



COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

EPC(2005)S3.2

Strasbourg, January 2005

European Population Conference 2005

Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion

Council of Europe Conference organised by the
European Population Committee in collaboration with the
Parliamentary Assembly and
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe,

**Hemicycle, Palais de l'Europe, Strasbourg,
7-8 April 2005**

Session 3

Impacts of migration on society and policies

**Integration processes of migrants: research
findings and policy challenges**

*Rinus Penninx,
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies,
University of Amsterdam*

Table of contents

1. Introduction
2. The logic of processes of integration and exclusion
 - Defining integration processes
 - Three dimensions of integration
 - Actors in integration processes
 - Three levels relevant for (measuring) integration
 - The long term nature of integration processes
 - Plurality of outcomes, diversity of policies
3. The logic of politics and policymaking
 - Majority-minority relations and political participation
 - Democratic impatience
 - Implementing policy: context and contents
 - Three prototypical models of integration policies
 - Divergence versus convergence
4. Levels of integration policies and actors involved.
 - National and local policies
 - What to expect from EU-integration policies?
5. Strategies and instruments for local polices
6. Policy fundamentals and dilemmas

Bibliography

1. Introduction

Demography is a 'hard science' in the sense that it is able to predict pretty accurate how many individuals there will be in certain populations in the near future and what their basic characteristics such as age and sex will be. As such the demography of Europe delivers important contributions to the thinking about Europe's future. In recent years reports of the Council of Europe have tabled a number of important challenges for Europe (Haug et al. 2002).

Such 'hard' demographic data, however, become more diffuse and unsure, when the question is asked where these predicted individuals will be in the future. Here the field of studies that focuses on forms and processes of migration (here specifically delineated as the study of mobility across political borders) and its regulation comes in (Brochmann et al. 1993; Salt et al. 2004). Trends of international migration turn out to be much more difficult to predict, because they are dependent on many non-demographic variables.

Things become even more difficult, when the question is posed, how the demographically forecasted individuals who become international migrants, will identify themselves or will be categorized by the countries of settlement. Will migrants, born in Turkey for example, in the future always be Turks, or will they become integrated in their countries of settlement, and (part of them) also be fullfledged citizens of these countries? The answers to such questions cannot be found in demography, nor in the domain of international migration studies, but should be sought in the domain of study of processes of integration of immigrants into societies of settlement and policies related to processes of integration. In this contribution I will focus on the last mentioned domain.

Integration of immigrants is a hotly debated topic nowadays, particularly in Northwest-European countries and cities. The background of this contentious debate is historically different in various countries. In some countries the debate started as a reaction to the perceived failure of integration policies: in the Netherlands, for example, a tradition of specific 'integration policies' under the heading of 'minorities policies' has been built up already since the beginning of 1980s, but these policies are now heavily under fire in a strongly politicized climate. Also in Sweden early integration policies have become politicized (see the contributions of Hammar and Tamas in Jandl & Stacher 2004). In other Northwest-European countries, like the FRG, the topic of immigrants was politicized much earlier, preventing integration policies from coming into existence; only very recently a political compromise was reached on a new Law on Immigration and Integration (Süssmuth-report 2001 and its political follow up).

The ambiguous stance of most European countries on integration policies is reflected at the EU-level. First of all, integration policies are quite new at that level also. There is a longer history of trying to establish a common immigration policy for EU-countries: the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, coming into force in May 1999, laid the legal foundation for a harmonization of asylum and communitarian immigration policies in the EU. The Tampere Summit in 1999 developed a political programme and a work plan to build gradually a harmonized, common immigration policy. The

Communication on a Community Immigration Policy (November 22nd, 2000) has set the framework for such policies (EC 2000) and in the first four years after the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty 23 binding regulations have been accepted; eleven of these 23 relate to borders and visa, six to illegal immigration and expulsion, five to asylum, and one to legal migration (Groenendijk and Minderhoud 2004, 139 ff; see also Niessen 2004). The topics reflect the still dominant preoccupation with restrictive and control-oriented migration regulation at the EU-level.

It is exactly this ambivalent attitude of European countries towards immigration that make integration policies problematic. In contradistinction to classical immigration countries like Canada, Australia and the USA, European countries do not regard themselves as immigration countries, but in fact they are receiving large numbers of immigrants. That is why integration appeared only as a topic on the EU-agenda since mid-2003, when the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment of June 3rd (EC 2003)) was published. Under the Greek presidency at the Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 this document was accepted as a basis for developing a EU-integration policy, however, not as a communitarian policy (like immigration policy), but as a 'Third Pillar'-policy, which means essentially that any common initiative can only be implemented by unanimous decisions of the Council of Ministers. A first further step towards such a consensus policy was recently taken at the Ministerial Conference of ministers responsible for integration under Dutch EU-presidency in Groningen, where eleven Common Basic Principles of integration policies were discussed.

The topic of integration processes and policies has thus been neglected in the past and at the same time it is on its way to the top of the political agenda at the local, national and EU-level. In this contribution I want to clear up some of the confusion in the debates about integration processes and policies by developing a conceptual framework and by drawing lessons from past experience. In doing so, I will focus on the policy aspects. I will do that by taking the following steps:

1. Firstly, I will make some basic observations on what I call the logic of integration processes. I will explore the nature of such processes, its conceptualization and lessons from empirical research. The reason for this is based on the assumption that if a policy wants to steer such a process, it should have a thorough, science-based knowledge of processes of integration and exclusion in order to decide with which instruments it can possibly intervene, in which part of the process, at what particular moment.
2. Such knowledge is a solid starting point for policymaking, but it is not enough. The process of policymaking and implementation has its own logic, which does not necessarily run parallel to the logic of integration processes. That's why I will make some basic observations on the logic of policy making as a second step.
3. In the third step I will ask the question: if we have a sound knowledge of integration processes, and if we have managed to formulate adequate policies to steer that process, who has to implement policies (actors) and at what level? How do policies at the local, national and EU-level relate to each other?
4. The fourth step is still more concrete: what strategies can or should be followed in implementing policies to be successful?
5. Lastly, in a conclusive part I will deduce from this overview what fundamentals are involved in integration policies and which dilemma's should be solved.

2. The logic of processes of integration and exclusion

Defining integration processes

Newcomers in a given society are often perceived as the classic 'other', who does not belong there. This observation has been the starting point of a long tradition of research initiated by early founders of sociology like Simmel (1908) and refined by scholars like Park and Burgess (1921) and Elias and Scotson (1965).

Constructions of the 'other' or 'stranger' may be based on various grounds: on legal status (aliens), on physical appearance ('race'), on (perceived) cultural and religious differences, on class characteristics or on any combination of these elements. Such constructions do not only have consequences for interpersonal relations, they also play out on the collective level, defining in-groups and out-groups. They may express themselves in discriminatory practices and lead to problematic interethnic relations and weakening of social cohesion in communities, cities and states. On the political level the 'otherness' may also be exploited, for example by anti-immigrant movements or parties.

