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situation report 2000**

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# 1 Introduction

The Group of experts on criminological and criminal law aspects of organised crime (PC-S-CO) was set up by a decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.<sup>1</sup> The task of the Group is to analyse – under the authority of the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) – the characteristics of organised crime in the member States of the Council of Europe, to assess the counter-measures adopted (including legislation) and to identify means of improving the effectiveness of both national responses and international cooperation in this respect. For this purpose, the PC-S-CO carries out “best practice surveys” on selected topics<sup>2</sup> and prepares the annual “organised crime situation report” of the Council of Europe.

In March 2001, the member States received a questionnaire concerning the organised crime situation in their country in 2000. In order to obtain comparable data, the questionnaire used was to a large extent the same as the one of previous years (1996 to 1999). The questionnaire was divided into the following six parts: I. Introduction, II. Criteria for identifying organised crime groups, III. Organised crime situation, IV. Statistics on specific topics, V. Methodology, VI. Data of the persons(s) providing the answers.

The report is based primarily on an analysis of the replies to the questionnaire. The fact that the same questionnaire went out to more than 40 countries – the entire Council of Europe membership – makes them a unique source of information.

The quality of the information supplied, however, was very uneven:

- Firstly, not all the countries replied. Only 32 out of 43 questionnaires were returned in time for consideration in this report. No replies were received from Austria, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovenia, Sweden, "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and the United Kingdom, while Greece submitted its report after the final compilation of the present report.
- The value of the replies varied greatly. Some of them were not complete, and some respondents submitted discursive text without supporting data.
- Data collection methods differed. Some replies, for example, refer to investigations others to convictions. Some refer to all recorded offences, others specifically to organised criminal groups.

Nevertheless, all replies received from member States were used for the compilation of this report. To a limited extent, other sources were used as well.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This group took over the activities carried out between 1997 and 1999 by the Committee of experts on criminological and criminal law aspects of organised crime (PC-CO).

<sup>2</sup> For example on witness protection (BPS no 1), the reversal of the burden of proof in the confiscation of proceeds of crime (BPS no 2), electronic surveillance (BPS no 3), corporate criminal liability (BPS no 4), crime analysis (BPS no 5), cross-border cooperation (BPS no 6)

<sup>3</sup> See the list of references in the Appendix.

When replying to the questionnaire, the following criteria of organised crime were used by member States when defining crime or criminal groups as "organised crime":

Mandatory criteria:

1. Collaboration of three or more people
2. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time
3. Suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences
4. With the objective of pursuing profit and/or power.

Optional criteria:

1. Having a specific task or role for each participant
2. Using some form of internal discipline and control
3. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation
4. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, law enforcement, the administration of justice or the economy by corruption or any other means
5. Using commercial or business-like structures
6. Engaged in money laundering
7. Operating on an international level.

For the purposes of this report, in addition to the minimum characteristics (the "mandatory criteria" 1 to 4), at least two of the "optional criteria" needed to be applicable to qualify a criminal group or crime as organised crime. In consequence, "organised crime" may not only include traditional criminal groups but also legal entities or professionals engaged in serious forms of organisational or white-collar crime.

Chapter 2 of the present report summarises the information received on the organised crime situation, starting with the characteristics of groups involved. As noted in this part of the report, the replies to the questionnaire seem to reflect a bias towards "traditional forms" of organised crime (with clear, mostly hierarchical structures) engaged in "typical" activities (such as drug trafficking, racketeering, prostitution). New and emerging forms of organised crime – for example related to environmental crime, smuggling of people, cyber crime, financial crime and fraud – with structures which are adjusted to the specific business pursued, remain largely undetected or unreported, or are not substantiated by data. While public authorities seem prepared to deal with "traditional" organised crime, law enforcement and criminal justice systems still need to find ways and means to cope with new and innovative forms of organised crime. Chapter 2 furthermore provides data on the criminal activities of the groups as reported by countries, the use of influence and violence, and the investment of proceeds of crime.

Chapter 3 provides information on the measures taken against organised crime in terms of seizures, arrests and convictions as well as judicial cooperation.

The Appendix includes tables on illicit drugs seized in European countries, as well as a list of references used in this report in addition to the replies to the questionnaire.

## 2 Organised crime situation

### 2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF GROUPS INVOLVED IN ORGANISED CRIME

#### 2.1.1 Structure of the groups

Information on the structures of organised criminal groups provided in the country reports reflect differences not only in the actual structures of the groups but also in the understanding of the phenomenon and the paradigm predominating in different countries.

Descriptions range from complex and permanent hierarchical groups to more or less permanent, horizontally organised networks or project groups. Three approaches can be distinguished, according to which organised criminal groups are structured hierarchically, horizontally or as a network of individuals or cells:

- The first approach stresses the degree of hierarchy in the structure. In such “Mafia-type organisations” different organisational levels – in most cases three or four – can be recognised. The top level consists of leaders, supported by a network of specialists with advisory functions. Such support functions also include bodyguards and certain executive roles, giving instructions to and supervising members of lower levels of the hierarchy. The middle level is responsible, with a certain degree of autonomy, to carry out single offences or criminal projects. The concrete commission of criminal offences is to be executed by those at the bottom level of the organisation. Membership at this level is bound to be fluid and flexible, according to needs and opportunities.
- Under the second approach, emphasising the horizontal aspects of criminal organisations, centralised leadership is weak or lacking altogether. Links between “middle level” operators of course do exist but are not coordinated and controlled by top level actors, organisers and financiers. These “middle level operators” should more accurately be identified as group leaders or even project leaders.
- The third approach refers to loosely linked networks of individuals or cells who join up to develop and carry out criminal projects. Hierarchies are very fluid. Group leaders may switch roles with other group members, according to the needs coming up in the context of each criminal project. A subdivision into “leaders” and “bottom level” participants may emerge on an ad hoc basis, depending on the situation, and the abilities, strengths and weaknesses of each group member.

The reports received from many eastern European countries – and of course the Italian report – reflect a definite, hierarchical “Mafia” paradigm, while the horizontal and project approaches are more often found in replies from western European countries.

The picture turns more diffuse but perhaps also more realistic when countries describe the nature and degree of organisation and in particular the sectors in which groups are involved. For example, narcotics offences require a different organisational setting than car theft, or organised sexual exploitation. The replies received are, however, too heterogeneous to allow for a systematic analysis of such matters.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that different forms of organisation may be found within a given country. The balance between different types may also vary from country to country.

The question of whether organised crime operates within the territory of a country or in several countries also has an impact on the structure of the groups. Cross-border criminal activities, for example, tend to rely on network structures.

When comparing data from 1999 and 2000, major changes in the overall assessment of the number, size and structure of groups, as well as their geographical scope were not to be expected.

Changes could be a result of changing law enforcement methods, changing opportunities influencing the choice of criminal operations. Furthermore, competition between groups might at times produce violent encounters and other movements changing relationships. Examples of such cases are described in the country reports, notably the Estonian one.

However, awareness of new, emerging forms of organised crime tends to remain low among public authorities until they have reached a significant size and have become firmly established.

Thus, the replies received, may be biased in favour of easily detected, voluminous traditional organised criminal activities, typically the smuggling and sale of drugs and other profitable commodities, as well as racketeering (forced "protection" and related services as traditionally found in eastern European organised crime).

More marginal or novel types of activities, on the other hand, remain unnoticed or unreported. For instance the smuggling of persons would seem to be a growth economy but there is little information. The same is true for the smuggling of tobacco and cigarettes, the production and smuggling of pirate products, or environmental crime, that is crimes pursued by innovative criminal groups. More such examples are found when looking at specific local situations where organised crime groups adjust their operations to locally and culturally shaped opportunities. These may include the export of profitable commodities and services such as metals, natural gas and crude oil, or alcohol production and marketing, or protection rackets, or trafficking in stolen cars, arms, mobile telephones and SIM cards, pirate products (music, video/DVD programs, pornography, computer games and programmes), art forgery, counterfeit money, protected/rare animals, dangerous waste management, other waste management, and probably many more.

This likely bias, at least to some extent, also influences the overall description of the structure and nature of the organised crime groups provided in the country reports. Together with different understanding of what constitutes organised crime, it could explain why the reporting authorities attribute clear labels ("hierarchical", "horizontal") to organised criminal groups, although in reality it is more likely to be the specific business and interests which explain the structure of a criminal group – or a combination of structures for that matter.

### **2.1.2 Geographical grouping**

The geographical context has a direct influence on the crime opportunities available and the way in which they are exploited by criminal groups. In order to facilitate the general



description of organised crime structures, member countries are therefore grouped geographically as follows:<sup>4</sup>

- Scandinavia/Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
- Northwest Europe: Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom (incl. England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland)
- Southwest Europe: Andorra, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino and Spain
- Central Western Europe: Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland
- Central Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
- South-eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", and Turkey
- Eastern Europe: Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine
- The Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

#### **SCANDINAVIA/NORDIC COUNTRIES: DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY, AND SWEDEN<sup>5</sup>**

The Nordic countries – affluent countries somewhat in the geographical margin of the European crime scene – have only gained experience of modern transnational or cross-border organised crime phenomena in recent years. The expansion of the narcotics markets has introduced some new organised activities in the region as of the 1970s, with Denmark in the lead as it has been most easily accessible from the south. Sweden, being the most affluent and largest of the Nordic countries, also developed a significant market, Norway following suit. In Finland, the situation only has begun to deteriorate in the 1990s as new routes to the country were opened from the east (Russia) and the south (Estonia). The Scandinavian countries are also sometimes used as transit countries en route to the larger European markets from the Far East. Overall, the region is familiar with many types and forms of organised criminal groups but the volume of these continues to be small or moderate, and their structure is usually not very permanent and not hierarchical (cf. Johansen 1994). Illustrative of this, motorcycle gangs are understood in all of these countries at times as a high-priority organised crime problem.

In reports from these countries, organised crime is described in rather vague terms, reflecting a low level of information about the phenomenon, together with a low level of organised crime in the region, and a lack of hierarchical or large and well coordinated criminal structures. Thus, criminal groupings are described as relatively small and separate groups where, however, the central persons seem to be well connected to networks within the country and often abroad.

In **Finland**, criminal groups are described as comprising 5 to 6 core members and 9 to 10 other members, with no coordination between groups. Out of 23 identified groups, 14 had domestic members only, while in six groups two or more nationalities were represented. Three of the identified (domestic) groups were biker groups. Among the foreign criminals involved, those from neighbouring countries dominated: Estonians (in 9 groups), Russians (in 4 groups), and Swedes (in 2 groups). The majority of the groups operate across the national borders, the main activity being smuggling (narcotics,

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<sup>4</sup> This particular solution is open for further improvements; also, the names given to the groups/regions are only chosen for practical purposes. The grouping of countries in the same group does not necessarily imply that they have other things in common than offering a similar geographical context which explains certain features of organised crime.

<sup>5</sup> No report provided for 2000.

alcohol, cigarettes) into the country, and exporting stolen property to the eastern neighbours, Russia in particular.

In **Denmark**, the criminal groups known in more detail are biker groups and street gangs. The biker culture is dominated by two groups; at a Scandinavian level, these were involved in a particularly violent internal conflict from 1994 to 1997, probably related to rights to areas of crime, which was terminated by a peace agreement in 1997.

The Hell's Angels in 1999 counted 7 chapters (109 members), and the "Bandidos" 11 chapters (111 members). Data for 2000 were not provided but the situation was reported to be stable. Street gangs are profit-oriented. Some of them have established cooperative contacts with biker circles in larger towns. Biker support groups and street gangs are reported to have some common members. 33 street gangs were identified in 1999, with 400 to 500 "core members". The street gangs have an over-representation of young men of foreign background.

Foreign contacts are noted in smuggling operations. The countries mentioned in this connection typically reflect the source of the of contraband commodities: Albanians and heroin, Poles and narcotics as well as car thefts, Russians and exporting stolen goods to Russia, Lithuanians and cigarettes, Turks and narcotics crime, people from various European Union countries and VAT frauds.

In Denmark, also non-European contacts are observed: child pornography and the Far East, Moroccans and cannabis, North Americans as connections to biker groups, and South Americans and cocaine. Of the neighbouring countries, Germany is mentioned as the transit country for heroin, while the Netherlands and Belgium are supplying amphetamines and ecstasy, and Spain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany are listed in connection with cannabis. Furthermore, stolen vehicles are often taken abroad to Poland, Germany, and the Russian Federation.

Both **Norway** and Denmark observe that the trend seems to be that the criminal environment is becoming more professional, more mobile, and tougher. Changes in the crime picture as a result of the development within the information and communication technology (ICT) are a challenge for law enforcement. The use of ICT means that some traditional types of crime assume new forms. ICT has created new criminal opportunities, which for instance enables efficient and anonymous international management of activities. This seems to be actively exploited by some criminal groupings.

## **NORTH-WESTERN EUROPE BELGIUM, IRELAND, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS AND UNITED KINGDOM<sup>6</sup>**

**Belgium** reports in 2000, that in the realm of serious crime, mafia-like structures are multiplying, Italian groups being involved in hold-ups and trafficking in drugs and stolen cars. Turkish groups are involved in arms trade, narcotics, and human beings. Further, a milieu of Kosovar Albanians have recently been observed to be involved in trafficking in drugs, vehicles and persons, and extortion. As a consequence of authority action, Biker groups ('Hell's Angels') are reported to have moved out of Belgian territory to the Netherlands. The Belgian report also mentions structures of Russian Mafia, as well as Albanian and Bulgarian, and African (Ghana, Nigeria) groups, narcotics and, in some regions, prostitution being the main concerns. Activities are described in details, but not the size, structure or other characteristics of the groups. The report observes, however, that "the criminal milieu" is increasingly resorting to commercial facades, which is an indication of the growing professionalisms of crime. Also, the number of criminal investigations of organised crime has grown in recent years.

**Luxembourg** in 1999 observed a number of foreign organised criminal groups on its territory. The most influential of them were Belgian groups (Brussels and Charleroi), and groups composed of refugees from Montenegro and Kosovo. The criminal operations were reported to include organised theft of cars and other property (groups from Brussels dominating), and VAT fraud where criminals from Nordic countries as well from southern neighbours were implicated. Apart from these, also Russian and ex-Soviet nationals, ex-Yugoslavians, and Chinese groups were particularly noted. All organised groups were understood as being resident in the neighbouring countries. Estimates on the number of groups or their members were not given. In 2000, Luxembourg reports more systematically than in the previous year, analysing 28 known criminal groups. All 28 were active at international level, reaching typically into neighbouring countries. The size of the groups was variable. The most common size was 4 to 6 members; also groups of 10 to 20 were found frequently. Only one group had 20 to 50 members. The criminals identified originated from some 20 countries.

The **Netherlands** in 1999 already provided an extensive and detailed report on the organised crime situation in the country. That report discussed the alternatives of hierarchical, vertical organisations and of the horizontally organised, 'flat' group, pointing out that the group structure is often connected with the types of crime the group is involved in.

The statistical unit applied in the report of the Netherlands is 'investigation' rather than 'criminal group'. The report described 118 'investigations', stating that the majority of the groups investigated have a hierarchical structure. Most of the groups (42) had a single leader, and 34 groups had two or three leaders. In 13 groups investigated, no leader could be identified, and six of the investigations showed that there were more than three leaders to the group. A further 23 investigations provided no information about possible leaders. It should be noted that 'investigation' as a concept is indeed a different concept than 'group', for instance, in the sense that 'investigation' may be focussing on a particular 'group' but the intelligence concerning this 'group' or groups may not be sufficient or consistent enough to allow for more accurate descriptions of individual groups. Over three-quarters of the groups observed had a structure that was more horizontal than vertical (this is an important empirical observation: no group is likely to

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<sup>6</sup> No report provided for 2000.

be strictly one or the other, if the vertical-horizontal distinction is concerned. Group characteristics of this kind would rather be placed at different points on a continuum).

Regarding the ethnic composition, one-fourth (27%) of the 1999 investigations had no information about this feature of the groups. In seven investigations, there was only one 'principal' suspect. Only 79 investigations could therefore be analysed for the ethnic composition of the groups. Half of the suspects came from the Netherlands, 11% were of Turkish origin, 6% of Moroccan origin, and 5% of Surinamese origin.

All the principal suspects were Dutch in 23 (29%) of the 1999 investigations. These all-Dutch groups were mostly involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud and falsification. In 13 (16%) investigations, the country of origin of all the principal suspects was outside the Netherlands. These all-foreign groups were principally involved in trafficking/smuggling persons and/or drugs. Of those investigations where Dutch and foreign principal suspects were observed together, trafficking in hard drugs was in a central role. Fraud was the other principal activity where heterogeneous criminal groups were typically engaged in.

In 2000, the number of investigations was 123, with 689 'principal' suspects and 1688 other suspects. Two-thirds of the groups had a hierarchical structure. Two-thirds had one or two leaders, and in one of five, the groups had three or more leaders. In some investigations, no clear leadership was found. Half of the groups had a structure that was vertical. As to the permanence of the groups, the principal suspects were found to have worked together for a long time. In one-quarter of the investigations, the suspects within the groups had known each other between two and three years, and in more than half of the cases for longer than three years. In by far the majority of cases, the criminal groups had a relatively fixed composition. In slightly less than half of the cases, there were family relationships within the group. In half of the investigations, the groups were found to work with other criminal groups. In 2000, the investigation focussed on 689 principal suspects and 1688 other suspects. The majority of principal suspects had Dutch nationality, the other nationalities named most frequently were Turkish, Moroccan, German, British and Nigerian.

In 46% of the investigations with more than one principal suspect, all the principal suspects were Dutch. In 18% of these investigations, all the principal suspects were of non-Dutch nationality. These foreign criminal groups were largely homogeneous. In 36% of the investigations, Dutch principal suspects were found to be working in cooperation with foreign principal suspects. Foreign criminal groups were most frequently involved where the principal activity was trafficking in human beings, immigrant smuggling and/or extortion (50% of the cases). In investigations where all the principal suspects were Dutch, the most frequently mentioned principal activities were fraud and falsification/fraud. Drug trafficking was most frequently carried out by heterogeneous groups, whose members were Dutch or another nationality, and also by homogeneous groups with Dutch and Turkish members.

The Netherlands distinguished between five particular – common – constellations of structure and criminal orientation: drugs, immigrant smuggling (and trafficking in human beings), motor vehicle crime (theft and export), fraud, and falsification. In each of these, specific group features were found. Drugs were the most variable sector, here they found three types of criminal groups: those dealing in both hard and soft drugs, and those dealing/trafficking only in one or the other. Regardless of this orientation, criminal groups involved in drugs were generally said to have a clear leadership structure, the majority having one or two leaders. This could depend on the scope of the operations:

groups involved both in smuggling/imports and in dealing in the local market would be likely to have more 'leaders' than one, as the import and the retail operations are likely to be quite distinct from each other, requiring different skills, abilities, and contacts, and also meeting quite dissimilar problems both in regards of control and of financing.

Groups that deal in hard drugs only were observed to be less likely to have a hierarchical structure than other groups and would rather be organised in a horizontal fashion. Groups dealing with soft drugs only were described more likely to be vertically organised, implying, perhaps, that they are more typically than others also involved in retail trade. Groups that deal in both hard and soft drugs were reported to represent both models (vertical/horizontal) in roughly equal numbers/proportions.

Groups involved in immigrant smuggling were usually reported to have a hierarchical structure. The division of responsibility within these groups was said to be fixed. In contrast, horizontally structured groups were believed to be connected with other criminal activities, trafficking in hard drugs being mentioned as an example. However, the 1999 report suggests a radical change in this respect, in that there are now as many horizontally as vertically structured groups involved.

Hierarchical groups that are mostly vertically organised, carry out motor vehicle thefts. Often there is a leader, the other members being for the most part specialists with specific tasks.

Fraud-related groups were observed often to be organised horizontally, with one or two leaders, members having regular contact with one another. Over half were said to have a hierarchical structure, and the members are largely specialised to their appointed tasks.

Groups engaged in falsification were said to be organised horizontally or vertically in roughly equal shares. The majority have a vertical structure, with one or two leaders, and members with special skills and, accordingly, specific tasks.

The **United Kingdom** did not report for 2000. In the 1999 reply, they reported 965 organised criminal groups, with 7,050 members. Most of these groups were said to operate in a hierarchical manner. Among the groups, some were understood to operate in a network structure, however, there was no information as to how frequently this was the case. The number of members of the groups mostly remained below 10; over 885 (92%) had between 3 and 9 principal members. This report also made a distinction between principal and peripheral members (the Dutch report, too, distinguished 'principal' suspects/ members from the rest); however as was the case also in the Dutch report, this feature is not elaborated (the idea of principal and peripheral 'members' may render the entire concept of 'membership' near to meaningless unless carefully explained since it may risk to encompass in an arbitrary manner everybody who has had one type of contact or another with one or several 'principal' members, thereby drawing in individuals who, in traditional underworld terminology would not so much be regarded as being 'members' but would rather be seen as carrying supportive roles, or representing for example crime-related and control-neutralising complementary and supportive functions that enable the group to operate). The groups were mainly composed of UK nationals (791, or 82%), but foreign nationals were identified as members of 589 (61%) criminal groups.

A quite different picture was described in the 1999 and 2000 replies of **Ireland**, assessing the structure of their organised criminal groups falling into two general categories. The first was said to consist of almost a dozen major groups, well established, tightly

structured, involved in drug trafficking, armed robbery, and computer components (to a lesser extent), and some in smuggling cigarettes. These groups were said to form the most significant element of Irish organised crime, and almost all of them were based in the Dublin area. There were two fewer groups in 2000 when compared with the previous year. They were also reported to have connections to foreign, both European and non-European criminal structures.

The second category involves groups, whose activities are less significant than those of the first category. These groups are characterised by less cohesive group structures and criminal activities that are often confined within Ireland. On average, organised crime groups contained six persons, approximately 20% of the groups having just three or four members. However, the membership of many of the less significant groups was explained to be quite fluid because of their relatively weak group structures and opportunistic approach to crime.

The Netherlands and the UK represent a relatively advanced approach to organised crime, with a rather long experience of the phenomenon and of investigations related to it. In contrast, Ireland is a country in the European margin, with a problem profile that rather resembles other marginal countries (such as Finland, Iceland, Portugal) than the one of its British neighbour. Luxembourg, then, represents again a different profile, representing at one hand an interesting country for money laundering and VAT frauds, and a transit country for car theft on the other hand. These observations underline that the similarities and differences between countries are not just functions of the geographical "neighbourhood" (a country is likely to be attractive for VAT fraud and money laundering because of its legislation and its administrative traditions rather than its geographical location) while it is exactly the geographical location that plays a central role in some other organised criminal activities (such as serving as a transit country in the trafficking in stolen cars or smuggling persons or drugs).

#### **SOUTH-WESTERN EUROPE ANDORRA, FRANCE, ITALY, MALTA, PORTUGAL, SAN MARINO<sup>7</sup> AND SPAIN**

**Portugal's** 2000 reply states that there is a certain stability in comparison to the previous year, except for crimes related to illegal immigration and to a certain extent, for drug trafficking for which Portugal is becoming an increasingly important transit country. A growing number of groups is observed to operate in different realms of organised crime. During 2000, Portuguese authorities identified and deactivated 93 groups of organised crime, with 480 individual members arrested. The majority of these groups do not share forms of common structures. Organisations operating in a network are found more often at a level of transnational crime, where also multi-national memberships are common. These groups are mainly involved in economic and financial crime, or in the trafficking of narcotics, or in vehicles. Traditional verticality is maintained in activities that are more localised and simple, including robberies of banks, petrol stations, jewellery stores, or individual victims.

Such structural diversification keeps up with the diversification of the realms of criminal activity. There is also a trend towards organisations becoming more fluid, capable of adjusting to changing environments, technological and others.

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<sup>7</sup> No report provided for 2000.

Crimes of abduction and extortion are reported to display the most remarkable development in 2000. The growth in migrations to Portugal has encouraged the appearance of organised networks which besides smuggling people have started to extort money from the immigrants. These networks mainly consist of citizens of eastern European countries (Romanian, Moldavian and Ukrainian nationals in particular have been observed). The groups are reported to have a vertical structure with highly centralised control, and with a restricted area of operation.

In the 1999 reply by **Spain**, a total of 209 groups with an estimated total of 6,623 members were analysed. The groups were categorised into those with a high level of organisation (35), a middle-range level of organisation (50), and a low level of organisation (118). The groups are subdivided further into those with a large (100+), a medium (25–49), and a low (10–24) number of members. The groups were also separated according to whether they had only national or also international activities. Eight large groups with international activities were identified. Overall, 149 of the groups (71%), belonging to all three size categories, had international dimensions, the remaining 60 having only national or local level activities. Quite a few (43) of the Spanish group were observed to have cooperation or connections with other organised criminal groups, 6 with Spanish groups, 37 with foreign groups – mainly Italian (8), other EU countries (6), Moroccans (13), or Colombians (10). The activities of these groups were explained to extend to about 30 countries – all EU countries, and some 15 others. Some of the geographical connections would seem to be obvious, Colombians being linked to cocaine trade, or Moroccans to cannabis. Other connections may relate to the trafficking in persons/smuggling illegal immigrants. Still other connections may have mainly an opportunity-related background.

The Spanish 2000 reply repeats similar observations but obviously applies a different selection of criteria, distinguishing only 56 organised criminal groups. These 56 have an average membership of 18 criminals, mainly men, the criminal activity being at international level, strongly structured, with a special division of tasks and an internal hierarchy. Additionally, 180 groups were known with less than 10 members; they are not included in the national report. Of the 56 groups reported, 53 had 11–50 members, and 3 had 51–100 members. The total number of suspected people who belong to criminal organisations ('active members') amounts to 1002, of whom 826 were men and 176 women. The groups are homogeneous, less than half of them have cooperation or interconnection with other criminal groups. Seven Spanish groups operated together; the remaining 14 groups cooperated with other nationalities: six groups with Italian nationals, seven with Colombians, and four with Moroccans. The origin of the criminal groups was from all over the European Union, as well as outside of Union (eastern Europe, Morocco, Colombia). For the 56 groups reported, connections to 28 countries, 9 in EU countries and 19 in third countries are observed. The activities of the groups within the Spanish territory have expanded to the whole country, more to the Mediterranean coast and the capital region than elsewhere.

**Andorra**, neighbouring to Spain, reported in 1999 that almost all of the organised criminal groups observed have a horizontal structure. This is probably related to the location and role of Andorra as a transit area from the Iberian peninsula to France. No cooperation between groups in the same country is found, but cooperation with foreign groups was noted to exist, quite unsurprisingly considering again the location of Andorra en route from Spain to France. Group leaders as well as members come from Spain, South America, and the United Kingdom. People involved in the narcotics business were mostly Spanish, Portuguese, and Andorran. Money laundering groups, another Andorran speciality, were not domestic but transient, mostly with members of

foreign origin. They were using the Andorran system for laundering foreign drug money and proceeds of other crimes. In this sense, the legal system of Andorra together with the geographical location of the country make for money laundering activities to be more abundant here than in many other countries. The number of participants in groups was below 10 in the money laundering business, and between 11 and 50 in drug-related groups. The total number of active groups members is estimated at 11–50.

In 2000, Andorra reports that there are no significant changes in comparison to 1999. The criminal organisations are mainly horizontal except for two money laundering groups with hierarchical organisations. Groups are not cooperating within Andorra, however they are cooperating with groups in other countries. Leaders and members originate in Spain, the Netherlands, and South America. Three money laundering groups are known, originating in the Netherlands, Colombia, and Spain. One group with ten members of Dutch origin has become established in Andorra in 2000. Their criminal activity extends to Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and the UK, but also to non-European countries such as South America and the U.S.A.

Three other groups, involved in trafficking narcotics from Spain (there being no domestic production of narcotics) are mostly of Spanish, Portuguese, and Andorran origin. The average size of the groups is 11–50 members, with a total of 11–50 active members.

**France** did not reply in 1999. In their 2000 report, France gives no definitive answers to questions on number, size, or structure of organised criminal groups. They do, however, report 248 sentences for 1999 that involve leaders of criminal organisations. The offences involved were mostly armed robberies, serious thefts, and narcotics offences.

**San Marino** states that there are no elements leading to believe that criminal organisations exist on their territory.

In the **Italian** reply for 1999, as in their previous replies, a detailed analysis of established Italian organised criminal groups is given. The Cosa Nostra, the Camorra, the 'Ndrangheta, and the Apulian organised criminal groups are assessed by the number of groups in each tradition as well as the volume of their membership. The Cosa Nostra was the only tradition described as representing a hierarchical organisation, while the three others were organised in a horizontal fashion. Each of the four traditions dominates in their own territory in Southern Italy. The number of groups is estimated at 180, with 6000 members for the Cosa Nostra, at 173 with 9000 members for the Camorra, at 151 with 5225 members for the 'Ndrangheta, and at 52 with 2171 members for the Apulian groups. The groups have extensive cooperation, in different constellations, with foreign organised criminal groups in both European and non-European countries.

The 2000 reply repeats the same statistical figures, and similarly states that a great number of criminal organisations are operating in Italy. These organisations represent a very complex and intricate scenario that can be assessed only by considering larger structures where individual organisations create federal-type criminal groups like the Sicilian mafia, the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, the Campanian camorra and the Apulian organised crime. In 2000, 5150 subjects were identified for criminal conspiracy (6020 in 1999); 2249 were identified for criminal conspiracy aiming at trafficking in narcotics (3033 in 1999), and 1238 for mafia-type criminal conspiracy (2214 in 1999). The Cosa Nostra is reported to attempt to recover – after serious problems caused by authority actions – its unity by a strategy that aims at establishing a single decision-making body.



