



# European Culture: Identity and Diversity

## Colloquy of the Council of Europe

*in cooperation with the French Minister of Culture and Communication  
and the City of Strasbourg*



## Summary

**Strasbourg, 8 – 9 September 2005**  
**Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art**



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Provisional version

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## Introduction

The colloquium “European Culture: Identity and Diversity” forms part of the activities commemorating the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the European Cultural Convention. The event is placed between the opening ministerial conference in Wrocław (9-10 December 2004) and the closing ministerial conference in Faro (27-28 October 2005).

The aim of the colloquium was to explore the fundamental challenges facing cultural cooperation today, and to develop the intellectual and political foundations of future Council of Europe programmes in the areas of education, culture and heritage, youth and sport. It continued and expanded the discussions initiated at the Wrocław Conference and earlier colloquia of the Council of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

In line with the philosophy and concepts developed by the Council of Europe over the last few decades, the colloquium looked at culture as “*all of the values that give human beings their reasons for living and doing*”. Accordingly, it not only dealt with the cultural policies of states, but focussed on cultural democracy, cultural development and the right of all to cultural expression as well, thus linking culture to the principles of democracy and human rights.

The colloquium concentrated on two major, interrelated transversal themes: identity and diversity.

### “TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND DIALOGUE”

The first part of the colloquium revolved around two key issues. The starting point was the notion of *identity*, where the meeting explored identity formation, the genesis and role of values, the role of language(s), the conditions of a “European identity”, the different components and levels of identity, perceived and real threats to identity etc. Following on from that, the colloquy discussed *culture as a form of coherence* and examined particularly the role of culture as a primary “vehicle of meaning” and tool for understanding, as the agent of individual and collective human development and the embodiment of social values.

The second aspect was the fundamental role that *dialogue and exchange* play both for cultural development and the building of a multi-faceted identity. Here the colloquium discussed issues of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, European cooperation with neighbouring regions, particularly the southern shore of the Mediterranean, emerging new forms of cultural interaction, the perception and valuation of difference and the knowledge of other cultures, and related topics. Education in all its forms and institutional contexts was analysed as the key vehicle of social and cultural development, which is central to identity formation and civic participation, the sharing of democratic values, the respect of human rights and the building of confidence and mutual respect between cultures and communities.

### “DIVERSITY AND COHESION”

The second part of the event was devoted to the need to ensure both diversity and social cohesion, and the balance between the two.

The colloquium first dealt with the fundamental character of *cultural diversity*. Discussion topics included the emergence of new cultural communities, the situation of minorities, and the exchange and consumption of cultural goods and services.

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. “The European Identity: Colloquium in three parts” organised in 2001-2002, revolving around the Committee of Ministers’ chair held by Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania and Luxembourg; and the “Intercultural Forums” organised in 2003 and 2004. Background documents are available on [www.coe.int](http://www.coe.int)

How can *social cohesion* be strengthened, in a situation of cultural diversity? This issue formed the core of the last part of the colloquium. Topics of discussion included the policies promoting democratic culture, participation and inclusion, including education for democratic citizenship and as a means of building up the necessary political and personal attitudes for integrated and cohesive societies. The colloquium also examined the role of culture and education for intercultural learning and the building of social trust. Among many other topics, participants discussed the political frameworks for the management of cultural diversity; access to educational and cultural rights; and the provision of minimum cultural and educational services.

The participants of this colloquium came from all over Europe and from diverse scientific and political backgrounds. Among them were experts familiar with the various areas of cultural policy, who had helped in the past to formulate the goals and develop action programmes at European level. Others were representatives of the 48 signatory States of the European Cultural Convention, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, and of the Observers states. Most Steering Committees in the cultural field were represented, as were a number of other international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations cooperating with the Council of Europe. The colloquy was also attended by many members of the intellectual community of the Alsace region.