At the moment immigrants settle they have to acquire a place in the new society, both in the physical sense (a house, a job and income, access to educational and health facilities, etc), but also in the social and cultural sense. Particularly if newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally and/or religiously 'different', they aspire to acquire also in these respects a recognized place in that new society and become accepted. From these observations I deduce a basic and at the same time comprehensive heuristic *definition of integration: the process of becoming an accepted part of society.*

This elementary definition of integration is – on purpose – open in two ways. Firstly, it emphasizes the processual character rather than that it defines an end situation. Secondly, it does not state the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society thereby leaving different temporal (in-between) and final outcomes open. (In contradistinction to the normative (assimilationist, multiculturalist or pluralist) models that have been developed by political theorists: see for example Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1989 and 1992; Hammar 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Soysal 1994; Young 1990). That makes the definition more useful for the empirical study of these processes, allowing us to capture more of its diversity.

Three dimensions of integration

This heuristic definition of integration covers at least three analytically distinct dimensions of becoming an accepted part of society: the legal/political, the socio-economic dimension and the cultural/religious one.

The *legal/political dimension* refers to the basic question whether immigrants are regarded as full fledged members of the political community. The legal/political dimension is of special importance, because it conditions the other ones in two ways. Firstly, from the perspective of individual immigrants the legal position and related rights allocated to them may have significant positive or negative consequences for their behaviour and their efforts to integrate. For example, long periods of uncertainty

about the question whether the migrant is allowed to stay legally in the case of temporary workers, or in the case of asylum seekers or temporarily protected refugees, will have negative implications for the migrant's preparedness and efforts to integrate. Secondly, exclusion of legally residing immigrants from access to local and/or national political systems and decisionmaking is not conducive for participation and integration. Such excluding policies do not only signal basic perceptions of the receiving society that look at immigrants as 'outsiders', they are also not inviting for active policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domain. In general such policies and attitudes will have negative effects on integration processes of immigrants. Turning this reasoning around, there are solid indications that where inclusion of immigrants in formal and informal channels of political participation does take place, this leads to (varying) forms of active policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domain. (For relevant empirical material on the level of cities see for example: Alexander 2003; Bousetta 1997; Fennema/Tillie 1999 and 2001; Moore 2001, Penninx *et al.* 2004 and Rogers/Tillie 2000).

In practice the question is for alien immigrants first of all whether they do have secure residence rights. Secondly, in how far do immigrants and ethnic minorities have formal political rights and duties that differ from those of natives. This also includes the question whether newcomers may (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system; it evidently also includes the granting (or not) of political rights to non-nationals, for example at the local level of cities. Also less formal political participation, such as through consultative structures for immigrants, are part of this dimension.

The *socio-economic dimension* refers to social and economic position and rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; these include industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere. Do immigrants have (equal) rights to accept work and to use institutional facilities to find it? Do they have the same rights as indigenous workers? Do they have access to work related benefits, like unemployment benefits and insurance, and to the state-provided social security facilities, like social housing, social assistance and welfare and care facilities.

The third dimension pertains to the domain of *cultural and religious rights* of immigrants: do they have (equal) rights to organize and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognized, accepted and treated like other comparable groups and do they enjoy the same or comparable facilities?

Actors in integration processes

Having defined the concept of integration and its dimensions the next question is: who are the actors involved? There are basically two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants with their characteristics, efforts and adaptation, and the receiving society and its characteristics and reactions to these newcomers. It is the interaction between these two that determines the direction and outcomes of the integration process. However, these two are fundamentally unequal partners in terms of (political) power and resources. The receiving society, its institutional structure and its reactions to newcomers are much more decisive for the outcome of the process.

Integration policies are part of the institutional arrangements in a society, particularly since we should define such policies broadly as including both general policies and

their effects for immigrants, and policies that carry the explicit flag of integration of immigrants. Such policies being defined politically by (majorities of) the receiving society there is the inherent danger of being lop-sided, representing expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than being based on participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups themselves.

Three levels relevant for (measuring) integration

The foregoing alinea indicates that processes of integration of immigrants are not – as is often supposed – only taking place at the level of the individual immigrant, but also at other levels. At the individual level integration is generally measured in terms of the migrant's housing, job and education, and his/her social and cultural adaptation to the new society.

Integration also takes place at a second level: the collective level of the immigrant group. Organisations of immigrants are here the expression of mobilized resources and ambitions, and they may either become an accepted part of civil society (and a potential partner for integration policies), or they may isolate themselves or they may be excluded by the society of settlement.

Thirdly, integration also takes place at the level of institutions. (I use here the sociological concept of institution: a standardized, structured and common way of acting in a socio-cultural setting.) Two kinds of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are *general public institutions* of receiving societies (national or local), such as the educational system, institutional arrangements in the labour market or for public health, or the political system. Such general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens, and equally so. Laws, regulations and executive organisations, but also unwritten rules and practices are part of these institutions. These general institutions, however, may hinder access or equal outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities in two ways. Firstly, they may formally exclude them, completely (as does the political system in most countries and cities with respect to alien immigrants) or partially (as often social security and welfare systems offer only partial service to alien immigrants). Secondly, if access for all residents including immigrants is in principle guaranteed, such institutions may hinder access or equal outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities by their – historically and culturally determined – ways of operating, not taking into account specific characteristics of the migrants' situation caused by their migration history, their cultural and religious background, or language. The functioning of these general public institutions (and the possible adjustment of them in view of growing diversity) is thus of paramount importance: it is particularly on this level that integration and exclusion are mirrored concepts (see Penninx 2001 on social exclusion).

The second kind of institutions that are of particular relevance for integration are *specific institutions of and for immigrant groups*, for example in the religious or cultural domain. The value and validity of such institutions, in contradistinction to general institutions, is limited to those who voluntarily choose for and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, such specific institutions may manifest themselves also in the public sphere as important actors of civil society, as the history of churches, trade unions, cultural, educational and leisure institutions, institutions of professions in European cities and states has shown. Such specific – migrant related - institutions may become an accepted part of society on the same level

as comparable institutions of native groups, or they may isolate themselves or remain unrecognized and be excluded.

The mechanisms working at the individual, the organizational and the institutional level are different, but the results are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements determine to a great extent the opportunities and scope for action of organisations. They may also exert a significant influence on the development and orientation of immigrant organisations, as Fennema and Tillie (in Penninx *et al.* 2004) have shown. Institutions and organisations together, in their turn, create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. The other way around, individuals may mobilize and change the landscape of organisations, and potentially contribute to significant changes in institutional arrangements. In view of the unevenness of power and resources mentioned before, however, such examples are scarce, though not absent.

I will illustrate the interconnectedness of integration processes on different levels by comparing the development of the position of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and in the Federal Republic of Germany (Penninx 2000). These immigrants came in the same period, for the same reasons and with roughly the same characteristics, but policy reactions to Islam and the Turkish group differed markedly in the two countries. The Netherlands introduced an 'ethnic minorities policy' in the early 1980s, which implied among others an official recognition of Islam on the same footing as other religions, thus opening opportunities for its public manifestation (Rath *et al.* 2001). It also entailed recognition of organisations (as potential partners in integration policies), including religious ones. In turn, this implied ongoing relations and negotiations between these organizations and authorities both for the public regulation of specific facilities for Islam in the Netherlands (*helal* slaughtering, mosque building, public call for prayer, public Islamic broadcasting, state funded Islamic schools, etc.) and for integration activities by Islamic organisations for their rank and file. In contradistinction, Germany (although differently in the different Länder and cities, as is shown in the Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt cases) has in general been much less engaging.