The Camorra groups, predominantly lacking a pyramid-shaped structure, have most recently been observed to operate in cigarette smuggling, rather than drug and arms trafficking; this is connecting Campanian camorra clans with Apulian clans, and camorra groups with mafia figures from the Balkans (Albania, Montenegro). The Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, with a horizontal structure including various family-based clans, appears to tend to create a collective body in order to support more effectively the most complex operations. It has connections with other Italian mafia organisations as well as with foreign organisations. Their main interest are drug trafficking activities and the infiltration in major public contracts. The Apulian organised crime contains a large number of independent groups, without a pyramid-type organisation. Two criminal organisations among these include groups with an overall structure, operating only in certain geographical areas in this region. Recently, the Apulian groups have expanded at a national level, and become involved with criminal organisations from Montenegro and Albania. They have initiated 'cohabitation' with foreign criminal organisations, developing links and organising meetings to conduct criminal operations that involve trafficking in human beings, drugs, and arms. This is facilitated through the large volume of illegal immigration taking place in the area.

The criminal activities of the Italian organised crime groups have expanded into many geographical areas, such as Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Egypt, Tunisia, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany, Belgium and France. Criminals coming from Germany, France and Switzerland were all linked to Campanian, Apulian and Sicilian organised crime; criminals from the UK were linked to Apulian and Campanian groups; criminals from Belgium were linked to Sicilian groups; and criminals from Australia were linked mainly to Calabrian groups.

The Italian 2000 reply assesses trends according to which all criminal organisations operating in Italy are interested in a modernisation process which is characterised by the attempt to establish new links, also at an international level, and by an entrepreneurial and business nature in order to connect the criminal economy with the legal economy. Thus, there is a trend aiming at establishing alliances. On the other hand, minor criminal structures are being parcelled out and operating in areas where major criminal organisations are not active.

In 1999, **Malta** stated that it has no locally based organised crime in the meaning of the Council of Europe questionnaire. Observations have been made, however, of persons in Malta who seem to be involved in organised crime based outside of Malta. The crimes typically implied here are narcotics business and money laundering. No organised crime groups in the strict sense are identified in Malta, but using more flexible criteria, the structure of existing groups is said to be mostly hierarchical, they operate on a national level, with members of the same age, or occasionally pertaining to the same family and also to the same ethnic background. The usual age range is 18-45 years. The countries of origin of group members are Bulgaria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt (i.e. those neighbours that are closest to Malta). The number of groups is very low, the total number of participants is not known.

In the 2000 reply, Malta repeats these observations. Malta does not have locally based organised crime. Occasionally however there are persons teaming up together, for a particular criminal enterprise (mainly armed robberies). Some individuals are identified in Malta who may participate in what could be organised crime based outside Maltese borders.

In this group of countries (i.e., **South-western Europe**), the decisive role played by geographical circumstances may be observed once more. Andorra, not quite unlike Luxembourg, reports being a transit country on one hand, and a base for organised money laundering on the other. Malta, another geographically peripheral country, also displays similar features. In contrast to these small countries, Italy and Spain are having a large-scale experience of organised criminal groups. Both have, however, a different organised crime scene in particular with regard to drug trafficking. Spain has been more connected with Hispanic overseas markets on one hand, and with its immediate neighbour (Morocco) on the other. Italy has widespread connections with organised criminal groups in a more diverse selection of countries together with a situation where several local domestic strongholds of organised criminal groups are identified. The present (1999) evidence did indeed suggest that Italy continued to be the most significant European country when organised criminal groups are concerned, and in particular if hierarchically structured permanent groups with transborder and overseas connections and influences are concerned.

#### **CENTRAL WESTERN EUROPE: AUSTRIA<sup>8</sup>, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, LIECHTENSTEIN**

The two large organised criminal groupings observed in **Switzerland** are the different Italian “mafias”, and the organised criminal groups originating in the Russian federation. The structure of these groups thus is in accordance with what has been reported for Italian and Russian organised crime groups. Also North and South American groups are present to an extent. The only “novelty” is the arrival of Asian mafia groups engaged in narcotics trafficking to Swiss territory. Otherwise, reference is made to the 1998 reply, indicating that domestic organised criminal groups are not abundant.

The geographical dimension of the activities of the “foreign” groups covers most European countries. They are involved in a broad range of businesses, including construction, oil trade, financing and money laundering, transports, and other business both locally and internationally.

The Swiss reply for 2000 does not provide additional information.

**Germany** reports that in 1999, 816 organised crime investigations were conducted, with 7,777 suspects from 94 countries involved. 562 organised criminal groups were investigated, where over one-half (297) concerned groups with up to 10 suspects. On the other hand, ten of the investigated groups involved more than 100 suspects. Details about the type of structure of the different groups are not given. Mostly, the groups investigated were heterogeneous in terms of nationality, and for one-fourth (145), cooperation with other criminal groups was established.

In 2000, the reply is equally brief, this time the number of organised crime investigations was 854, with 9,421 suspects from 92 countries, derived from those 628 investigations where suspect data are included. In terms of nationality, heterogeneous groups were established in 506 cases. 122 cases involved groups of offenders comprised of a single nationality. Cooperation with other criminal groups was established in 211 cases. Half of the groups (307) had 10 members or less, while seven cases had more than 100 suspects. In 138 of the investigations analysed there were regional and supra-regional links. In 500 investigations, international links were established, with altogether 90

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<sup>8</sup> No report received in 2000.

countries. The leading countries in this respect were Germany's close neighbours: the Netherlands and Poland. Also Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, the UK were mentioned frequently.

The 1999 reply of **Liechtenstein** is not specific about the matters concerned. Due to the small size of the country and of its rural character, it is explained that Liechtenstein does not experience the common forms of domestic organised crime. In the 2000 reply, this message is repeated. However, progress is reported in that a money laundering branch of an international criminal organisation has probably been disclosed, with a network of companies that have connections to South American Mafia families. The company network has companies in many European and American countries. Further, some illegal immigration operations were disclosed, with seven smugglers of persons apprehended (with no information of the organised criminal groups involved).

This group of countries (i.e. Central Western Europe) again contains one (Switzerland) that because of its banking legislation and the administration principles linked to this is attractive for other kinds of organised criminal activities (and, consequently, groups) than is the case with its neighbours. Apart from this, Switzerland is described as an organised crime scene where groups from the strong neighbour Italy, together with Russian, North and South American, and even Asian groups and dominate. All of these may have found their way to this particular country for purposes related to money laundering.

#### **CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, POLAND, SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA<sup>9</sup>**

**Slovenia** reported in 1999 that an increasing number of their nationals are part of associations which are led from abroad (Turkey, Bulgaria), whereas the Slovene "cells" are only responsible for the execution of a certain part of the deal, most frequently the organisation and execution of logistic tasks. This indicates that a network structure with cellular associations was seen as the basic form. However, also the formation of hierarchically organised associations was observed to be emerging. The number of organised criminal associations was estimated at 72, with 628 members.

In a geographical sense, Slovenia was frequently used as a transit country in illicit drug trade; en route from producer countries (Turkey, Albania, Columbia) to western Europe. The same role was also played with regard to the transport of illegal migrants to western Europe. The war in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was seen as the major source of the latest developments, resulting in that more and more criminal groups from Slovenia have made connections with criminal groups from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.

For the **Czech Republic** and Slovakia, the 1999 replies were rather similar. This, considering the common recent history of both, would also seem a plausible reflection of the real situation. The Czech Republic described the structure of organised criminal groups as twofold. The first type is organised at a lower level. Despite a clear division of tasks, its structure is primarily horizontal and the existence of higher governing sections is not evident here. The second type has a vertical organisational structure with several levels. At the top, there is the highest leader who may run several groups, known as so-called 'middle link'. Following this, there are the rank and file members. These highly

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<sup>9</sup> No report provided for 2000.

organised groups were estimated to have a share of between one-third and 40% in the Czech Republic between 1995 – 2000. The organisations were using external accomplices who provide services, and they also were hiring advisors if needed for various functions. Such external collaborators were often not familiar with the nature and operations of the criminal organisation. The share of external accomplices is probably half of the total membership.

In 2000, the Czech report has a more detailed view of the situation. The number of groups practising organised crime was estimated at approximately 75 and the number of members at 2,000. Over the 1990s, there have been a slightly larger number of groups dominated by foreign elements. In a relatively constant way, half the groups are mixed. The rest, just more than a quarter is made up of purely foreign groups and a slightly smaller number are purely Czech ones.

With regard to proportions of individual nationalities represented in organised crime in the Czech Republic. Three groups are distinguished:

- The strongest one is constituted by ex-USSR citizens, in particular Ukrainians and Russians. An increase of violent criminal activity is linked with the growth of this category, racketeering (the sale of protection services) being the most common criminal activity involved. Organised prostitution and car thefts are also ascribed to these groups.
- The second category is represented in particular by citizens of ex-Yugoslavia, and also Albanians and Bulgarians from the neighbouring areas, and Vietnamese
- The third category is made up of smaller nationalities, apparently involved in a number of various criminal enterprises.

In 1999, the largest groups identified were three with a Russian origin, each with 100-200 members. Russian and Ukrainian groups of a smaller volume, with about 50 members, were observed to be active in some parts of the country. A total of 20-30 groups with about 2000 members were estimated to exist in the country. A large proportion of these are of mixed origins, including even quite exotic nationalities such as Chinese and Vietnamese persons, indicating cross-border activities with all neighbour countries at least, as well as with countries outside of Europe. Operations were often seen as involving the Czech territory as a transit area from east to west, where target countries are primarily those near-by: Hungary, Italy, Spain, France. Further, traffic from the Far East and Africa are routed over the Czech Republic to the USA and the Caribbean region. Illegal migrants, often gathered in Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union, eventually cross Slovakia, Hungary and Poland to the Czech Republic and then to EU countries. In 2000, the situation had changed. The first and strongest group were the Russians and the Ukrainians. Until 1999, there were also citizens from the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in the first group. With the gradual disintegration of Yugoslavia, their share has slightly weakened. In 1999, they could be better ranked in the second group. Here, of course they took the leading position, so their significance on the Czech organised crime scene did not fade altogether. In 2000, they ranked more on the threshold between the first and the second groups. Until 1997, the Chinese were also in the first group and during 1998 their share slightly dropped. In 1999, they found themselves amongst the less important in the second group.

Representatives of the second group are primarily citizens of Yugoslavia. In 2000, Bulgarians, Albanians and Vietnamese were also relatively strong. Separate here are

Albanians from Kosovo. From 1998, Chinese have been in the second group, having been between 1993-1997 in the strongest group. Until 1997, Poles were also here, but their numbers fell sharply in 1998. In 1999, they found themselves in the weakest group in one of the last places.

In 2000, citizens of those nationalities which appear in the third group were active only in a relatively sporadic manner, within the context of organised crime in the Czech Republic. In this group there are: Turks, Arabs, Romanians, Italians, inhabitants of Afghanistan, inhabitants of South America, Dutch groups, Nigerians and Poles.

Also **Slovakia** 1999 reported well-organised hierarchical structures of organised criminal groups. These were also having cooperation with foreign criminal groups, in particular where drug-related activities are concerned. Many group leaders were typically Slovak nationals, however, groups involved in drugs offences had a foreign leader, mostly from Albania/Kosovo, or former USSR countries. An estimate of the number of groups is not given, group sizes range from 5 to 50 members.

All of the territory of Slovakia was reported to be divided between organised crime groups, in particular the biggest cities. Slovakian organised criminal groups were also reported to cooperate with foreign groups in Europe as well as outside of Europe. In Europe, all neighbouring countries were enumerated as general partner countries, cooperation with organised criminal groups in other European countries was varying according to the relevant commodity: Romania was used for stolen cars; for trafficking of women, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Holland were partners; for trafficking human beings, other EU states were used; and for drug trafficking, contacts with Scandinavia, Holland, Germany, Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania were mentioned. Non-European countries included drug producers such as Columbia and other Latin American countries, and Asian countries.

In their 2000 reply, Slovakia estimates the number of organised criminal groups to amount to 202, with 2,745 persons operating in the groups. The groups have typically less than ten members, ten groups identified with more than 50 members. The groups are hierarchically structured, which implies the involvement of various family members and, more often, aliens, most typically Ukrainians and citizens of the Czech Republic.

About one-half of the groups are active only at regional level, one-fifth have competence in the whole country, one-fifth have links to the border states of Slovakia, and some 15% have links to other European and non-European countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Afghanistan, and South Africa are mentioned).

In 1999, **Hungary** enumerated 76 existing and active organised crime groups with altogether 1,982 individuals suspected to be involved, or an average of 26 persons per group. Nearly one-half, or 34 groups had between 5 and 10 members, and 28 groups had between 11 and 30 members. Six massive groups were observed, with 100-300 members each, the largest ones operating in the Budapest metropolitan area.

In the 2000 reply, the number of groups was estimated at 72, or four less than in the previous year. Most groups were operating at the local level, 26 of them conducting their activities in the capital city and its immediate vicinity. Organised crime is not the isolated activity of separate groups; indeed there is a loose inter-group alliance in which positions, common and conflicting interests as well as relationships become increasingly permanent.

Apart from leading figures and permanent members forming the core, there is some degree of change and fluctuation in almost every organised crime group. Based on the total membership of such groups, there are about 1,800 permanent members suspected of participation, that is an average of 25 persons per group. This number has been almost identical in the four previous years. Groups having 11-50 members are the most common, less than 10 members in 16 groups, 51-100 members in 4 groups. There were 8 groups with more than 100 members; this is the estimated number of groups based abroad and controlled by foreigners.

The groups are predominantly hierarchical, and leadership and decision-making by a single person is dominant. Also, the number of network-built groups has risen. Altogether, 52 groups are under hierarchical leadership and there are 13 cell-like and 7 network-built groups. The primary motive for organisation is profit (63 groups). Groups based on families (8), relatives (7) and origin (4) still exist. Belonging to a particular ethnic groups is decisive in as many as 20 groups. Hungarians participate in 57 groups. Only few groups consisting of foreigners only exist.

The structure of the groups typically was of a hierarchical character. Also many of the groups operating independently of the large ones had a hierarchical structure. Of 62 observed hierarchical groups in 1999, 38 had one leader, 8 were ruled by two or more individuals, whereas 16 hierarchical groups had a multi-layered management structure. Even groups with a high level of task separation and long distances to be covered (such as organisations smuggling illegal immigrants) represented a hierarchical structure which was maintained over cellular phones

More than half of organised crime groups operating in Hungary consisted in 1999 of Hungarian citizens only. One-third had mixed membership, and 7 groups consisted of foreign nationals only. Of foreign members participating in the organised crime scene, the largest group were persons from former Yugoslavia (in 11 groups). Citizens of the neighbouring Slovakia (7 groups) and Ukraine (7 groups) were also numerous. Further, Arabs, Turks, Germans, Russians, Sub-Saharan Africans, Albanians, and Romanians were observed. Single instances of organised criminal groups involving citizens of other European countries as well as of Armenia, Georgia, China and Australia were found.

Concerning the geographical area of operation, the Hungarian 1999 report stated that the majority of groups operated in a large area spanning several counties within Hungary. The metropolitan area of Budapest and the northern counties of Hungary were the most important geographical areas of Hungary in this respect. Eleven groups were found to operate beyond the borders of Hungary. Connections to other continents were not observed, European connections encompassed, in the first place, Slovakia and Ukraine. Also the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Romania and Austria played a clear role, with a less important part played by Switzerland and Georgia. Links to Slovak organised crime groups were often noted to involve violent crimes; Slovak groups also played a central role in the trade of large volumes of arms and explosives.

Similar to other countries in the region, also Hungary was found to serve in the role of transit country in the smuggling of illegal immigrants from East to West. Similarly, drugs trade from many source countries was often using Hungary as a transit area, besides it being also a target country.

The 2000 report for **Poland** states that the structure of the organised groups in Poland is usually rather simple. It is mostly a hierarchical structure with no more than two or at

least three levels. Every group has a single leader and few other members belonging to some sort of collective leadership. Other members, so-called 'soldiers' are usually not 'constant' or 'full time' members. They are usually hired to do a concrete job and for concrete purposes. It means that the membership of groups, leadership excluded, is usually by no means stable and fixed, and changes constantly according to the needs and the current situation. It is only within few groups involving foreign nationals where family connections constitute the base of the existence of the group and because of that membership is rather constant. Groups with more complicated structures, for example a cell-wise structure, are not very common. Where they do exist, they are usually most dangerous and most difficult to penetrate and destroy. They are found to be engaged in theft, trafficking and smuggling of motor vehicles, and in the production, smuggling and trafficking of drugs.

Geographically, Poland is an important producer of synthetic drugs exported to western Europe, in particular to Sweden and Germany, and an important transit country for the smuggling of narcotic drugs to western Europe, in particular from Turkey and CIS countries. Poland is also generally used as a smuggling route for a variety of other goods. Some of them, like alcohol and cigarettes, electronic equipment, are to a large extent designated for the Polish market. However, they are smuggled also from western Europe to other countries like Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic republics and Russia. Poland also serves as a major transit route for stolen cars from western Europe to the region of the former Soviet Union. Poland also appears to be a significant location for international money laundering operations. All of these observations point at links between Polish organised crime groups with groups abroad.

**SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE ALBANIA, BULGARIA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, GREECE<sup>10</sup>, "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA"<sup>11</sup> AND TURKEY**

**Bulgaria's** 2000 reply reports on both hierarchical and a cell-wise structured criminal groups, depending on the type of criminal activity they are involved in. The hierarchical structure has one leader, 2 to 3 assistants who control a number of 'executives', not permanent members of the association but summoned for specific tasks. This structure is typical for groups operating in classical criminal activities (robberies, extortion, debt collection, trafficking motor vehicles, pimping). The cell-wise structure is typical for groups involved in trafficking of drugs and smuggling of people, in illegal gambling, and forgery. Sometimes, a mixture of both structures is observed. As to organised crime in the shadow economy, no structures may be discerned but rather associations of autonomous establishments, usually legal persons.

In 2000, Bulgaria identified 287 organised criminal groups, their typical size being 4 to 15 participants. 135 criminal groups are documented in more detail, having a total of 1602 active participants of whom 1235 were Bulgarians and 164 foreign citizens.

The detected groups mostly (87%) have a homogeneous composition, being only Bulgarian citizens. Foreign citizens participated in 37 (13%) of the criminal groups, mostly Turks (8), Russians (6), Ukrainians (5), and a few persons from neighbouring countries. Bulgarian citizens are the leaders of 270 (94%) of the identified groups. Links have been ascertained for 16% of the groups, pointing to the existence of 4 associations, linked with criminal activities. These associations include 19, 17, 5 and 5 groups respectively. Typical for them is the use of legal business covers and the performance of legitimate business activities.

There is cooperation between local criminal groups and groups from other countries in particular in the immediate neighbourhood. However, also Germany, Spain, Norway and Brazil are mentioned. The foreign connections are particularly active in the fields of drug trafficking and trafficking in women, falsifications of bank notes, credit cards and other similar documents, and pirate product and cigarette trade.

The predominant part (89%) of the Bulgarian criminal groups act only on the national territory, and mostly only locally. International activities have been linked to 20 of the groups.

**Albania** reports in 2000 that they have 'combated' 23 organised criminal groups involved in drug trafficking. In addition, three criminal organisations involved in economic crime were combated in 1999/2000.

The drug group members have specialised roles, such as the financing and directing persons, the organisers of the transportation, and the assistants and other participants. The cooperation between the members shows a relative continuity. The groups are often using businesses as fronts of the trafficking operations. In some cases, the activity is carried out in cooperation with various corrupted officials who could be defined as being part of the organised criminal groups. The activity takes place in the country as well as abroad. The size of the groups is usually up to 10 persons, sometimes more. The groups have connections to different parts of the country, some of them have also links to

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<sup>10</sup> No report provided for 2000.

<sup>11</sup> No report provided for 2000.



foreign criminal organisations, mainly from Italy, Turkey, Greece, Colombia, "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", and Malaysia. The groups are mostly independent of each other

The organised economic crime groups are described in detail. One of them, with 13 members in a network structure, 'stole' the Savings Bank. All members were Albanians, the group only operated within the country. The second group with 52 members organised false pensions for mine workers, also in a network organisation, with only Albanian members, operating in Tirana only. The third group with nearly 200 members, with a network structure, committed insurance fraud, operating all over Albania.

**Croatia** did not provide a report for 1999. In their 2000 reply, it is stated that there are persons who are taking advantage of the state of aggression in Croatia and have, by smuggling of goods and persons, financial engineering, money laundering, practice of usury, racketeering, extortion and organising of prostitution, acquired material goods which they want to invest into legal financial flows. This leads to the establishment and purchasing of firms, catering establishments and investment of 'dirty money' into other criminal activities. Interestingly, Croatia thus reports of broadly speaking identical criminal activities that are dealt with in other country replies. However, they state that, with regard to the internal structure, criminal groups in the Republic of Croatia could not be considered as criminal organisations or criminal associations in a classical meaning of those terms, because there are no hierarchical relations among the members of the groups. The members are only related as personal acquaintance and have common interests in acquiring illegal material gain by the commission on one or several offences. Nevertheless, members of some groups are in connection with criminal organisations or individuals in Italy, Slovenia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, FR of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria and the newly established States of the former Soviet Union.

However, during 2000, 12 persons have been arrested in the Zagreb area, charged with the criminal offence of a criminal association (connected with a series of many serious offences). Another extensive investigation resulted in the arrest of 38 persons who participated as an organised criminal group linked with other criminal groups in neighbouring countries (Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) in smuggling immigrants from the East to western Europe.

Suggesting a trend, Croatia states that one can expect foreign criminal organisations, criminal associations and individuals to use their connections in Croatia to extend their criminal activities and spread them over the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

**Cyprus** represented a rather limited organised crime scene, according to the 1999 country report. The 2000 report is similar. The country has two main organised criminal groups, one based in Larnaca, the other in Limassol. Both are hierarchical, family-based structures that cooperate to some extent, and fight each other on occasions. Both groups have non-family members at the lower levels of the hierarchy, mainly Greek-Cypriot males with a criminal record. The top of the groups is being held by family members who are native Cypriots. Each group consists of a small number of hard core members and few other associates. The groups are not having any international dimension, but restrict their activities to the area of Cyprus.

**Turkey** counts 47 organised criminal groups in 2000, their size ranging generally from 11 to 50 members, with an estimated total number of 2,500 participants (these figures are identical with those given for 1999).

In Turkey, organised crime groups mostly have a hierarchical structure. They are based on the group leader, necessitating absolute obedience to the leader, with a division of tasks. Occasionally structures of a cellular character are also found. Organised crime groups are generally composed of members coming from the Black Sea region of Turkey. Some groups also have members from other regions. Occasionally, cooperation with groups in other parts of the country may take place. Organic ties with foreign organised criminal groups are not observed, beyond the situation that some group members have personal relationships with members of foreign groups.

In 1999, "**The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**" reported within the organised criminal groups, there is no clearly defined structure, but they constitute rather a criminal network in which the members are horizontally connected through a division of tasks and their interest in making profit. The size of the groups is not indicated. The role of family connections is said to be dominating. Most leaders and members are nationals. However, in groups that are dealing with illegal migration and drugs, there are attempts to impose foreign citizens as leaders. The small size of the country prevents geographical or other divisions in the actions of criminal groups. Most of the groups are regionally connected with organised criminal groups or individuals from neighbouring and sometimes other European countries.

**Greece** reported in 1999 a multitude of organised criminal groups, with domestic groups representing the majority. Among foreign ethnic groups, Albanian, Russian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Turkish and Iraqi groups, i.e. groups from countries neighbouring to or near Greece are enumerated. Also Pakistani and Bangladesh-originating groups are observed in connection with illegal migration, fraud and forgery. The group size basically ranges from 3 to 10, with a division of tasks. These gangs are seen to be rather circumstantial as compared to mafia-type organisations.

In 1999, 41 organised criminal activity investigations involved a total of 256 offenders, little over half (138) of these being Greek, 44 Albanian, 17 Georgian, 7 Romanians, 4 Russian, 2 Bulgarian, 1 of "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", 1 Hungarian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Syrian, 1 Moldavian. From further East, 6 were Pakistanis, 31 Bangladesh nationals. Also one Nigerian and one Ethiopian were noted.

Geographically, most of the organised crime activities involving foreigners are of a cross-border character. In the northern parts of the country, this cross-border crime is related to the trafficking in narcotics, the theft of and trade in stolen cars to and from Greece. In Southern Greece, where the ports are used for organised cross-border criminal activities, organising of illegal migration, and trafficking of arms and narcotics are observed. In these parts, organised criminal groups are also involved in the forgery of certificates (seamen's qualification documents). Overall, the largest part of organised criminal activity is located in the region of the two largest cities. A new element is the operation of members of the Italian Mafia-groups over the whole of western Greece.

Countries of the south-eastern Europe group vary according to how close and on which side of the countries of ex-Yugoslavia they are located. In this case, local tradition together with the recent war-induced situation of unusual crime opportunities and low level of control has probably provided favourable conditions for many organised

criminal groups. Some countries in this group are relatively isolated from large European crime markets and report, consequently, organised criminal groups whose activities are relatively restricted to their own territory and locally. Greece, in contrast, reports a more massive influence of organised criminal groups that are having connections to groups in all of the neighbouring countries but not much further. More than the other countries in this group, Greece is experiencing a growing importance as a transit country for trafficking of human beings to western European destinations.

#### **EASTERN EUROPE: ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN<sup>12</sup>, GEORGIA<sup>13</sup>, MOLDOVA, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION<sup>14</sup> AND UKRAINE**

The **Russian Federation** reported in 1999 very briefly on the organised crime situation. It stressed the hierarchical type of organised criminal groups, with a detailed division of tasks and rigid internal discipline. The groups were, accordingly described to be stable, with a superior union management. The latter refers to the existence of associations of organised criminal groups, often referred to in studies of Russian organised crime (e.g. Aromaa & Lehti 2000; Bäckman 1999).

The **Armenian** reply for 2000 states that no data on the topic are available.

The **Georgian** 1999 report stated that their organised criminal groups were more often representing a hierarchical than a network structure. They were reported to cooperate only rarely with other criminal groups in Georgia or abroad, the leaders and the members being typically Georgian nationals. The size of the groups was reported to range between 11 and 50 members, and they were known to operate only in their own country.

Russia and the CIS countries would be expected to have similar experiences with organised criminal groups, influenced by the collapse of the Soviet regime, connected with the rapid privatisation process and the weakening of state controls that continue to prevail. The fact that Georgia provides an overview that is different from this may be an interesting case for further study.

In 1999 and 2000 alike, **Moldavian** organised crime groups were reported to be structured hierarchically or as networks, with a few observations of cellular formations too. Their composition was heterogeneous, including ethnic groups of Moldavian, Jewish, Russian, gypsy, Bulgarian, and Caucasian origins. The groups were known to cooperate at the national level, but also international cooperation encompassing the entire area of the CIS exists. The criminal group leaders and other group members were Moldavians and nationals of other CIS countries.

The number of organised criminal groups was estimated at 121, with 1160 persons involved. These 121 groups were understood to belong to six larger organisations of which five have as their leaders renowned 'thieves-in-law'. The largest community has almost 500 members. The sizes of these six organisations ranged from 471 to 27 members, including two groups with up to 100 members. 93 of the 121 groups counted less than 10 members each. For 1999 and 2000, identical figures are reported.

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<sup>12</sup> No report provided for 2000.

<sup>13</sup> No report provided for 2000.

<sup>14</sup> No report provided for 2000.

Besides the country's own territory, the criminal activities of Moldavian organised groups involved many European countries that were reasonably close to the country (also Cyprus and Israel), but also further west such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal. Outside of Europe, cooperation with groups in the USA and China were observed. The profiles of the criminal activities were geographically differentiated. Operations carried out with CIS countries were quite similar to the selection of organised criminal activities carried out towards or in cooperation with organised criminal groups in European countries: trade in alcohol, tobacco, drugs, arms and explosives, people, and smuggling of migrants, money laundering, economic crime of various kinds. The exact character of the criminal operation reflected, in each instance, which countries were involved in which operations. Overall, the description resembled ones received from the Russian Federation in other sources.

**Ukraine**, for 1999, reported that 294 organised criminal groups with more than 2,000 members were active in their territory. Of the groups, 33 (with 500 members) were said to have international ties. 12 groups (125 members) had an ethnic background. In the Ukrainian reply for 2000, the number of organised criminal groups was reported to have decreased, from 1165 to 9608 (in this reply, Ukraine has obviously applied a different definition of organised criminal groups than in 1999). Recent years have seen a tendency towards an increasing average size of the organised criminal groups. While in 1992/1993 most of the disclosed organised criminal groups comprised 2 to 3 persons, starting from 1997 most of them appear to have 4 to 10 persons, with an increasing number exceeding 10 participants.

The social and political changes of the last decade directly affected the international nature of organised crime also in Ukraine. One of the typical features is a trend to form transnational criminal groupings. The criminal environment in this region is explained to have become more serious due to activities of so-called 'Russian-speaking' criminal groups or 'the red mafia'. These criminal groupings cannot be named purely 'Russian-Ukrainian' since they include many Russian-speaking participants from other CIS countries. Foreign criminal groups are noted to try to expand their spheres of influence into Ukraine. Another problem are groups formed on an ethnic basis. Such groups exist in all regions of Ukraine. The formation of such groups is facilitated by the rapid increase in the number of illegal migrants, originating from all over Asia and Africa.

The Ukrainian 1999 report provided two examples of major organised criminal formations (eventually liquidated) that represent clear hierarchical structures, with renowned leaders with national backgrounds in Kazakhstan, and the Poltava region, and members with Chechen, Ingush and Dagestan backgrounds. The size of one group was about 30, with extortion of businesses as the central form of activity. The second group was involved in several kinds of business, ranging from oil trade, construction, food markets, and providing 'legal consultations' to commercial structures. This formation comprised about 100 members. These cases resemble closely those found in Russia.

Traditional general criminal organised crime include groups involved in fraud, racketeering and smuggling, as well as in dealing with drugs and sex business, arms trade, car thefts, and others. However, the report notes that in the most recent years there has been a shift to economic organised crime related to finance and credit, banking, foreign economic relations, privatisation, fuel and energy sector, agricultural industry, metallurgical, mining and refineries. These are observed to be the sectors where the lion's share of 'shadow' capital is being formed and money laundering is flourishing. The

Ukrainian report does, however, not give estimates of the number, size or structure of organised criminal groups engaged in these fields.