On behalf of the Council of Europe, I wish to take this opportunity to thank all speakers, participants and guests for their interesting and stimulating contributions to the debate. The continuous support over the past few months of Ambassador Ter Stepanian, Chair of the Committee of Ministers *rapporteur* group on education, culture, sport, youth and environment, has been an invaluable asset. I particularly want to thank the Chairman of the Ministers' Deputies, Ambassador Duarte, for his encouragement and also for his participation in the event. His participation was particularly significant as it was possibly the first time that such a high-ranking representative has attended a Council of Europe colloquy of this type.

The Council of Europe is also grateful for the support of the French Minister of Culture and Communication and the City of Strasbourg, who helped organise the colloquy.

The debate on European culture, "identity" and "identities", cultural diversity and all the other issues raised in this colloquy will continue. It is the task of the Council of Europe, its Steering Committees and political organs, to translate the proposals and insights of this event into policies and action. I regard it as a privilege that so many intellectuals are providing us with their support as we embark on strengthening cultural cooperation.

*Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni*

*Director General*

*Directorate General IV - Education, Culture and Heritage, Youth and Sport*

# Programme

Thursday 8 September 2005

## **Opening session**

15.00h            **Opening remarks**

Terry Davis, *Secretary General of the Council of Europe*  
Benôit Paumier, *Ministry of Culture and Communication, France*  
Fabienne Keller, *Mayor of Strasbourg*  
Jacques Legendre, *Chair of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe*

### **Theme A:**

#### **“Towards a European Identity: The Role of Culture and Dialogue”**

Chair: Catherine Lalumière

15.50h            “Culture, identity and citizenship”  
John Tomlinson, *Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham*

16.45h            “In praise of subversive reason: beyond dialogue and the quest for identity”  
Mohammed Arkoun, *Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris*

17.10h            **Panel discussion:**  
“Towards a common European cultural identity: reality or ideal?”  
With John Tomlinson, Mohammed Arkoun, Maria Hadjipavlou, Laurent Mazas and René Gutman

18.00h-19.30h    **General debate**

Friday 9 September 2005

### **Theme B:**

#### **“Diversity and Cohesion”**

Chair: Jacques Toubon

09.00h            “Protecting and managing cultural diversity”  
Mikhail Shviydoy, *Federal Agency for Culture and Cinematography, Moscow*

09.40h            “Inclusion, participation and the role of culture”  
Gvozden Flego, *University of Zagreb*

10.10h            **Panel discussion:**  
“Turning Europe into an inclusive and cohesive, civic and creative community – future challenges for culture and education”  
With Mikhail Shviydoy, Gvozden Flego, Katerina Stenou, Giovanni Di Stasi, Simon Mundy, Michael Raphael and César Bîrzéa

11.30h – 13.00h **General debate**

***Closing session***

Chair: Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni

14.30h Summary by Lynne Chisholm, *General Rapporteur*

14.45h **General debate**

15.45h-16.00h **Closing remarks**

- Christian Ter Stepanian, *Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe, Chairman of the Rapporteur Group on Education, Culture, Sport, Youth and Environment, Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe*
- Joaquim Duarte, *Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the Council of Europe, Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe*

## Opening session

### **Mr. Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe**

Minister,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Culture is one of the recurrent issues of European policy. In times of euphoria and in times of turmoil, the so-called “makers of Europe” often embark on a quest for the cultural foundations of European unity, the essence of European identity and the boundaries of diversity.

As for the Council of Europe, we are no stranger to this sort of debate. Since the 1980s, the Secretaries General of the Council of Europe have been in the habit of inviting representatives of intellectual and creative spheres of activity to discuss major cultural challenges in a multi-disciplinary and trans-continental perspective: the Orwellian prophesies in 1984, “Interdependence and cultural development” in 1988, Euro-Arab understanding and cultural exchange in 1991, racism and anti-Semitism in 1995, and “the European identity” in a series of three colloquies in 2001 and 2002.

Today’s colloquy is somewhat different because it is one of the string of events devoted both to the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the European Cultural Convention in Paris, and to the development of the future cultural agenda of the Council of Europe.