The result of these diverging policies relating to specific institutional arrangements for Islam and to Islamic organisations is that on the individual level attitudes towards the receiving country and towards integration, particularly as measured among young and second generation Turks in the Netherlands and the FRG, seem to differ markedly. Heitmeyer's research in the FRG (Heitmeyer *et al.* 1997) and a comparable survey done by Sunier in the Netherlands (Sunier 1996 and 1999) illustrate this point. While the former study finds inward-oriented and even fundamentalist attitudes of Turkish youngsters on an alarming scale, the latter one signals a much more positive attitude towards integration, involvement and participation, particularly in local society. (Sunier's observations in Rotterdam in the mid-1990 are confirmed by a recent study of Canatan *et al.* (2003) on the role of mosques in Rotterdam in the wider social context of the city and their integration activities.) This goes together with more critical and independent views of youngsters on established Islamic umbrella organisations like Milli Görüş, headquartered in the FRG. At the level of organisations the differential impact seems to be reflected in the liberal and independent course of the North-Netherlands Branch of the Milli Görüş headquartered at Amsterdam as compared to the reputation of Milli Görüş in the FRG (See also for

the FRG: Karakasoglu 1997; Karakasoglu & Koray 1996; Oezbek & Koray 1998; For the Netherlands see: Doomernik 1991; Landman 1992; Rath *et al.* 2001).

The long term nature of integration processes

Finally, I want to highlight another important element of the logic of integration processes: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long term by their nature. At the individual level, an adult immigrant may adapt significantly in the cognitive dimension of his behaviour: it is both pragmatic and pays off rather immediately if you learn how things are done, by whom etc. Adaptation of adults in the aesthetic and normative dimensions of their behaviour, however, tends to be less easy: knowledge may change, but feelings and likings, and evaluations of good and evil are pretty persistent within an individual's lifetime. This is a general rule for mankind, but it becomes more manifest in those who change environments through migration.

The situation of the descendants of this 'first generation' of migrants differs normally in this respect. Through primary relations within their family and the network of the immigrant community they are familiarized with the immigrant community, and possibly with its background elsewhere. At the same time, however, they become thoroughly acquainted with culture and language of the society of settlement through informal contacts in the neighbourhood from their early childhood and particularly through their participation in general institutions, the educational one in the first place. If such a double process of socialization takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies play a major role) this second generation develops a way of life and lifestyle in which they combine the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Ways to do this are manifold, which makes for more and more differentiation within the original immigrant group. At the group level this means that the litmus test for integration, and for the success or failure of policies in this field, is the position of the second generation.

Plurality of outcomes, diversity of policies

If the integration process results from the interaction of two parties that takes place at different levels, as I have posited so far, and if we add the differentiating effect of time and generations, what can we expect in terms of outcomes? Comparative studies provide clear answers on this point, namely that plurality of outcomes is the rule.

A first category of studies compares the integration process of different immigrant groups in the same institutional and policy context of a nation or a city. Two major messages transpire from such studies. Firstly, long term (historical) studies reveal that as a general rule immigrant groups disappear after one or two generations as specific groups, because they have become an accepted part of society (Lucassen/Penninx (1997) for The Netherlands; Lequin (1988) and Noiriel (1988) for France; Bade (1987), Herbert (1990) and Hoerder (1985) for the FRG; Holmes (1988) and Lunn (1985) for the UK; Morelli (1992), Deslé et al. 1993) and Caestecker (1993) for Belgium). Policies are by definition selective in that only those immigrants are defined as relevant groups that are not (yet) an accepted part of society. For the postwar period in the Netherlands, for example, this means that the large group of Eurasians that 'repatriated' from the Dutch East Indies since 1945, were not included as target groups in the Ethnic Minorities policies of the early 1980s: they had obviously acquired an accepted place by then.

Secondly, studies reveal that immigrant groups follow different patterns of integration or incorporation. For the Dutch case, for example, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) have shown that Moluccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Southern European, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants – all target groups of the Ethnic Minorities Policies - differ in the speed of their integration and in the tracks of social mobility they tend to follow. The consequence of the design of such studies is that explanation for such differences are found primarily in characteristics of the immigrant groups, simply because the (national or city) context in which they are being integrated is the same.

A second category of cross-national comparative studies looks at the integration of the same immigrant group in different national contexts. Such studies have exactly the opposite explanatory scheme: they also find differences in outcome, but these are primarily ascribed to the differential functioning of the context in which the group is integrated. Also here differences turn out to be significant, as was shown already in Penninx's observations on Turkish Muslims in The FRG and The Netherlands. It is additionally illustrated in a number of studies of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam. The first one compares the institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K. in the postwar period (Rath *et al.* 2001), and finds markedly different outcomes as a consequence of varying institutional arrangements and traditions of public acceptance of religions in these societies, and the subsequent difference in interaction. The second study is one on the attitudes and actions of trade unions in relation to immigration and the position of immigrants in society in seven European countries (Penninx/Roosblad 2000). Also here remarkable differences become evident. For example, the high degree of membership of Turkish immigrants in Sweden (above 90 %) and the low degree of this same group in France (around 15 %) turns out to be basically the consequence of how trade unions are organized and are incorporated in (or not) socio-economic decisionmaking at the national level. A third example concerns the comparative studies of the second generation immigrants in European countries. In their overview of research on this topic Crul and Vermeulen (2003, 983) conclude 'that national contexts have a considerable impact on the paths of integration that the second generation Turks are following in the various countries'.

A recent empirical research project on 'Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship' (MPMC) in 17 European cities shows the heterogeneity of both immigrants and the receiving local societies on an even more intensive scale (Rogers/Tillie 2000; Penninx *et al.* 2004). Looking at the immigrants first, the background of their migration is very diverse, both in time and space. Part of the migration movements towards Europe's cities has a background of colonial relations with the country of destination, clearly visible in cities like Amsterdam, Birmingham, Lisbon and Marseille. Another part goes back to – very selective – demand-driven migration of mainly low skilled workers, some of it with a long history as in Swiss, Belgian and French cities, others of a more recent origin in the post-war decades. And all countries and cities received a varying share of the mixed immigrant flows of the last three decades: significant supply-driven movements of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, often along with highly skilled cosmopolitan professionals and company linked migrants. The total picture emerging from this is not only a significant growth in diversity of origin (from mainly European to more and more global nowadays), but also of marked differences in social and cultural capital that immigrants bring with them and/or have developed during their stay.

Variability is also strong, if we turn our eye to the other partner, the receiving cities. The 17 cities show great variety in their institutional settings and their policies and reactions to immigrants (see Alexander 2003). Some of this variance can be explained by differences of the national institutional systems in which cities are embedded, but there are a great many local factors and circumstances that add to more variability of local reactions and policies: local political constellations and coalitions that may work for inclusion or exclusion, the physical built up of the city and its relation with the neighbouring area (compare Paris that gentrified its centre and remitted poor immigrants to the *banlieus*, and Berlin before 1991 that had to accommodate immigrants within the narrow boundaries of the city (see Mahnig 2004), the historical experience with earlier immigration and diversity, the concrete instruments and resources available to local policy makers to steer processes in the vital domains of (social) housing and urban regeneration, of the labour market and entrepreneurship, of education and health, et cetera.

3. The logic of politics and policymaking

Policies intend to steer processes in society, in our case integration processes of immigrants in society. As stated in the introduction of this paper, we need not only a thorough insight in the logic of integration processes in order to formulate and implement effective policies, we also have to get such policies politically approved and backed up. The logic of politics and policymaking, however, is one of a different kind and often problematic in relation to immigrants.