The geographical scope of the activities of these gangs was reported as having spread to several western and central European countries (Germany, Hungary, Poland, Greece, and Great Britain were mentioned separately), and the USA. Money laundering (legalising illegally obtained means) is, of course, carried out in countries where offshore zones are situated. For illegal immigration, Ukraine was seen as being in a central position as a transit country to Europe, migrants arriving from China, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mention was also made of a transit function in the provision of women to the sexual markets in Turkey, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Greece, Arab emirates, Israel, and the USA. The number of illegal migrants on the territory of Ukraine is increasing in big leaps. Apart from various 'Caucasian' (Chechen, Azeri, Armenian, Daghestan, Georgian) communities, a number of other colonies of illegal migrants have formed in Ukraine, such as Vietnamese.

**Romania** reported that their organised criminal groups are structured either as cells with reduced numbers of members, or as networks, often connected to similar structures in other countries. The groups usually have a leader and a degree of inner discipline. Criminal groups composed of members from the gypsy population are based on family criteria with, however, criminal relationships with other domestic as well as foreign groups. Isolated cases of organised groups based on Turkish, Arab or Chinese communities were observed but not considered significant.

Links to foreign criminal groups were said to be related, specifically, to trafficking in human beings, including white slavery, and drugs. In addition to contacts of a cross-border nature, thus concerning neighbouring countries, some groups were also said to be involved in operations involving other European countries (e.g. Germany, Hungary, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Yugoslav Federation, Switzerland) and Asian and North and South American countries.

The 2000 reply distinguishes between internationalised groupings (Russian-CIS-Ukrainian) and groupings formed on an ethnic basis. Such groupings exist in all of the regions of Romania and, in some cases, compete successfully with local criminals trying to put under control individual state-owned and commercial structures, as well as some types of criminal business.

The group leaders in activities inside the country are Romanian citizens, or for ethnic groups, members of the Gypsy community, Turks, Arabs or Chinese. In cross-border activities, the leaders are usually foreign citizens, established in other states. In the latter cases, there are Romanian local leaders with the role to commit particular offences and recruit new members.

In 1999, a total of 1,261 groups were observed by the police, of which 842 groups consisting of Romanian citizens, 145 of foreign citizens, and 274 mixed groups. In 2000, a total of 1,339 groups were noted, of which 133 groups composed of foreign citizens, 924 of Romanian citizens, and 282 mixed groups. The groups usually have less than 10 members, but also networks with 11 to 50 members have been identified, in particular in the field of trafficking in human beings where the group membership of course is a mix of Romanian and foreign nationals.

Besides Romanian groups, also groups formed on the basis of the nationality principle (Turks, Chinese, Iranians, Nigerians, Ukrainians, Moldavians and Russians were

observed. The activities of such groups were mostly of a local character, directed against their own nationals for the purposes of robbery and extortion of protection fees.

#### **THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: ESTONIA, LATVIA<sup>15</sup>, LITHUANIA**

The structure of **Estonian** organised criminal groups is either hierarchical or of a network character. They are influenced by the geopolitical proximity to Russia and the historically strong connections with Russian groups; although these links are said to be weakening.

Two organised crime models are distinguished in Estonia today. One is the "conservative model", resembling Russian organisations. The second is called the "progressive model", which is directed towards economic crime and creates contacts with western European countries. The groups of the conservative model have one leader, forming a permanent group of brigadiers about himself. Their ethnic background is dominantly Russian; they typically share a prison background. These deal with semi-legal business or also purely criminal activities (drugs, thefts, robberies, extortion, racketeering). Such groups protect their territory, and were observed to operate in three regions of Estonia. The scope of their geographical activity encompasses the CIS region and other eastern European countries.

The progressive groups are orientated towards economic crime, also with international dimensions.

At the moment there are five active criminal groups operating in Estonia (three others have been reported as non-active). The five active criminal groups are identified as two Russian ones (the Kemerovo group and Stanislav Volkov's group), one Armenian, one Azerbaijan group, and one Estonian group. The Kemerovo group is the most "monolithic" and most powerful group in Estonia, also involved in legal metal-import business to Estonia and Scandinavia. The Volkov group is more specialised, its main area being stolen cars. The Armenian group, mostly operating in smuggling and prostitution, is fading away.

The estimated number of members of the group is about 15 to 30 persons. There are significant changes in the number of groups in comparison with the year 1999, when ten groups were reported. One of the groups liquidated itself because of serious internal contradictions and problems with other groups.

The Estonian group is described as the "progressive" one, with a cell-wise organisation and about 200 members. It cooperates with groups from Scandinavia and Finland (illegal alcohol, illicit drugs), Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Netherlands and Spain (transit of the drugs). Spain appears to be the foreign country where the Estonian criminal group carries out most of its activities. For money laundering the group uses Cyprus, Malta, Belarus and Ukraine. The Estonian criminal group and Stanislav Volkov's criminal group organise car thefts in Germany and Scandinavia on a regular basis. The Armenian criminal group also acts in St. Petersburg and Armenia.

Regionally, the main place of activity is the territory of Estonia (Tallinn, Tartu – two bigger cities, and the county of Ida-Virumaa in the north-east with Russian domination.).

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<sup>15</sup> No reply received in 2000.

However, there are clear indications that criminal groups also increase their activities in other European countries, in particular the group consisting of Estonians.

The Azerbaijan group is new, first observed in 1998, with 20-30 active members and 20-30 supporting members. This group would seem to be engaged in largely similar activities as the Armenian one. The majority of the members of organised criminal groups are Russian-speaking people coming from different parts of the former Soviet Union, and living in Estonia legally or illegally.

Besides the Estonian group, also the Volkov group is ascribed activities that could be assessed as being "progressive". The other three groups would seem to operate more along traditional lines albeit not without a trans-border dimension, either.

The progressive groups are orientated towards economic crime, also with international dimensions. Business ideas typically observed are related to smuggling, tax frauds, bankruptcy offences. The structure of the group involves a few key persons, in certain activities also more extensive support networks, and a level of the concrete operation, with partners in another country (model example: smuggling drugs, narcotics, cigarettes, and alcohol to Finland).

The Estonian organised criminal world has a hierarchy, the top of which consists of "the Council" with approximately 12 members, current or former leaders of groups, with great authority in the criminal world. The Council together with Estonian organised criminal groups formulate a specific territorial-criminal syndicate. The Council supervises the activities of most groups; these groups are accountable to the Council. They also pay taxes to the Council that uses the funds, inter alia to compensate losses suffered by group members (imprisonment, death). The Council does not lead the groups. This description resembles ones concerning Russian organised crime.

For **Latvia**, no reply for 2000 was received. In 1999, Latvian organised crime groups are reported to be structured in a hierarchical manner where four large associations of groups divide the territory. Each main group consists of a number of smaller groups, with from five to several tens of members. There are more than 50 criminal groups like these. They have a hierarchical structure, with strict tasks for each member. Nationality is of no great importance, except for the Chechen group that is considered being one of the largest and most serious groups in Latvia. Outside of the groups belonging to the larger associations, some small groups exist, with a less stable structure and composition.

The group leaders are mostly Latvian nationals. In total 13 criminal associations and over 30 other organised criminal groups were estimated to be active in the country, indicating that also Latvia is familiar with the Russian-style large associations of organised criminal groups as explained in the Estonian report in particular, and in Lithuania. The number of participants in these groups is estimated at 1,300 to 1,500.

A major part of the groups have contacts with organised crime groups abroad, mainly Russia, but also Lithuania and other neighbouring countries are relevant. The activities requiring such cooperation are typically related to smuggling and transit of smuggled goods.

Geographically, organised crime groups are prominent in metropolitan Riga and other large cities. Operations are expanding to the neighbouring areas of Russia, Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, as well as Germany, Poland, Finland, and the Netherlands.

Smuggling is the main area of contacts since Latvia is an important transit country for smuggling stolen cars and excise goods. No permanent activities outside of Europe were detected. However, individual contacts cover many eastern and western European countries, Israel, and the USA.

In 1999, **Lithuania** reported that the structure of organised criminal groups is variable and not complicated. There are no exclusively ethnic groups. In the 2000 reply, about 40 organised criminal groups are noted, with about 1,500 members, but with no detailed information on group size. Their structure differed from group to group. However, it is not complicated but mostly of two kinds: clear-hierarchical structure with coherent leader or unclear where it is difficult to understand who guides the group. The groups are mostly heterogeneous, save the capital city of Vilnius and the port city Klaipeda. There is no criminal group which is composed solely on an ethnic basis, except groups of Roma. The age of criminals involved in criminal groups is decreasing. The group leaders are mostly Lithuanian nationals.

Cooperation with other groups in the same country is observed but it is not of a permanent nature but, rather, ad hoc cooperation. The cooperation is in particular for drug trafficking, and also trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation, and for illegal immigration. Their cooperation with foreign groups takes place mostly with groups from neighbour countries, like Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Russia, and in western Europe United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia. A trend of growing activities abroad is observed.

Over the 1990s, the phenomenon of organised criminal groups in the Baltic countries seems to have developed along dissimilar routes. The great influence of organised crime in the Russian tradition is still discernible but becoming weaker while national groups may be growing in importance. Estonia reports a diminishing influence of Russian-style organised crime groups, Lithuania reports a relatively moderate situation with Russian influences not playing a central role. Latvia, in contrast is still understood to be strongly influenced of Russian-style organised crime groups. The three countries would thus be developing along quite individualistic routes despite their background and location. However, as transit countries all three play a similar role, moving cars to the east and alcohol, drugs, and people to more affluent western member countries.



### 2.1.3 Number of organised criminal groups and participants

Primarily, the compilation presented in table 1 – like the one in table 2 – reflects the size of the countries in question, with small countries reporting small numbers, and large countries reporting large numbers. Some countries report that they know of a given number of 'major' or 'main' groups, while others say they have no knowledge of groups that would fulfil the Council of Europe criteria but report on numbers of less structured and permanent groups. What exactly constitutes a 'group' thus still remains a partly unsettled matter. This is a particularly acute problem if countries with very different traditions are compared, as for example countries of the Scandinavian versus Russian or Italian traditions. A further distinction of 'criminal groups' and 'criminal associations' might be helpful in some situations, however also the concept of 'association' represents considerable standardisation problems. The reported figures clearly also depend on the level of awareness and on the sophistication regarding the matter of organised crime. We should not, however, interpret this only as a matter of awareness since it is likely that there is a significant correlation between the volume of effort spent on the topic and the real size and seriousness of the problem. Tables 1 and 2 deserve, nevertheless, to be continued since, as yet, no better option is developed.

Table 1: Estimated number of organised criminal groups in 2000  
(or 1999 for countries that did not provide an estimate in 2000; the 2000 data are given in bold type)

< 25	<b>Andorra, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Malta, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Norway, San Marino</b>
25-100	<b>Albania, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey</b>
100-200	'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', <b>Moldova, The Netherlands</b>
200-500	<b>Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland</b>
> 500	<b>Germany, Italy, Romania, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Ukraine</b>

A similar confusion may hamper the comparability of data on the number of 'participants'. This also reveals the great difficulty caused by the lack of standard criteria for 'group' as well as 'participant' or 'core member' and 'other member'. The data for Iceland may just serve here as an illustration of the seriousness of this problem. When estimating the numbers of 'participants', a very large number is indicated because the reply refers to 'persons involved' and apparently involvement, if the narcotics scene in particular is considered may likely comprise everybody who is dealing or using drugs. For this reason, attempts to relate the given quantities to the size of the population of each country may not be very useful at this point of analysis – except that such an exercise could very well point out probable discrepancies in definitions and counting rules applied.

Another perspective is a historical one, comparing the 2000 data with previous statistics. When doing this, many member States for which such statistics were available, appear to report quite similar, even identical, figures for each year. However, there are exceptions. Finland reported 27 organised criminal groups in 1999, compared to 12, 16 and 22 in the three previous years. In 2000, they reported again slightly less groups, or 23. Moldova also reported rising numbers: 71 in 1996, 65 in 1997, 105 in 1998, 121 in 1999, and again 121 in 2000.

**Table 2: Estimated number of participants in organised criminal groups in 2000**  
(or 1999 for countries that did not provide data for 2000; the 2000 data are in bold type)

< 500	<b>Albania, Andorra, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 'the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', Norway, Portugal, San Marino</b>
500-2,500	<b>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey</b>
2,500-5,000	<b>Poland, Slovakia</b>
> 5,000	<b>Germany, Italy, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, United Kingdom</b>

## 2.2 CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUPS

### 2.2.1 Fraud

Fraud is a very general term covering a wide range of activities aimed at making money by circumventing economic and financial regulations. Certain common characteristics are reflected in most of the national reports, namely:

- fraud may be directed against the public purse or against private economic interests, companies or individuals
- while crimes of fraud are sometimes confined to a single country they tend increasingly to have an international dimension
- fraud is sometimes the work of individuals but in most cases it requires infrastructure plus a certain degree of organisation, and it is often complex, demanding a high level of specialist knowledge
- fraud often goes unrecognised by supervisory bodies because its victims, be they individuals or companies, are reluctant to report it.

Measuring the incidence of these types of fraud is very difficult. Estimates in most countries are fairly loose. For one thing, official awareness of fraud depends on people reporting it and, in the case of this type of activity more than others, supervisory bodies may not recognise the significance of what is reported. Individual victims are often reluctant to go to the authorities, while in some instances the financial impact of the fraud is so thinly spread that the victims do not react. To use a familiar image, there is general agreement that what is visible is merely the tip of the iceberg. Moreover, because many crimes of fraud have an international dimension<sup>16</sup> they may not be included in national reports. Lastly, many countries also point to the difficulty of distinguishing between fraud carried out by legitimate economic players and the fraud that is part of organised crime. Some of the reports thus refer to all crimes of fraud irrespective of whether those responsible belong to organised criminal groups, while others concern only the fraud perpetrated by such groups.

This report is concerned exclusively with fraud carried out by members of organised criminal groups but it is evident from the national reports that there is no clear dividing line and in practice the distinction tends to blur. Cloaked in many cases by legitimate economic activity, crimes of fraud are contingent, as a rule, on the economic circumstances of the country concerned and often depend not only on other illegal activities that are carried out simultaneously by the same groups but also on the involvement of legitimate economic interests.

The ability to defraud implies a mastery of economic and financial techniques that are often complex. In particular it presupposes capabilities that tend to be the preserve of legitimate economic players – to set up sophisticated systems, for example, to operate front companies or to work through established off-shore centres. Methods and systems of this type, set up in the first instance by legitimate players as a means of getting round the rules, may later be put at the disposal of organised criminals. Violence or the threat of violence lies behind such cases in which collaboration is purchased or pressures exerted.

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<sup>16</sup> A frequently made point, see (Levi, Pithouse, 1999), (1997)

Fraud is often underpinned by other types of crime such as the manufacture and use of false documents or the laundering of profits for reinvestment, and it is increasingly carried out alongside other offences such as the distribution of counterfeits or even drug trafficking.

#### **TYPES OF FRAUD AND THEIR ECONOMIC CONTEXT**

Fraud is not the type of crime most frequently mentioned in the national reports on the organised crime situation in the year 2000. But although crimes of fraud are less visible than drug trafficking or trafficking in human beings, they nonetheless represent a real menace, as emphasised in the UK's National Criminal Intelligence Service publication on the threat posed by organised crime (NCIS, 2001). It is estimated that fraud against the public purse, economic interests and consumers costs the UK economy a total of GBP 5 – 12 billion annually.

Many of the types of fraud described are closely linked to national economic circumstances. The crimes of fraud highlighted thus differ depending on whether the reporting country is an eastern European state in transition towards a market economy, a western European country intensifying its exchanges within the European Union or, indeed, an international financial centre.

Fraud in the EU member states is often related to the single economic area and much of it harms the Union's financial interests. In the year 2000 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which concentrates on the most serious fraud, investigated 328 new cases, the great majority of which involved criminals. Yet the precise connection of these cases with organised crime, in its accepted definition, cannot be established. The cost of fraud, across all areas of the EU budget, amounted to more than € 900 million. The OLAF report notes that, while it is always difficult to tie the cost of fraud to a particular budgetary year, the figures for 2000 show a fresh increase in both the number of cases detected and the amount of money involved, both indicators having tended to stabilise in the preceding years. As well as the particularly serious cases under investigation by OLAF, the member states report other cases (involving a total of € 1.1 billion) in which the dividing line between fraud and non-compliance with regulations is not clear. (EU, 2001).

Many EU countries (including Belgium, France, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) report cases of so-called *carousel* VAT fraud. This entails organising rapid and sometimes fictitious intra-Community transactions in easily transportable goods with a high added value, e.g. computers, mobile phones (particularly in the UK, France and Denmark where seven out of nine cases detected involved this commodity), electronic components and vehicle parts (notably in the Netherlands). When the goods are apparently re-sold, the fraudsters, in many cases shielded by front companies, can reclaim VAT which they falsely assert that they paid at the time of purchase. These transactions follow one after another and often involve front companies – or the setting up in rapid succession of companies that exist only on paper and are swiftly dissolved once the fictitious purchases or sales have been concluded (a point highlighted in the reports from Belgium and the Netherlands) – as well as forged documents or real documents that have been falsified. Investigations are complicated not only by the ephemeral nature of the companies involved (the Belgian authorities reporting, for example, that their inquiries focus only on carousels that are currently functioning), but also by the fact that they are registered in several European countries (see, for example, the reports from France, Norway, Liechtenstein, Sweden and Germany).

The Danish report is clear in classifying as organised crime fraud involving an organisation of several individuals whose aim is to break the law by evading taxes or charges. This type of fraud succeeds because of the substantial profits to be made and because it is simple in as much as it depends on accounting records and administrative formalities that are not monitored. Those who engage in it can make a lot of money in a short time, and for that reason criminals are increasingly drawn to it. The UK publication underscores this point, noting that organised criminal groups tend to be involved, in particular, in carousel-type fraud in which fictitious companies are set up purely for criminal purposes (NCIS, 2001; Brard, 1999; Brana, 2000). The incidence of this type of fraud has increased markedly since 1998; one in six organised criminal groups is involved in it and for half these groups it is their principal activity.

For the past ten years or so there have been specific opportunities, in countries making the transition towards a market economy, for fraud in connection with the emergence of private companies. While some such fraud still goes on, it would seem there is a trend towards "normalisation" in this respect, with fraud generally tending to take the same forms as it does in other countries, i.e. tax evasion, financial or credit card fraud. Many of the countries concerned class all such activities, without distinction, as "economic crime".

The report from Bulgaria mentions further cases of fraud in connection with the recent privatisations there (the amount of money involved totalling more than BGL 120 million) but it also notes that police investigations were initiated against 18 criminal groups operating under cover of legal economic activities and responsible for VAT fraud, as well as eight other groups responsible for fraud against banks and companies. In these cases the groups concerned were Bulgarian and did not operate on a transnational footing.

The Czech Republic's report, on the other hand, indicates that transnational groups were operating there, one of them involving nationals of the former USSR whose specialities are financial fraud and dealing in strategic materials. The report also mentions that investigations began during the year – in cooperation with Germany through the Munich Office of Criminal Investigations (KRIPPO) and Italy (via the DIA) – into a leasing-fraud network also associated with trafficking in stolen vehicles. A police report shows that fraud of all types doubled against 1999 levels and cost a total of \$ 1.3 million.

The Slovakian report, based on the work of the Office of Financial Police, highlights the cost of tax fraud, particularly VAT and customs fraud. Companies entirely dedicated to fraud and linked to criminal groups are reported to be costing the public purse hundreds of millions of Slovakian koruna in individual swindles. Overall losses could be as high as SKK 10 billion. Over the last three years the incidence of this type of fraud has increased significantly while there has been a marked decline in fraud directly connected with privatisation. Behind the new type of fraud lies a highly structured role-based system involving not only criminal organisations, individual figureheads and front companies that can be rapidly wound up, but also legally established business people who can help to set up fraud operations and launder the profits.

The Hungarian report confirms the tendency for organised criminal groups to be heavily involved in fraud and counterfeiting: one-third of the groups in Hungary engage in these activities. A number of criminal groups producing fake credit cards had been successfully infiltrated. The report notes a new trend with the emergence, independent of other criminal groups, of organisations specialising in computer crime, including, for example, groups that possess the know-how necessary for reading card PIN codes. One such group had just been dismantled. The report forecasts that organised criminal

groups will step up their involvement in this type of crime over the next few years, causing increasingly heavy losses. The Netherlands report also mentions credit card fraud based on hacking into data on optical reader tracks, which has caused substantial losses (estimated at more than NGL 120 million) over the last two years.

The incidence of financial fraud (connected to stock markets, financial institutions and banks) is also increasing steadily. The Netherlands report highlights savings-fraud schemes (so-called "boiler rooms") which attract savers seeking to make a lot of money quickly. Three of seven such cases were linked to Switzerland. In Belgium, the Crown Prosecutor's Office in Brussels reports ever closer links between organised crime and financial crime. It identifies a branch of organised crime that is concerned solely with financial matters, alongside fraud in the diamond and oil markets. In France there was organised gang involvement in 179 out of 6640 offences for which persons were convicted of obtaining by false pretences but gangs were not found to have been involved in any offences of fraud or counterfeiting.

Many reports note the use of commercial structures to commit offences and the Hungarian report mentions the indirect impact of statutory measures such as a new companies law that has helped to combat the formation of front companies by raising the amount of capital required to form a company.

Organised criminal groups are diversifying into various illegal economic activities and, indeed, specialising in certain areas. In Poland, for example, twenty groups (out of 400 identified) were reported to be involved in economic crime including corruption, fraud and the counterfeiting and laundering of money; in Romania fraud and counterfeiting were among the principal activities of the country's criminal organisations; in Ukraine organised criminal groups were specialising in bank-lending fraud by setting up fictitious networks of companies, and in obtaining money under false pretences by taking advantage of the deregulation of foreign trade. In the year 2000 there were over 1000 cases of fraud of different types, costing in total more than \$ 5 million. In Lithuania the value of the underground economy could be as much as 42% of GDP and there is an increasingly common pattern of organised criminal groups involving themselves in legitimate economic activity and committing economic offences.

The Netherlands report points out that most groups involved in fraud have a hierarchical structure, a fixed division of responsibilities and a vertical system of organisation but that they are less likely than those engaged in different forms of crime to cooperate with other groups.

The Spanish report – which identified only seven or eight groups engaged in fraud (out of a total of more than 200 criminal groups involving 6000 people) – noted that organisationally these groups were becoming increasingly complex and hierarchical. They were more and more likely to use networks of companies to mask their activities, and as they developed they were seeking out more technical and less violent activities with a higher level of profitability and less risk. The groups were estimated to be worth an average of € 26 million each, their average revenue topping € 2 million. These organised criminal groups, based chiefly in the big cities and along Spain's Mediterranean coast, have extended their operations in Europe (e.g. Italy, France and the United Kingdom) and beyond (e.g. Albania, Romania, Morocco and Colombia). The Italian report notes that of the four traditional Mafia organisations – the *Cosa Nostra* (based in Sicily), the *'Ndrangheta* (from Calabria), the Puglia groups (such as the *Sacra*

*Corona Unita*) and the *Camorra* (Naples) – only the first two are particularly active in the broad field of public-contract fraud.

Countries like Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland, which are major financial centres and bases for foreign companies, tend to be implicated through the establishment of front companies and the abuse of local financial facilities. Similar activities are reported in Andorra and Malta. Cases of fraud here are connected with the concealing and recycling of funds of dubious origin. They involve links with members of organised and non-organised criminal groups most of which are based in other countries, including the EU states, Russia and the countries of former Yugoslavia, or among the Chinese diaspora. The degree of implication of groups of organised crime is difficult however to define, Luxembourg reports, for example, with much reserve, that 5 affairs (from a total of 28 in relation to organised crime) would be linked to frauds implicating the country with the title of host country and Switzerland reports that it has never seriously been confronted with an outstanding affair dealing with international organised crime involving active criminal organisations, having been updated in 2000.

#### **MAIN, SUBSIDIARY OR SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES**

As the Slovakian report points out, it can be hard to distinguish between the different activities of organised criminal groups, as there is considerable overlapping. In many cases, fraud, counterfeiting and smuggling are carried out simultaneously. The Albanian report also stresses the activity of three active groups in the global field of economic and financial crime, of which 2 of them are responsible for more than 150 million leks of damage

Some of the national reports draw a distinction in the activities of organised criminal groups between primary and subsidiary activities. Groups may be active on a number of fronts because they engage in certain types of operation in support of a core activity (see the Netherlands report), because they are simply opportunistic or – as highlighted in the UK – because they are diversifying into new activities that they consider more profitable (NCIS, 2001).

The Netherlands report is based on a study of 148 investigations (63 of them concluded and 85 ongoing, with 700 people implicated) into groups that meet all the "organised crime" criteria. Most of these groups are involved in a range of activities and this can make it difficult to distinguish between their main and subsidiary areas of operation. Based as it is on in-depth analysis of the investigations, the Netherlands report sheds some light on the various principal, subsidiary and supporting activities in which the groups engage.

Two criteria are used to distinguish groups' principal activities – that they pre-date their other activities and that they are the main focus of the investigation. Principal activities are criminal activities for which the criminal group has been primarily established and which are a focal point of the investigation. Subsidiary activities are secondary activities which do not serve the principal activity and are carried out independently of it. A subsidiary activity is a criminal activity which is subordinate in terms of size, participation or proceeds to the principal activity, but which cannot be regarded as supporting the principal activity. Subsidiary activities can in principle be performed independently of a principal activity. Supporting activities are those that underpin the principal or subsidiary activities.

Next to drug trafficking, fraud is the type of activity most frequently mentioned. Among the 148 investigations analysed, there were 60 involving fraud: in 37 of these fraud was the principal activity and in 9 it was the group's only activity. Analysis showed that the forms of fraud which most often constitute a group's principal activity are tax, customs and VAT fraud carried out under cover of legitimate organisations with no involvement in other types of crime. Apart from the cases of groups for whom it is a primary activity, fraud often goes on in combination with other activities such as illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, smuggling and counterfeiting.

In the United Kingdom, activity in a range of areas is the norm and it is not uncommon for the same groups to be involved in drug smuggling, tobacco smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Drug trafficking is still the most widespread activity, (two-third of groups engaging in it) but many groups are active on a number of fronts: for example, 20% of organised criminal groups involved in drug trafficking are also involved in fraud, 5% in payment card fraud and 10% in stolen-vehicle trafficking, while a quarter of the groups involved in illegal immigration are also engaged in counterfeiting and 40% of the groups that deal in stolen vehicles are also involved in fraud (NCIS, 2001).

## TRENDS

Analysis of the national reports reveals a number of general trends:

- The forms that these activities take and the characteristics of the groups involved are increasingly similar in both eastern and western Europe.
- The groups involved are becoming less specialised and tend to have an expanding range of activities. Their membership is increasingly multinational and their activities are becoming more and more international.
- Organised criminal groups are tending to shift their focus towards types of offence with a lower level of risk and higher potential profits.
- Traditional criminal groups are seeking to diversify by pursuing what they see as more lucrative opportunities in the economic and financial sphere.

Thus the Italian report once again makes the general point that these criminal organisations have embarked on a process of modernisation, seeking to forge new international links, adopting an entrepreneurial approach and attempting on that basis to combine legal and illegal business – trading illegally in legitimate commodities and at the same time distributing illegal commodities. The Portuguese report also notes that organised criminal groups are diversifying: their range of activities is steadily expanding, while the boundaries between legal and illegal activities are becoming blurred. The same trends are observed in many countries. The Estonian report highlights a shift towards "white-collar crime", citing the activity of one of the country's most powerful groups, which mixes law breaking (in the form of extortion and corporate racketeering) with legal activities such as the import and export of metals.

The Hungarian report indicates a similar shift into sectors such as property and the motor trade, noting however that the organisations' prospects of legitimate profit-making are tending to decline.

In Poland a police unit with special responsibility for organised crime was set up in April 2000. As purely illegal activities become increasingly risky, the author of the Polish report notes a growing tendency for organised criminal groups to invest ever larger sums of money in the legitimate economy. These investments are made in a whole range of



businesses – bureaux de change, pawnbrokers shops, hotels, bars and restaurants, bloodstock, construction companies and estate agencies, for example. The level of investment in transferable securities appears to be increasing, the report noting estimates by some sources that 8% of holdings on the Warsaw Stock Exchange were in the hands of organised criminal groups. Alongside this expansion into the legitimate economy, the groups have increasing recourse to the services of highly specialised professionals such as financiers and tax consultants, lawyers and computer experts (Plywaczewski, 2000).

Most of the reports make the point that it is very rare for profits to be reinvested entirely in further illegal activities. They note the tendency towards diversification into illegal trading in legitimate commodities – a type of activity that leads certain groups to set up legitimate organisations which then operate illegally. This diversification compounds the blurring of the distinction between legal and illegal activities. In the process of diversifying into the legitimate economy, organised criminal groups may develop links with legitimate economic players of the kind who take a cavalier attitude to the rules governing their business activities and will seek, in so far as possible, to provide a legitimate front for crime. Criminal organisations are interested in establishing new corporate-look relationships and in shifting into legitimate businesses. The reported result of this trend is an ever-expanding grey area of legally established companies whose business is, for example, the management of pre-laundered capital. In contrast, in Finland there are reported to be no links between organised crime and financial crime, the latter being entirely attributed to "legitimate" business people and companies.

### **2.2.2 Counterfeiting**

Many countries report the various types of counterfeiting – of currency, documents, brands and products, for example. Counterfeiting often goes hand in hand with other activities, as when false documents are produced for purposes of trafficking in human beings or vehicles or for other forms of smuggling.

Thus the Netherlands report notes that counterfeiting in one form or another was involved in 51 out of 148 cases investigated. It was the fourth most significant field of activity after drug trafficking, fraud and money laundering. Although it was often present alongside other activities, typically (in a third of cases) it was being carried out in support of those activities. Analysis shows that the production of false documents and the practice of fraud based on bogus invoicing are often associated with trafficking in human beings.