What happened in Paris in 1954 was a major step in the process of European co-operation. The European Cultural Convention, was signed by 14 states. Now it is a total of 48 states. But numbers are not everything. The fact is that the European Cultural Convention was the first and only comprehensive instrument of international law designed to encourage the development of a European cultural identity, to safeguard European culture, and to promote national contributions to Europe’s common cultural heritage. The Convention encourages the emergence of a European cultural space through the study of Europe’s languages, history and civilisation. And as a result, the Council of Europe became the pioneer in enlarging Europe’s cultural geography beyond the Berlin Wall in the late years of the Cold War thus paving the way for political developments.

I should note in passing that the Convention covers a range of policy areas which do not necessarily coincide with the areas of responsibility traditionally held by Ministers of Culture. This breadth will be echoed by your debates today and tomorrow, which will not be restricted to a narrow notion of culture, but will explore the contribution of areas such as education, youth, sport, and both natural and cultural heritage. Indeed, we are already preparing to draw the lessons of decades of experience in a White paper on the Management of Diversity, which will put forward a transversal strategy for developing cohesive and harmonious multi-cultural societies through comprehensive policies in all these fields.

It is certainly true to say (as the chronicler of the first forty years of the Convention, Etienne Grosjean, pointed out) that European cultural co-operation has produced expertise and skills which cannot be boiled down to legal texts alone. The European Cultural Convention has proved itself to be an effective framework for the gradual emergence of a certain approach to cultural and educational issues, whose influence now reaches far beyond the limited sphere of intergovernmental relations. Under the influence of the Convention, the Council of Europe has, like contemporary culture, developed “multiple identities” – an intergovernmental

organisation in the classical sense, but also a think-tank and a discussion forum offering a pan-European platform to civil society.

Cultural co-operation has inspired the work of numerous networks promoting the most fundamental human values in Europe and beyond. The Europe of artists and intellectuals, students and scientists, has in many ways advanced faster than the Europe of governments and is a source of inspiration and advice in our search for the tools to build harmonious, tolerant multi-cultural societies.

This is why during these two days I hope that you will not only look at governmental and international domains, but also look, much more radically, at the very basis of cultural practice, at challenges, policy approaches and responses.

Yet it is important to affirm – as the European Ministers of Culture have done in their “Wroclaw Declaration” on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary – that the values and principles of the Convention today remain as valid as ever and represent a precious resource for an undivided, democratic Europe.

In their Declaration, the Ministers of Culture also formulated a number of objectives in response to the cultural challenges we are facing today. To develop a sense of shared history and common future; to ensure cultural freedom *and* manage cultural diversity; to foster intercultural dialogue; to strengthen the cultural dimensions of the European knowledge society; and to create new forms of co-operation with civil society and new partnerships between international organisations – these have all been set down as important tasks for future cultural policies at national and international levels.

But I ask the question. Are these insights correct? Are they the real issues and is the list complete? Or are we - because of the necessity to express general continental trends rather than specific local detail – in danger of over-simplifying complex realities?

Let us also ask ourselves what are the implications of these issues for national policy-making and the action programme of the Council of Europe, in particular in terms of implementing the Action Plan adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe member states at their Summit in Warsaw last May. The Summit confirmed the determination of European states to “foster European identity and unity, based on shared fundamental values, respect for our common heritage and cultural diversity” and further inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue. What are the instruments, processes and alliances which would help us to achieve these goals?

These are the challenges for this colloquy. I ask you to look at “Europe” and “culture”, at “identity” and “diversity” in all their various aspects.

And I offer you something in return. In the past, many colloquies of the Council of Europe have suffered from “splendid isolation” and a less than stringent follow-up. It will not be so in this case.

In exactly seven weeks from now the European Ministers of Culture will again come together, this time in Faro in Portugal, to discuss the way forward. The results of this colloquy are item one on the Ministers’ agenda – an opportunity to translate intellectual insights into political commitment and action.

Common sense tells us that not every one of your conclusions during these two days will become reality overnight. But the very fact that the Committee of Ministers has followed closely the preparation of this colloquy over a period of several months shows that European governments are interested in your advice and proposals. For my part, I assure you that as

Secretary General of the Council of Europe, I shall work very closely with Mrs Gabriella Battaini, our Director General for Education, Culture and Heritage, Youth and Sport, to press for action rather than words by all our member states.