Majority-minority relations and political participation

Above I have formulated as a key condition for effective policies that actual long-term-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in politics and policymaking, especially in policies that affect their position. Here I add the observation that the existing political system often blocks such a condition. The political fate of the Süßmuth-report (2001) in the FRG is an outstanding example, but surely not the only one. This also plays for local policies as is aptly shown by Mahnig (2004) in his comparison of the cities of Berlin, Paris and Zurich. The conundrum is here that decisions on integration policies and their content and orientation, are taken in a political system in which the majority vote decides. In such a system, majority-minority relations and the actual or perceived clash of interests connected to them are played out. This happens both on the national level and in cities. This may lead to outright exclusion of part of immigrants (as aliens) from the formal political system, or it may – in case they are (partially) included - marginalize their voice. The way immigrants are perceived by the receiving society turns out to be important in such a process, often more than facts. This is the more so, if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants become politicized questions. This mechanism leads either to the absence of integration policies and avoidance of issues related to immigrants, or to lop-sided and patronizing policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding needs and voice of immigrants.

Although this has been the rule in Europe, exceptions exist both at the local and at the national level. Some of the British cities may serve as local examples. Most of their immigrants being of ex-colonial origin and having UK-citizenship, the political system is basically open to them from beginning. This does not prevent significant polarization of

majority-minority relations, as a wealth of literature in the UK and the case study of Garbaye (2004) on Birmingham testifies. But in the course of time the significant concentration of immigrants in certain districts, combined with political coalitions with powerful parties, may lead to substantive political participation in cities. Crises in such cities have reinforced this process. Thus cities may play a prominent role in establishing new practices of political participation and integration.

A different trajectory towards more political participation and inclusive integration policies is shown by Swedish and Dutch societies and their cities. In both these countries rather comprehensive integration policies have been introduced at the national level in a period in which immigration and immigrant integration was much less politicized: in Sweden in the mid-1970s and the Netherlands in the beginning of the 1980s. In both cases there existed also an active and fruitful relation between research and policy in this field. These conditions have promoted the early establishment of liberal and inclusive measures and policies in these countries, leading among other things to the early introduction of local voting rights for aliens (Sweden in 1976, The Netherlands 1985) and easier access to naturalisation. Such novelties (at that time) were introduced by the conviction and awareness that forces within migrant groups need to be mobilized to have policies accepted and implemented and cohesion created. Naturalisation and local voting rights were seen as means to promote integration, rather than as final testimony of acquired integration.

The trajectories and achievements described above for (cities in) the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, however, do seem to be exceptional rather than the standard pattern. In most other cases of the cities of the MPMC-project the stimulating factors mentioned above have been absent. The question when, and what kind of policies are developed in these cities seems to be closely related to the urgency of the situation. In practice, crises situations often lead to actions and policies that strongly and lop-sidedly reflect perceptions and interests of locally dominant groups.

Democratic impatience

If integration policies are accepted, an additional aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges. In contradistinction to the long-term-nature of integration processes discussed above, political mechanisms in democratic societies require policies to bear fruits within much shorter – in between election – terms. Unrealistic promises and demands derived from such a ‘democratic impatience’ (Vermeulen/Penninx 1994) - that is the political desire to have quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-term character - often leads to backlashes. The recent vigorous debate on the (supposed) failure of integration policies in the Netherlands is a shining example.

More difficult than democratic impatience, however, is the situation in which the political climate (of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments, translated in political movements and politicization of the topics of immigration and integration) prevent well argued policy proposals from being accepted. Unfortunately, this has become the case in several European countries and cities, the Zurich example as described by Mahnig (2004) being an extreme example of this. It means that much more attention should be given to the question of how to frame immigration and integration policies politically in such a way, that these are acceptable and accepted by the ruling political system, political parties and their rank and file.

Implementing policy: context and contents

All foregoing observations relate to the political process that may or may not lead to the establishment of explicit integration policies or block such a route. I add here some observations on the form and content of such policies, if they have been established.

First of all, as I have indicated earlier integration policies are by necessity context bound. It is implicated in the answer to the question IN WHAT immigrants are supposed to integrate. On the level of states differences between countries in the ideologies and practical models through which they incorporate (alien) immigrants have received rather systematic attention (See a.o. Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1998; Favell 2000; Freeman 1995 IMR; Guiraudon 1998; Hammar 1985; Soysal 1994).

This context-bound nature is illustrated by Vermeulen (1997) who compares immigrant policies in five European countries since the 1960s, specifically relating to a) integration and labour market policies; b) policies relating to immigrant languages, and c) policies in relation to religious systems introduced by immigrants. His study shows basically that the actual content of integration policies is to a great extent dependent on, or inspired by the pre-existing institutional arrangements in these domains within the different countries. For a country that traditionally had different recognized languages within its territory (or religions for that matter), it is in principle easier to make additional provisions for newcomers in this domain. In the same vein Vermeulen and Slijper (2003) analyse the practice of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and the USA. The 'multiculturalism' of these countries differs not only in terms of its historical development, the practice of it turns out to be clearly context bound. Both these examples pertain to the national level of states, but the same rule holds for the level of cities, as the MPMC-study (Penninx *et al.* 2004) and the comparative analysis of city policies of Michael Alexander (2003) has shown.

Three prototypical models of integration policies

Local variations in institutional arrangement and opportunities for integration policies and participation of immigrants may to a significant extent be explained by diverging national policies, institutional settings and their underlying conceptions, as the body of cross-national research suggests. Embedded as cities are in their national contexts, they necessarily reflect national policies and conceptions. I will demonstrate this by comparing political 'problem definitions' of immigrants and their integration on the national level, and the ensuing strategies to be applied in these policies.

A first prototypical definition is the one that defines the immigrant principally as an alien and outsider. That society is emphatically not defining itself as an immigration country and migrants are therefore temporary 'guests'. At best measures may be taken to make that temporary stay comfortable and profitable for both parties and to facilitate their anticipated return; there is no logical ground for inclusive policies that would incorporate these immigrants as full citizens or political actors. Such an *exclusionary definition* leads to the kind of policies that Michael Alexander (2003) in his typology calls either 'non-policy' or 'guestworker policy'. Forms and instruments of such policies are variant and accidental, being mostly ad-hoc reactions to concrete problems.

In contradistinction to such exclusionary policies, we also find definitions that in principle include immigrants in the course of time. In the way this inclusion is envisaged, however, two distinct political definitions of immigrants and their integration can be discerned. The first one is prototypically formulated in the *French, republican*

vision. As a consequence of this vision on the state, its relation to citizens, the ensuing political system and institutional arrangements in the public sphere, the distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial. Alien immigrants should preferably become citizens and thus become recognized as individual political actors. Immigrant collectivities are not recognized as such. French republican terminology avoids notions like ethnicity, ethnic minorities and multiculturalism that suggest collectiveness and institutionalized difference of any sort, be it origin, culture, religion or class. (Formal) equality on the individual level is the overriding political principle. In this sense this definition principally depoliticizes the issue of immigrants and their integration (which does not prevent immigration becoming an overriding issue for established parties).