## **PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING**

Many countries face problems with product counterfeiting. The Belgian report notes that criminal elements are increasingly attracted by the profits to be made from counterfeiting. In Germany, one in three investigations into organised crime concerns counterfeiting. According to customs estimates, more than \$1 million worth of counterfeit goods was seized, with eastern Europe and Turkey the main regions of origin (International Chamber of Commerce). In France, too, great importance is attached to combating counterfeiting: customs officers there seized almost 5 million items in the year 2000. The United Kingdom reports that organised criminal groups are becoming more and more involved in counterfeiting (NCIS, 2001). According to an Anti-Counterfeiting Group study of four sectors (textiles, toys, perfumery and pharmaceutical products) counterfeiting cost the tax authorities GBP 3 billion and reduced GDP by more than GBP 140 million (A-CG, 1999). In Bulgaria certain organised criminal groups are reported to have diversified into CD pirating, with almost 750 000 pirate CDs seized in two operations in the year 2000. The Hungarian report suggests that half the country's organised criminal groups are involved in counterfeiting.

## **OTHER TYPES OF COUNTERFEITING**

With the introduction of the euro imminent, the European Union fears an increase in the counterfeiting of money, especially from the Balkans and Russia. Portugal reports that organised criminal groups there were particularly active in currency counterfeiting, 15 such groups having been dismantled. The groups had forged international links stretching as far as South America (Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela) on the one hand and Ukraine, Moldova and Russia on the other. The Portuguese report also highlights an increase in activity in the new field of telecommunications fraud. Although the face value of the Slovakian currency is low, the report from that country also notes an increase in currency counterfeiting (with 914 cases recorded in the year 2000), but little organised criminal interest in these low-profit operations is reported. There had been a recent shift in the focus of counterfeiting towards the burgeoning field of fake payment and telephone cards and the production of false papers in connection with trafficking in stolen vehicles.

In Turkey more than 2000 cases of counterfeiting were recorded, with bogus invoicing - involving 5000 people - the most significant area. Turkey also reported a high incidence of currency counterfeiting. Bulgaria too noted that the volume of counterfeit currency in circulation had grown and that the quality of fake banknotes had improved. Most fake notes are denominated in dollars (typically \$ 100 bills) or deutsche marks (DM 100, 200 or 500 notes). Six groups are said to be mainly involved in currency counterfeiting and producing false documents. The incidence of bank-card fraud is also increasing and here Bulgarian criminal groups were working in association with Ukrainian and Hungarian outfits.

Many countries report the use of fake bank cards to make purchases. The incidence of bank-card fraud in France rose sharply in the year 2000 (+50%), although it is still relatively low (affecting less than 0.03% of transactions). The increase reflects the growth of fraud via the Internet and mobile telephones (an area worth FRF50-100 million). In Europe as a whole, the incidence of bank-card fraud increased by 50% over the year, costing the Visa group € 400 million.

As noted in the Spanish report, most groups are involved in various types of activity. More than half the groups identified in Spain had activities connected with drug

production or trafficking and one third engaged in theft and the falsification of documents.

### **2.2.3 Trafficking in illicit drugs**

#### **GENERAL PICTURE**

As in previous years, drug trafficking and smuggling were reported as the most common criminal activities of organised crime groups in Council of Europe member States. In Ireland, as many as nine of the ten major groups are involved in drugs. Two thirds of organised crime groups in the UK are trading illicit drugs. In the Netherlands 43% of organised crime investigations were directed at groups involved in hard drugs (heroin, cocaine or synthetic drugs) and 29% at groups trafficking soft drugs (cannabis). According to the Hungarian report 58% of organised crime groups operating in this country are involved in manufacturing and/or trafficking drugs. In contrast, only 28% of Polish organised crime groups and 31% of organised crime groups in both Spain and Slovenia were engaging primarily in this type of activities. In Belgium the corresponding figure was 21%.

Many member States report that manufacturing and trafficking of illicit drugs is increasingly important as an organised crime activity, as some examples show. More and more Estonian organised crime groups are getting involved in drug-related crimes. Lithuanian authorities also observed a growing interest of organised crime groups in drugs. In Slovakia trafficking in drugs is becoming a more lucrative area of organised crime because the number of addicted persons permanently increases. The Romanian contribution notes a tendency of drug trafficking expanding as a result of population pauperisation. Portugal reports that there are few groups that at some time or another have not been linked to the drug phenomenon, which, due to the enormous profits this generates, is far too attractive for already established structures. Trafficking of drugs occupies the centre stage of organised crime. It is the point of departure for other illicit activities and the corollary of activity of some organised crime groups which at their genesis were not dedicated thereto.

British law enforcement authorities noticed that drug traffickers increasingly are involved in more than one commodity. Heroin traffickers, for example, have been observed distributing crack cocaine. A possible explanation for the trend towards multi-drug trafficking is the fact that the Netherlands has become a major distribution point for various types of drugs, including heroin, cocaine and ecstasy. The country is also an important producer of ecstasy and amphetamines. Since most UK-based traffickers appear to obtain their supplies from the Netherlands, they have potential access to more than one type of drug (NCIS, 2001, p. 18).

## HEROIN

### Production

At the end of the twentieth century the production of opium has become almost completely the realm of only two countries: Afghanistan and Myanmar (ODCCP, 2001). Here originates over 90% of the world opium harvest. From the mid-1990s Afghanistan has been the leading producer of opium, as surveys carried out by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) since 1994 clearly show.

The opium harvested in Afghanistan is refined into morphine base or heroin either in Afghanistan itself, or the Pakistani-Afghan border areas or exported for further processing to Turkey or Central Asia.

While the largest part of the opiates is consumed in Asia, it is in particular the Afghan opium production which is of relevance for Europe. Most of the heroin consumed in Europe has been produced with opium from Afghanistan. In the second half of the 1990s, Afghan farmers harvested between 2000 and 4600 tonnes of raw opium annually; sufficient to produce 200 to 460 tonnes of pure heroin equivalent every year.<sup>17</sup>

There are a number of member States, especially in eastern Europe, where illicit poppy fields can be found. Examples are Poland, Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. In 2000, illicit poppy straw and heads were also found in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Spain. However, the production in European countries is rather modest compared to the one in the countries mentioned earlier.

### Trafficking

The increase of the world opium production over the last decade has had a significant influence on the amounts of heroin seized in Europe. Between 1990 and 1999 the total quantity has doubled, from 6.5 to 13.3 tonnes (see graph 1). In 2000 a new record was noted: 17.1 tonnes. This is 29% more than the quantity seized in the previous year. The amount reflects the particularly large yields of opium in Afghanistan in 1999.

To a certain extent, national drug seizure statistics can be used as indicators for the position as a transit and/or consumption country, especially when quantities seized are calculated per million inhabitants. Traditionally, Turkey takes the first position on the ranking of countries with heroin seizures, both in absolute figures and per million inhabitants. Until the mid nineties Turkish law enforcement authorities were responsible for approximately one fifth of the total amount seized in Europe. During the last five years, this proportion has risen to approximately one third (see table 14 in the Appendix). In 2000, 5.9 tonnes of heroin were discovered in Turkey, which is more than ever before. The data show that the country still plays a major role as a gateway to the European heroin markets.


For a long time, Turkey has been the starting point of the Balkan route. Some 80% of heroin destined for the European market is transported across this route. Seizure data since 1995 show that Bulgaria, Hungary, "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Switzerland are important transit

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<sup>17</sup> In July 2000, the Taliban prohibited opium poppy cultivation and subsequently enforced this ban. The following 2000/2001 opium harvest thus dropped to about 10% of previous levels.

countries along this route. The most important consumption countries can be found in western Europe and include Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France and the United Kingdom. A second major route originates in Afghanistan. First it goes north via the central Asian states (especially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) into Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Russian Federation and then onwards west to Belarus, the Baltic states or Poland and into the European Union. According to the UNDCP, by the end of 2000 only 20 – 30% of Afghan heroin was transported to Europe via the ‘traditional’ Iranian-Turkish route. At least 50% of heroin consumed in Europe nowadays would transit Central Asia (Makarenko, 2001, p. 19). So far, seizure statistics do not confirm this new trend.

**Graph 1: Heroin seized in Europe**



Member states mention Turkish (including Kurdish) criminal groups most often as being involved in heroin smuggling in Europe. The traffickers make use of the vast number of ethnic Kurds and other Turks spread across Europe. The routing is influenced by the location of Turkish communities rather than the directness of the routes or the costs. This explains why most of the heroin seized in France previously had transited the Netherlands. However, in recent years the picture has changed. Ethnic Albanian groups seem to fight the hegemony of the Turkish organisations, especially in the central European and northern countries. The Albanian organisations appear to have large depots in “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Bulgaria. An illustration of the relative importance of the two types of groups in the drugs trade is provided by the Swiss police statistics. In 2000, 433 Albanian nationals and 397 individuals from the former Yugoslavia (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Kosovo and “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”) were indicted for drugs trafficking while only 25 Turkish nationals were indicted for the same offence. Another example is the situation in Bulgaria, where 32% of all detained traffickers are Turkish citizens. 21% are of Albanian ethnic origin, compared to 9% in 1999. According to Norwegian, Swedish and Danish authorities, ethnic Albanian groups dominate the heroin smuggling into the Nordic countries.

In some member States, other criminal groups are involved in the wholesale heroin business as well. An example is the Czech Republic, where organised groups originating

in countries of the former USSR (including the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan) focus on the smuggling of drugs. At the retail level, domestic groups are often involved. Sometimes they are wholly or partly composed of representatives from ethnic minorities, e.g. individuals of Turkish or Pakistani origin.

## **COCAINE**

### **Production**

Almost all cocaine is produced in three South American countries: Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. After strong increases in the seventies and eighties, the world production has stabilised in the nineties. This does not mean that in the last decade nothing has changed. On the contrary. In Bolivia cultivation of coca increased until the mid nineties. Since then, production was reduced drastically, to less than a quarter of the 1994 record harvest of 255 tonnes. The decrease was mainly caused by the deliberate destruction of coca cultivations by Bolivian law enforcement authorities. Between 1992 and 2000, the Fujimori administration in Peru has implemented a fierce anti drugs policy as well. Helped by a fungi infection of coca bushes the annual production was lowered by three quarters, from 550 to 145 tonnes.


For Columbia a completely different story must be told. In the eighties the well known drug cartels from Medellin and Cali were for the major part dependent upon supply of coca leaves from Peru and Bolivia. Over the years the drug barons more and more cooperated with domestic farmers. In the past decade the Colombian share in the world production rose from one tenth to two thirds. In absolute figures the quantity of Colombian cocaine increased from 92 tonnes in 1990 to between 580 and 695 tonnes in 2000. This enormous growth can partly be attributed to the fact that various guerrilla movements and paramilitary organisations increasingly use drugs production and trafficking as a means to finance weapons transactions and military activities. Although the Colombian government has an anti drugs policy, it does not exercise authority over large parts of the country's territory. The ongoing negotiations with guerrilla movements tend to lead to the withdrawal of the army in even a larger part of the territory. Therefore it is doubtful whether or not drugs production in Colombia will be reduced in the near future.

### **Seizures**

Notwithstanding the stabilisation of world cocaine production in the last decade, the quantities seized in Europe show a large increase, from 17.2 tonnes in 1990 to 44.7 tonnes in 1999. In comparison to heroin the increase in the amount of cocaine seized is much stronger, which is the more striking if the production trends are taken into consideration. The most plausible explanation for this development is the downward trend in the consumption of cocaine in the United States since the mid eighties. Between 1985 and 1992 the number of recreational cocaine users dropped from 5.7 million to 1.4 million. Still the present North American consumption market is much bigger than the European one. The number of Americans who use cocaine at least once a year (hard core and recreational users) is estimated at 7.0 million, compared to 2.3 million in Europe (ODCCP, 2000a, p. 196 & 2000b, p. 74). And despite the fierce law enforcement effort the price of cocaine in the US is only about half the European price. This explains why South American drugs traffickers still take the trouble of crossing the Atlantic Ocean.

Graph 2 and Table 15 in the Appendix show that in 2000 much less cocaine was seized than in previous years. Compared to 1999 there is a decrease of about 40%. The 2000 figure for Spain, traditionally the country where the largest quantities are discovered, is only one third of the amount seized in the previous year. The decrease in the Netherlands was less dramatic: 40%. Quantities of cocaine seized were also significantly lower in other countries with high figures in recent years, such as France (64%), Germany (-54%), Italy (-21%), the UK (-16%) and Belgium (-6%). The figure for Portugal is an exception: it shows an enormous increase (+274%). A plausible explanation for the changes in the pattern in seizure statistics might be the circumstance that cocaine wholesale traffickers use large stocks in Europe. Also the average size of shipments is much bigger than is common for most other types of drugs. The discovery of one of these multi-ton consignments influences the European statistics significantly. Therefore these statistics fluctuate more from one year to another than for instance heroin and cannabis seizure figures do. In 1999 there was a significant number of seizures of greater than one ton, including a record one of almost ten tonnes by Spanish authorities from a vessel about 900 miles from the Canary Islands (ICPO-Interpol, 2000, p. 15).

**Graph 2: Cocaine seized in Europe**



The circumstance that most Latin Americans speak Spanish probably explains why Spanish law enforcement authorities seize by far the most cocaine in Europe. They were responsible for almost two thirds of the total amount discovered by European law enforcement authorities in the period 1995-1999. As mentioned before the quantity seized by Spanish police and customs decreased substantially in 2000 (6.2 tonnes versus an average of 13.8 tonnes in previous years). At the same time the amount seized in Portugal doubled from an average 1.6 tonnes to 3.1 tonnes. This shift on the Iberian Peninsula could well be the result of infiltration by the Spanish police in drug smuggling groups in the north-western region of Galicia and the subsequent arrest of a large number of traffickers. The remaining groups are looking for alternative routes and harbours, which they find in Portugal as well as on the Mediterranean side of Spain. The fact that in the first half of 2001 several consignments of one tonne or more were seized which were on route to Spain or Portugal shows that the Iberian Peninsula with its many small harbours did not diminish its attractiveness for cocaine traffickers (Geopolitical Drug Newsletter, October 2001, p. 8).

More and more the Netherlands have become the second most important point of entry for cocaine in Europe. The last five years a quarter of the total amount seized in Europe was discovered by Dutch customs and police. As in previous years the largest amounts are seized in the harbour of Rotterdam and at the international airport Schiphol near Amsterdam. In Rotterdam most consignments were hidden in maritime containers. At Schiphol airport couriers arriving from Latin America (especially Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles) are caught on an almost daily basis while trying to import cocaine hidden in their clothes, luggage or body. In some cases, substantial amounts of cocaine are found in air freight.

The fact that the cocaine supply to the European market is highly concentrated in two countries automatically means that in other member States much lower quantities per annum are discovered. In Italy and the UK between 5 and 10 percent of the European total is seized. In all other countries the average proportion in the period 1995-1999 was less than 5%. For member States in central and eastern Europe it is even less than 1%. This means that the transit role of these countries is marginal, though there have been cases in which large amounts of cocaine were seized while on route to the main consumer markets in western Europe. A recent example occurred in Croatia, where in 2000 law enforcement authorities discovered 913 kilogram of cocaine. In the two previous years the annual amounts seized were 6 and 2 kilos, respectively.

Most cocaine is smuggled to Europe in containerised sea freight. In Spain, it is not uncommon for multi-tonne shipments of cocaine to be transported across the Atlantic Ocean by large commercial vessels and to be moved to smaller fishing boats or yachts near the Canary Islands or near the Atlantic shore. Several member States also reported significant seizures of cocaine at airports, smuggled by couriers or in freight. Examples are Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. At the airport of Zaventem near Brussels the number of intercepted cocaine couriers, companions and collectors doubled in comparison to 1999. Direct flights coming from Paramaribo and Curaçao are responsible for that evolution. The final destination of the import was almost every time the Netherlands. It is established that this cocaine traffic is organised in the Netherlands. Within Europe, trains, buses and (sometimes rented) cars are used to transport cocaine across borders.

Colombian criminal groups control the supply of cocaine into Europe. They cooperate with indigenous groups in member States and more recently, with Turkish and ethnic Albanian groups. In some cases Colombians have joined mixed drug trafficking groups for the wholesale distribution. Generally speaking the retail distribution is handled by domestic groups.



## **CANNABIS**

### **Production**

Without doubt is cannabis the most widely consumed type of illicit drugs, both in Europe and in the rest of the world. How much cannabis is produced world wide is difficult to estimate. This is mainly caused by the circumstance that cannabis grows in many regions. Because of indoor cultivation it is found even in regions with unfavourable climatic conditions, such as the northern and western parts of Europe. However it is possible to point to certain regions in the world where most of the cannabis is originating. These are northern Africa (especially Morocco), central and Southwest Asia (including Afghanistan and Pakistan). Rough estimates of the world production are between 20,000 and 30,000 tonnes per annum.

The geographical spreading of the cultivation influences the smuggling, which also has a more regional character than the trafficking of heroin and cocaine. Within Europe this can be illustrated by the import of Albanian cannabis in Greece and Italy. Nevertheless there are countries which produce cannabis for consumption in other regions than their own. Examples are Colombia, Thailand and Morocco. A large part of the cannabis originating in these countries is destined for west-European consumer markets.

Nowadays cannabis cultures are found in many member states, both in western and in eastern Europe. This is demonstrated by recent seizures of cannabis seeds or plants in the majority of member States (see table 21 in the Appendix). Albania and the Netherlands probably are the largest producers for the European market. Large quantities of Albanian cannabis were discovered in Greece, Italy, "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and other countries. In the Netherlands most cultures are found in glass houses. In some of them more than 100,000 plants were discovered. The so called Nederwiet (Dutch cannabis herb) is popular because of its high contents of tetra hydro cannabinol, which reached an average value of 11% in 2000. This is more than twice the proportion found in foreign cannabis sold on the Dutch market. In recent years Nederwiet was exported to various member States, including the UK, Germany, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries.


Besides Albania there are several other member States in Southeast Europe where in recent years huge numbers of cannabis plants and large amounts of plant material were discovered and subsequently destroyed by law enforcement authorities. Between 1997 and 1999 in Turkey over 300 million cannabis plants were uprooted. Authorities in Azerbaijan destroyed in the last three years 1,455 tonnes of plant material, and Bulgarian police 60 tonnes. Armenian authorities discovered 322 tonnes of cannabis plant material in 1999.

### **Trafficking**

Despite the cultivation of cannabis in many member States, the most important producer country for the European market still is Morocco. This mainly concerns cannabis resin. An estimated 80% of all cannabis resin seized in member States is of Moroccan origin. Large quantities of the drug make the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea to Spain and are transported to other countries in trucks and lorries. No wonder that Spanish law enforcement authorities are responsible for a large proportion of the total amount of seized cannabis in Europe: on average 37%. In 2000 Spanish customs and police discovered 475 tonnes of cannabis, which was more than ever before.

But not all Moroccan cannabis goes via Spain. Sometimes there is a direct maritime connection between Morocco and the country of destination. Cannabis resin seized in the UK often is found on board of ships and yachts which had visited north-African harbours. In some cases cannabis is brought to the Netherlands over sea and are distributed and transported further overland, e.g. to Scandinavian countries.

**Graph 3: Cannabis seized in Europe**



Cannabis resin produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan are usually transported by ship to Europe. Frequently the drugs are loaded in Pakistan harbours and unloaded in Dutch, British or German harbours. Cannabis from central Asian countries is less often found in Europe. Smaller consignments are smuggled by road to consumer markets in central and western Europe.

The total quantity of cannabis seized in member States has stabilised in the recent past at a level of about 950 tonnes. However, compared to 1995 the 1999 seizure statistics on cannabis resin show an increase of about 40% whereas the data on cannabis herb in the same time period show a decline of the same magnitude. (The 2000 statistics are too incomplete to make a comparison at European level.) A more detailed analysis brings to light that more and more Moroccan cannabis resin is discovered by law enforcement authorities in Europe while the quantities of Colombian cannabis herb have declined substantially.

In former times a large part of the cannabis herb (marihuana) found in Europe originated in Southeast Asia (especially from Cambodia and Thailand). Other important regions of origin were Latin America (especially Colombia and Jamaica) and southern Africa. In the recent past the Netherlands played a dominant role as a point of entry for large amounts of Colombian cannabis herb. However, since the middle of the nineties the quantities seized have declined from 275 tonnes to 10 tonnes. The central position which the Netherlands used to have in the European cannabis herb trade has not been taken over by another country. Although amounts between 20 and 40 tonnes per annum are not uncommon in the UK, Belgium, Italy and Russian Federation, the quantities do not match the Dutch figures of the mid nineties. A possible explanation for the abrupt break in the Dutch trend is a change in investigative methods. Between 1990 and 1996 law enforcement authorities in the Netherlands allowed controlled deliveries of substantial

amounts of cannabis because they expected to find clues which would lead to wholesale cocaine traffickers. In some cases consignments of drugs were not seized, but reached the consumer market. Because of this unwanted effect and because of its general ineffectiveness the method was criticised by a parliamentary commission and has not been used anymore (Van der Heijden, 1999).

Indigenous groups within member States control the wholesale trafficking of cannabis. In some cases, there is close cooperation between criminal groups in destination countries and those in the major transit countries for Moroccan cannabis: Spain and the Netherlands. Some criminal organisations from destination countries have their own bases in the two transit countries to facilitate the trade. In other cases Moroccan communities in member States are involved in the smuggling, e.g. in Denmark. In Greece and Italy the distribution of herbal cannabis is dominated by Albanian criminal influence. In the Czech Republic, a significant new development involved the utilisation of letters to send small amounts of drugs, mainly hashish.

## **AMPHETAMINES AND ANALOGUES**

### **Consumption**

In the nineties, ecstasy, amphetamines and other synthetic drugs have become very popular, in particular among younger people in western Europe. The popularity is related to the rather innocent image of the tablets. The drugs are stimulants, which indeed have only minor addictive effects. Psychological dependence can occur, but also this is not very big risk. This can be illustrated by figures from Germany. Three quarters of people who admitted the consumption of ecstasy in the previous twelve months, used it less than ten times (EMCDDA, 2000, p. 13). Physical damage by the use of ecstasy is mainly experienced by dancing participants of house parties who don't drink enough and get in trouble because of dehydration and overheating of the body.

Consumption of ecstasy and amphetamines is highest in the United Kingdom. In 1998 10% of the adult population (16-59 years) had tried amphetamines at least once in their lives and 4% ecstasy (ISDD, 2000, par. 8.2). In other western European countries between one and four percent of the adult population has used amphetamines at least once. For ecstasy the prevalence figures vary from 0.5 to 4%. If the consumption statistics for synthetic drugs are analysed over a longer period, the trend in West-Europe shows a strong increase in the first half of the nineties, followed by a stabilisation in the second half. In other parts of the continent consumption is much lower, though gradually increasing in recent years (EMCDDA, 2000, p. 11 & 39).


### **Production**

In the last decade Europe has become a major production region for synthetic drugs, including amphetamines, ecstasy and other amphetamine type stimulants. It is not very difficult to manufacture these drugs. In general they are odourless and compact. Also the precursors and other materials needed for the synthesis are not as voluminous as those necessary for the production of heroin and cocaine. Besides there is a large variety of precursors and methods for the synthesis of amphetamine and its analogues. For low scale production a limited space suffices. Such space is usually called a 'kitchen lab'. Turning the drugs powder into tablets can happen at other locations. Besides, the distance between production and consumption locations usually is much smaller than

with most other types of drugs. All these factors make the work of investigators very difficult.

According to the annual contributions of member States the Netherlands are the prime producer of amphetamines and ecstasy. This is confirmed by the discovery of dozens of

**Graph 4: Amphetamine-type substances seized in Europe**



laboratories and the seizing of 3.7 tonnes of synthetic drugs (not in tablet form) and almost 11 million tablets by Dutch police and customs over the past three years. Obviously, it is unknown how many tablets were manufactured and reached the market without being seized. However there are indications that it concerns dozens of millions of pills. One sort of indications are consignments of precursors which are seized. One example is a case in Germany. In 2000 law enforcement authorities discovered a shipment of 400 litre of the precursor PMK (piperonyl methyl ketone) which was destined for the Netherlands. The investigating team found out that the criminals involved previously imported 2,300 litres of PMK (USD, 2001, p. 16). Another clue can be found in the outcomes of a recent British study on the size of the national market for illicit drugs. One of the results was the estimated annual consumption of ecstasy in the UK: 27 million (Bramley-Harker, 2001, p. 29). According to customs and police 80% of British ecstasy seizures originate in the Netherlands. The same counts for ecstasy discovered last year by law enforcement authorities in the United States (BINLEA, 2001). In most cases, the drugs are transported by air.

The Netherlands is not the only member State which produces synthetic drugs. Other important manufacturers are Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, Lithuania and the Czech Republic. In Belgium, ten laboratories were dismantled in the year 2000. One of the largest synthetic drugs laboratories ever found in Europe was discovered in April 2000 in Greece. In the UK, some 20% of amphetamine requires to supply the market is produced locally, the remainder is imported from Belgium and the Netherlands. A number of precursors and auxiliary chemical substances are produced in central and eastern European member States, including Poland, Ukraine, Hungary and the Slovak Republic (see also table 26 in Appendix II). In most Slovakian cases it concerns ephedrine (for the production of methyl amphetamine, ergotamine, lysergic acid – production of LSD). In 2000, one ton of ephedrine was stolen in Poland. Other

chemicals for synthetic drugs laboratories in member States originate in East Asia, including the Peoples Republic of China.

### **Trafficking**

Indigenous criminal groups of member States in western Europe dominate the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs. In Germany domestic groups control the trafficking. In the UK, British, Dutch and Belgian groups jointly control the importation and wholesale distribution. In Scandinavia, biker groups are involved in amphetamine smuggling as well as in trafficking. The smuggling of ecstasy and amphetamines within Europe is most often carried out via land in personal vehicles, lorries, buses and trains. Export to other continents mainly takes place by air, using express mail services for smaller consignments and couriers for larger shipments.

As regards seizures, traditionally the United Kingdom comes in the first place. British customs and police are responsible for 41% of the total amount of amphetamines and analogues seized in member States in the period 1995-1999. Usually the second place in the ranking is for the Netherlands (23%). In the year 2000, law enforcement bodies in the Netherlands discovered more synthetic drugs than their British counterparts did, which leads to a change in the ranking of the two countries. The following places are for France (14%), Germany (9%), Belgium (4%) and Spain (3%). Although in some western European countries (e.g. the Netherlands and the UK) consumption seems to have stabilised, the long term trend in the amounts of amphetamines and analogues is clearly rising (NDM, 2001, p. 74; Ramsey et al. 2001, p. 34). Between 1995 and 1999 the increase was larger than for any other type of drugs; approximately 150% (see table 16 in Appendix II). Despite the fact that the 2000 figure is lower than the year before, it still is more than double the quantity seized in 1995. The difference between the trends for production and consumption causes an overflow of the market and a drop in the prices for synthetic drugs. The UK retail price for an ecstasy tablet for instance declined since 1998 from 11 to 9 pound sterling (Nexus, 2001). Denmark and the Czech Republic also noted a tendency for a price fall for ecstasy tablets.

### **OTHER TYPES OF ILLICIT DRUGS**

LSD, a hallucinogenic drug which was fairly common used by western European youngsters in the sixties and seventies of the last century, seemed to have lost its popularity over the years. At the end of the century, the use was reduced to a minimum. The number of trips seized in member States between 1995 and 1999 reflect this trend (see graph 5 and table 18 in the Appendix). However, in the year 2000 an extremely large number of trips was discovered in Belgium: 1.1 million. This represents 80% of the European total. It appears there still is a market for LSD in the new century.


Traditionally, the largest numbers of LSD trips are found in the United Kingdom. Almost half of the LSD trips seized in Europe between 1995 and 1999 were discovered by British law enforcement authorities: 870 thousand. Germany, the Netherlands and France are in second, third and fourth position of the European ranking list, with 15, 13 and 10 percent of the European total, respectively. In the year 2000, Spanish law enforcement authorities have seized 140 thousand trips, which puts the country in second position, after Belgium.

In the eastern part of the continent LSD is rather seldomly found. The main exception is Poland, where in the last three years over thirty thousands trips have been seized. In the

year 2000 seizures totalling to more than one thousand trips were also reported by Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

Misuse of depressants is a problem in various parts of Europe. In contrast, misuse of doping substances seems to be concentrated in Scandinavia (compare tables 20 and 23 in Appendix II). Poland is mentioned as a country of origin for doping substances. Khat is another type of drug which is mainly reported by Scandinavian countries (table 24). Since 1998 some 9 tonnes were seized both in Norway and in Sweden. Furthermore, seizures of substantial amounts of Khat are reported by Germany: 12 tonnes over the last three years.

**Graph 5: LSD seized in member States**



## 2.2.4 Theft of vehicles and trafficking in stolen vehicles

International trafficking in stolen vehicles is still increasing and has now assumed an intercontinental dimension. Interpol estimates the value of this trade at \$19 billion (ICPO-Interpol, 2000). Half of all vehicle theft is reported to take place on the continent of Europe.

Vehicle theft is a problem in many countries. It assumes different forms and this is not always evident from the statistics. Thefts are often recorded in the same way whether they are cases of "borrowing" by joy-riders or organised theft for the purposes of vehicle trafficking. It is reasonable to assume that recovery of the vehicles is the norm when the thieves are joy-riders but is highly unlikely in the case of organised theft. Those vehicles not recovered feed into distribution systems, which may or may not be organised, and in which there are "exporting", transit and destination countries. Trafficking in stolen vehicles may also involve laundering, i.e. changing the identity of the vehicles by falsifying their registration and documentation (a process known as "ringing"), or trafficking in vehicle parts obtained by stripping stolen cars, a practice once again mentioned in the Netherlands report.

Because vehicle trafficking networks are transnational they are particularly difficult to combat. Most investigations into this type of crime have uncovered the use of companies, and it is quite common for vehicle trafficking to involve legitimate businesses such as garages and car dealerships.