Before closing, I should only like to express my warmest thanks to the French Minister of Culture and Communication, Mr Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, and the Mayor of Strasbourg, Mrs Fabienne Keller, and their respective teams for their support in the preparation and organisation of this colloquy. A particular word of thanks also goes to the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers' Rapporteur Group on Education, Culture, Sport, Youth and Environment, Ambassador Christian Ter Stepanian, who has followed the preparations over several weeks, and given us the benefit of his practical advice.

I offer you a final personal thought. If culture is the cement which holds society together, let this colloquy help us to design the mixing machine for Europe.

### **Mr. Benoît Paumier, *French Ministry of Culture and Communication***

I should first like to apologise for the absence of the Minister of Culture and Communication, Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, whose obligations have kept him in Paris today. You all know his attachment to the Council of Europe, which he has demonstrated on several occasions since he took up office, particularly at his meeting in Strasbourg last February with the Secretary General, Terry Davis, and when he addressed the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in September 2004.

The Minister is particularly pleased at your choice of the theme "diversity and identity", an issue this Ministry considers decisive for the future of cultural policies and one which, in more general terms, illustrates the new place occupied by the cultural dimension in the economic, social and diplomatic affairs of our time.

The first conference of Ministers of Culture organised to mark the 50th anniversary of the Council of Europe's Cultural Convention, in Wroclaw last autumn, strongly highlighted the Council of Europe's interest in these matters. Recent events have confirmed the dangers linked with lack of openness to other cultures and the increasingly violent irruption of intolerance and terrorism, merely underlining the urgent need for more thorough research into this theme of identity and diversity.

Culture is indeed one of the keys to war and peace in the world. The identity crisis which has spared neither France nor Europe today largely explains the upheavals in the world. One of the main challenges facing us today is to convince our fellow citizens of the strength to be found in a solid identity, to help them live with globalisation and open themselves to others without fear of losing their own identity.

The Council of Europe has an eminent part to play in this debate. Having an essential role in promoting respect for fundamental rights and freedoms in Europe, and in conflict prevention, it has taken into account, along with many others, the essential role of culture and intercultural dialogue in conflict prevention, for example in the declaration of the ministers of culture in Opatija in October 2003 on intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention.

It is thus in phase with the new role of cultural diplomacy, which is no longer merely a question of promoting the heritage and creation, but also of reviving and bringing out the strength of identities, in a spirit of peace and respect for others, in a world where most conflicts are first and foremost conflicts of identity.

As the programme of this conference rightly points out, this debate concerns both the international diplomatic level and the domestic social sphere.

In the international sphere the challenge is to develop exchanges between all cultures on a reciprocal basis. It concerns not only culture in the traditional sense of the term but also as expressed using modern communication tools. In all our countries we must foster a model of dialogue that strikes a proper balance between respect for the identities of origin and adherence to shared values.

The globalisation of culture is a fact of life. It is at once an extraordinary opportunity for the circulation of ideas, people, works and products, but there is also a risk of everyone falling into the same mould, and their cultures and languages disappearing. Let me briefly remind you of the figures quoted at the conference in Wroclaw: 85% of the films produced in the world are made by Hollywood studios, four firms share the bulk of the world's music market, and 60% of the fiction programmes shown on television in many of our countries are made in the USA.

Europe, on the whole, is well aware of the dangers inherent in these trends, and we welcome the fact that the draft convention on cultural diversity elaborated last June by the UNESCO committee of intergovernmental experts met with the approval of all the member states of the Council of Europe which are members of UNESCO. This continent-wide consensus, which came as no real surprise following the declarations made by the ministers of culture of the Council of Europe both in Opatija in 2003 and in Wroclaw, was one of the key factors that made it possible to move these difficult negotiations forward.

There is nothing unusual about this if one considers that one of the characteristic features of European civilisation throughout history has been exchange, openness and curiosity about the outside world and different cultures. Indeed, in order to continue building itself, Europe needs cultural diversity.

If, as we hope, the draft international Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions is adopted at the UNESCO General Conference in October, and subsequently ratified, the specificity of cultural and audiovisual goods as sources of identity and therefore not to be treated like other goods will at last be recognised, and governments will be able to set in motion the support and co-operation machinery necessary for cultural diversity to survive.