The second prototypical inclusionary vision is the *Anglo-American* one, in which also immigrants are supposed to take up citizenship individually, but having done so, the political system leaves much room for collective manifestation and action of immigrants. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as relevant notions, even to the extent that the total population in censuses for example, is officially registered as such. Although equality is also an important principle in this political vision, there is the additional notion that substantive equality may in practice be related to membership of cultural, ethnic, immigrant or disadvantaged groups. Political struggle between groups on issues of multiculturalism is thus an explicit part of politics (irrespective of the outcomes of such political struggles).

The internal logic of these prototypical inclusive visions leads to different strategies employed in integration policies. The French Republican system leads principally to strategies that choose for general policies, equality within the given system as priority, avoidance of designating fixed target groups and non-recognition of collective manifestations and organizations as important actors. The inherent problem of such a definition is that of mobilizing and engaging forces from within immigrant groups (which are feared as counteracting integration) in the implementation of policies. The second vision tends to be more inclined to designate target groups and formulate group-specific policies, even to the extent that positive discrimination or affirmative action may be part of such policies; it is more prone to recognize, if not stimulate, forms of representation of such groups, for example by extending subsidies directly to immigrant organizations, or indirectly by subsidizing certain activities of such groups; this vision is also more inclined to combine equality with cultural difference, implying recognition of cultural and religious aspects of integration processes.

On purpose we have outlined these two models of inclusion as prototypical contrasting ones in order to illustrate their internal logic. In practice we see many variations and eclectic *bricolage* of the elements of both visions in the definitions and instruments of policies. This is the case both on the national and the city level (see Penninx et al. 2004). The elements of this bricolage, moreover, may also change in the course of time.

Divergence versus convergence

Differences in (national and local) contexts thus lead to divergence and to integration policies in plurality, so runs the argument in the preceding section. But how does the picture look like, if we bring together evidence and arguments for convergence?

Several cross-national studies indicate forms of convergence, be it hesitant and partial ones. Vermeulen (1997, 150-152) listed earlier a number of issues that show at least

some convergence. Firstly, in immigration policy, particularly the part of the residential status regulations for immigrants of non EU-countries, the European Commission has issued in recent years a number of directives that partially harmonize member state policies. Secondly, some convergence has also occurred in naturalisation policies. For example, the wide disparities between French and German legislation and practice in this field have narrowed: the *jus sanguinis* element in the FRG-legislation is thus being relaxed and the *jus soli* principle is introduced to enable children of immigrants to gain citizenship more easily, while in France the *jus soli* principle has lost ground in recent years. The recent studies of Weil (2001) and Hansen and Weil (2001) on methods of adjudicating nationality to aliens confirms the convergence tendency on a wider scale in Europe. Thirdly, Vermeulen also sees some convergence in the use of a common terminology that is particularly encouraged by supranational organisations. He warns, however, that such common vocabulary of 'integration' and 'multiculturalism' may be deceptive: "Using the same words does not necessarily mean people agree in their ideas. It could even serve to create the illusion of agreement."

Apart from these convergence tendencies that stem from national or even supranational levels of policy action, there are specific forces at work at the local level that lead to convergence. It seems that the strong local character of the settlement process of immigrants itself acts as a major force towards convergence of policies. Whatever the institutional arrangements is, local authorities have to find answers to the same questions, such as how to provide immigrants with adequate housing and jobs, how to make educational and health facilities available for them, but also how to react to their demands to fulfill religious obligations or facilities to use and teach their mother tongues. They furthermore have to deal with very similar reactions of the native population to immigrants, and processes of discrimination and social exclusion. Neglecting and avoiding these questions is easier at the more distant level of national policies, but in cities these questions make themselves concretely felt, the more so, if the number of immigrants and their concentration in certain parts the city increase. If city authorities do not address such questions on their own initiative, they may be forced to do so by emerging crises. 'Inner city riots' as they are often called in the UK, or the *banlieu-problematique* in France are illustrations of triggers to may lead to (new) policies for and of cities. In this sense such crises may be seen as 'bottom-up' forces for convergence.

A logical consequence of such area specific manifestations as triggers for policies is that these policies are often framed as space-specific policies in which housing, concentration and segregation are central issues. The 'Inner City Policies' in the UK since 1968 and the 'Politique de la Ville' in France since the 1990s illustrates this.

Such forces do not only stimulate the emergence of policies and influence the content of them, in their implementation they also tend encourage in the end similar strategies. In some cases consultation of immigrants and engagement of individuals and organisations in the implementation is part of policies from the beginning, as the Manchester case described by Moore (in Penninx *et al.* 2004) illustrates. If this is not the case, however, it often becomes clear soon that it is impossible to effectively implement immigrant policies without linking into the immigrant groups themselves and engaging these in the formulation and implementation. The Marseille and Toulouse cases of Moore (in Penninx *et al.* 2004) illustrates adequately how the city authorities there have found informal ways of linking into immigrant groups by

recruiting mediators from them. The Oeiras case – a suburb of Lissabon - shows another form of solution for the same problem: while not recognizing the immigrant status or ethnicity as a relevant criterion, the Town Hall simply uses existing neighbourhood, sport and leisure organisations that happen to be mainly immigrant organizations (Marques/Santos in Penninx *et al.* 2004). These and other examples suggest that conditions for effective implementation lead to a certain convergence in the strategy used, although the forms may differ.

4. Levels of integration policies and actors involved.

Integration processes from the point of view of immigrants themselves are taking place primarily at a local level, and since circumstances there may vary significantly, local policies for integration should have the highest priority. Also from the perspective of the city there is a priority argument. The city receives newcomers of all sorts and of different origins who bring with them different cultures, religions and lifestyles. Their integration into the social embroidery of the city is not a natural process: social segregation, social exclusion and marginalization of (certain of these) immigrant groups is lurking, threatening the social cohesion in these cities. The city and their neighbourhoods are the places where important things happen that affect the daily lives of all residents, including immigrants. It is also the level where loyalty of newcomers and old residents can be gained, or for that matter, lost.

If we follow this evidence-based starting point, it also follows that such local policies should be given instruments and room to act in locally adequate ways. National policies, and by implication also European integration policies, should primarily facilitate local actors, both governmental and civil society actors, by setting general frameworks, rules and instruments.

National and local policies

In practice, however, relations between national and local levels of policy are not always as smooth and complementary. In the European context tensions between the national arena and the local one have developed according to two different patterns. The first patterns are in countries such as Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria where national integration policies have been piecemeal or absent completely, and where pressures to formulate adequate policies and claims for competence and resources have come from their big cities. The cities of Zurich, Bern and Basel in Switzerland, for example, took – in the complete absence of such policies at the national level - the initiative of developing local policies (Leitbilder) in the late 1990s, while Berlin, Frankfurt and Vienna developed such policies earlier under the same conditions of absence of national policies and resources.

In countries where integration policies have started rather early on the national level, such as The Netherlands and Sweden, such tension takes a different form. The major cities in these countries have been confronted on a quite different scale with immigration than the average in the country, expressing itself in high pressure on essential institutions like the housing system (segregation and degeneration of neighbourhoods), the labour market (disproportionate unemployment, high levels of social benefit costs) and the educational system (concentration of pupils of immigrant origin in certain sectors and spaces) and public order (racial harassment, crime and

tensions between groups). In view of such developments these big cities have joined forces to claim more executive power and resources from the national government to cope with such problems. In these two countries general policies for urban areas and integration policies for immigrants were brought together – at least in the formal sense - in one framework in recent years, creating in principle new and more comprehensive possibilities.