The Slovakian report makes the point that vehicle trafficking often goes hand in hand with the production of false documents. Organised criminal groups tend to be involved particularly in the theft of vehicles for international trafficking (into Ukraine or Poland, for example), but this is not the most widespread type of car theft, the vehicles most commonly stolen tending to be privately owned and of lower value. People who repair or sell vehicles are often involved in the latter type of theft and some of the stolen vehicles are stripped for parts. Lastly, a significant number (30%) of reported car thefts are fictitious and related to insurance fraud.

In France, where the number of vehicles reported stolen exceeded 300 000 in the year 2000 (after declining in 1999), the number not recovered (around 80 000) has been rising steadily for a number of years. According to police estimates, half of the vehicles that go missing end up in the hands of international traffickers. In the United Kingdom, the same downward trend in vehicle recovery has been noted. This, along with the increasing incidence of lorries being stolen with their loads (there were 3500 such cases in the year 2000), suggests that the role of organised criminal groups in vehicle theft is growing. UK police estimates put the cost of trafficking in stolen vehicles at hundreds of millions of pounds annually (NCIS, 2001).

The Estonian report once again highlights the activities of a specialised group which organises regular thefts in Germany and Scandinavia to supply trafficking operations. Denmark and Norway report that stolen vehicles are often used as a means of payment in the illegal drugs trade. The networks that combine drug trafficking with trafficking in stolen vehicles are very probably associated with the use of Poland as an important transit country for stolen vehicles on the way from western Europe to Russia. With regard to vehicles going missing inside Poland, the year 2000 was the first since 1990 in which vehicle theft declined – from 71 543 stolen vehicles in 1999 to 60 062. For the past

10 years, Switzerland has continued to report a decrease in stolen cars, without which, this evolution could be related to organised crime in this country.

The national reports show that vehicle traffickers use two main routes, one leading east to the countries of eastern Europe (with Russia frequently mentioned) via Italy, Austria or Germany, and the other south to the Maghreb and central African countries, as well as the Persian Gulf, leaving the Schengen area via Spain.

Over the last few years both the Netherlands and Belgium and Luxembourg have faced two new types of theft: theft from showrooms (647 cases in the year 2000) and theft by burglars (1200 cases), the vehicles targeted being top-of-the-range models that end up in Africa and the Baltic countries. The Netherlands report also mentions the Dutch West Indies and Greece as destinations for a proportion of the vehicles stolen.

The Czech Report states that 75 groups, involving 2000 people in all, were implicated in organised criminal activities. Of these, trafficking in stolen vehicles rivalled prostitution as the most widespread, although it was expected to decline over the next few years.

Croatia and Lithuania report a significant increase (30% over one year) in the incidence of vehicle theft. The Ukrainian report emphasises that vehicle trafficking networks are becoming increasingly international: four recently dismantled groups were operating in Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In Belgium the city of Charleroi, a base for Albanian Kosovar networks, is singled out as a vehicle-trafficking hotspot.



Table 3: Vehicle theft

Member State	Vehicles reported stolen			Vehicles not recovered			Proportion not recovered (%)		
	1998	1999	2000	1998	1999	2000	1998	1999	2000
Albania			74			12			16
Andorra		73	54			15			28
Armenia			43			21			49
Austria	10,304			3,415			33		
Azerbaijan									
Belgium									
Bulgaria	8,039		10,786	4,430		5,456	55		51
Croatia	1,678		2,529	890		1,256	53		50
Cyprus	1,252	948	210	663	356	66	53	38	31
Czech Republic	28,000	29,001	20,994	23,000	24,254		82	83	
Denmark	5,000								
Estonia	681	2,455	624		1,483	518		60	83
Finland		15,379			1,582			10	
France			301,539						
Georgia		318							
Germany	168,600	119,665	93,237	83,328	50,840	39,096	49	42	42
Greece	18,243	17,362	7,160	10,384	9,954	3,939	57	57	
Hungary	16,205	12,628	1,123	10,340	7,594	850	64	60	76
Iceland		277			12			4	
Ireland	13,793	14,851		1,500	2,262		11	15	
Italy	284,296								
Latvia	3,068	3,102		1,562	2,256		51	86	
Liechtenstein		17	4		4	4		100	100
Lithuania	6,946	3,675	5,694	5,578	1,654	2,079	80	45	52
Luxembourg			542			168			31
Malta	1,202	1,066		606	457		50	43	
Moldova	901	645		401	414		45	64	
Netherlands	32,496	29,300	32,000	14,363			44		
Norway	17,716	17,254	23,339	1,794		2,339	10		10
Poland	61,151	84,855	79,943		44,925	31,720		53	40
Portugal	1,048		26,420						
Romania		156							
Russian Federation		55,368			39,467			71	
San Marino		14			5			36	
Slovakia	7,682	7,123	5,856	6,033	5,735	4,798	79	81	82
Slovenia	1,016	1,282		622	733		61	57	
Spain	143,544	137,857	102,419	45,502	42,447	30,391	32	31	30
Sweden			48,400			3,700			8
Switzerland	80,386	74,319	67,301						
'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'	227			173			76		
Turkey		17,912	16,084		8,866	6,223		49	39
Ukraine			3,000			1,022			66
United Kingdom									

## 2.2.5 Smuggling of contraband goods

As in previous years, the national reports indicate that smuggling focused on goods with the highest rates of tax, namely alcohol and cigarettes. For the groups involved in this illegal commerce, smuggling was often associated with the movement of stolen vehicles, drugs or human beings. Operation Lagos, coordinated by Europol (Europol, 2000) provides an example: prostitutes were being brought into Denmark from Poland and Lithuania alongside an amphetamines trafficking operation between Poland and Denmark, while goods from lorries stolen in Denmark were being shipped to Belgium for resale and forwarding to eastern Europe. The police operation led to the arrest of 10 people in Belgium in connection with the smuggling of luxury goods and 50 in Denmark accused of trafficking in human beings, vehicle theft and drug trafficking. It also uncovered a network for the trafficking of cigarettes and alcohol from Russia and Lithuania into Denmark via Poland, and a large number of front companies were identified.

### CIGARETTE SMUGGLING

Cigarette smuggling is still on the increase and most countries (including the United Kingdom, Spain, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, France, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal) report this type of activity.

The smuggling routes extend to the Middle East, Africa and China. Routes that cross continental Europe, with the United Kingdom as the main destination, originate in:

- the southern Mediterranean, passing through Italy and Greece
- the Iberian Peninsula (i.e. Portugal and Spain)
- northern Europe, crossing the Baltic
- central Europe.

Cigarette smuggling poses serious problems in many European countries, whether they are destinations (like the United Kingdom and Italy) or transit countries (like the Netherlands and France); it has been a priority for customs authorities for several years and was recently reaffirmed as such.<sup>18</sup> Switzerland is diversely concerned by this type of smuggling, its free ports for example could be used as intermediary stations on complicated routes used by the international webs or by the activity responsible for the trafficking. In May 2000, it arrested one of the main organisers of a network of cigarette smugglers, wanted in Italy for dealings with organised crime.

The unlawful trade is highly damaging to the EU's interests – a point made by the European Commission in summer 2000 – and it is for this reason that the Commission filed a lawsuit in New York against cigarette manufacturers accused of smuggling (November 2000)<sup>19</sup>. Several EU member states became parties to the proceedings in this

<sup>18</sup> At its most recent Council Session the World Customs Organisation launched a specific programme entitled the World Cigarette Offensive (Brussels, 30 June 2001).

<sup>19</sup> The basis of the lawsuit is the claim that tobacco companies violated the 1970 *RICO Act* (*Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act*) which targets corruption and organised crime. The companies are accused not only of smuggling but also of involvement in organised criminal activities and laundering operations. See *Le Monde*, 8 November 2000.

class action. The success of cigarette smuggling in fact depends on the involvement of major cigarette companies, criminal networks and small-scale retail operators. The smuggling operations are sometimes organised by the big cigarette companies themselves. They reflect strategies, on the part of large and legitimate business interests, for getting round public policy, and involve both criminals and legitimate economic players (Dantinne, 2001; Von Lampe, 1999).

Counterfeiting is also a relevant factor here inasmuch as certain cigarettes imported from outside Europe (especially from China) are counterfeit brands, some of them produced at the initiative of legitimate companies based in what are compliant countries. French customs officers seized a million packets of counterfeit-branded cigarettes in the year 2000.

UK customs authorities estimate the volume of smuggling at 18 billion cigarettes (around 30% of all those smoked) and the cost at GBP 3 billion. The trade is believed to generate profits of around GBP 500 million for organised criminal groups (NCIS, 2001). While some smuggling may be the work of operators based close to the English Channel and crossing it on a daily basis to supply local networks, three-quarters of the trade is connected to organised crime, and 20% of criminal groups are reported to be involved in it as a main activity. The NCIS report notes that certain groups, attracted by the potential profits and seeking relatively low-risk activities, have abandoned drug trafficking in favour of the cigarette trade.

Indeed, many countries report that organised-crime networks have switched to cigarette (and meat) smuggling because there are huge profits to be made and the sentences risked by smugglers are lighter than those imposed on drug traffickers.

The Italian report points out that of the four traditional Mafia networks, two – the *Camorra* (Naples) and the Puglia Mafia (including the *Sacra Corona Unita*) – are heavily involved in cigarette smuggling. The latter, which has developed cooperation with groups based on the other side of the Adriatic, combines its smuggling with illegal arms trading and, reportedly, with illegal immigration. Greece points at the increasing importance of the Balkan route (in particular through Albania and Montenegro). Nine groups with the participation of different nationalities (Italian, Yugoslav, Greek and Russian) are particularly active. Bulgaria still has problems with cigarette smuggling even though 16 networks have been dismantled. It is an important transit country on routes to the Balkans and western Europe. The Bulgarian report notes that many networks involve ethnic Albanians and fund radical groups involved in the Balkan conflicts. Estonia also reports the involvement of organised criminal groups, particularly those with an Azeri membership. In Poland – the scene of much activity in international drug-trafficking towards western Europe – organised criminal groups are also heavily involved in the inward smuggling of many commodities including alcohol, cigarettes and electronic equipment. A proportion of these goods remains on the domestic market while the rest is smuggled on to other countries including Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic republics and Russia. By contrast, tobacco and alcohol smuggling across the Slovak/Ukrainian border does not appear to involve organised criminal groups; instead it tends to be conducted, albeit very actively, by individual inhabitants of the border area who see it as a means of raising their living standard.

Norway, Denmark and Finland report not only smuggling networks with links to the Baltic countries and Poland but also counterfeiting based in Lithuania (Junninen, Aromaa, 2000). The Netherlands report also mentions cigarette smuggling (from the

Russian Federation, Lithuania and, increasingly in recent times, Estonia). The routes used cross Poland and Germany in the north, as well as Greece, Italy and even Africa in the south. Lorries and ships transport the cigarettes which are concealed, with the aid of false documentation, amid legitimate movements of goods. Most such shipments are destined for the UK market. Among the 148 investigations analysed for the report, there are references to smuggling in 17 cases and in half of these it is a principal activity.

In France too, seizures of cigarettes have been increasing over the last few years (219 t were seized in the year 2000). As in previous years, the United Kingdom is the smugglers' main destination. At the same time, customs authorities have noted cigarettes originating from an ever wider range of countries: China, Lithuania, Russia and indeed Finland feature in this type of fraud. Such trafficking is often the work of very highly organised fraud networks involving fraudulent companies as well as organised crime groups. In Ireland, too, cigarette smuggling is connected to the UK market. Ireland reports that several groups based in Dublin and the north-east were involved in this trade (with almost 100 million cigarettes seized in the year 2000). In Portugal the volume of seizures rose in 2000: the authorities managed to dismantle six well structured groups and seized 45 million cigarettes worth € 4 million as a result.

#### **SMUGGLING OF OTHER COMMODITIES**

Specific, localised smuggling of other commodities also goes on. The Belgian report, for example, mentions diamond smuggling by Georgians linked to the world of organised crime, who are trying to establish themselves in this field, traditionally the preserve of the Antwerp Jewish community.

The Scandinavian countries continue to report alcohol smuggling on a major scale, with routes through northern Germany (to Norway), Estonia and Russia (to Finland).

Lastly, some countries are affected by smuggling of basic resources. In Georgia, for example, smuggling networks seem to have ousted legitimate traders: it is reported that only one-third of petrol imports and one-fifth of grain imports enter the country legally. The Hungarian report warns that smuggling into that country could increase in the event of a significant rise in oil prices.

Smuggling of other commodities – including works of art – is reported in Malta and Cyprus.

## 2.2.6 Illegal arms trading

As in previous years, the countries mainly affected by illegal arms trading are those close to conflict zones, those directly involved in conflicts and the arms manufacturing countries. Illegal trading in light weaponry is often a subsidiary activity for the groups involved (see the Netherlands report, for example).

Organised criminal groups frequently use apparently legitimate import-export companies as cover for illegal arms trading operations. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from a number of eastern countries, arms dumps were sometimes left in situ and stocks of weapons remain available, while continuing conflicts ensure a demand for them. The troubles in the Balkans, for example, continued to generate a demand for arms smuggling from Bulgaria to southern Serbia, the west of "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and Kosovo. Some ten criminal groups were identified as trafficking in light weaponry but the Bulgarian authorities report they have no evidence of any trafficking in nuclear materials. Two Mig 29 aircraft were seized in an international investigation into arms trafficking.

There is still a high level of illegal arms trading in the Czech Republic but the authorities cannot accurately gauge the number of criminal groups involved. International trafficking continues, involving in particular nationals of the former USSR, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia and Albania. The Slovakian report once again notes numerous cases of theft of explosives, such as Semtex. It suggests that Slovakia may be a transit country in the trafficking of nuclear materials (especially uranium) and that organised criminal groups may be involved in these activities. The Turkish report notes an increase in the incidence of illegal arms trading, probably associated with the proximity of conflict zones. It pinpoints the Black Sea region as home to the membership of many organised criminal groups.

In Belgium, illegal arms trading was the main area of organised criminal activity and it is suggested that this reflects a lack of effective legal measures to combat international trafficking. The Netherlands reports illegal arms trading largely as a subsidiary activity of organised criminal groups whose main business is drug trafficking. Most of the arms traded were light weapons for a local market, with just one case involving heavy weapons (missiles). Most investigations initiated here were linked to eastern Europe (notably the Czech Republic), the countries of former Yugoslavia or the United Kingdom.

Table 4: Illicit arms seized in member States

Member State	Firearms			Other arms		
	1998	1999	2000	1998	1999	2000
Albania			1,635			215
Andorra	1					
Armenia			172			16
Austria						
Azerbaijan						
Belgium						
Bulgaria	187		47	7		38
Croatia	2,334		629	146		381
Cyprus	171		12			51
Czech Republic	155	115	44		1	10
Denmark						
Estonia			250			3
Finland						
France						
Georgia			1,248			94,022
Germany						
Greece						
Hungary		54				878
Iceland		16			8	
Ireland	1,404	678		18	62	
Italy						
Latvia		91			3	
Liechtenstein						
Lithuania	663	292	141	20		60
Luxembourg		8	89			
Malta						
Moldova	607	194		233	784	
Netherlands		1,522			12	
Norway	735		228	370		
Poland	2,571	2,283	2,185			
Portugal	68					
Romania	33		49			
Russian Federation		2,169				
San Marino						
Slovakia						
Slovenia	1,712	889		267		
Spain	3,558	3,672	1,427	7,446	8,829	
Sweden						
Switzerland						
"The former Yugoslav Rep. Of Macedonia"	1,274	2,610				
Turkey	2,053	1,331	93			933
Ukraine			9,710			
United Kingdom						

## 2.2.7 Theft and crimes of violence

### ARMED ROBBERIES

In several countries armed robbery is still a growing problem. One such is Poland, where a specialised police unit has just been set up to tackle organised crime. Crimes involving violence (including extortion, armed assault and illegal arms trading) continued to pose many problems in the year 2000. Of 405 groups listed, 80 are reported to have been involved in this type of activity. The number of actual bank robberies almost doubled in the year, from 46 in 1999 to 91. There were 402 reported armed robberies of various types (attacks on post offices, security service vehicles etc), with a total of some \$6 million stolen. Slovakia also reports that its authorities were particularly concerned by a recent increase in the incidence of armed robberies (approximately 100 cases in the year 2000) targeting financial institutions, security service vehicles and petrol stations. According to the Irish report, armed assault, along with drug trafficking, was still the major activity of criminal groups in that country. Half of the twelve groups listed were reported to have been involved in armed robberies. Several Irish groups had also been involved recently in the theft of computer hardware. In Luxembourg, even though the number of armed robberies remains low (6 out of 28), the report shows a disturbing evolution in 2000 especially in the means of perpetrating them.

Police in France report a decline in the incidence of armed robbery, with the total amount stolen relatively stable (at FRF 254 million in the year 2000) but they highlight a specialised and frequently violent type of crime perpetrated by roving gangs from eastern Europe. These groups had been ripping out and making off with cash machines and safes, stealing freight and goods vehicles and mounting ram-raids under cover of darkness. In the United Kingdom, classic crimes of violence such as armed robbery (2561 cases in the year 2000) and extortion were less common, criminals apparently preferring more profitable and less risky activities or resorting to violence in support of other activities such as drug dealing. In the Netherlands, while armed robbery was an element in seven cases under investigation, the main activity in five of these was drug dealing. Most of the targets were financial institutions.

Reports from northern Europe (notably Denmark and Iceland) mention violence perpetrated by motorcycle gangs, such the *OMG (Outlaw Motorcycle Gang)*, *Hells Angels* and *Bandidos*, specialising in extortion and protection rackets.

Table 5: Armed bank robberies

Member State	1998	1999	2000
Albania			2
Andorra	0	1	
Armenia			
Austria	30		
Azerbaijan			
Belgium	207		
Bulgaria			2
Croatia	28		16
Cyprus	3	7	7
Czech Republic	47	19	21
Denmark	131	97	
Estonia	4	3	
Finland	21	11	
France	677		1,340
Georgia			
Germany <sup>20</sup>	1,300		16
Greece	116	1,898	64
Hungary		60	
Iceland			
Ireland <sup>21</sup>		17	
Italy			
Latvia		1	1
Liechtenstein			
Lithuania		6	
Luxembourg			8
"The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"		10	
Malta		2	2
Moldova		696	
Netherlands	179	140	
Norway		64	
Poland	40	46	91
Portugal	67		
Romania			
Russia			
San Marino			
Slovakia		8	
Slovenia		9	
Spain		1,018	591
Sweden			
Switzerland	30		
Turkey	31		
Ukraine			
United Kingdom		467	

<sup>20</sup> The figure for 2000 refers to cases explicitly implying organised crime groups.

<sup>21</sup> The figure presented refers to the number in the first 9 months of the year



## **OTHER TYPES OF THEFT**

Illegal trading in stolen artworks is a subject of concern in Slovakia. According to the Slovakian report, several organised criminal groups trade in stolen art objects. Investigations into art theft in France uncovered the existence of international receiving networks (especially in Belgium and Holland) and specialised cross-border smuggling networks, now dismantled. Investigators recovered cultural property worth a total of FRF22 million.

## **EXTORTION AND KIDNAPPING**

A number of countries report problems of racketeering and kidnapping. In Slovakia, for example there were frequent cases of business people being targeted by extortionists or racketeers claiming to offer "protection". Many of these cases involved organised criminal groups whose members originated in the former USSR. Twenty-four such cases were reported to the police in the year 2000 and 16 of them were solved. There was a similar trend in the Czech Republic, where nationals of the former Soviet Union countries were particularly active in this type of crime. Activities here take various forms, one being the "*krisha*" ["roof"] system of protection racketeering directed against business people. Fictitious companies often serve to screen this type of activity or to launder the profits. In Italy, extortion and money lending are still major activities of the Cosa Nostra. In Portugal several groups specialising in extortion, armed robbery and attacks on banks and security service vehicles had been dismantled. There was a particular increase in the year 2000 in the incidence of extortion targeting immigrants who wanted to get to Germany, France or the UK at any price. Many of the networks involved have an eastern European membership. The report notes the dismantling of a network in which Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians, Lithuanians and Azeris were implicated. Extortion and racketeering continue to cause concern in Turkey. Meanwhile, Ukraine reports that a general improvement in the economic situation and a determined policy of fighting organised crime have produced some success: the number of groups engaged in organised crime declined (to 960 in the year 2000 as against 1165) as did the number of offences they committed (7744 compared with 9300). There was particular success in the fight against violent crime (extortion and gangsterism) and crime committed under the cover of business activities.

## 2.2.8 Illegal immigration

### MIGRATION AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

More than 150 million international migrants celebrated the turn of the millennium outside their countries of birth. International migrants are people who take up residence in a foreign country. By this definition, international migrants do not include the tourists, business travellers, religious pilgrims, or people seeking medical treatment who make millions of visits to foreign countries each year. Rather, only those foreigners who remain for an extended stay in a new country are counted as international migrants. International migrants belong to two broad groups: voluntary migrants and forced migrants. Voluntary migrants include people who move abroad for purpose of employment, study, family reunification, or other personal factors. Forced migrants leave their countries to escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom, or livelihood. Among them are individuals compelled to move by government or other authorities, often in the process referred to as “ethnic cleansing”. The US Committee for refugees “2000 World Refugee Survey” estimated that there were 14 million refugees at the beginning of the year, down from almost 17 million at the beginning of the decade. During 1999, significant new movements occurred, particularly from Kosovo, which also saw mass return. In Europe 1,9 million refugees showed up. Four global trends have particular importance for decision-making on migration matters (IOM, 2000, pp. 3 and 15):

- Growing economic integration and globalisation
- Changing geopolitical interests in the post-Cold War era
- Increasing trans-nationalism as migrants are able to live effectively in two or more countries at the same time
- Changing demographic trends and gender roles.

Central and eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprise a vast geographical region stretching from Prague to Vladivostock with a population of more than 550 million people. When the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989 and the “Iron Curtain” fell, there was considerable concern in the west about the prospect of an upsurge in East-West migration. This concern increased still further when the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. The predicted westward mass migration never occurred, however. Following the report of central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States the largest population movements took place within the region, as many of those living outside their home republics during the break-up of the USSR relocated. Since 1989, about 9 million people have moved within or between the countries of the CIS-region.

### IMMIGRATION TRENDS

The most important movement into the Russian Federation since the break-up of the Soviet Union is the return of ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers. Between 1990 and 1997, some 2,7 million people repatriated to Russia from other parts of the CIS and the Baltic States. Some of the relatively more affluent countries of central Europe, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, increasingly have become target countries for voluntary and forced movements. After the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989, some 1.2 million people left the region. More than one-half of those who left the region (720,000 people) were ethnic Germans; 320,000 were Bulgarian Turks, of whom about

half later returned to Bulgaria. Albania was perhaps the most affected by emigration: an estimated 300,000-450,000 Albanians (10 to 14 per cent of the population) left the country in the early 1990s when removal of prior exit controls coincided with recurrent economic and political crisis. No single explanation lies behind migrants desire to move to other countries. Emigration pressures vary by country and involve a combination of factors. The lure of higher wages and better living conditions, the worsening conditions for ethnic minorities are more important push factors.

As a result of conflicts since 1989 in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Chechnya, some 870,000 persons became refugees and a further 1.1 million people were internally displaced. In 1999, there were 173,000 internally displaced people in the Russian Federation, of whom 150,000 were from Chechnya (IOM, 2001, p. 163 ff.).

In Kosovo, where the Serbs had held political control since the abolition of its autonomous status in 1989, some 350,000 ethnic Albanians left and applied for asylum in other European countries. Beginning in 1998, when the recent conflict began, until March 1999 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened, some 400,000 Kosovo Albanians were displaced from their homes. When the bombing campaign was in full swing, a total of 848,100 ethnic Albanians fled. Most Kosovo Albanians resided in Germany, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. Many of them returned by the end of the war. After the peace accord, an estimated 180,000 Serbs and Romanians fled Kosovo, mainly to Serbia.

Between 1991 and 1998, more than 1 million people from the countries in the former Yugoslavia sought refuge in western Europe, about 600,000 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, approximately 400,000 from Croatia.

## **ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION**

Trafficking and smuggling of migrants usually refers to the facilitation of unauthorised border crossing by a smuggler who usually is paid for this service. In Hungary, for example, the number of migrants apprehended trying to cross Hungary's borders with the assistance of a smuggler has increased substantially, rising from an average of 1,000-1,500 people per year between 1995 and 1997 to 3,200 in 1998. The latter figure, however, accounts for only one-quarter of the migrants apprehended. In the Czech Republic, the situation seems to be similar; 22 per cent of the 24,000 people apprehended for unauthorised crossing during the first 10 months of 1997 were reportedly assisted by smugglers (Matzka-Wolfslehner, 1999). In 1999, the number of illegal entries into the Czech Republic had risen to 44,000. The next year, there was a decline by a quarter, to 32,720. Croatia registered 24,180 illegal entries in 2000, Ukraine 27,000 and Albania 13,819. Slovenian authorities reported 18,571 illegal entries in 1999.

In 2000, the Austrian law enforcement authorities registered 18,495 cases (a case is a police operation resulting arrest of one or more persons), which corresponds to a rise of 2,699 police interventions (+ 17%) compared to 1999. In the course of these operations, carried out both at the internal and external EU-borders as well as within Austria 45,730 persons were stopped and subjected to measures, as foreseen by the legislation pertaining to aliens, which constitutes a rise of 2,918 persons, or in other words, an increase by 7%. In 2000, in total 4,742 people entered Austria illegally (3,813 in the previous year), that is an increase by 24 percent. In 2000 nationals from 148 countries were arrested. Further increase of the number of detected/arrested illegal persons is to be mainly attributed to growing migration of Afghan, Iraqi and Chinese nationals, as well

as migrants from the Indian sub-continent. Romanian and Moldavian “economic refugees” also play a significant role.

Root causes and triggering factors of modern migration flows go back to historically decisive events of the past century. Among them are series of processes and events, apparently closely related to each other, such as:

- breakdown and fall of multi-cultural federations and alliances, accompanied by religious and ethnic conflicts
- continuous war-like or civil war-like conflicts world-wide
- widely different growth of population and economy (too rapid population growth and too fast growing economy of which only very few really benefit from)
- increase of natural disasters and advancing destruction of major ecological systems as a result of the industrial economic systems.

In regard the consequences resulting there from we have to distinguish “push and pull factors”.

Push factors are inter alia:

- discrimination for various reasons,
- political instability and wars,
- uncontrolled population growth,
- impoverishment owing to lack of social networks
- 

Pull factors in the target countries are inter alia:

- population decline and shortage of labour
- comprehensive social security networks in the destination countries
- excellent economic conditions in Europe and the United States of America democratic governments, political and social stability.

The native countries of those migrants that affect Austria most, are Romania, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Moldova, the Indian sub-continent, Poland and China. The motives for emigration from these areas are, as in the previous years, in one third of the cases economic interests, and in another third of a personal nature (family reunification). Other reasons are political persecution (about 1/10 of all cases), flight from war zones, escape from justice in the home country, and unravelled motives.

Table 6: Illegal entries

Member state	1998	1999	2000
Albania			13,819
Andorra	313		
Armenia			
Austria		42,812	45,730
Azerbaijan			
Belgium			
Bulgaria	7,744		
Croatia	2,591		24,180
Cyprus	52	213	456
Czech Republic	7,530	44,000	32,720
Denmark		348	
Estonia			2,488
Finland			
France			
Georgia			
Germany <sup>22</sup>		2,163	1,962
Greece	146,295	595	
Hungary	18,017	6,499	999
Iceland	16		
Ireland	2,288	3,456	
Italy			
Latvia			
Liechtenstein		16	42
Lithuania	483	349	100
Luxembourg			266
Malta		611	
Moldova		70	
Netherlands		27,900	>25,000
Norway	5,900	10,160	
Poland			
Portugal			5,503
Romania			
Russia			
San Marino			
Slovakia		7,888	7,752
Slovenia	13,740	18,571	
Spain			14,346
Sweden			
Switzerland		11,000	
"The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"	6,772	3,736	
Turkey		47,579	2,868
Ukraine	11,820		27,000
United Kingdom			

<sup>22</sup> The data for Germany do not refer to persons but to offences.

## 2.2.9 Trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation

Trafficking in Human Beings are all acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, transportation within and across borders, purchase, sale, transfer, receipt or harbouring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion (including the use or threat of force or the abuse of authority) or debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding such person, whether for pay or not, in involuntary servitude (domestic, sexual or reproductive), in forced or bonded labour, or in slavery-like conditions, in a community other than the one in which such person lived at the time of the original deception, coercion or debt bondage (Kartusch, 2000). This definition recognises that the core elements of trafficking in human beings that constitute the violation of human rights are deception, coercion, force or debt bondage, whereas the nature of the labour and services is not relevant to the qualification of an exploitative and abusive situation as trafficking. This definition therefore does not confine itself to sexual exploitation, but also includes amongst other things the exploitation of domestic workers, sweat shop labour and forced marriages.

It is difficult to obtain accurate statistics on the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation or to estimate the scale of the problem of trafficking of women and to collect information about it. Trafficking of women for sexual exploitation has been of increasing concern to European governments as a major world-wide problem. The European Union launched in 1996, the five-year STOP programme to prevent the sexual Trafficking of Persons. The European Union and the United States supported information programmes to prevent the trafficking of women in Poland and Ukraine in 1998. These programmes and new information campaigns were repeated by the EU and the USA in 1999. The programmes were implemented in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary (IOM, 2001, p. 182 –184).

There is little doubt that a considerable increase in trafficking of women for purposes of sexual exploitation occurred during the 1990s. In 1997, the US Government estimated that such trafficking involved 175,000 women and girls from central and eastern Europe and the newly independent States, representing one-quarter of all women involved in this trade world-wide. One of the leading non-governmental organisations dealing with this problem in Europe, the Foundation Against the Trafficking in Women in the Netherlands, reported that the majority of victims of this form of trafficking now come from the central and eastern Europe region, whereas in 1990 most of the women came from developing countries. Generally, the profile of women involved in trafficking from central and eastern Europe is younger, better educated, unmarried, and without children, compared to women from other parts of the world. According to official statistics in Germany and Austria between 1996 and 1999, 80 percent of the victims of trafficking in women were from central and eastern Europe.