So this text is not an end in itself, but rather a starting point: it invites us in to preserve respect for cultures and cultural diversity; and I think that in this new phase, the Council of Europe, with its pioneering role in heritage co-operation and its particular awareness of the role of culture in conflict prevention, has a prominent role to play.

Beyond this international dimension, however, and the consolidation of an international law on culture along the lines of the international law developing in the health and environment fields, the question of cultural diversity in our own societies is becoming increasingly topical. While some countries know the subject well because of their traditionally multiethnic character, the consequences of immigration within Europe and from outside make it a question which concerns us all.

In this context, the policy of cultural exchanges cannot be limited to encouraging exchanges of works of art and being open to other-cultural input. It is also a matter, in more general terms, of encouraging cultural practices which promote tolerance, dialogue and respect for differences, which help fight all forms of exclusion or even segregation, and make us want to live and build something together.

The opening of a national centre on the history of immigration at the Porte Dorée in Paris in 2007, where all French people will be able to appreciate the valuable contributions made by the successive waves of immigration in France, will be an emblematic example of this new approach.

This combat only makes sense, however, if we give education in culture and the arts its rightful place.

Transmitting a common heritage of works, and the cultural values attached to them, to the greatest number is absolutely essential to the protection of cultural diversity. The genuine democratisation of culture, however, as we all know, means making culture present throughout the education system. There must be more culture in education, in both scope and intensity, and those in charge of our education systems must be constantly reminded of this essential dimension of their work.

What is more, education policy in culture and the arts must allow for the fact that, for most people, access to culture does not necessarily mean practising an art, even as a hobby, or using cultural facilities; it also and increasingly involves the consumption of works produced by the cultural industries.

Education in culture and the arts should help children and young people to find their way through the maze of cultural productions available thanks to the development of cultural industries on a worldwide scale; it should help them to take a critical view of the risks inherent in the standardisation of tastes and cultural practices. This education should include respect for author's rights, particularly with regard to music and pictures.

Against this backdrop, pooling our respective experiences of assessing the effects of education in culture and the arts on integration and social cohesion seems to be an essential line of research. The French Ministry of Culture and Communication will be organising a symposium on the subject next year in Paris. We are confident that the Council of Europe, which has also begun to look into these questions, with its compendium of cultural policies in Europe, will contribute to this research.

It is because our strength as Europeans lies in our diversity that we must continue to act and organise ourselves, and that the Council of Europe has its place as a think-tank and a promoter of cultural exchange. The alternative we must avoid is a world of uniform and standardised mass culture, with societies divided along increasingly unshakeable lines of identity which breed violence and conflicts. Because cultural issues also concern the cohesion of our societies and peace on our continent, the fight for a Europe of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue is one we must all wage together.

### **Mrs. Fabienne Keller, *Mayor of Strasbourg***

Mr Secretary General,  
Ladies and gentlemen representing the Parliamentary Assembly,  
Ambassadors,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very happy and very honoured to be participating today in the opening of the colloquy celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the European Cultural Convention and to be hosting your proceedings in the auditorium of the Strasbourg Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art.

I should like to bid a special welcome to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, who is doing us the honour chairing this opening session, the representative of

the French Minister for Culture, Benoît Paumier, and my fellow senator, Jacques Legendre, Chair of the Cultural Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

Even if we are not on the Council's own premises today, this is not, strictly speaking, an "extramural" event, because everyone knows that the Council of Europe is at home everywhere in Strasbourg, *a fortiori* where culture is concerned. History has taught our city and our region as a whole that culture has a dual nature: it can be a great revealer, bringing to light conflicts and tensions, differences and oppositions. It can also – sometimes simultaneously – be one of the most fantastic means of initiating dialogue. This allows us to once again learn to live together and to transcend frontiers that have divided European states over the centuries, as well as transcend chronological frontiers that separate us from past generations.

As we are in Strasbourg, a city where Europe and culture are indissolubly linked, the figure of Goethe inevitably springs to mind. It was the cathedral that inspired this great author to write his first book entitled, *On German Architecture*, where he argued principally that "*the only culture is national culture*".