Common to all these cases is that such tensions often lead to a critical dialogue between big cities and national governments on topics where national and local policies work out contradictory. Cities will not always win these battles on principle. At the same time, however, city authorities may use their discretionary power to gain more room to manoeuvre in favour of (certain) immigrants. What such examples make clear – and this is the broader message of it – is that the interests at stake in integration policies and its practice at the local level of cities may be substantially different, or perceived differently at the local and national level. At the city level the confrontation with the day-to-day consequences of immigration is much more direct. If any serious attempt to cope with these problems, or - in a positive formulation - to get the best gains out of the presence of newcomers, is taken at that level it will make pressure on the higher and more abstract national level.

What to expect from EU-integration policies?

In view of the ideal division of tasks outlined above and taking into account the political will of the European Commission in the field of EU-integration policies as expressed in the Communication of 2003, the consent of the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003) and the recent Ministerial Conference in Groningen (November 2004), what could we expect from EU-policies? What special tasks could the EU/EC take on in favour of policies at the national and local level? In my view these can be listed briefly as follows.

A first task of the EU is *'framesetting'*. The EC could frame both (im-)migration and integration, and the nexus between the two, in a different way than is done predominantly at the national level in most EU-countries until now: from defensive and mainly control-centered policy to a pro-active, future-oriented, comprehensive approach to immigration; towards a balanced approach between (realistic) problem-orientation and possible present and future gains of immigration, thus furthering acceptance of immigration; accentuating the necessity of common action in both the immigration and integration domain. The EC is in principle in a position to bent negative competition and “burden shifting” practices among EU-member states towards an approach that focuses on common interests.

The framesetting task is one that has to be done in the first place within the political and bureaucratic setting of the EU/EC and between 'Brussels' and the national authorities and policy makers, which implies tough and long negotiations. But using Sarah Spencer's (2003) formulation, the EC/EU should also take “active responsibility for leading a balanced, informed, public debate about the reasons migrants are in Europe by putting into the public domain information about the contribution they make and barriers they experience, acknowledging public fears, and correcting misinformation”. This wider task is of great importance, because it prepares the ground for policy making in civil society and among the population at large and mobilizes a counterforce against populist anti-immigrant political

exploitation. The two Communications (EC 2000 and 2003) mentioned earlier can be regarded as important first steps in the efforts of the European Commission to set a sound frame for policy action.

A second function or task that follows from framesetting is *normsetting*. The above mentioned general frame should be worked out in a number of norm-setting regulations, directives, or even laws that pinpoint basic starting points for integration policies. Such norms pertain to:

a) The definition of the target group of integration policies. Important normsetting regulations could be developed, among others as to the following questions:

- which immigrants are regarded, at what particular point in time as a resident for whom comprehensive integration policies are applicable? (Here again immigration/admission policies and integration policies should clearly be co-ordinated.)
- how should admission policies distinguish between temporary migrants and long-term residents, and if migrants are initially admitted temporarily, when does 'temporariness' end?
- What status should be accorded to family members and marriage partners of established immigrants?

b) The scope of integration policies. If the ultimate aim would be in principle *full access of long-term residents to all public institutions and facilities of the society of settlement* then in the course of time a system of norms could be developed systematically (through political negotiation) for the three basic dimensions of citizenship: the socio-economic, the legal-political, and the cultural/religious dimension.

c) *Anti-discrimination policies*. In fact this is the negative corollary of positive normsetting. It is a necessary element in policies, but it also has severe limitations. I have explained elsewhere (Penninx 2000) in a paper on Social Exclusion, any anti-discrimination norm assumes a positive normsetting in the first place, against which is being discriminated. Since, and as long as, positive normsetting differs in national contexts, the practical use of anti-discrimination norms also differs between countries.

Thirdly, apart from framesetting and normsetting, the EC has in practice instruments to promote activities related to the development of integration policies. Specific budget lines of General Directorates in charge of certain policy domains (Justice and Home Affairs for immigration, asylum and reception of asylum seekers and refugees; Social Affairs and Employment for integration and anti-discrimination) can be used to mobilize forces, for example to set up systems for collecting systematically information (both internally and externally), to have certain policy questions researched externally, etcetera. Also a special fund has been created to involve non-governmental agencies in reception of asylum seekers and refugees (European Refugee Fund). In 2003 a programme to promote integration projects and the dissemination of their good practices was started: the (still) small INTI-programme. It is expected that the INTI-programme will expand significantly in the coming years. The significance of such EC-financing activity for the development of integration policies can be high, if such activities enable local actors in integration policies to develop and implement strategic projects, if successful pilot projects are analysed and reported systematically, and these results disseminated as examples of good practices.

5. Strategies and instruments for local policies

Evaluations of local policies point at a number of important strategic and tactical aspects of such policies. In the first place, in order to become effective, such policies have to *engage partners in the integration process* at different levels: immigrants in the first place at the individual level, the level of their organisations and the institutional level. Too much policy conception is 'top-down', addressing individual immigrants, while much of the policy implementation has to rely on mobilizing forces within immigrant groups to be successful. A number of good examples of using the potential within groups have been developed and are developing: for example mentor-projects of immigrant students who monitor younger co-ethnics during their secondary education; immigrant organizations mobilizing their rank and file for training and language courses, or for labour market projects; participation of women immigrants, etc.

But local policies should involve important players in the receiving society as well: institutional actors, such as churches, trade unions, employers' organizations, political parties, media. In brief : civil society in general. Such non-governmental partners are important in two ways. Firstly, as direct partners in the implementation of policies. But they may be even more important as political actors. They may influence the political climate and contribute to framing the policy questions in such a way that adequate policies are accepted. They may be important agents in combating exclusion, discrimination and xenophobia. In the Swiss case, for example, institutional agents like churches, trade unions and employers organizations have often helped to avert the danger of anti-immigrant referenda being accepted. In the German case, trade unions and churches have been – in the absence of governmental integration policies – the most important actors and promoters in the integration process of foreign workers.

Secondly, local integration policies should define clear priorities for action in a number of domains of integration. For long term immigrants priority should be given to domains in which local authorities do have effective, and generally accepted instruments to promote integration (and prevent exclusion): the economic domain of work and the social domain, particularly education and housing. Policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion) are indispensable over the long term to integrate immigrants. The forms that policies in the latter domains initially may take depend to a great extent on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities. In the long run, however, gradual changes towards more inclusive policies are indispensable.

On the more concrete level of strategic instruments evaluations suggest that an important strategy is that of *monitoring* outcomes both of general public institutions and of specific integration policies. Monitoring is a device for developing awareness, to establish an empirically based diagnosis and thereby an instrument for steering policies. The basic assumption involved here is that the position of newcomers in a society is determined to a great extent by the (mostly unintended) differential impact of general public institutions. Because of the socio-economic status, their immigration-related characteristics, and sometimes their cultural/religious characteristics, the outcomes for immigrants may be unequal. Such unintended outcomes can be higher unemployment and thus (if access is permitted) overrepresentation in social welfare or benefit regulations for disabled, as is the case

in the Netherlands; or lower educational attainments of immigrant children; or concentration/segregation through housing policies and regulations. Turning this reasoning around means that monitoring outcomes leads to awareness of the functioning of general public institutions for immigrants, and when the procedures through which the unequal outcomes are scrutinized, it will lead to a clear diagnosis. (On the level of the EU the Annual Report of states - decided at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 - is intended to have this same function as an instrument for progressive policy making).