There are several causes for the increased trafficking of women from central and eastern Europe. The high level of poverty and unemployment among women as well as the tighter western European immigration controls probably provide only part of the explanation. The main factor is more likely the existence of organised networks of traffickers and criminals who for huge profits at relatively little risk recruit, transport and then exploit these women. Penalties for trafficking in women are not severe and convictions are rare. It is easier and less expensive to bring women from central and eastern European regions to western Europe than to recruit women from developing countries: these women do not have to travel as far and, as visa restrictions no longer apply to many central and eastern European citizens, authorised entry on a tourist visa

is relatively easy. The majority of women involved in trafficking are sexually exploited; a minority are engaged as domestic help, usually with little or no pay and no contract (Kartusch, Knaus & Reiter, 2000).

In 1997, a survey on the availability of statistics on trafficking in women and children was conducted in 25 countries, including all European Union countries and five candidate countries. Although many countries were unable to produce reliable statistics specifically on the scale of trafficking in women, the majority of surveyed countries reported this form of trafficking to be a growing problem, especially involving women from central and eastern Europe. However, because victims are afraid of turning to authorities for help, much underreporting is suspected. Law enforcement agencies often do not give sufficient priority to combating trafficking in women because the crime is poorly defined in national legislation, when it is defined at all. Trafficking in women in central and eastern Europe has significantly increased since the breakdown of the communist regime. A major reason underlying this phenomenon is the feminisation of poverty following the breakdown of national economic and political systems in the former communist countries and the transition of central and eastern Europe towards market economy. In these countries, social services and education are no longer free, and poverty and unemployment are rising. As a consequence of traditional gender stereotypes and discrimination in the labour market, women make up disproportionate amount of those workers in low-paid, less prestigious jobs and are more affected by unemployment. Additionally, women as single mothers increasingly have the sole economic responsibility for their families. All these factors taken together create incentives for women to migrate abroad, in many cases in order to send money back home. As the labour market in general does not offer equal opportunities for women and men, women are to a great extent dependent on working in the informal, unregulated, unprotected labour sector. This is also true with respect to countries of destination, where sex work and domestic labour often are the only available income generating activities.

At the same time a decrease in opportunities for legal migration to the European Union can be observed. Member states are tending to reinforce their border controls and to grant less residence and labour permits for non-EU citizens; therefore making women willing to migrate dependent on "assistance" from third parties who provide loans and organise transport facilities, (false) documents and working arrangements.

Since 1990, there has been an increase in trafficking in women from central and eastern Europe. There are several reasons for this: because of the short geographical distances involved and the fact that visa restrictions no longer apply to some central and eastern European countries, recruitment has become easier and less expensive, women do not have to travel so far, and it is also easy to replace women with new recruits. The enlargement of the European Union will increase the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and trafficking of women from central and eastern Europe.

Austrian experiences, for example, show that the women are lured into the "Golden West" by false pretences with the help of non-Austrian criminal organisations, and are forced into complete personal and economic dependence. As in the past, almost all victims are smuggled into Austria by land. There is evidence that migration racketeering organisations have contacts or accomplices who are either able to provide visas or are specialised in passport forgery, or carry out the actual smuggling. The primary criminal figures in the third countries maintain direct contacts to criminals within Austria. Quite often women are transported to Austria upon "order". It is extremely difficult for the

border control officers to detect traffic in people, especially of women from countries where visas are not required. Investigations focussing on all known criminal groups involved in sex trade revealed characteristic signs of organised crime. Bars and brothels are frequently operated by "figure heads" in order to conceal the true owners or persons responsible, and to minimise the risk of detection.

The complex background and methods of traffic in human beings and of the procurement of prostitution resulting in the desperate financial situation of the victims, and also in some respects an overlapping of interests of perpetrators and victims render the investigator's work extremely difficult.

Partly due to differences in definitions and reporting habits, there are huge differences between member States regarding statistical data on Trafficking in Human Beings and Prostitution. In 2000, Bulgarian authorities identified 12 organised criminal groups involved in the trafficking in human beings. In Romania, 169 groups were investigated and in the Netherlands 47. Poland reported 19 criminal cases, Norway 79 and Germany 420. In Luxembourg 12 persons were arrested, and in Albania 37. In Croatia, 445 individuals were prosecuted in 2000. The great variety in types of data preclude the drawing of conclusions on trends.

### 2.2.10 Child pornography

Child pornography includes the production, distribution, exportation, transmission, importation, intention, possession and advertising of child pornography (Vienna Commitment against Child Pornography on the Internet, 1<sup>st</sup> October 1999, Chapter II, pt.3). As practical experience shows, Internet is used extensively for providing and selling pornographic material. Child pornography, sexual services, advertising contacts on the Internet is a growing problem. Basically there are only a small number of reports on child pornography. Reports are made by Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Slovak Republic and The Netherlands.

In March 1997 the Austrian Ministry of the Interior created a unit to process reports on child pornography in the Internet. Upon receipt of a message it is attempted to verify its correctness and to identify the individual(s) behind the web sites in question. The results were as follows:

Year	Number of reports	Useful leads	Cases with links to Austria
1997	552	78	0
1998	389	174	25
1999	504	268	33
2000	1,706	595	47

Bulgaria reported on an on-going investigation in spread of child pornography through Internet. The domain is based in the USA.

Denmark reports that throughout the last year, new child pornographic material continued to surface, especially on the Internet, and the pictures had become even more rough. The actual organised production of child pornographic material is assumed to have emerged primarily in eastern Europe, Russia and Asia. It was not possible to provide a safe estimate on the number of members of paedophile networks in Denmark, because these networks operate in closed circles. This was substantiated in 2000 when



during a case it was revealed that it is only possible to enter into paedophile circles if you can deliver the material yourself. Generally speaking, the exchange of child pornographic material was made in international networks consisting of relatively autonomous actors. These networks also applied state-of-the-art technology and their criminal actions thus characterised as being qualified and technically advanced.

According to authorities of the Slovak Republic child pornography is a highly latent form of criminal activity which is difficult to investigate. Five cases of child pornography have been recorded in the year 2000. Internet is a well-used medium for pornography material exchange. Advancing technology and more refined criminal activities in the Internet require permanent efforts by the investigators to keep pace through regular training and exchange of information with foreign authorities. One case deals with the transportation of minor children and young persons abroad (mainly to Austria), where they are used for making pornographic films or the production of pornographic photographs and nudes. In most cases they are young unemployed people with antisocial behaviour that do not mind how they earn money. All cases of short-term stay abroad that have been recorded up to now were on a voluntary basis by the aggrieved party. The other form is shooting domestic pornographic films and making pornographic photographs, mainly amateur ones. In relation to this type of crime, attention shall be paid to paedophilic (active cooperation with health service institutions), young persons with antisocial behaviour (cooperation with educational facilities and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family). It is necessary to improve cooperation with providing photographic services and private film production companies. These activities have been carried out within the framework of both organised criminal activity with relationships at an international level and the non organised form of activity carried out by paedophiles for their own sexual needs or by persons with criminal social conduct for commercial purposes.

The Netherlands report that child pornography only seldom occurs in a form which can be considered as organised crime. Generally speaking, the offenders belong to a loose network of paedophiles who exchange images and films with each other. In most cases this involves barter. In one case large sums of money were made through the distribution of child pornography. The material was obtained through so-called news groups and web sites all over the world. In order to obtain access to child pornography, interested parties had to pay using a credit card. For the group in question, therefore, child pornography was an important source of income. This investigation therefore meets the criteria for organised crime. In response to the increased dissemination of child pornographic material, the police and judicial authorities in the Netherlands jointly set up a project team, which operates under the same name of SKIM 2000 (Surveilleren Kinderporno Internet Methodieken – Surveillance methods with regards to child pornography on the Internet). This team will occupy itself with Internet surveillance and the investigation of criminal (Europol, 2001)

## 2.2.11 Illegal gambling

The fascination of striking lucky and making a fast buck naturally attracts the underworld. Gambling has always been accompanied by crime. Gambling has supported all forms of crime from deception and theft to murder. Illegal gambling and prostitution are the backbones of organised crime. Where illegal gambling is expanding, we can see further facets of criminal presence:

- dubious neighbourhoods (night life, prostitution)
- a tendency towards acts of violence (blackmail, gang warfare between gambling organisations with the gamblers themselves often the victims)
- loan sharking (extortionate rates of interest)
- Organised crime (classic the Las Vegas phenomena)
- use of electronic support equipment to cheat casinos/customers

It has only recently been recognised that addiction to gambling is an illness and that it should be categorised under the heading of addiction. As a result of uncontrollable obsession, there are countless cases of gamblers, their associates and families, who descend into poverty. Common consequences are the murder and manslaughter of each other, as well as murder, robbery, theft and deception to gain new funds with which to feed their addiction to gambling.

In Bulgaria, offences and violations in terms of organisation of gambling games can be regarded in two aspects: obtaining illegal profits and investing criminal proceeds in licensed gambling games. A significant indicator for this trend is the declaration of large turnovers whereas there is a small number of clients of the gambling places of entertainment.

Two illegal gambling schemes were uncovered in Cyprus in the year 2000.

The authorities of the Slovak Republic reported several incidents with illegal gambling and excessive stakes. In most cases were linked to illegal animal fights. However, these events are organised in highly conspiratorial ways on private land. None of the cases have been proved by documentary evidence. It is anticipated that members of criminal organisations organise such events. In the past some cases of so-called "pyramid" schemes were recorded. Their organisers caused losses to a few thousands of people while they gained many millions of Crowns. Although this criminal activity was undoubtedly organised, no criminal activity was proved to any of the organisers. organised crime groups are also active under the legal gambling in various gambling clubs, casinos, night-clubs and hotels. in those cases, as well as in cases of gambling machines, they are looking for the legalisation of proceeds from crime.

## 2.2.12 Environmental crime

Environmental crime as a legal concept is an act committed with the intent to harm or with the potential to cause harm to ecological and/or biological systems, for the purpose of securing business or personal advantage, and in violation of state or federal statutes for which criminal sanctions apply. Environmental crime is a multi-faceted concept. It includes: Trafficking of endangered species, dumping of toxic or hazardous waste, use of, or trafficking in, ozone depleting substances. Environmental crime is divided into three basic categories:

1. Violation of a permit condition
2. Violation committed outside the regulatory scheme
3. Acts that would be illegal regardless of the regulatory provisions.

The total annual global trade in animals, plants and their by-products is currently estimated to be around USD 20 billion and it has been suggested that around a quarter of this trade is illegal (Clifford, 1998).

In Austria, seven cases of illegal trafficking in radioactive and nuclear substances were investigated in 2000. In all cases, fraudulent intent was the criminal purpose.

The number of reported violations of the environmental act in Denmark have dropped through the past years. In 1997, a total of 578 reports were filed, whereas the number had decreased to 409 in 2000. The most serious environmental crimes were primarily related to commercial enterprises handling of waste products, pollution of the marine environment and trading in endangered species.

The investigation of this type of criminal activity is at a very low level in Slovakia. It represents the whole range of criminal acts, starting with threats to the environment through the protection of fauna and flora, poaching, the illegal import, export and transit of waste, cruelty to animals and ending with exposing people to the danger of venereal diseases. From these types of activities, the illegal logging of trees and their subsequent sale abroad has been recorded to a larger extent, even cutting down trees and protected reserves, mainly by Roma who use the wood for heating. In many cases there are mass raids on the forests, taking it literally, without any sanctions or remedies. The organised form of criminal activity in this particular area related mainly to organised poaching. Poachers kill deer and other wild animals on the demand of and upon the agreement with the owners of various restaurants without respecting hunting seasons. Environmental crime has gained a new feature within the last two years, in particular in that sense that criminal groups with international ties are active in individual areas of the environment, mainly in the following areas.

The Netherlands is one of the countries where synthetic drugs are produced. This production leaves residual substances. Four investigations concern the illicit dumping of such substances. The information desk of the Synthetic Drugs Unit (USD) recorded 101 cases of dumping of chemical waste in 2000. If dangerous chemical substances are imported or exported without a licence (i.e. smuggled), this too, strictly speaking, constitutes environmental crime. This is the case, for example, where precursors and raw materials for drugs are smuggled and sold. Although in some cases these activities result in convictions under environmental legislation, they also constitute criminal offences under the Opium Act.

### 2.2.13 Cyber crime

It is believed that the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the information century. Information is spread by computer technology. Consequently computer crimes are spreading and are a new field for criminals. Computer crimes deal with unauthorised access to and illicit tampering with systems, programs or data. Examples of high technology/computer crime include: hacking/cracking; assaults on computer networks; denial of service; viruses and other malicious programs; Internet fraud; money laundering; intellectual property offences; procuring or prostitution; Internet paedophilia; illegal virtual casinos and gambling.

Intruders are using increasingly fast, automated tools to probe for and exploit vulnerabilities in computer systems and to gain unauthorised access. Automated hacking tools account now for a larger number of successful intrusions.

Cyberspace is becoming more dangerous for financial institutions because of greater vulnerability of financial institutions to intrusion via Internet, greater opportunity for thieves to steal customer's identifying data, more places to look for stolen digital data. "Classic" intrusion-scenarios:

- Attackers break into corporate networks
- Attackers break into web sites
- Disgruntled employee (extortion accomplished by encryption).

E-Commerce provides fraudsters a new vehicle to commit crimes. The challenge of E-Commerce is based on the ability to commit more of the crimes faster and with greater anonymity, the proliferation of on-line instant credit creates new fraud opportunities.

State-of-the-art analytic systems capitalise on the merchant's data advantage, powerful scores combined with effective strategies increase profits dramatically, fraud prevention has to focus on the customer and more information than traditional sources makes fraud detection better.

The complexities and inconsistencies of international law relating to computer crime pose a number of problems for law enforcement across the world. Keys to investigate "classical" intrusion can be:

- Identify whether your intruder as an "insider" or "outsider"
- Determine the seriousness of the threat
- Weigh the benefits of apprehension versus the risk of loss.

In Austria, numerous charges in relation to computer crime and network crime were filed by the law enforcement authorities, i.e. for violation of section a of the Austrian Penal Code. In the course of police operation huge data quantities were confiscated and analysed. In total 40 such police operations were carried out in 2000. Many of the searches of premises, seizures and analyses focussed on child pornography in the Internet. Typically, monitoring of ICR-chats by the BKA-Wiesbaden revealed that the user of an Austrian PC downloaded pictures containing child-pornography. The person was arrested and during the search of his premises it turned out that one hard drive had been yielded more than 1200 photographs illegal under the Austrian Penal Code, and several thousand files containing pictures not prohibited by law. The material was passed on to the investigating agency for assessment and action.

Especially in cases of fraudulent bankruptcy it is of utmost importance to obtain evidence on IT-media to step up the investigations. So for instance , in the course of proceedings against an Austrian kitchen manufacturer, 4 networks, consisting of 15 servers and more than 150 workstations, had to be searched. The relevant files were discovered, secured and forwarded to the agency in charge for further action.

Bulgaria registered one case revealing spread of child pornography via Internet. The domain is based in the USA. An investigation is being carried out in a hacker attack to a Japanese server.

## 2.3 USE OF INFLUENCE

When reviewing the influence of organised crime upon the body politic, including law enforcement agencies, one always encounters the paradox that although some countries are able to keep corruption to a minimum, there are some highly corrupt 'failed states' in which the official corruption rates are very low, and/or in which corruption prosecutions are a method of attacking political opponents or even criminal competitors (Transparency International, 2001). Whether or not there is corruption in the sphere of public administration and politics – for example in relation to the granting of contracts – it is hard to conceive of long-term organised crime – especially that involving the supply of illegal goods and services – without corruption except where the State is extremely weak. None of the reports mentioned corruption in the context of money laundering, despite the plausibility that as laundering controls are imposed and tightened, more bankers and allied occupations will be bribed to bypass regulations to assist depositing and layering that formerly, they might have been comfortable to do as part of their everyday work.

The Czech report for 2000 states that there was bribery and corruption in 89% of cases where organised crime was found: the highest in the past four years of reports. (This may not represent a rise in corruption over time there: rather that the Czech authorities have developed greater capacities and willingness to act against it.) Experts stated that the least corruption-prone professions were (in ascending order) state prosecutors, journalists and judges, but even they were quite likely to experience *some* infiltration, though there is no evidence of the extent of infiltration, nor whether this is part of a long term relationship or merely one-off payment for 'assistance'. (Though once bribed, it becomes difficult to resist further bribes even if so inclined.) In Hungary, out of 72 organised crime groups identified, almost a quarter were involved in influencing the public administration or judicial system; 11 in politics; and roughly half in influencing improperly law enforcement agencies or the business world. Mass communications were least involved with organised crime, with only 1 in 9 gangs being suspected of such contacts. Moldova acknowledges that unlawful and improper influence is exercised in every sphere.

The TI indices suggest a low rate of corruption among the Scandinavian countries, both internally and in willingness to pay bribes internationally. Therefore we might regard as real rather than as an artefact the absence of prosecutions for organised-crime related corruption in Iceland, not least because there is little or no organised crime there. In most of the Scandinavian and Baltic states, the influence of organised crime on the political sphere is minimal. The Finnish report, while acknowledging that corruption is difficult to detect, states that only two of its organised crime groups are suspected of bribery and even in those cases, it is suspected that bribes took place in Estonia or Russia. In general, especially for the supply of illegal goods and services, the 'front line' staff at police, immigration, customs and border guards are the most readily targeted for corrupt payments, and as the Estonian report makes clear, sometimes people seek these positions precisely for what economists term 'rent-seeking' opportunities. Sometimes, though there may be evidence only against front-line staff, a proportion of funds collected are passed upwards to senior personnel in 'rotten barrel' rather than 'rotten apple' corruption. In some cases, the distribution of funds may reach all the way to the top. The Lithuanian report states that no major research was done in 2000 and there is no exact information on relations among organised criminals and corrupted officials, even though it is presumed that such relationships could exist. Some of the state institutions are considered to face corruption problem to a greater extent than others e.g. State border

security institutions, customs. Several reports on corrupt practice in state institutions were made, though investigations did not confirmed suspicions. There is no reported information about the use of influence in the political world, business sector and mass media in Lithuania.

In Poland, according to the Polish Ministry of the Interior, criminal groups have close contacts or even cooperate with the increasing number of the members of public administration, both governmental and NGO's. These contacts reach the upper levels of the administration. The bald statistics – as everywhere – tell us little about the social composition or contexts of corruption, since they are based around categorisations more appropriate to court processes than to criminological enlightenment. In the year 2000, the police registered 287 offences (487 in 1999) under art. 228 § 1 – 4 cc (simple passive bribery), 3 offences (4 in 1999) under art. 228 § 5 cc (aggravated passive bribery, i.e. accepting a bribe 200 times greater than the minimum monthly income), 281 offences (206 in 1999) under art. 229 § 1 – 2 cc (simple active bribery), 513 offences (268 in 1999) under art. 229 § 3 – 4 cc (aggravated active bribery, i.e. offering a bribe for violating professional secrecy or offering a bribe 200 times greater than the minimum monthly income), and 57 offences (177 in 1999) under art. 230 cc (paid favouritism).

Corruption is one among many methods by which organised crime groups are able to shield their activities from effective intervention. With or without corrupt alliances from inside, some criminal groups make use of disinformation campaigns, in which misleading information is deliberately fed to the investigation team in order to derail it. In several countries such as Croatia, bribery takes the form of the giving of unmerited loans or gambling debts which are not expected to be repaid, or more direct gifts such as summer houses, cars, *et cetera*.

Corruption is sometimes but not always connected with the more organised forms of crime (though in our definition and that of the European Union, organised crime excludes transnational bribery carried out by otherwise legitimate corporations to obtain contracts). In 2000, 31 (21%) of the investigations reported in the Polish survey mention corruptive contacts or suspicion of such contacts: this figure is lower than in the situation reports of 1998 and 1999. By contrast, the Cypriot report states that there are no reported cases involving corruption in any area of government, business or mass media (though some cases were tried that arose from acts committed in previous years). The French report states that it does not have any available information, but the many well-publicised scandals in the media tend to be connected to the high politics of government rather than to organised crime conventionally defined. Italy experienced organised crime influence in all areas specified in the report. The German report helpfully divides organised crime investigations into those which involved corruption in public administration in Germany (34) and those that involved corruption abroad (40); the corresponding figures for the justice system were 5 and 11; for business enterprises 3 and 5; the media, 13 and 2; and political world 5 and 7. Thus, the majority of detected corruption by organised crime groups occurred abroad, but not overwhelmingly so: the sole exception was in relation to the media, where 'influence' is anyway a broad term. The Spanish report notes a slight increase in corruption attempts and successes, with no gangs bribing the judiciary, only one (domestic) gang involved in corrupting the public administration: the most corruption-prone sectors were law enforcement and merchants, both of which had 6 domestic and three foreign organised crime groups getting some corrupt advantage or improper influence.

A striking factor in the number of corruptive contacts is the role of the business community, both in the Netherlands and abroad. In one out of every eight investigations

in the Netherlands, there is a more than dubious involvement of legitimate business in criminal activities is mentioned (see below). Further specifications show that this involves corruption in the transport companies and airlines, and bribery of airport staff. Connected with this latter category, a relatively large number of investigations mentioned corruption among customs officials abroad.

Table 7: Number of Dutch investigations in 2000 in which reference is made to corruptive contacts<sup>23</sup>

Corruptive contacts	National	International
Police	5	6
Customs & Royal Gendarmerie	2	8
Law enforcement agencies	1	2
Judiciary	1	1
Business community	16	11
Politics	3	2
Public administration	5	6
Legal profession	5	5
Accountancy profession/tax experts	1	2
Notaries	3	2
Media	1	1
Other	5	3

The majority of criminal groups that have corruptive contacts use these contacts to collect useful information, often in order to prevent discovery of offences. They also use corruptive contacts to ensure that people or consignments of goods (drugs) can pass a border without difficulty. In other countries there have been cases of bribery of embassy staff in order to obtain travel documents, while a common form of organised crime quasi-corruption in many Council of Europe member States is theft of credit cards from the mail by insiders, whether deliberately planted there or corrupted once in employment. (Despite competitive pressures, this has been reduced very markedly in the UK by scientific analysis of losses and by special delivery to addresses in high-risk areas, or requiring card-holders from such areas to collect their cards from branches.) Taken as a whole, since corruption cases are so much related to shifts in crime control resources and strategies, it is difficult to have confidence in trends, but there is no evidence that organised crime-related corruption is falling.

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<sup>23</sup> More than one corruptive contact may be mentioned in a single investigation, so one cannot add the numbers in each column to get a total number of cases.



## 2.4 USE OF VIOLENCE

### 2.4.1 Violence within the criminal world

Many criminal organisations use intimidation and physical violence as a means to gain discipline among members. Groups use violence in order to inflict punishments or to support the leadership in internal relations or with others in the criminal world. A position of power established by means of violence is often sufficient to make people compliant.

The proportion of criminal organisations which use sanctions to maintain internal discipline varies among member States. In general, it is not possible to quantify precisely the use of violence within the criminal world, one of the main reasons being that such incidents are rarely reported to the police. In some countries, such as Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia, it is very common to use violence inside the group. Finland reports that almost all organised groups have an internal discipline of some degree, which usually is based on violence and/or extortion. About 20% of the criminal organisations in Ireland engage in violence within the group. The violence (in- and outside the criminal world) resulted in four deaths. The Irish report emphasises that the willingness of organised criminals to use murder as the ultimate form of sanction within and between groups is in no way limited to the major criminal organisations. Persons of the Danish biker environment threaten other criminals to work for them.

Two thirds of the organised crime groups in Hungary resort to some form of violence (threats or physical violence) within the organisation to manage and direct their operations and to force members to cooperate. The only surviving groups seem to be the ones that use brutal force to maintain internal discipline, enforce the 'law of silence', wipe out or drive out (of their territory), intimidate or take on concurrent groups. In Slovakia, 38% of the organised crime groups apply violence, including 30 groups (15%) which use physical violence towards members and 47 groups (23%) which use intimidation.

In half of the Dutch investigations against organised criminal groups, it appeared they applied physical violence, threats to use violence or other forms of intimidation (such as the taking away of personal property). Almost one third of the organisations used physical violence or intimidation against persons who were not group members but did belong to the criminal fraternity. Examples are reprisals against criminals who had appropriated consignments of drugs belonging to the group, and threats against persons who had failed to fulfil their agreements to buy goods obtained from criminal activities. There were also disputes within the criminal world which led to shootings, resulting in casualties. The total number of victims killed within the criminal world in the Netherlands is estimated at twenty.

Thirty revenge killings or attempted revenge killings were committed in France during 2000. Many of these cases were attributed to disputes over the use of 'slot machines' or drug trafficking. In Italy, continuing tension and conflict between organised crime groups (including the 'Ndrangheta) in the different provinces in Calabria over the control of the territory has again resulted in bloodshed in 2000. A similar trend is seen in the Neapolitan region, where new and younger groups, often lacking in Camorra traditions, are characterised by extreme violence. Conflicts between groups have become more significant in order to obtain the control of highly profitable illegal activities and leadership positions within the clan.

On the Iberian peninsula, organised groups are not excessively violent. Portugal notes that groups involved in organised crime never have violence as the aim of their activity. In Spain, there was intra group violence within six groups in 2000. Furthermore, one case of inter-group violence, due to rivalries and opposed interests, occurred. There were no casualties. Violence is mainly used by Colombian, Moroccan, Italian, German and Russian criminals, mostly connected with drugs trafficking and money laundering.

Several member States observed the growing use of bombings. In Bulgaria, 136 cases were registered in 2000, compared to 112 in 1999. Four persons died as a result of handling self-made bombing devices, intended for members of organised crime groups. A total of 11 people were injured. Analysis of these cases showed that the use of explosives is generally characterised by a thorough organisation both at the stage of their planning and perpetration. As a rule their aim was to impose threats on the targeted persons, rather than their physical killing. Bombings within the criminal world also occurred in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland. In the year 2000 Polish authorities recorded 161 bomb explosions, which meant a slight decrease as compared with the previous year (187 explosions). As a result, 16 persons were killed and 51 injured.

Other forms of physical violence within the criminal world in Poland show a tendency to increase. Several prominent leaders of organised criminal groups were recently killed by bullets. The growing violence indicates that there is an increasingly intensive competition between these groups, which are fighting over their 'turf'. In Latvia, exact data on sanctions within criminal groups are lacking, even though it is obvious that such sanctions exist and they are drastic. According to intelligence data several leaders of the gangs, their deputies and other notorious criminals were killed in 2000.

The German report notes that the motives for using violence vary considerably and may relate, for example to:

- the recruitment of participants in a crime (preparation of an offence)
- the imposition of discipline on the participants (commission of the offence)
- the concealment of the offence
- the establishment of a 'reputation' for violence to serve a particular purpose
- extending a group's power base.

The statistics in the report make no distinction between violence within and outside the criminal world. In 2000, there were 128 cases of physical violence related to organised crime and 233 cases which involved other means of intimidation. It was noted that Polish organised crime groups operating in Germany are particularly ready to use violence. For instance violence was used in connection with the recovery of outstanding debts. A strong propensity for violence is also characteristic of Vietnamese criminals in Germany. Although most of the violence takes place between Vietnamese nationals, it is of considerable public concern in those cases where it is acted out in public. Another type of groups with a strong tendency towards violence are Kosovo-Albanian groups.

In Belgium, some 126 criminal organisations (57% of organised groups investigated in 2000) resorted to violence or other means of intimidation. In the majority of cases (59%) they only used some form of intimidation. Assault and battery were applied in 46 incidents (15% of cases), while there were 18 cases of assassination or murder (6% of violent incidents). In total there were 130 acts of violence directed towards members of

the criminal organisation itself and 166 incidents against others. With regard to violence or intimidation outside the group, the principal targets were representatives of law enforcement and the judiciary (including investigators and judges; 44 cases), persons cooperating with the authorities (like witnesses and informers; 35 cases) and other individuals or firms (53 cases). Some 11 criminal organisations also used violence or intimidation to reinforce their position with respect to rival criminal clans.

#### **2.4.2 Use of violence outside the criminal world**

In a number of member States, statistics on violence outside the criminal world refer to violent crimes which are not necessarily committed by organised criminal groups. There are groups in Norway which seem to have specialised in debt collecting by use of force. Criminal motorcycle clubs are for instance involved in this, but there are also other criminal organisations. These debt collecting groups are in addition involved in other criminal activities. Swedish biker groups commit violence with regard to the illegal debt collection too. Acts of violence also seem to occur with regard to the settling of internal conflicts. The number of violent incidents related to the outlaw motorcycle environment decreased somewhat in 2000, while the total number of violent cases has increased. Swedish youth gangs as well as Russian, Serbian and Lithuanian groups in the sphere of organised crime are considered prone to use violence.

Until recently, kidnapping for the purposes of extortion was commonly practised by criminal groups in certain areas in Italy (Calabria, Sardinia), where specific human resources and land formations made it easier for this crime to be committed, leading to a steady growth in the huge profits that could be used for other illegal or pseudo-legal activities. Today, changes in the criminal scene as well as more successful legal measures to combat this type of crime have made it less attractive for the traditional criminal groups. However, there are indications that the Mafia specifically tends to plan and systematically use violent actions, also of a terrorist nature, as a means to affect the social order in Italy.

Brutal force against people who do not belong to the criminal world is applied by the majority (58%) of organised criminal groups in Hungary. Romania reports that in 2000, there were 33 cases of intimidation and 78 cases of physical violence against individuals outside the criminal world. In Bulgaria 13 acts were registered against representatives from the law enforcement and the judiciary. The figure includes two cases against witnesses during trials against members of organised criminal groups. Also in Norway there have occurred some threats against judges, prosecutors, lawyers and police officers as well as against trial witnesses. Furthermore, journalists and their families have been intimidated by organised criminal groups.

