluded from full membership of society. Nor should we require assimilation or conformity to dominant group norms; yet, a requirement of communal membership can also be oppressive of individuals and their life-chances (Appiah 1994). Inherited or ascribed identities – such as black or Muslim – which slot people into pigeonholes not of their choosing, giving them a script to live by should be refused (often referred to in the literature as a transgression of boundaries). They not only reduce the options of the kind of person one can be but divide society up into antagonistic groups. The conception is of multiculturalism as maximum freedom, for minority as well as majority individuals, to mix with, borrow and learn from all (whether they are of your group or not) so individual identities are personal amalgams of bits from various groups and heritages and there is no one dominant social identity to which all must conform. The result will be a society composed of a blend of cultures, a multicultural.

While this is an attractive image of contemporary society and blends easily with the ideas of liberal democracy, it has only a partial fit with even, say, London today, let alone many parts of Britain and continental Europe. In some towns and cities, say in Northern England, there is not a diversity of groups but often just two (eg., Asian Muslims and whites) and minority individuals do not float across identities, mixing and matching, but have a strong attachment to a particular identity. For example, most British Muslims seem to think of themselves in terms of ‘Muslim’ and/or ‘British’ (Modood, 2007: 108). The fact of superdiversity is emerging alongside rather than displacing the fact of settled, especially postcolonial, communities, who have a particular historical relationship with Britain, and the political significance of such communities. Similarly, there are other communities in other European countries with their own historical significance such as Maghrebians in France and the Turks in Germany. Moreover, some groups continue to be much larger than others, and stand out as groups – in their own eyes and those of others – and are at the centre of public policy and debate, especially if they are thought to be failing to integrate. Muslims, for example, seem to be in this category across much of western Europe regardless of the degree of conviviality or superdiversity that might be present. Which is not to say that such minority identities are exclusive. Successive surveys have shown that most Muslims in Britain strongly identify with being Muslim but the majority also identify as British, indeed are more likely to identify with ‘British’ and say they have trust in key British institutions than non-Muslims (Heath and Roberts 2008; Gallup 2009 found the same in Germany, albeit less so in France though Pew 2006 found much higher levels of national identification in France than other Western European countries). Post-immigration hyphenated identities, such as British Muslim, have become as commonplace in Britain as they have been in the USA for decades. Similarly, diasporic links as described above certainly exist, and are likely to increase, but I am

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3 British exponents of this view tend however to put some communal identities in a normative, privileged position. This particularly applies to political blackness and to some extent to non-cultural political identities generally (Modood 1994).
unconvinced that the net result is an inevitable erosion of national citizenship: British African-Caribbeans and South Asians have families in their countries of origin and in the US and Canada, but there is little evidence that most branches of those families do not feel British, American, Canadian, etc.

An important point of difference, then, between the concepts of individualist-integration and multiculturalism proper is that for the latter, the groups in question, the post-immigration minorities, are not of one kind but are a ‘multi’. For example, some people will identify with a ‘colour’ identity like ‘black’ but there will be others for whom national origin identities (like Turkish), or a regional heritage (like Berber), or a religious identity (like Sikh) may be much more meaningful, expressing forms of community and ethnic pride that are struggling for recognition and inclusion. And of course these minority identities will interact with wider, societal identities – woman, working class, Londoner, British – in differing ways, expressing the different experiences, locations and aspirations of different groups. So, both the alternative models of multiculturalism as diversity and as ethno-religious communitarianism have some grounding and meet the political aspirations of some minority groups. Neither works as a comprehensive sociological or political model and should be viewed as complementary (Modood 1998; CMEB 2000; Modood and Dobbernack 2010). Moreover, while recognition of ethnic or religious groups may have a legal dimension, for the most part it will be at the level of civic consultations, political participation, institutional policies (for example, schools and hospitals), discursive representations, especially in relation to the changing discourses of societal unity or national identity and their remaking. Regardless of the extent to which recognition of minority identities in this way is formal or informal, led by the state or the semi-autonomous institutions of civil society, it does not challenge, let alone displace individual rights and the shared dimensions of citizenship. There may however be genuine concern that some groups at a particular time and in some areas are becoming too inward looking; where the concern is primarily about a lack of positive mixing and interaction between groups at a local level, community cohesion measures may be an appropriate response (Cantle 2001), and where the concern is about self-conceptions and discourses more generally, the issue will be about the national or societal identity.