A second important element for local policies is to provide newcomers with basic tools that they need to acquire a place in society independently: a *toolkit* of training in the language of the society of settlement, basic knowledge of that society, civic training, etc. The basic idea (and the lesson from earlier policies related to temporary migrants and guest workers) here is that immigrants should be given the necessary tools to find a place in the new society; tools that prepare them for full participation. Several countries and cities are developing policies in this field. It is important, however, to look at such efforts as primarily facilitating the beginning of an integration process (and thus avoid normative claims of adaptation or assimilation). Preferably such activities should take place in connection with trajectories for labour market or further education.

6. Policy fundamentals and dilemmas

There are many lessons to be drawn from the foregoing general observations on integration processes and policies relating to these processes. Reformulating these lessons I see three fundamentals (which may present themselves for policy makers sometimes as dilemma's) derived from the logic of integration processes:

The first is that a key condition for effective integration policy is transparency of admission of immigrants and their residential and legal status (the immigration-integration-nexus). Expectations of, and actual long-term-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in politics and policymaking, especially in policies that affect their position. Local policies are in this legal-political domain to a great extent dependent on (immigration, integration and naturalization) policies at the national level, but not completely. They first of all have discretionary power in the implementation of national regulations, and furthermore they may develop effective alternative channels for participation, thereby creating a city-related form of inclusion and citizenship as was shown in the MPMC-project (Penninx *et al.* 2004).

Secondly, integration policies should be comprehensive in the dimensions and domains covered, thereby signifying that they do not only represent concerns of the native majority, but are also built on needs as defined by the immigrants. The economic and the social domains, particularly labour market, education, housing and health are priority domains. Policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion), however, are indispensable over the long term for integration. The forms that such policies may take depend in practice very much on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities, and on the political willingness to change these to become gradually more inclusive.

Thirdly, (local) integration policies should follow strategies and tactics that engage the partners in the integration process at different levels. It should combine 'top down' activation elements with 'bottom up' mobilization. It should define the process of integration as 'open', within the rules of liberal-democratic societies, leaving room for a more diverse, but cohesive society as a result.

The preceding observations on the logic of policymaking give rise to some additional fundamentals or dilemmas. The first is that to get policies established we not only need a solid scientific knowledge of the logic of integration processes, but also an adequate political definition that makes such policies politically acceptable and endorsed. What is needed is a balanced framework which does not hide problems to be solved, but primarily stresses the common interest of all. There is much to be gained here: not only avoiding crises, that are shown to be inevitable, if problems are consistently neglected, but also restoring and promoting cohesiveness of cities and states that makes it possible to reap the potential fruits of immigration and immigrants. Acceptance of immigrants and their active participation is an essential condition in such a framework. Negotiated new forms of diversity will result from it. On this front there is still much work to do, for all actors but for politicians primarily.

A second lesson is that the viability of integration policies in the long term depends heavily on realistic targets to be attained and an adequate analysis of the institutional setting and its possibilities to build such policies on. Such a – less ideology-driven – practical approach, combined with active participation of immigrants and their organizations, will not only avoid backlash effects among the majority population, it will also result in a practice in which immigrants are involved and feel recognized.

About the author

Rinus Penninx is professor of Ethnic Studies and director of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam since 1993. Since 1999 he is also co-chair of International Metropolis.

He has written for many years on migration, minorities' policies and ethnic studies. His report 'Ethnic Minorities' (1979) for the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) formed the starting point for integration policies in the Netherlands. From 1978 to 1988 he worked as a senior researcher in the Research and Development Department of the Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture, particularly for research relating to migration and integration of immigrants in the Netherlands.

His recent publications in English include 'Newcomers: Immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands 1550-1995 (with Jan Lucassen), Het Spinhuis Publishers 1997; 'Immigrant Integration: the Dutch case (with Hans Vermeulen), Het Spinhuis Publishers 2000; 'Trade Unions, Immigration and Immigrants in Europe 1960-1993' (with Judith Roosblad), Berghahn Books 2000; 'Western Europe and its Islam' (with Jan Rath, Kees Groenendijk and Astrid Meyer), Brill 2001, and Citizenship in European Cities (with Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello and Steven Vertovec), Ashgate 2004.

Bibliography

Alexander, Michael (2003), *Comparing local policies toward migrants as an expression of Host-Stranger relations*. PhD-thesis Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Bade, K. (Ed.) (1987), *Population, labour and migration in 19th- and 20th-century Germany*. Leamington Spa: Berg.

Bauböck, R. (ed.) (1994), *From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*, Aldershot: Avebury.

Bauböck, R., A. Heller and A.R. Zolberg (eds) (1996), *The Challenge of Diversity. Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration*. Aldershot: Avebury.

Bousetta, Hassan (1997), 'Citizenship and Political Participation in France and the Netherlands: Reflections on Two Local Cases', *New Community*, 23 (2) 215-231.

Brochmann, G., A. Fadloulah and M. Poulain (1993), *Political and demographic aspects of migration flows to Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Brubaker, R.W. (ed.) (1989), *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Brubaker, R.W. (1992), *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Caestecker, F. (1993), *Ongewenste gasten. Joodse vluchtelingen en migranten in de dertiger jaren*. Brussel: VUB-press.

Canatan, K., C.H. Oudijk and A Ljamai (2003), *De maatschappelijke rol van de Rotterdamse moskeeën*. Rotterdam: COS June.

Castles, S. and M.J. Miller (1998), *The age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Houndmills/New York: Palgrave (second edition).

- Crul, M. (1999), Turkish and Moroccan Sibling Support and School Achievement Levels: An optimistic View. *Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences*, 35, 2, pp.110-128.
- Crul, M. (2002), Success breeds success. Moroccan and Turkish student mentors in the Netherlands. *International Journal for the advancement of Counselling*, 24, 275-287, 2002.
- Crul, M. and H. Vermeulen (2003), 'The second generation in Europe, Introduction', *International Migration Review*, 37 (3) 965-986. (Special Issue of the IMR on 'The future of the second generation: the integration of migrant youth in six European Countries', edited by Crul and Vermeulen).
- Deslé, E, R. Lesthaeghe and E. Witte (eds) (1993), *Denken over migranten in Europa*. Brussel: VUB-press.
- Doomernik, J. (1991), *Turkse moskeeën en maatschappelijke participatie. De institutionalisering van de Turkse islam in Nederland en de Duitse Bondsrepubliek*. Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociale Geografie.
- Elias, N. and J. Scotson (1965), *The Established and the Outsiders – a sociological inquiry into community problems*. London: Sage Publications.
- Entzinger, H. and R. Biezeveld, *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration*. Report to the European Commission, August 2003.
- European Commission (2000), *Communication on a Community Immigration Policy*. November 22nd.
- European Commission (2003), *Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment*. June 3rd.
- Favell, A, (2000), *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. Houndmills/Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Fennema, M. and J. Tillie (1999), 'Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam. Civic communities and ethnic networks', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25 (4) 703-726.
- Fennema, M. and J. Tillie (2001). 'Civic Communities in a Multicultural Democracy.' *Connections* 24 (1) 26-41.
- Freeman, G. (1995), 'Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States. *International Migration Review* 29: 881-902.
- Groenendijk, C.A. and P.E. Minderhoud, 'De Nederlandse invloed op nieuwe Europese regels betreffende migratie en asyl'. In: W.A. Brusse, D.Broeders and R. Griffith (eds), *Immigratie en asiel in Europa. Een lange weg naar gemeenschappelijkheid*. Utrecht: Lemma BV, pp 137-162.
- Guiraudon, V. (1998), 'Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens: France, Germany and the Netherlands.' In: C. Joppke (ed.), *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. Oxford: OUP.
- Hammar, T. (1985), *European Immigration Policy. A Comparative Study*. London: Cambridge University Press.