But years later, Goethe drastically changed his stance (as he tells us in *Conversations with Eckermann*). He had just finished reading a novel written in China in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. For Goethe, this was a revelation, a true intellectual revolution. If he, an 18<sup>th</sup> century German author, had been moved to tears by a book written thousands of kilometres away five centuries ago, then art and culture indeed have only one homeland: the mind. The universal mind, which consistently transcends the frontiers of the world and the frontiers of time, and makes us feel - whoever we are, wherever we are - that we are part of the same humanity.

The change in Goethe, one of the most outstanding European intellects, proves that the fundamental issue in culture is the relationship between identity and diversity, between the particular and the universal, between what sociologists such as Dominique Schnapper place in the "ethnic" and "civic" categories, in short between what differentiates us and what brings us together.

I feel there is a kind of tightrope between identity and equality. A tightrope on which we must move forward to build cultural and educational policies, but if we lean too far on the "identity" side, we run the risk of turning diversity into division, and in the long run making society nothing more than a conglomeration of enclosed communities. However, if we lean too far on the "equality side", there is a great risk of depriving individuals of their ability to develop multiple affiliations, thus leaving them disembodied and uprooted. There is indeed a balance to be found. A fragile balance between cultural diversity and the aspiration toward equality demanded by our democratic societies.

Is not Europe, or rather the idea of Europe embodied by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, precisely the balance we have all been searching for over half a century?

In one of those magnificent shortcuts, of which only he has the secret, Umberto Eco, the author of *The Name of the Rose*, writes that "the language of Europe is translation". I do not think there could be a finer image of what our continent is: such that linguistically it is exceptionally diverse, but there is the resolve to adopt a common language through such instruments as the European Cultural Convention.

The French politician and man of letters, Edouard Herriot, who was mayor of Lyon and a member of the Académie Française, is customarily accredited with the somewhat trivial observation that "culture is what is left over when you have forgotten everything else..."

Will it one day be forgotten (may that day never come and remain in the realm of the incongruous) what all the European institutions have given Europeans for over 50 years: peace, democracy, human rights, geopolitical stability, etc... Even if all that were forgotten, what we would still have left more than anything else is culture; the idea that every human being is called upon to forge his or her own destiny.

I should like to thank you for having held this meeting here in Strasbourg and for having chosen to come to our city in order to join together in reflecting upon European culture, in other words the destiny of Europe. I hope that your work will be a major contribution to the advancement of the European Cultural Convention, and I wish you every success.

**Mr. Jacques Legendre,  
*Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe***

Mr Secretary General,  
Madam Mayor,  
Mr Chairman,  
Minister,  
Dear friends and colleagues,

I was invited to take part in your meeting in my capacity as Chair of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. I should like to say how delighted the whole committee is that the initiative was taken to hold this colloquy.

The Cultural Committee may sometimes be seen as one of the less important committees of national parliaments and even in the Council of Europe. We are vain enough to think that this is a mistake and that culture is an integral part of the Council of Europe's main concern, namely the protection of human rights, and that if there is something that accurately defines the European spirit, it is this will, this culture that leads us to uphold such respect for human rights. For example, only the day before yesterday, at a committee meeting in Paris, we were discussing the relationship between education and knowledge of religion. We really felt that we were addressing fundamental issues. I am confirmed in this view when I remember the evenings spent recently in the courtyard of the Palais Royal in Paris. Here, the Ministry of Culture, dear Mr Paumier, had itself sought to illustrate the identity and diversity of culture in Europe.

I think that a colloquy such as this is fascinating. I think that it comes at just the right time, when we are touching on one of the Council of Europe's central functions, celebrating the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Convention, and especially when all the men and women present here explore the present relevance of this question.

Dear Fabienne Keller, mayors and MPs are incorrigible! The mayor of Strasbourg naturally illustrated her thoughts on European identity by referring to one of the great European thinkers associated with this city, Goethe. Please excuse me if I spontaneously opt for the same approach. The constituency which I represent, Cambrai, a much smaller town than Strasbourg, has prided itself for three centuries on possessing a masterpiece by Peter Paul Rubens: a descent from the cross which had been commissioned from the artist, and which the artist brought to the town.