Use of violence against other criminals is common in Finland. In contrast, violence is used very rarely outside criminal groups in the Czech Republic. An exception is the increasing trend of groups from the former Soviet Union to use extortion. Until 1999, mainly Russian speaking businessmen were provided paid protection. In 2000, also Czech entrepreneurs were forced to pay regularly for protection by threats of immediate violence. Sometimes physical violence (in extreme cases even liquidation) is applied against family members of businesspeople. The use of violence by organised criminal groups in Latvia is mostly also connected to extortion cases.

Not violence but other forms of intimidation sometimes are enough to break down a person's resistance. Prostitutes from eastern Europe, for instance, were intimidated in

Germany with threats that nude photos of them would be published in their home countries. Their fear of being ostracised was enough to get them to continue working as prostitutes.

### **2.4.3 Number of people killed by organised criminal groups**

Table 8 presents statistics on the number of victims killed by activities of criminal organisations. Due to a lack of exact data, it is difficult to find a clear trend. In some member States (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Slovakia, Spain) there is a decrease, in some (e.g. Cyprus, Romania) the number of victims is stable and in others (e.g. Finland, Hungary) there is an increase. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that organised crime causes hundreds of people killed each year.

Table 8: Number of people killed by organised criminal groups

Member state	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania					
Andorra					
Armenia					
Austria		1	≥1		
Azerbaijan					
Belgium	15	28			18
Bulgaria					10
Croatia					
Cyprus			3	3	3
Czech Republic				±15	10 to 15
Denmark	3	2			
Estonia	±10	2	2	±25	7 to 10
Finland	1	1	1	4	6
France <sup>24</sup>	33	47			34
Georgia					
Germany <sup>25</sup>	70	44	63	32	29
Greece		4			
Hungary <sup>26</sup>		6	≥3	12	49
Iceland					
Ireland	6	1		1	4
Italy <sup>27</sup>	201	190	63	93	
Latvia					3
Liechtenstein					
Lithuania				12	
Luxembourg					
Malta					
Moldova		6			
Netherlands <sup>28</sup>		66	35	≥12	±20
Norway	1				
Poland		20	≥20	>21	≥16
Portugal					
Romania			4	4	
Russia		>130			
San Marino					
Slovakia		30	45		3
Slovenia	8	8	2	1	1
Spain	10		9		8
Sweden					4
Switzerland			76		
'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'					

<sup>24</sup> The figure for 2000 refers to revenge killings (30, including attempts) and victims killed during armed robberies (4).

<sup>25</sup> The number of persons killed includes criminal attempts.

<sup>26</sup> The number of persons killed in 1999 includes criminal attempts. The figure for 2000 is based on non-verified data.

<sup>27</sup> The number of deaths in 1998 only refers to homicides by Mafia associations.

<sup>28</sup> The 1998 figure refers to homicides within the criminal world, whereas the number for 1997 also includes other homicides by criminal groups.

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Member state	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Turkey					7
Ukraine			≥18	≥14	≥20
United Kingdom			28		

## 2.5 INVESTMENT OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME

There is a great deal of confusion caused generally by the use of the term 'money laundering', which can mean anything from the simple deposit of funds in a bank account (i.e. saving) to the integration of proceeds of crime into direct investment in the economy, whether via corporations held overseas or individuals. Although some crime proceeds are spent directly by high-living criminals or are distributed in cash to gang members for their living expenses, we do not know what the overall savings ratio is for organised crime offenders, nor how it varies among the Council of Europe member (and non-member) states. However, it is hard to believe that an organised crime group can present much of a threat to the State if it does *not* launder at least part of its proceeds, and in this sense, data from member states on the laundering activities of groups may be as much a reflection of policing activities as of their criminal behaviour. Whether the funds are laundered in-house or are contracted out to specialists (including lawyers and accountants) is affected by policing efforts, especially contemporaneous surveillance and early introduction of financial investigators into the case, rather than just the presence or absence of an FIU. Likewise, though many reports by member states (other than those specialising in financial services) blame the 'offshore' islands for facilitating laundering, we do not know what proportion of laundered funds take this route: where money laundering controls are weak, there is less need for elaborate concealment, since trusted nominees or 'front men' can be used to hide beneficial ownership and control even domestically. Cyprus states that there are no money-laundering cases connected to organised crime, or at least to its indigenous organised crime. Malta notes that its financial institutions are used to exchange currency or establish businesses, buy real estate *et cetera*. It only takes one or two staff rather than the whole institution to generate a corrupt relationship for laundering purposes. In any event, most countries have some capacity to serve as 'offshore' for other countries: the key questions are:

1. what level of formal banking secrecy exists to protect customers, and in particular the beneficial owners of individual or business accounts, against investigation on behalf of other countries; and
2. what level of provision does the country make to enable such investigations to take place in practice in a timely manner.

In these respects, one of the major changes in recent years has been of Switzerland, both in relation to international organised crime and, more noticeably still, in relation to 'politically exposed persons' who exercise an important measure of influence in countries outside Switzerland. There are very few Council of Europe member countries whose senior public officials arguably have fallen within this category but in certain respects, it would be absurd to exclude from the category of organised criminals such figures who extort millions and/or steal from the government treasury and from transnational and domestic businesses. In 2000, reports from investment banks and foreign banks fell, and the significant increases in reports came from large bank chains and from private banks, perhaps reflecting the post-Abacha scandal sanctions imposed by the Swiss Banking Commission rather than organised crime as commonly understood. Indeed, the number of reports arising from organised crime fell from 13 to 3; those for drug trafficking rose from 8 to 13; and reports for proceeds of money-laundering fell from 62 to 43. Only a third of the subjects of reports were domiciled in Switzerland and a quarter (including corporate entities) had Swiss nationality, though both these figures rose very significantly in 2000 compared with 1999.

Whereas most serious crimes for profit will have money laundering attached to them as an ancillary offence, some of the specialised money-laundering services will be conducted – knowingly or not – via lawyers, accountants and company formation agencies and will be inter-connected – if at all – by the offshore locations only if and when a mutual legal assistance request comes in. It may not come in with a direct connection to that ‘organised crime’, but financial investigation on other transactions of the same firm may yield further evidence of other as yet unreported organised crime activities.

Those Czech businesses controlled by organised crime figures, especially those originating in Russia, whether genuine trading companies or mere fronts, are often discovered to be registered to non-existent addresses or to the addresses of Czech citizens who have no knowledge of this, raising interesting questions about the demands of corporate registration and the checking of details, let alone the determination of beneficial ownership of companies currently exercising the minds of the PC-R-EV and FATF. These companies are then used to transfer money with apparent legitimacy internationally. They are also used purely as fronts, registered falsely in the names of Russians, and deposits are made in many Czech banks in the false names, which are used to buy large quantities of real estate apparently on behalf of these firms. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of proceeds of crime being integrated into any business sectors, though construction and transport companies – that one might expect to be among the principal targets for such integration in any country (see Van Duyne & Levi, forthcoming) – were least suspected. Among the business sectors where criminal investment has occurred in both the Czech Republic and Hungary are banks and investment firms, foreign exchange bureaux, casinos, tourism, entertainment, night clubs, transportation and car hire, import/export and retailers. Night clubs and sex shops are common areas of investment for many countries, especially those in central and eastern Europe, though the Estonian report notes that whereas indigenous groups invest in them, the Russian groups merely collect ‘taxes’ from Estonian ones.

In Hungary, money laundering was identified as the primary activity of 6 organised crime groups though presumably, most will have engaged in it if only to the extent of paying persons outside the gang to do it for them. There, the most common outlets for crime proceeds detected were night clubs and small trading enterprises, followed some way behind by tourism, import/export companies, car dealerships and real estate businesses. The Hungarian report notes that changes in the Hungarian economy apparently unconnected to law enforcement have generated a financial crisis for organised crime groups, leading to substantial drops in profitability of their trading firms. Furthermore, improved supervision of financial services and taxation has reduced economic and fiscal crime opportunities, while Courts of (Company) Registration have been striking phantom front firms from the register by requiring evidence of real trading. In spite of Hungary’s blacklisting in 2001 by the FATF Non-cooperating Countries and Territories *inter alia* for not getting rid of anonymous bank accounts, this appears to be a good example of enforcement practices restricting the scope for money laundering.

Much laundering arises from activities such as fraud and tax crimes that are mainly outside the province of ‘organised crime’ in this report and that of the European Union. Nevertheless, Polish crime groups have been shown to engage in investments in various legal enterprises, including money exchange offices, pawnshops, so called “social agencies” (in fact usually brothels), recreational enterprises (for example hotels), horse stud farms, construction firms, acquisition of real estate, investments in banks and insurance companies. We are unable to verify estimates that about 8% of the entire value of stocks in Warsaw is owned by organised criminal groups, but this figure is not



implausible. Some of what might be regarded as laundering is in fact extortion, in that people and businesses are pressurised into criminal schemes, providing entertainment facilities, et cetera. Furthermore, as may be noted also in the context of terrorist finance, it is difficult sometimes to distinguish between businesses used for the perpetration of substantive crimes (e.g. transport firms for trafficking) and those used for laundering money: in principle, businesses could be used for either or for both.

Scandinavian money laundering levels connected with organised crime (as opposed to tax evasion rings) are comparatively modest. In Norway, there is some intimation that formerly isolated sex workers are now connected up to reinvestment in other crime activities. The main areas for criminal investment are real estate, second-hand car dealerships and restaurants: but there is no evidence of investment in financial services, and both casinos and bureaux de change are banned in Norway. Only one Icelandic group has been identified as engaged in money laundering. No pertinent information is available of investment in the named sectors. A common refrain in all countries is the difficulty of proving money laundering in a court of law: Finland suspects that half of its organised crime groups are engaged in laundering – a surprisingly low proportion – but there is insufficient evidence to press charges.

In Lithuania, in 2000, 51 reports on suspicious transactions were received at the Money Laundering Division of the Tax Police Department, the said reports lead to institution of 13 criminal cases, including 3 cases, which were investigated as acts of money laundering. There were 181 criminal investigations into money laundering. There is no specified data on the investment of profits from criminal activities done by organised criminals. According to soft data, Polish criminals prefer insurance, tourism, security firms and show/leisure business for the investment of profits from criminal activities. Organised criminal groups, which have relatively small amounts of money at their disposal, prefer investments in real estate and allied products.

Some countries do not yet have money-laundering legislation and therefore understandably are not able to provide any data from their criminal statistics on it: these include Armenia (which also was unable to provide any data on corruption or fraud). Others such as Moldova have not enacted legislation but nevertheless (or partly because of this) have evidence of involvement of organised gangs in laundering and in investment in the business sector.

The French had no convictions for laundering committed by organised gangs, and there are no data on the number of the 71 convictions of heads of 'associations de malfaiteurs' whose activities related to money laundering. Nor is any official information available on the areas in which criminal funds are invested. This suggests several difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of anti-laundering measures in France. Italy experienced the use of existing companies to launder money; the mixing of licit and illicit activities in companies controlled by criminal groups, and the use of shell companies – registered offshore and onshore – that do not conduct any legitimate activity. It also noted an expanding grey area in which legal companies managed previously laundered, 'integrated' funds, which proved resistant to investigation. Portugal noted outflows of €100.5 million, sent via financial institutions in the EU, eastern Europe, and offshore islands, as well as substantial real estate investments. Spain noted a diminution of over a tenth in the number of money laundering cases associated with organised crime, especially among Colombian, Moroccan, French, Italians, Portuguese, Argentines, Russians and Ukrainians, and in the major cities, and especially through the means of rings driving up prices of real estate artificially. But we are unable to determine whether

this reflected a real reduction in laundering or rather changes in policing or changes in the level of sophistication of laundering, making it harder to detect for the same level of policing resource. 5 criminal organisations were specialists in laundering; 37 were tied to drugs trafficking; and 14 were connected to a variety of other offences. Spanish and foreign groups invested proceeds of crime in the following ways: offshore shell businesses; financial deposit institutions; bureaux de change; casinos, leisure, sex and tourism industries; construction and transportation firms; import/export; car hire and sales; and retail stores. Portugal and the UK tended to be the EU destinations assisting in money laundering, with Colombia, Russia and Ukraine being the principal locations outside the EU. A measure of scale is that organised criminals in Spain had an average income of €48,700 (presumably illegally tax free), so despite inequalities *within* groups, the sums available for saving and laundering would not be huge.

Groups with strong foreign links are known to send large amounts cash out of the UK. There is also evidence that some individuals have offered their services to OCGs as specialist money launderers. Some of this money is then recycled to the UK through the legitimate banking system, while some is used to finance further criminal deals or to buy property or other assets overseas. In moving cash out of the UK, organised crime groups risk it being intercepted and confiscated.

Criminals are known to have exchanged cash in casinos for a 'winner's cheque', though this cannot plausibly be done regularly without being observed. Such disclosures of suspicious transactions as there have been have tended to be from the larger multinational organisations and not the smaller operators. Some casinos have also begun to accept foreign cash, which provides those groups with international links with additional laundering opportunities. (A further risk arises where international groups are allowed to run cross-border credit transfers.) The number of gaming companies offering services to UK gamblers via the Internet and telephone has increased significantly. From a money laundering perspective, such offshore companies are likely to have fewer controls over ownership, record-keeping, and access to information than for similar companies based in the UK (where, nevertheless, unlike Jersey and Guernsey, companies are not required to divulge beneficial ownership). However, the planned replacement of betting tax by a 15 per cent tax on gambling institution profits has resulted in announcements from the major betting firms that their offshore operations will be relocated to the UK.

Activities involving money laundering were mentioned in 59 organised crime investigations which were conducted in 2000 in the Netherlands (41% of the total). The following types of money laundering were discovered in the course of these investigations: Exchange of money for foreign currency (32 times mentioned), smurfing (7), quick transfer of funds (10), interruption of 'paper trail' (7), fictitious gaming proceeds (4) fictitious investment earnings (1), loan-back arrangement (7), underground banking (8), money transfers (10), real estate carousel (9), other (14) and unknown (11). It may be noted that even in an advanced criminal market such as the Netherlands, few of these involve any sophisticated operations.

Table 9: Reports on suspicious transactions<sup>29</sup>

Member State	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania						
Andorra	5	3	8			

<sup>29</sup> The statistics for Andorra, Malta and Poland refer to investigations.

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Armenia						
Austria	310	301	239	254		
Azerbaijan						
Belgium <sup>30</sup>	3,926	5,771	7,747			
Bulgaria						49
Croatia						
Cyprus		55	32	37		115
Czech Republic <sup>31</sup>		103	1,200	956	1,699	
Denmark	174	254	309	357	337	
Estonia					56	394
Finland	190	232	209	186	348	1,109
France	866	902	1,213			1,655
Germany	2,935	3,289	3,420	3,543	4,137	4,818
Greece			38			
Georgia						
Hungary <sup>32</sup>			406	1,010	930	29
Iceland		<10		< 30		
Ireland	199	378	504	1,202	1,421	
Italy	2,961	3,218				
Latvia						
Liechtenstein					20	
Lithuania			30	29	66	
Luxembourg	77	78	64	108		
Malta	11	12	5	13		
Moldova						
Netherlands	2,994	2,572	3,795	3,995	10,803	11,023
Norway		164	727	840	788	890
Poland		8	18	17		113
Portugal	85	115	129	106		
Romania						
Russia						
San Marino						
Slovakia			106	107		
Slovenia		53	376	69	81	
Spain		42	734	869		1,354
Sweden		502	909		1,512	
Switzerland			58	160	370	311
'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'						
Turkey		10	12	12		564
Ukraine						
United Kingdom	13,170	16,125	14,148		14,000	18,500

<sup>30</sup> These figures concern not only money laundering cases, but also receiving (of stolen goods) cases, because in the Belgian legislation both are incriminated under the same paragraph.

<sup>31</sup> The figures refer to unusual rather than suspicious transaction reports.

<sup>32</sup> In contrast to figures for previous years, the 2000 figure refers to persons connected to organised crime.



## 3 Measures against organised crime

### 3.1 SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS

The data on seizures, arrests and convictions for offences related to organised crime are difficult to analyse, the main reason being that they are not complete. Another factor is that the data received from different countries are not comparable.

With regard to data on seizures and arrests related to drug trafficking, for example, some countries report only seizures above a certain limit, while others report all seizures of illicit drugs. Concerning arrests, the figures for a number of member States include arrests for possession of illicit drugs, while these are excluded in arrest statistics in other countries. In some member States the 2000 contribution seems to differ in this matter from previous national reports. Therefore only some tentative conclusions are drawn from the available data. In various member States the number of drug seizures shows a rising trend (Table 10). Most increases were reported by central and eastern European countries, including Croatia, Estonia, Hungary and Moldova. In some western European member States there are increases as well, such as in Spain and Germany, whereas the Netherlands report a substantial decrease. The figures for Turkey and Cyprus were also lower than in 1999. In many countries cocaine seizures went down in 2000, whereas seizures of cannabis and of synthetic drugs went up in the majority of member States for which data are available. Generally speaking, most seizures of illicit drugs in Europe concern cannabis, at a distance followed by heroin.

The available data on arrests for drugs trafficking do not show a clear trend. In some countries the statistics show an increase (e.g. in Bulgaria, Cyprus and France), while others show a decrease (e.g. in Poland, Spain and Turkey).

Data on arrests and convictions for vehicle theft (Table 11), on seizures and arrests for illegal arms trafficking (Table 12) and on number of cases or investigations and arrests for illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings (Table 13) pose similar problems.

Table 10: Seizures of illicit drugs and arrests for drug trafficking

Member State	Number of seizures			Arrests		
	1998	1999	2000	1998	1999	2000
Albania				148		
Andorra	159			227		31
Armenia						522
Austria				2,198		
Azerbaijan						
Belgium				23,184		
Bulgaria	156				59	134
Croatia	4,849		5,702	291		282
Cyprus	283	420	291	30	318	377
Czech Republic		510	1,162	1,300	3,159	
Denmark				8,900		
Estonia	220	535	1,942	531		1,505
Finland		4,802		8,173	9,287	
France				91,048		
Germany		51,691	54,046	55,922		
Georgia					1,600	
Greece				10,973	10,902	
Hungary	129	125				
Iceland						
Ireland	7,818	7,222		5,631		
Italy				33,179	33,180	33,516
Latvia		292		82	128	
Liechtenstein					3	
Lithuania				414		
Luxemburg	533			112		
Malta	157			686	733	
Moldova	473	538		111	1,482	
Netherlands	5,142			7,700		
Norway	16,736	19,425	21,509	13,600		
Poland					3,832	
Portugal	7,205			7,329		
Romania	118				1,014	
Russia	182,943	177,014		161,578	41,000	
San Marino					6	
Slovakia	1,062				167	
Slovenia		729		1,166	1,036	
Spain	71,415	100,386	81,644	13,900	13,430	9,933
Sweden	15,199	15,197				
Switzerland		30,208				
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'	125			186	355	
Turkey	969	3,256	2,794	6,121	6,819	6,527
Ukraine				6,632		32,793
United Kingdom	149,900			127,919		

Table 11: Arrests and convictions for vehicle theft

Member State	Persons arrested			Persons convicted		
	in 1998	in 1999	in 2000	in 1998	in 1999	in 2000
Albania			93			
Andorra		12	14			
Armenia						6
Austria				1,846		
Azerbaijan						
Belgium			1,492			380
Bulgaria	1,492		1,595	380		
Croatia	383		1,488			
Cyprus	34	51	87	1		
Czech Republic	4,400	3,369		4,400		3,717
Denmark						
Estonia						
Finland						
France						8
Germany						
Georgia						
Greece			1,864			
Hungary	1998	1,283	9			
Iceland						
Ireland				1,927		
Italy						
Latvia	427	220		658		
Liechtenstein						
Lithuania						
Luxembourg						
Malta	54	55		6		
Moldova	196	186				
Netherlands						
Norway	1,441			326		
Poland	5,665					
Portugal						
Romania	69				150	
Russia						
San Marino						
Slovakia						
Slovenia						
Spain	14,530	15,978	11,959			
Sweden						
Switzerland		4,094				
'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'						
Turkey		3,903	2,636			
Ukraine						
United Kingdom						

Table 12: Seizures and arrests for illegal arms trafficking

Member State	Number of cases or seizures			Persons arrested		
	1998	1999	2000	1998	1999	2000
Albania				524		526
Andorra	1			1		
Armenia						252
Austria				1,121		
Azerbaijan						
Belgium						
Bulgaria						2
Croatia	1,025			670		81
Cyprus	27	109		41	123	149
Czech Republic	800			900		16
Denmark						
Estonia						
Finland						
France						
Georgia		44				
Germany <sup>33</sup>	591	516				15
Greece						1,993
Hungary		40		59	27	
Iceland						
Ireland	445			2	17	
Italy						
Latvia		42			29	
Liechtenstein		8				
Lithuania	482			7		129
Luxembourg						
Malta						
Moldova	499	442		284	442	
Netherlands						
Norway	1,500					
Poland				198		
Portugal	6					
Romania		2,605				194
Russian Federation						
San Marino						
Slovakia		692				19
Slovenia	1,093	1,379		168	133	
Spain						895
Sweden						
Switzerland						
'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'	527	240	157	54		
Turkey				227	644	240
Ukraine						10,008
United Kingdom						

<sup>33</sup> The number of arrests refers to cases implying organised crime.



Table 13: Number of cases/investigations and arrests for illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings

Member State	Number of cases/ investigations			Persons arrested		
	1998	1999	2000	1998	1999	2000
Albania				86		
Andorra						
Austria						
Belgium						
Bulgaria			21	949		
Croatia				247		
Cyprus				2	3	
Czech Republic				70	100	
Denmark		388		510		
Estonia		36			7	
Finland		58	45			
France						
Georgia		28				
Germany		2 530				
Greece						
Hungary	558	1 508		379	613	
Iceland						
Ireland						
Italy						
Latvia						
Liechtenstein					3	
Lithuania					11	
Luxembourg					14	
Malta						
Moldova						
Netherlands						
Norway						
Poland				60	10	
Portugal	17					
Romania			81			
Russian Federation						
San Marino						
Slovakia						
Slovenia				675	751	
Spain						
Sweden						
Switzerland	12					
'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'				45	21	
Turkey				41	187	
Ukraine		116				
United Kingdom		35				

## 3.2 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

### 3.2.1 Preliminary remarks

The Council of Europe questionnaire over the years 1999 and 2000 contained a number of questions on mutual assistance in criminal matters. Although requests for judicial assistance do not exclusively refer to cases of organised crime, an overview of requests sent and received by each member State offers a way to evaluate the international cooperation in the fight against this type of crime. This chapter concentrates on the situation in 2000, though information on the previous year is also analysed.

#### VERY LITTLE INFORMATION IN THE COUNTRY REPORTS

From the replies received, the following country reports did not include statistics about the international cooperation for the year 2000: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Netherlands, Turkey and Ukraine.

Statistics considering the number of incoming and outgoing requests for the year 2000 were found in the following reports: Andorra, Armenia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland.

This means that only 15 out of 43 countries provided information regarding international cooperation in the year 2000.

#### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SOURCES

In order to complete the comparative overview, information regarding the EU countries was gathered through the European Judicial Network. Pursuant art. 8(5) and art. 10 of the Joint Action of 5 December 1997, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the application and implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organised crime, all 15 European Union Member States were asked to assess mutual assistance in criminal matters from their point of view and put their findings in an evaluation report. A final, general report on the conclusions of these evaluations was drawn up on 10 May 2001 (Crimorg 55, EJM 10). All 15 country reports are available at <http://ue.eu.int/ejn>.

None of these reports have statistics for the year 2000, but most of these reports contain additional information regarding incoming and outgoing requests for judicial assistance for the previous years (except for the German, Italian and Luxembourg report).

For the following countries, more information was found in their 1999 reports for the Council of Europe: Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Moldova, Norway, the Russian Federation and Slovakia.

No additional information was found for the other non-EU countries.


## QUESTIONS DIFFICULT TO ANSWER

Most countries seem to have had difficulties in answering the main question regarding international cooperation. (*8a. Number of requests for judicial assistance sent to other countries; 8b. Number of requests received from other countries*). Most countries either do not answer the question or mention that there are no statistics available in relation to the number of outgoing and incoming requests (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine). Other countries can only provide partial information (Armenia, Andorra, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland). This makes it almost impossible to draw general and reliable conclusions.

Problems of interpretation of the question also arose. The question about the nature of the assistance (*8a. if possible, please specify the nature of assistance and the countries involved. 8b. please specify*) was not understood and answered in a uniform way. There was either no answer (in most cases) or there were very general remarks regarding the origin or destination of the requests (Armenia, Cyprus, Hungary, Liechtenstein and Lithuania), or there were very vague specifications regarding the type of action linked to the requests (Cyprus, France, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta and Spain.)

Based on the, mostly partial and incomplete information taken from the different reports we consulted, the following schematics were made. The figures that can be found in these schematics all have different sources or represent different periods in time. In order to understand these figures correctly, it is necessary to consult the chapter on 'Sources'.

### 3.2.2 Number of outgoing requests for judicial assistance




The following table gives a more detailed overview of the destination of outgoing requests from Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. (vertical line: countries of origin, horizontal line: countries of destination). For more information on the origin of these figures, see 'Sources'.

	Al	Ad	Am	At	Az	Be	Bg	Hr	Cy	Cz	Dk	Ee	Fi	Fr	Ge	De	Gr	Hu	Is	Ie	It	Lv	Li	Lt	Lu	Mt	Md	Nl	No	Pl	Pt	Ro	Ru	Sm	Sk	Si	Es	Se	Ch	Mk	Tr	Ua	Uk	Oth
At					35						20	4	53		22	9			5	29				6			136		3							23	15					12		
Be	1		7			2	1		2	3				174		55	4	3		8	38		1	1	25		90		19	5	6	4			1	1	50	5	32	1	14	1	55	75
Hu			12				2								4				1							1	2		1		6						1	1		12		3		
Ie					1									1	1													5									2					16		
Lt		3		1	1	1				5	8	29		5	5	43	1		2	1	5	115	1				8	2	1	44	1		229		2			7	6		2	88	7	137
Nl			9		41						13	1	35		24	7				11	12				20					7							47	11				119	380	
No	1			4	2	3	1		1		3		6		14					1	1	1		6			10		2			17		1		9	2	2		2		20	21	
Uk			12		92						12	1	107		121	9				63	38				12			230			16												458	

- Ad = Andorra      Be = Belgium      De = Germany      Fr = France      Ie = Ireland      Lv = Latvia      Mt = Malta      Ro = Romania      Sm = San Marino
- Al = Albania      Bg = Bulgaria      Dk = Denmark      Ge = Georgia      Is = Iceland      Md = Moldavia      Nl = Netherlands      Ru = Russian Federation      Tr = Turkey
- Am = Armenia      Ch = Switzerland      Ee = Estonia      Gr = Greece      It = Italy      Mk = 'The former      No = Norway      Se = Sweden      Ua = Ukraine
- At = Austria      Cy = Cyprus      Es = Spain      Hr = Croatia      Lt = Lithuania      Yugoslav Republic      Pl = Poland      Si = Slovenia      Uk = United Kingdom
- Az = Azarbaijan      Cz = Czech Republic      Fi = Finland      Hu = Hungary      Lu = Luxembourg      of Macedonia'      Pt = Portugal      Sk = Slovakia

### 3.2.3 Number of incoming requests for judicial assistance



The following graphic gives a more detailed overview of where incoming requests in Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom come from. (vertical line: receiving country, horizontal line: country of origin). For more information on the origin of these figures, see 'Sources'.

	Al	Ad	Am	At	Az	Be	Bg	Hr	Cy	Cz	Dk	Ee	Fi	Fr	Ge	De	Gr	Hu	Is	Ie	It	Lv	Li	Lt	Lu	Mt	Md	Nl	No	Pl	Pt	Ro	Ru	Sm	Sk	Si	Es	Se	Ch	Mk	Tr	Ua	Uk	Others
At						12				4		0	51		25	34			2	19				1			8		2						8	0					3			
Be		1		12	1		1		1	5	10		1	293		112	1	4		1	32		1	6	6			16		28	16		8			1	73	7	390		44	3	68	724
Hu				3				1		1			1	2		7					1			1				3	1			2	1		1			2	1		19	5	6	
Ie				2		7							2	30	1	10		3			15	1	1	8				9	1	4			5		2		23		8		3	6	67	6
Li				30		1				4	1			4		54		2			12			2	3			5		5			2				5		134		1	6	8	
Lt				9		1				2	8	17	18	1	1	45	3	1			1	51						3	4	70			98				1	3	22			71		89
Nl				152		50					36		13	235		64	24			4	34				4						10						51	13				176	1265	
No				7		3	1			39	1	1		24		11	6	37	1		2	1		4				7		10	1		7				14		7	16	1	4	4	
Es				1		13							1	19		30	3				7			1				5			5							2				9		
Uk				29		112					26		14	949		284	31			7	82				3			139			49												486	

- Ad = Andorra      Be = Belgium      De = Germany      Fr = France      Ie = Ireland      Lv = Latvia      Mt = Malta      Ro = Romania      Sm = San Marino
- Al = Albania      Bg = Bulgaria      Dk = Denmark      Ge = Georgia      Is = Iceland      Md = Moldavia      Nl = Netherlands      Ru = Russian Federation      Tr = Turkey
- Am = Armenia      Ch = Switzerland      Ee = Estonia      Gr = Greece      It = Italy      Mk = 'The former      No = Norway      Se = Sweden      Ua = Ukraine
- At = Austria      Cy = Cyprus      Es = Spain      Hr = Croatia      Lt = Lithuania      Yugoslav Republic      Pl = Poland      Si = Slovenia      Uk = United Kingdom
- Az = Azarbajjan      Cz = Czech Republic      Fi = Finland      Hu = Hungary      Lu = Luxemburg      of Macedonia'      Pt = Portugal      Sk = Slovakia

### 3.2.4 Sources

#### 1. Andorra

According to national report 958 requests were sent to other countries via Interpol and 6572 requests were received through Interpol. No other information or data are available.