Ways in which multiculturalism is not dead
This unpacking of what I mean by ‘multiculturalism’ is also helpful in understanding those who say that multiculturalism has failed or that multiculturalism is dead. They may mean to endorse assimilation, individualistic integration or diversity. At the same time they are acknowledging and possibly reinforcing the sociological reality of group difference because their lament is that some groups (especially Muslims) are clearly visible as distinct groups when they should not be (they attribute this fact to a separatist tendency in the groups, encouraged by allegedly ‘multiculturalist’ policies). Hence paradoxical as it may sound, fierce critics of multiculturalism are usually deploying the sociology of multiculturalism even while rejecting its political dimensions. If they thought these groups were merely the product of stereotypes and exclusion (in the sense that ‘racial’ groups are a product of racism) or were primarily socio-economic in character (perhaps a working class ‘fraction’), then that would be a sociological disagreement with the multiculturalists. The irony is of course that the accusatory discourse of ‘some groups are not integrating’ may actually be reinforcing group identities and therefore contributing to the social conditions that gives multiculturalism a sociological pertinence. On the other hand, a sociology that marginalised ethnicity in favour of say, individuals, class and gender, would have a better fit with anti-multiculturalist politics but may be unable to explain or predict the relevant social reality.

Moreover, it is not just at the level of sociology that anti-multiculturalists may find themselves using multiculturalist ideas; even while deploying an anti-multiculturalist discourse they may
enact multiculturalist policies. For example, they may continue with group consultations, representation and accommodation. The latter have actually increased. The British government has found it necessary to increase the scale and level of consultations with Muslims in Britain since 9/11, and, dissatisfied with existing organizations, has sought to increase the number of organised interlocutors and the channels of communication. Avowedly anti-multiculturalist countries and governments have worked to increase corporatism in practice, for example with the creation by Nicholas Sarkozy of the *Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman* in 2003 to represent all Muslims to the French government in matters of worship and ritual; and by the creation of the *Islamkonferenz* in Germany in 2005, an exploratory body, yet with an extensive political agenda. These bodies are partly top-down efforts to control Muslims or to channel them into certain formations and away from others; nevertheless, such institutional processes cannot be understood within the conceptual framework of assimilation, individualist integration or diversity. There is indeed a new intolerance in relation to certain Muslim practices (eg., the burqa) and this is leading to some new laws or policies in parts of Europe (though not yet in Britain). The point is that we do not seem to be witnessing a shift in models, for example, from pluralistic integration to individualist integration.

This analytical framework helps us also to understand those who say they welcome diversity but seem to be in agreement with critics of multiculturalism. Critics of multiculturalism are usually pointing to the public assertion of strong group identities to mobilize a group to achieve certain policies and/or to demand differential treatment. They are sometimes responded to by those who point to how multiculturalism is working in their neighbourhoods, which they say are multi-ethnic and where people do not just live peaceably side by side but mix freely and where that mixing is valued above monoculturalism. Yet such views do not imply support for strong group identities and related policies; on the contrary, their success may be seen to be dependent on the absence of the latter.4 While this is a reasonable response in its own terms it does not meet the criticism of multiculturalism and in fact may share it. Group-based multiculturalism has become unpopular and is what critics have in mind, though this is obscured by the fact that what I call ‘diversity’ is referred to by its advocates as ‘multiculturalism’. For example, it has been argued that the majority of Australians welcome ‘multiculturalism’, indeed they see it as part of the country’s identity but they see it ‘in terms of a mix of individuals rather than an ensemble of groups’ (Brett and Moran 2011, 203; for a related discussion in relation to England, see Fenton and Mann 2011, and Searchlight Educational Trust 2011). A group-based multiculturalism is much less popular than diversity, but what we have to consider is whether integration of all post-immigration formations can be achieved without the latter (Modood 1998; 2007)? Moreover, a group-based multiculturalism, where group membership is voluntary, may be part of the future in an unintended way: it is highly compatible with Prime Minister Cameron’s vision of a ‘Big Society’ in which civil society associations based on locality and faith, including inter-faith groups, take over some responsibilities currently undertaken by state agencies. If it is the case that groups such as Muslims are to be civil society partners of government, and to be delegated resources as such, it is difficult to see how the new ‘Big Society’ is a break with what is rejected as ‘state multiculturalism’.

