The economic crisis in Europe – causes, effects, policies, alternatives

Presentation to European Forum Cyprus seminar Two tests for Cyprus – world financial crisis and identity, Nicosia, 12-14 June 2009



Overview

Causes – not just a financial crisis

Current situation

Green shoots?

EU policy response

Critique – what needs to be done



Causes – complex interaction of fundamental developments

Global current account imbalances

Excessive consumption (and overvalued USD) in US, excessive savings in China, Japan, Germany

Internationalisation of production without internationalisation of regulation and oversight

State withdrawal, liberalisation, de-regulation Notably but not only in finance

Distributional changes

Falling labour share and/or increasing inequality of wage incomes

'Financialisation' of the economy Securitisation, rising debt levels

Low interest rates



Causes – 'traditional' sources of downturn plus external shock

Sharp rise in commodity prices Sharp appreciation of the euro Lagged effect of past interest-rate rises Imbalances and (housing) booms in some EU countries

Then shock from US (housing bubble!) hit Europe: US consumer retrenchment Fed rate cuts led to more appreciation of euro Toxic assets held by EU banks Emerging markets and world trade hit




Grim prospects for EU (worse than US)

Note: following charts from European Commission Spring Forecast

	2007	20	08	20	99	2010		
(percentaged ange compreceding year)		Spring	Jan09	Spring	Jan09	Spring	Jan09	
Wald EP growth	51	31	33	-14	1/2	19	2/4	
APgranthin:								
-theUS	20	11	1.2	-29	-1.6	0.9	1.7	
-Japan	24	-07	-01	-53	-24	01	-02	
-Cira	130	9.0	9.7	61	<i>Ĝ</i> /4	7.8	8	
-HU	29	0.9	1.0	40	-1.8	-01	Q5	



Massive output drop – but no unsustainable boom






Latest unemployment figures (OECD 8 June 09)



- small rise in Germany: temporary success, but much worse to come
- US now equal to euro area.



Severe lagged impact on (un)employment






Severe lagged impact on fiscal position

(%of GEP, general gov't)		(euroarea		FL27				
	2007	2008	2009	2010		2007	2008	2009	2010
Gweinnert balance	-0.6	-19	-53	-6.5		-08	-23	-60	-7.3
Interest expenditure	29	3.0	3.0	3.2		27	27	28	30
Pinary balance	23	1.1	-23	-3.3		19	0.4	-32	43
Structural balance (1)	-1.8	-28	-3.9	-4 .7		-20	-3.1	46	-5.5
Gross debt	66.0	D .3	77.7	83.8		587	61.5	726	79.4

The structural budget balance is the cyclically-adjusted budget balance net of one-off and other temporary measures, estimated by Commission services




Bottoming out? - sentiment indicators





Bottoming out? - OECD leading indicator euro area



CLI stable Jan, Feb, rose Mar, Apr. (shaded areas = downswings in activity)




Bottoming out? – share prices





Bottoming out? - industrial production





Green shoots but major downside risks

Green shoots thanks to massive government intervention Keynesian policies work!

Renewed rise in commodity prices

Unexploded bombs in the financial sector (especially in Europe!)

IMF: 2/3 EU toxic assets not accounted for

Collapse of the US-dollar

Currency crises in eastern Europe


Premature exit strategies



Policy response in Europe – too little too late


ECB 325 bp cut (but after increase in July 2008

No significant quantitative easing (cf. US, UK)





Cut in interest rates limited impact on firms borrowing costs





Policy response in Europe – too little too late

		Simple	Weight ed averag
		average	е
Total fiscal packag	e 09/10	1.70	1.79
	in 2009	0.99	1.02
	in 2010	0.61	0.59
	revenue side	52%	52%
	expenditure side	48%	48%
17 Andrew Watt © etui (2009)	Economic crisis - Nicosia		etui

Policy response in Europe – too little too late

	AT	BE	DK	FI	FR	DE	H U	IT	LU	NL	NO	PT	ES	SE	UK
Overall size of fiscal package	2.4	0.	2.2	1.5	1	2.64	0	0.2		1			4.6	2.4	1.5
in 2009	1	0. 4	1.2	1	0.7	1.2	0	0.2	1.7	0.4	0.7	1.2	2.3	1.2	1.4
in 2010	1.4	0. 4	1	0.5	0.3	1.5	0	0.1		0.5				1.1	-0.1
expenditu re side	30	60	60	20	64	46			50	80	84	75	80	34	10



Assessment of fiscal packages

- The fiscal packages in the EU are too small they offer a 'quantum of solace' to Europe and fail to address global imbalances. Current self-satisfaction by policymakers completely inappropriate.
- The distribution across countries varies considerably. On the positive side, to some extent this is justified economically and widespread free-riding seems to have been avoided (success for EU). However, the supposed 'fiscal room for manoeuvre' seems to be a binding constraint on more cyclically appropriate policies. Particularly problematic in eastern Europe (IMF). Failure of European fiscal solidarity.
- Mixed picture in terms of content of the packages. Considerable focus on public investment, but concerns about distribution, lack of attention to labour market crisis and missed opportunity on green issues.



Critique – recession in Europe needlessly deep and long

- Overall European macroeconomic policy is behind the curve and too timid
- Policy coordination was partially effective (protectionism freeriding) but inadequate
- Lack of European solidarity (especially vis-a-vis eastern Europe)
- Social and distributional issues not adequately addressed
- Missed opportunity for longer-term reforms (especially climate change)
- Misplaced concerns about inflation and fiscal deficits/debt risk leading to premature exit strategies (cf. Japan)



Policy alternatives – save the economy and address distributional crisis

Make support for financial sector more conditional

Expand fiscal packages

Ease constraints on fiscally challenged countries to enable them to run expansionary policies and prevent downward spirals

EU investment program especially in 'green' growth

Equitable exit strategy (higher top rate of income tax, financial transactions tax): announce now, do later

Reform of financial sector regulation – strengthen EU level

Guidelines for management remuneration schemes

Medium term: Support for collective wage bargaining institutions, strengthen economic policy coordination, debate on fiscal and monetary architecture, rehabilitate public investment, more European coherence to industrial policy and restructuring, strrengthen worker participation, etc. etc.