#### 2. Armenia

According to the Armenian report 4469 requests were sent to other countries via Interpol. These requests were mainly sent to Germany, Turkey, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Armenia only received 126 requests through Interpol. All requests originated from the same countries. No further specifications can be found in the report.

#### 3. Austria

Austria did not send a report. The Austrian report for the European Judicial Network only provides figures for the year 1998. According to these figures 372 requests were sent to other countries through the Ministry of Justice and 169 were received the same way. There are no other figures or statistics available concerning (for example) the number of cases directly dealt with by Austrian courts. The Austrian report does however mention the origin and destination of these requests. The report only mentions requests exchanged with European Union Countries.

#### 4. Belgium

The report does not contain statistics for the year 2000. The evaluation report for the European Judicial Network is based on information provided by the Ministry of Justice and states that in 1998 1086 requests were sent abroad and in 1999 288. This brings us to an average of 687 for the years 1998 and 1999. As far as incoming requests are concerned, Belgium received 3040 requests in 1998 and 707 in 1999 which is an average of 1873 per year. The Belgian report also mentions the origins and destination of the different requests. The figures that can be found in the more detailed graphics are the average amount of requests sent to and received from different countries for the same period.

#### 5. Cyprus

According to the report only 10 requests were sent to other countries and 88 requests were received (channels are not specified). Requests were sent to England, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Requests were received from the Russian Federation, England, Greece, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Germany. Most requests were related to taking of evidence or seizure and freezing of assets. No further details can be found in the report.

#### 6. Denmark

The Danish report did not provide for statistics for the year 2000. The evaluation report for the European Judicial Network only mentions figures for the year 1998 and only regarding the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime, the Danish State police and not further specified prosecuting authorities. (507 outgoing – 833 incoming)

#### 7. Estonia

According to the Estonian report 428 requests were sent through Interpol and 378 through the Public Prosecutor's office (a total of 806). Estonia received 597 requests via



Interpol and 306 through the Public Prosecutor's Office (a total of 903). No further details were given.

#### 8. Finland

There were no figures mentioned in the report. The report for the European Judicial Network only mentions that there are no concrete figures available. Nor the Ministry of Justice or the individual judicial authorities hold statistics relating to the total number of incoming and outgoing requests.

The Ministry of Justice says that they deal with approximately 100-150 requests per year and that 60% of these are outgoing and 40% are incoming. For the year 1998 they assume to have dealt with approximately 130 requests which means that around 80 of these requests were outgoing and 50 incoming. No further information seems to be available.

#### 9. France

According to the French report 5685 requests were sent to other countries and 6403 requests were received. No other information seems to be available. The report for the European Judicial Network does not provide any useful statistics.

#### 10. Hungary

The Hungarian report states that 46 requests were sent to other countries: 36 for investigating a crime and 10 were related to a take-over of criminal proceedings. Hungary received 58 requests, 49 concerning not further specified proceedings and 9 concerning the take-over of criminal proceedings. More details can be found in the detailed graphics. The figures in these graphics all relate to the year 2000.

#### 11. Iceland

The Icelandic report mentions that only 2 requests were sent to other countries and none were received. No further information is provided.

#### 12. Ireland

According to this report 214 requests were received in 1999 and 26 were sent. More information can be found in the detailed graphics. The Irish report for the European Judicial Network only mentions that between November 1996 and June 1998 only 35 requests were sent to other countries and 139 were received. Because we have no information on the number of requests sent and received from 1 July 1998 till 31 December 1998, it wasn't possible to determine a clear average per year. Therefore the detailed graphics only mention the information regarding the year 1999.

#### 13. Latvia

We did not receive a report for the year 2000, but relevant information can be found in the report for the year 1999. This report states that in 1999 18 requests were sent to other countries (Switzerland, Ireland, Russia, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, France, Poland, Ukraine, the Netherlands and Sweden). 16 requests were received (from Ukraine, Lithuania, Russia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Great Britain)

#### 14. Liechtenstein

In the report it is stated that in 2000 188 requests were sent to other countries, but with no further specifications. 281 requests were received. The report describes in detail the origin of these requests.

#### 15. Lithuania

The Lithuanian report states that 774 requests were sent in 2000 and 519 requests were received. These requests were related to service of documents, recognition of judgements, transfers of sentenced persons, extradition, transfers of criminal proceedings or other, (not further specified) requests for judicial assistance. More specific information can be found in the detailed graphics.

#### 16. Malta

According to the report only 4 requests were sent to other countries and only 24 requests were received in the year 2000. These include requests for taking testimonies, the gathering of evidence or for investigative actions. No further information was provided.

#### 17. Norway

The following information originates from the 1999 report. According to this report 130 requests were sent and 209 requests were received. More detailed information can be found in the relevant graphics.

#### 18. The Netherlands

The Dutch report did not mention how many incoming and outgoing requests were dealt with in 2000. In the Dutch report to the European Judicial Network it is mentioned that there is still no national computerized recording system, so the data are only partial. The Office for International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Ministry of Justice use the JUDISIR programme. According to this programme 696 requests were sent abroad and 2131 requests were received in 1997. But these statistics do not include requests sent directly to the relevant judicial authorities. For more detail on these figures, see the abovementioned graphics.

#### 19. Portugal

The report does not contain statistics for the year 2000. The Portuguese report for the European Judicial Network only mentions that per year about 800 requests are dealt with by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice assumes that 63% of these are outgoing and 37% are incoming. Therefore we can state that an average 504 requests per year are outgoing and 296 are incoming.

#### 20. Russian Federation

The only available information was taken from the 1999 report. According to this report 2380 requests were sent to different countries and 1324 requests were received. Most requests were sent to Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Greece and the USA. There is no information on the origin of the received requests.

#### 21. Slovakia

The Slovakian report for 1999 states that 104 requests were sent to other countries in that year, but that it is impossible to specify the nature of the requests. More information can be found in the detailed reports. In that same year 154 requests were received but again, it was not possible to give more specific information on the nature of the requests. The countries of origin of these requests can be found in the detailed graphics. The report for the year 2000 states that 171 requests were sent to other countries, but no further information is added. There is no information in the report on incoming requests. The numbers that can be found in the incoming and outgoing graphic, must be understood as follows:

Outgoing requests:  $104 + 171 / 2(1999 + 2000/2) = 137,5$

Incoming requests: 154 (for 1999)

## 22. Spain

The report states that in 2000 Spain sent out 58 requests (18 regarding extradition and 40 regarding investigative commissions) and received 93 requests (58 regarding extradition and 35 regarding investigative commissions). The origin of the incoming requests can be found in the graphics. The Spanish evaluation report for the European Judicial Network only provides for concrete statistics regarding the High Court of Justice of Catalonia. The Ministry of Justice was at that time not able to provide exact figures. According to this report the High court of Catalonia states that over a period of two years (1998-1999) 340 requests were sent to other countries. This makes an average of 170 per year. There are more detailed statistics, from this same court, available regarding incoming requests. The court received 333 requests in 1997, 374 in 1998 and 362 in 1999. This leads to an average of 355 incoming requests per year. The report also provides in more specific data on the origin of these requests. Because the Spanish report had detailed statistics for the year 2000, the information of the report for the European Judicial Network was not incorporated in the graphics.

## 23. Sweden

The Committee on Crime problems did not receive a report for Sweden. In the evaluation report for the European Judicial Network it is said that there are no separate statistics maintained by the Swedish authorities in connection with mutual assistance requests. Thus the information provided is partial and limited.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that for 1998 and 1999 a total of 203 requests were sent to other countries. This makes an average of 101,5 per year. There were quite a few more incoming requests. For the same period the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that Sweden received 965 requests, making an average of 482,5 per year.

## 24. Switzerland

The Swiss report for the Committee on Crime Problems only mentions that 3078 requests were sent to other countries and 3078 were received in 2000. No further details are given. The 1999 report states that every year between 2000 and 2500 requests are sent and received by Switzerland.

## 25. United Kingdom

The Committee on Crime Problems did not receive a report from the United Kingdom. The figures for the United Kingdom were taken from its evaluation report for the European Judicial Network and provided by the United Kingdom Central Authority. In 1997 1163 requests were sent to other countries, 1325 in 1998 and 1532 in 1999. This leads to an average of 1340 per year. The United Kingdom received 2593 requests in 1997, 2587 in 1998 and 2455 in 1999 (an average of 2545 per year). More details on origins and destination of these requests can be found in the more detailed graphics. The used figures are averages for the same period.

## **REMARKS REGARDING THE CZECH REPUBLIC, GREECE AND MOLDOVA**

Although there is information regarding request for legal assistance available, for different reasons this information was not incorporated in the graphics.

### 1. Czech Republic

For the Czech Republic, we consulted two reports, both of them reports for the Council of Europe (1999 and 2000).

The first report states that in the year 1999 421 request were sent to other countries by the Supreme Prosecutor's office. The Supreme Prosecutor's Office received 207 requests in

the same year. 4411 requests were dealt with by the Ministry of Justice, but the report does not specify how many of these were incoming or outgoing.

The second Czech report states that in the year 2000 408 requests were sent by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's office and 'a part' of 1728 requests passed through the Ministry of Justice (incoming and outgoing). The Czech Republic received 246 requests through the Supreme Public Prosecutor's office. The rest of the 1728 requests that passed via the Ministry of Justice can be considered as incoming. As no further details were given regarding the requests that were dealt with by the Ministry of Justice, it was not possible to make a correct estimate of all incoming and outgoing requests. Therefore these figures do not appear in the graphics.

## 2. Greece

No report from Greece was received. In the report for the European Judicial network it is said that no regularly compiled statistics regarding mutual legal assistance dating from before the evaluation. There were some partial statistics available that were put together due to the evaluation. In total 9416 requests were dealt with between 1997 and 1998 all of them regarding the service of documents. 1734 requests were dealt with regarding legal assistance in carrying out investigations. It is not possible to say exactly how many of these request were outgoing or incoming. Therefore no information regarding Greece was incorporated in the graphics.

## 3. Moldova

The 1999 report states that the National Central Bureau of Interpol received 35 645 requests regarding 145 countries. As it is impossible to establish how many of these were either incoming or outgoing, we have not incorporated this information in the graphics. The same can be said of the information regarding 2000. The report mentions that in the year 2000 in total 15.464 requests (incoming and outgoing) went through Interpol regarding 142 different countries. Again, it is not possible to establish how many of these were incoming and how many were outgoing.

## 4 Appendix

### 4.1 REPLIES TO THE 2000 QUESTIONNAIRE

Replies were received in time for consideration in this report from the following countries:<sup>34</sup>

Albania  
Andorra  
Armenia  
Belgium  
Bulgaria  
Croatia  
Cyprus  
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Estonia  
France  
Finland  
Germany  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Ireland  
Italy  
Liechtenstein  
Lithuania  
Luxemburg  
Malta  
Moldova  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Poland  
Portugal  
Romania  
Slovak Republic  
Spain  
Switzerland  
Turkey  
Ukraine

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<sup>34</sup> Greece replied after the final compilation of the report. The information on Greece for the year 2000 is thus only reflected in the present report to a minor extent.

## 4.2 ILLICIT DRUGS SEIZED IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1995-1999)

Seizures of illicit drugs reflect patterns of law enforcement activity as much as the market. These data do, however, provide a rudimentary indicator of supply levels. The available figures are presented here.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> For sources of information in addition to the data provided by countries in their replies to the questionnaire see the list of references.

Table 14: Heroin (kg seized)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania		3			7	48
Andorra						
Armenia			1			
Austria	47	81	165	118	79	231
Azerbaijan		3	1	4	4	
Belarus	2		1	1	2	
Belgium	129	140	109	76	74	186
Bosnia and Herzegovina				5	1	
Bulgaria	213	371	415	220	281	2,079
Croatia	33	2	3	51	13	7
Cyprus	3	1			2	5
Czech Republic	24	20	84	252	108	115
Denmark	37	61	38	55	110	32
Estonia					1	
Finland	16	7	3	2	3	6
France	499	617	415	344	203	444
Georgia					2	
Germany	933	900	722	686	796	797
Greece	173	194	146	232	98	660
Hungary	588	319	206	750	173	505
Iceland					1	
Ireland	13	11	8	38	17	22
Italy	954	1,270	474	710	1,314	980
Latvia					1	
Liechtenstein		9	19		14	
Lithuania					1	1
Luxembourg	13	6	3	4	2	11
Malta	2	3	5		2	6
Moldova			10	13		1
Monaco						
Netherlands	351	516	999	784	781	896
Norway	50	74	56	38	46	51
Poland	67	46	143	70	45	110
Portugal	67	47	57	97	76	567
Romania	54	112	171	412	83	53
Russian Federation	15	18	40	443	1,011	655
San Marino						
Slovakia	125	11	146	14	6	99
Slovenia	18	25	30	46	32	395
Spain	560	537	479	444	1,159	486
Sweden	32	40	14	71	64	31
Switzerland	213	406	209	404	398	372
'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'	111	29	15	92	16	91
Turkey	4,500	4,422	4,200	4,651	3,862	5,900
Ukraine	10	4	9	9	22	22
United Kingdom	1,395	1,072	2,235	1,345	2,342	1,253
FR Yugoslavia		574	17			

<b>Total</b>	<b>11,250</b>	<b>11,948</b>	<b>11,563</b>	<b>12,481</b>	<b>13,252</b>	<b>17,117</b>
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Table 15: Cocaine (kg seized)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania				10	2	28
Andorra						
Armenia						
Austria	55	73	87	99	63	20
Azerbaijan						
Belarus			2			
Belgium	576	838	3,329	2,088	1,762	1,652
Bosnia and Herzegovina				126		144
Bulgaria	8	22	2	686	60	3
Croatia		2	563	6	2	913
Cyprus	3				5	58
Czech Rep.	52	27	67	50	141	15
Denmark	120	32	62	44	24	36
Estonia				3		
Finland		1		2	2	39
France	874	1,753	861	1,076	3,697	1,332
Georgia						
Germany	1,846	1,378	1,721	1,332	1,979	913
Greece	9	156	17	284	46	115
Hungary	19	5	7	26	121	5
Iceland					1	1
Ireland	22	648	11	334	86	16
Italy	2,603	2,379	1,650	2,151	2,998	2,360
Latvia	19	5	7		2	
Liechtenstein	1		1			
Lithuania	2	1	2	10		2
Luxembourg	1	16	9	6		11
Malta					1	28
Moldova						
Monaco					1	
Netherlands	4,899	9,222	11,495	8,998	10,849	6,472
Norway	5	33	5	93	60	12
Poland	383	31	16	21	20	4
Portugal	2,537	812	3,163	625	823	3,079
Romania	16	713	70	1	10	13
Russia	372	74	248	100	28	
San Marino					1	
Slovakia	26	15	10	16	26	
Slovenia	3	1	4	4	2	1
Spain	6,898	13,743	19,294	11,688	18,110	6,165
Sweden	4	29	34	234	418	50
Switzerland	262	256	349	252	298	207
'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'		14			4	5
Turkey	76	13	10	605	13	8
Ukraine			627	251	26	1
United Kingdom	970	1,219	2,350	2,985	2,973	2,512



Total	22,661	33,511	46,073	34,206	44,654	26,260
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Table 16: Amphetamines and analogues (kg seized)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania				1		
Andorra						
Armenia						
Austria	18	10	14	39	11	42
Azerbaijan						
Belarus					2	
Belgium	227	80	240	513	447	280
Bulgaria			390		87	233
Croatia		3		3	5	5
Cyprus						1
Czech Republic		20	1	77	26	18
Denmark	42	32	121	32	50	62
Estonia		1	1	2	11	27
Finland	21	22	23	26	145	100
France	189	244	252	451	698	1,019
Georgia						
Germany	248	403	464	415	728	680
Greece					46	15
Hungary	6	2	12	11	12	15
Iceland	5	3	1	3	5	16
Ireland	37	13	107	209	127	181
Italy	85	41	50	33	74	188
Latvia	1	1		1	1	
Liechtenstein						
Lithuania					1	39
Luxembourg		1		3		
Malta					1	
Moldova			21			
Monaco						
Netherlands	449	1,250	1,762	1,840	2,271	2,300
Norway	55	30	93	215	58	107
Poland	19	15	27	51	104	103
Portugal		2	19		8	8
Romania		3	1	1	3	4
Russian Federation	5	22	18	34	41	
San Marino						
Slovakia				10	1	
Slovenia	2	2	2	2	1	7
Spain	228	146	181	251	153	233
Sweden	281	164	191	140	247	109
Switzerland	12	20	22	6	78	86
"The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"					1	
Turkey		1	255	1	1,061	8
Ukraine		7	40	23	6	
United Kingdom	1,470	4,075	3,344	2,329	2,506	1,455

Total	3,400	6,613	7,652	6,840	8,468	7,341
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Table 17: Cannabis (herbal and resin in kg)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania				2,308	4,500	6,604
Andorra	3	2	2	1	1	1
Armenia	55	91	62	47	47	54
Austria	697	518	915	1,336	451	1,807
Azerbaijan	245	78	52	36	55	
Belarus	128	71	96	1	427	
Belgium	70,686	106,690	48,705	9,609	9,327	2,346
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10			45	133	81
Bulgaria	94	14,471	127,762	1,528	29,365	14,757
Croatia	41	44	139	20,346	208	799
Cyprus	46	36	54	130	37	38
Czech Republic	4,500	11,903	6	7	112	40
Denmark	2,414	1,772	498	2,733	14,051	2,952
Estonia	5	6	4	5	43	80
Finland	152	103	210	169	519	211
France	42,270	66,861	61,116	55,699	67,479	53,579
Georgia		3,854			22	
Germany	14,248	9,357	11,499	21,008	19,907	14,396
Greece	1,219	3,396	19,377	48,321	14,223	14,965
Hungary	589	819	2,161	50	71	207
Iceland	11	49	9	15	42	32
Ireland	16,677	1,940	1,283	3,218	23,764	497
Italy	15,399	11,870	60,613	54,522	68,056	46,810
Latvia	13	795	24	6	232	
Liechtenstein		26	2	3	4	
Lithuania	8	1	8	34	771	638
Luxembourg	12	31	35	7	5	9
Malta	1	7,218	2	25	2	70
Moldova	231	907	6,998	228	416	6,232
Monaco		1	2			
Netherlands	335,020	102,951	65,587	126,159	110,341	39,920
Norway	19,946	722	979	1,992	1,272	664
Poland	12,308	2,808	690	1,975	897	119
Portugal	7,495	5,360	9,693	5,755	10,740	30,683
Romania	41	6,589	1,352	225	48	341
Russian Federation	20,645	19,618	23,864	25,099	34,711	
San Marino						
Slovakia	11	24	864	15,371	849	2
Slovenia	32	40	49	2,775	314	3,431
Spain	197,040	261,013	341,952	428,236	431,761	474,851
Sweden	527	452	741	496	1,160	1,240
Switzerland	808	4,236	7,288	15,001	13,163	19,572
'The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'	10	133	58	2,301	708	1,750
Turkey	17,360	12,294	10,439	9,434	16,544	25,600
Ukraine	3,192	1,300	2,971	10,400	6,000	8,391

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United Kingdom	58,484	101,805	149,969	107,541	56,483	50,591
<b>Total</b>	<b>842,653</b>	<b>762,255</b>	<b>958,132</b>	<b>974,197</b>	<b>939,261</b>	<b>824,328</b>

Table 18: LSD (trips/doses seized)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Albania						
Andorra	148			28		198
Armenia						
Austria	2,602	4,166	5,243	2,494	2,811	865
Azerbaijan						
Belgium	5,458	13,704	621	2,050	1,047	1,090,000
Bulgaria						
Croatia	387	172	114	86	247	231
Cyprus		1			2	11
Czech Republic	500				19	1,001
Denmark	1,282	282	381	108	83	1,109
Estonia		4			6	
Finland	500	41	323	301	50	2,355
France	70,217	74,780	5,983	18,680	9,991	20,691
Georgia						
Germany	71,069	67,082	78,430	32,250	22,965	43,924
Greece	426	1,106	166	44	212	128
Hungary	266	1,079	1,450	3,351	1,928	556
Iceland	11				339	15
Ireland	819	5,901	1,851	798	648	1,006
Italy	35,499	14,194	8,140	9752	5,509	1,980
Latvia		16	205	58	27	
Liechtenstein						
Lithuania			2	342	164	26
Luxembourg	100	122	4		1	21
Malta	9	45	20	123	54	
Moldova						
Monaco				10		
Netherlands	305	32,320	137,218	37728	30,512	9,972
Norway	1,375	551	6,888	2833	483	1,430
Poland			542	14902	14,099	3,659
Portugal	11	705	84	261	1,845	809
Romania	13				1	
Russian Federation	11,525				153	
San Marino						
Slovakia			2	63	72	110
Slovenia	1,911	947	156	53	512	59
Spain	15,437	13,373	25,368	9,068	3,353	139,877
Sweden	373	2,859	1,541	2,704	1,588	1,804
Switzerland	5,098	9,010	9,424	2,995	3,130	15,525
"The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"						
Turkey					61	
Ukraine			14	500	36	4,707
United Kingdom	381,800	216,697	164,100	40,100	67,400	12,479
<b>Total</b>	<b>607,141</b>	<b>459,157</b>	<b>448,270</b>	<b>181,682</b>	<b>169,348</b>	<b>1,354,548</b>

Table 19: Other narcotics

Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
Papaver Somniferum	hectare with poppies	4	3		Poland
			1		Russian Federation
			3		Lithuania
				20	Ukraine
Poppy seeds	kg		2,577		Azerbaijan
			91		Czech Republic
			129		Estonia
			706		Moldova
			133		Ukraine
Poppy straw and heads	kg	19			Armenia
		9	9		Austria
		6			Azerbaijan
		1,621	1,056		Belarus
			91	28,430	Czech Republic
		36			Estonia
		1			Finland
		8			Georgia
		192	30	40,000	Latvia
		1,525	744		Lithuania
		407	706	870	Moldova
		6,872	3,553	3,180	Poland
		15,815			Russian Federation
		5	1,003	22,756	Spain
26,632		22,000	Ukraine		
Poppy straw extract	litre	65			Latvia
		50			Lithuania
Opium (raw)	Kilogramme			2	Armenia
		10	34		Austria
		2	6		Bulgaria
		5			Denmark
				1	Cyprus
		19			Estonia
		3	1	17	France
		20	12	27	FYROM
		286	80		Germany
			9		Georgia
			46		Greece
			2	1	Hungary
		3			Italy
		1			Latvia
			36		Lithuania
		13	28	158	Moldova
		1			Netherlands
		2	2	10	Norway
		1	2		Romania
		2	1,507	1,916	Russian Federation
	1	5	Spain		
16	10		Sweden		

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Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country	
			1		Switzerland	
		142	319	215	Turkey	
		54	38		United Kingdom	
Opium (liquid)	litre	9			Croatia	
		49	190		Lithuania	
				99	Moldova	
	kg			16		Sweden
		2				Armenia
		331	244			Belarus
			45			Azerbaijan
			3			Denmark
		19				Estonia
		65	17			Latvia
		13	280	95		Moldova
		127	21,000			Ukraine
'Polish heroin'	litre	394	389	388	Poland	
Morphine base	kg		1,010		Turkey	
Morphine	piece x 1000		1		Croatia	
		17			Romania	
			1		Norway	
	kg	2				Austria
		3				Denmark
			1			Finland
			2			France
				16		Hungary
		2	1			Italy
		15	2			Russian Federation
			1			Switzerland
		754	1,010			Turkey
		41	1			United Kingdom
Codeine	piece x 1000		25		Georgia	
		2	1	1	Moldova	
			12		Ukraine	
Dihydrocodeine	piece x 1000	124	137		Ireland	
		77	67		Malta	
Methadone	litre	16	2		Ireland	
				1	Lithuania	
		1			Luxembourg	
		505	445		Netherlands	
	kg		2			Bulgaria
			50	16		Netherlands
		83	61			UK
	piece x 1000	4	186	6		Netherlands
			6			Switzerland
		34			Turkey	
Other opiates (including synthetic)	kg	168			Russian Federation	
			123		Ukraine	

Table 20: Other depressants

Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
Barbiturates	Piece x 1000		3		FYROM
		2			Moldova
	Kg		500		UK
Methaqualone (Mandrax)	Piece x 1000	2	9		Romania
		5			Switzerland
	Kg	11			Belgium
Nitrazepam	Piece x 1000	566			Lithuania
Oxazepam	Piece x 1000		2		Croatia
		43			Lithuania
			2		Portugal
Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol)	Piece x 1000	44			Austria
				9	Czech Republic
		5			France
		4			Germany
		36	175		Greece
				10	Iceland
		361	339		Ireland
		15			Malta
		25			Norway
			68		Portugal
		15			Slovakia
			12	2	Spain
		222	14	178	Sweden
	Kg			5	Bulgaria

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Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
			55		Czech Republic
Diazepam (Valium)	Piece x 1000		3		Croatia
			1		Georgia
			5		Germany
		671			Lithuania
		176	8		Malta
		28			Norway
		342			Slovakia
			170		Slovenia
		650			Ukraine
		Glutetimid	piece x 1000		321
20					Slovakia
Alprazolam	piece x 1000	223			Slovakia
Bromazepam	piece x 1000	5			Malta
Temazepam	piece x 1000	447	108		Ireland
	kg	59	1		UK
(Other) benzodiazepines	piece x 1000	2	2		Ireland
		97	181	411	Norway
Tranquillisers	kg		80		Greece
	piece x 1000		42		Greece
Barbiturates and tranquilisers	kg	8			Russian Federation



Table 21: Cannabis (except herbal and resin)

Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
Cannabis Sativa	plant x 1000	63		256	Albania
			19		Bosnia and Herzegovina
		11	3	3	Bulgaria
		5	3	2	Croatia
		3			Czech Republic
		23			Estonia
		3	3		Finland
		34	23		France
		1	151		FYROM
		81	169	25	Germany
		10	46	61	Greece
		1	5	5	Hungary
		1			Ireland
		190	572	1,306	Italy
		353	583	662	Netherlands
		17	1		Portugal
			78		Russian Federation
		14	8		Slovenia
		3	6		Spain
			10		Sweden
		27	80	227	Switzerland
		55,656	197,361		Turkey
			44		Ukraine
85	73		UK		

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Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country	
	hectare with plants	36		23	Bulgaria	
		51	4		Croatia	
		7	1		Poland	
			33	11,474	Russian Federation	
		5			Slovenia	
				5	Ukraine	
	kg plants			322,000		Armenia
		682,000	385,000	388,000		Azerbaijan
		117				Belarus
		6,280	2,911			Belgium
		16,000	29,372	14,425		Bulgaria
		950	337			Denmark
		23	42			Estonia
		25,000	31,953			Georgia
		1,520	620			Hungary
		1,300	4			Liechtenstein
			1			Luxembourg
		30	695	5,725		Netherlands
		23	29			Norway
		1,904	900	81		Poland
		216				Romania
		2,831	849	168		Slovakia
		3,073	2,319	18,156		Spain
		7	40			Sweden
				80		Switzerland

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Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country		
		106			Turkey		
		5,103			Ukraine		
Cannabis seed	kg			1	Albania		
		1	5		Andorra		
		48	16		Belgium		
		7	7	2	Bulgaria		
			1		Croatia		
			4		Poland		
		2	38		Portugal		
		piece x 1000	24	17		Croatia	
	1		1		Finland		
			1		FYROM		
			5		Belgium		
			30		Cyprus		
	Cannabis oil	kg		4		Denmark	
1			2		France		
1			2		Germany		
1			7		Italy		
103			141		Russian Federation		
2			1	10	Switzerland		
63					Turkey		
70					United Kingdom		
litre					13	2	Albania
						77	Lithuania
			150	1			Netherlands

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Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
		75			Spain

Table 22: Other hallucinogens

Type of drug	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
LSD	gram			22	Estonia
		12	79		Netherlands
Hallucinogenic mushrooms	kg	1,128			Russian Federation
			43	36	Germany
		15			Netherlands
		4	2		Poland
Psilocybin	kg		2		Czech Republic
				1	Norway

Table 23: Doping substances

Type	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
Steroids and other doping substances	piece x 1000	220	69		Denmark
		2			Iceland
			140	76	Norway
	527		20	Poland	
	13			Sweden	
	41	74		UK	

Table 24: Other stimulants

Type of drug	Type of unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country	
Fenmetrazine	kg		9		Sweden	
Fenetyline (Captagon)	piece x 1000	477	2,449	758	Turkey	
Khat	plant	50			Ireland	
	kg	549			Denmark	
			374			Finland
					230	France
		2,865	5,674	3,557		Germany
		64	1			Italy
			4,700	4,309		Norway
		3,296	3,406	1,806		Sweden

Table 25: Other illegal drugs

Type of drug	Type of unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country	
Gamma Hydroxy Butyrate (GHB)	Unit x 1000			7	Spain	
	Litre		18		Spain	
Pain killers (unspecified)	Unit		19	15	Norway	
Unspecified psychotropic preparations	piece x 1000	20			Italy	
		11			Latvia	
			1	1		Poland
		295	255			Sweden
		99		80		Spain
			55			Turkey
	Kg	673				Russian Federation

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Type of drug	Type of unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
		727			Turkey

Table 26: Precursors

Type of substance	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country	
Acetic anhydride	Kg		6,000		FYROM	
			15,000		Romania	
			37,763		Turkey	
	Litre			13,144		Bulgaria
				2,340	10	FYROM
					160	Romania
Benzyl methyl ketone	Kg			1,770	Germany	
	Litre			31	Bulgaria	
			110			Hungary
					10	Lithuania
	Ephedrine	piece x 1000		22		Romania
					Bulgaria	
Kg			62			Ukraine
					1	Bulgaria
			15			Czech Republic
			9			Lithuania
	30			Netherlands		
	100				Poland	
Phenylacetic acid	Kg			31	Bulgaria	
Piperonal	Kg		2,640		Slovakia	
			5,000		Spain	
Piperonyl methyl ketone	Kg			5,016	Belgium	
	Litre			8,200	Belgium	
					400	Germany



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Type of substance	Unit	Amount 1998	Amount 1999	Amount 2000	Country
				4,750	Netherlands

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