Finally, moving beyond a focus on exclusion and minorities is a third level of multiculturalism, which is not just about sociology (the first level) or politics (second level), but a positive vision of the whole remade so as to include the previously excluded or marginalised on the basis of equality and sense of belonging. It is at this level that we may fully speak of multicultural integration or multicultural citizenship (Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). This third level of multiculturalism, incorporating the sociological fact of

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4 Hence the irony that anti-multiculturalists like President Sarkozy are trying to create corporate representations for Muslims in France; while pro-diversity authors call for the cessation of government meetings with Muslim community leaders (Sen 2006; Malik 2011).
diversity, groupness and exclusion but going beyond individual rights and political accommodation, is perhaps the level that has been least emphasised. Or at least that is how it seems to many whose understanding of multiculturalism, sometimes polemical but sometimes sincere, is that multiculturalism is about encouraging minority difference without a counterbalancing emphasis on cross-cutting commonalities and a vision of a greater good. This has led many commentators and politicians to talk of multiculturalism as divisive and productive of segregation. Theorists of multiculturalism such as Taylor (1994) and Parekh (2000), related policy documents such as the Report of the Commission the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB 2000) and enactments such as those in Canada and Australia, universally regarded as pioneers and exemplars of state multiculturalism, all appealed to and built on an idea of national citizenship. Hence, from a multiculturalist point of view, though not from that of its critics, the recent emphasis on cohesion and citizenship, what has been called ‘the civic turn’ (Mouritsen 2008), is a necessary re-balancing of the political multiculturalism of the 1990s, which largely took the form of accommodation of groups while being ambivalent about national identity (Meer and Modood 2009a). This does not invalidate the analysis offered here that integration without some degree of institutional accommodation is unlikely to be successful. Indeed, for multiculturalists a renewing of national identity has to be distinctly plural and hospitable to the minority identities. It involves ‘rethinking the national story’ with the minorities as important characters; not obscuring difference but weaving it into a common identity that all can see themselves in and giving all a sense of belonging to each other (CMEB 2000, 54-6; Modood 2007, 145-154). Minority politics are common in the US but most groups, while honouring their origins, seek inclusion in the American dream. They seek to be and have come to be accepted as hyphenated Americans (Italian-Americans, Asian-Americans etc) and the trend is present in parts of western Europe and, while not yet fully accepted, it may be that hyphenated nationalities will become the norm here too.

Conclusion

It may be the case that all the attempted models of integration, not just in Britain but across Europe, are in crisis. We can however have a better sense of what the issues are and so what needs to be done if, firstly, we recognize that discourses of integration and multiculturalism are exercises in conceptualizing post-immigration difference and as such operate at three distinct levels: as an (implicit) sociology; as a political response; and as a vision of what is the whole in which difference is to be integrated. Depending upon the sociology in question certain political responses are possible or not, more reasonable or less. The sociological and political assumptions are thus mutually dependent. Secondly, I have offered a framework in which four distinct political responses – assimilation, individualist-integration, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism - illuminate each other and where each successive position attempts to include what is thought to be missing from the predecessor. Each position, however, has its merits and may be appropriate in certain contexts, depending on the sociological reading of the context. Each can be seen to be an interpretation of the classical democratic values of liberty, equality and fraternity, though not each is equally satisfactory. Each has a particular conception of equal citizenship but the value of each can only be realized if it is not imposed but is the preferred choice of minority individuals and groups, who of course – being a ‘multi’ - are bound to choose differently. Thus no singular model is likely to be suitable for all groups. To have a reasonable chance of integrating the maximum number of members of minorities, none of these political responses should be dismissed. Ethno-religious communitarianism may currently be viewed as undesirable by European publics and policymakers but given how central Muslims have become to the prospects of integration on a number of fronts, it is unlikely that integration can be achieved without some element of this approach, which is being practiced even by those politicians who are making anti-multiculturalist speeches. Perceptions of Muslims as groups, by themselves and by non-Muslim majorities are hardening; so the key question is whether they are to be stigmatised as outsiders or
recognised as integral to the polity. Finally, we must not overlook the third analytical level, which in many ways is not primarily about minorities but about the majority. The enlargement, hyphenation and internal pluralizing of national identities is essential to an integration in which all citizens have not just rights but a sense of belonging to the whole as well as to their own ‘little platoon’.

References


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