- Hammar, T. (1990), *Democracy and the Nation State. Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in an World of International Migration*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Hansen, R. and P. Weil (2001), *Towards a European Nationality. Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU*. Houndmills/New York: Palgrave.
- Haug, W., P. Compton and Y. Courbage (eds) (2002), *The demographic characteristics of immigrant populations*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Heitmeyer, W., J. Müller & H. Schröder (1997), *Verlockender Fundamentalismus. Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Herbert, U. (1990), *A history of foreign labor in Germany, 1880-1980*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hoerder, D. (1985), *Labor migration in the Atlantic economies. The European and North American working class during the period of industrialization*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
- Holmes, C. (1988), *John Bull's island. Immigration and British society, 1871-1971*. London: MacMillan.
- IOM (2003). *World Migration 2003. Managing Migration; Challenges and responses for people on the move*. IOM, Geneva.
- Karakasoglu, Y. (1997), *Türkische Muslime in Nordrhein Westfalen*. Duisburg: Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales NRW.
- Karakasoglu, Y. and S. Koray (1996), *Islam and Islamic organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany. A short summary of study of the Zentrum für Türkeistudien on Islamic organizations in Germany*. Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship. A liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Landman, N. (1992), *Van mat tot minaret. De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland*. Amsterdam: VU-uitgeverij.
- Lequin, Y. (Ed.) (1988), *La mosaïque France. Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France*. Paris.
- Lunn, K. (Ed.) (1985), *Race and labour in twentieth-century Britain*. London: Cass.
- Migration Policy Group (2004), *Introduction and Language Training*. Issue Paper no. 1, MPG. Background Paper for the European Seminar on the Introduction of Newly Arrived Immigrants and Refugees, organized by the Danish Ministry of Integration in cooperation with the Dutch Ministry of Justice and with the support of the European Commission, Copenhagen, February 5-6, 2004.
- Moore, D. (2001), *Ethnicité et Politique de la Ville en France et en Grande-Bretagne*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

- Morelli, A. (Ed.) (1992), *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en Belgique de la préhistoire à nos jours*. Brussels: Editions Vie Ouvrière.
- Niessen, J. (2004), *Five years of EU migration and asylum policymaking under the Amsterdam and Tampere mandates*. Brussels: MPG.
- Noiriel, G. (1988), *Le creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration, XIX-Xxe siècles*. Paris:Seuil.
- OECD (2001), *Trends in International Migration*, Paris.
- Oezbek, Y. and S. Koray (1998), *Muslim voices. A stranger within? Section on Germany, Part I and II*. Essen: Zentrum für Türkeistudien.
- Ögelman N., J. Money, and Ph. Martin (2002), 'Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Foreign Policy', *SAIS Review* XXII (2).
- Ögelman N. (2003), Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics Among Germany's Turks. *International Migration Review*, pp.163-193.
- Park, R. and E. Burgess (1921), *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Penninx, R. (2000), 'Het dramatische misverstand'. In: J.E. Overdijk-Francis en H.M.A.G. Smeets, *Bij nader inzien. Het integratiedebat op afstand bekeken*. Infoplus minderheden, Houten/Lelystad: Bohn, Stafleu & Van Loghum/ Koninklijke Vermande, 27-49.
- Penninx, R. (2001), 'Immigrants and the dynamics of social exclusion – Lessons for anti-discrimination policies'. In: Flip Lindo and Mies van Niekerk, *Dedication and Detachment. Essays in Honour of Hans Vermeulen*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 193-211.
- Penninx, R., K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec (2004), *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Penninx, R. and J. Roosblad (eds) (2000), *Trade Unions, Immigration, and Immigrants in Europe, 1960-1993. A Comparative Study of the Attitudes and Actions of Trade Unions in Seven West European Countries*, New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Penninx, R. en Marlou Schrover, 'Bastion of bindmiddel? Organisaties van immigranten in historisch perspectief'. In: Jan Lucassen en Arie de Ruijter, *Nederland Multicultureel en Pluriform? Een aantal conceptuele studies*. Amsterdam: Aksant 2002, 279-322.
- Penninx, R. en B. Slijper (1999), *Voor elkaar? Integratie, vrijwilligerswerk en organisaties van migranten*, IMES/Uitgeverij Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam.
- Rath, J., R. Penninx, K. Groenendijk and A. Meyer (2001), *Western Europe and its Islam*. Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill.
- Rogers A. and J. Tillie (2001), *Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Salt, J., J. Clarke and Ph. Wanner (eds) (2004), *International labour migration*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

- Schrover, M. (2003). Immigrant organizations in the Netherlands, Then and Now. Paper for the Workshop 'Paths of Integration: Similarities and Differences in the Settlement', Osnabrueck, June 19-21, 2003, www.imis.uni-osnabrueck.de/biling/papers/schrover.pdf
- Simmel, G. (1908), 'The Stranger'. In: K.H. Wolff (ed.), *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. New York: Free Press.
- Spencer, S. (2003), 'The Challenges of Integration for the EU'. Published on the website of the Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2003: <http://www.migrationinformation.org>
- Soysal, Y.N. (1994), *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Sunier, Th. (1996), *Islam in beweging. Turkse jongeren en islamitische organisaties*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Sunier, Th. (1999), 'Niederländisch-Islamische Staatsbürgerschaft? Ansichten über Islam, Bürgerschaft und Bürgerrechte unter türkische Jugendlichen in den Niederlanden', in: W.D. Bukow & M. Ottersbach (eds), *Der Fundamentalismus-verdacht. Plädoyer für eine Neuorientierung der Forschung im Umgang mit allochtonen Jugendlichen*, 85-97. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.
- Suessmuth-report (2001), Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission 'Zuwanderung', July, 4th.
- Vermeulen, H. (ed.) (1997), *Immigrant policy for a multicultural society. A comparative study of integration, language and religious policy in five Western European countries*. Brussels/Amsterdam: MPG/IMES.
- Vermeulen, H. and R. Penninx (red.) (1994), *Het democratisch ongeduld. De emancipatie en integratie van zes doelgroepen van het minderhedenbeleid*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Vermeulen, H. and R. Penninx (red.) (2000), *Immigrant integration. The Dutch case*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Vermeulen, H. and B. Slijper (2003), *Multiculturalisme in Canada, Australië en de Verenigde Staten. Ideologie en Beleid, 1950-2000*. Amsterdam: Aksant.
- Weil, P. (2000), 'Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws'. In: A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds), *From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World*. Washington DC: Carnegie Foundation.
- Wolff, R., A. van Heelsum en R. Penninx (1999), *Erkend, aangesproken, aanspreekbaar? Evaluatie van het migrantenbeleid van voormalig stadsdeel Oost en de participatie van organisaties van migranten, 1996-1998*. Amsterdam: Stadsdeel Oost/Watergraafsmeer.
- Young, I.M. (1990), *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Zolberg, A. and A.J. Clarkin (Eds), *Sharing Integration Experiences: Innovative Community Practices on Two Continents*. International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship, New School University, New York 2003.