I should like to invite you to take a look at the career of Peter Paul Rubens. He was born in Siegen in Germany, then the Holy Roman Empire. He soon followed his family to Antwerp, where he received his initial training in the southern Netherlands. He then travelled Genoa,

Mantua, Venice and Rome, Italy, where he watched the grand masters and in turn left a deep impression.

Returning to Antwerp, he perfected his talent with a series of increasingly prestigious commissions, leading him soon to be called to Paris by Maria de' Medici, who commissioned a cycle of paintings to illustrate her own life and that of King Henry IV of France. Only the painting illustrating the life of the queen was completed. It once graced the walls of the *Palais du Luxembourg*, which became in due course the seat of the Senate. This painting has now left the Senate, but as it has only gone as far as the Louvre, the senators cannot miss it too much.

There have been famous paintings by Rubens all over Europe since the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In addition to the masterpieces commissioned from him by the Austrian Hapsburgs and the Spanish monarchy at the high point in his career, he was part of a diplomatic mission to Madrid and produced his final masterpiece in London for the Banqueting Hall. Is this not the career and story of a great artist who perhaps belonged to one nation but was first and foremost a great European intellect and artist?

I could have invited you to travel across Europe in the footsteps of Erasmus, from Rotterdam to Bologna via Paris and Bâle (Goethe), but that has been done much better than I could have done it. Despite the great difficulties of communication, the unity of Europe was clear from the time of the medieval universities, from Krakow to Coimbra. It is a truism to say that our continent is a land of exchanges between a hundred, if not a thousand, towns and cities that have sometimes been rivals and sometimes united. I am therefore firmly convinced that the cultural exchanges, which we encourage in the wider Europe – the widest Europe –, are an opportunity to get to know the best of every country's contributions and to gauge each peoples' distinctive characteristics and the many mutual influences between them, which are so complex and so fascinating.

To this extent, the best means of dispelling the tensions between the remaining centres of aggressive nationalism is the promotion of a European model that respects both the identities and the diversity of the cultures present. The spirit of discovery is another characteristic of Europeans. I shall not mention its dark side which sometimes appears in the form of the spirit of conquest. Here I should like to come back to Rubens, an artist who showed an infinitely respectful attitude in his portraits of Africans. He was a Flemish artist who also at this time gave us pictures of the peoples of Brazil, which had only just been discovered. We are left with the testimonies provided by these masterpieces when the unrest, conflicts, and even civil wars which tore nations apart at various times have virtually disappeared from our memories.

The artist's untiring curiosity about otherness makes the European model a constant search for openness. I had the honour of inviting my colleagues on the Culture Committee to a debate in the *Palais du Luxembourg* about the protection of the African heritage from the speculative excesses of the international market. Following my report, the Assembly adopted a recommendation calling on the governments of the 46 member states to contribute to this much-needed protection.

Next year we shall have the opportunity to visit the *Musée des Arts Premiers* founded in Paris on the initiative of Jacques Chirac. The inauguration of this new centre will give us a fresh look at the importance of non-European arts, with their inherent dignity and their influence on our own artists, from the cubists to the German expressionists.

It is in keeping with this spirit that we can and must celebrate the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Council of Europe's Cultural Convention, while hoping that ideas of protection, enhancement, research and openness are shared by an increasing number of states anxious to preserve

their cultural identity and to foster exchanges which, in future, will enhance the message of respect for the diversity of intellectual works as a universal value.

**Theme A:  
"Towards a European Identity: The Role of Culture and  
Dialogue"**

**John Tomlinson, *Nottingham Trent University*:  
"Culture, identity and citizenship"**

The agenda before us in this colloquium is both an extensive and a tough one. Although our immediate focus is European culture, as we are all aware, this can only be understood in the context of more general questions about the nature of modern, increasingly globalized cultures. Our deliberations therefore necessarily range across: the issue of the constitution of cultural identity, the question of cultural universalism and human rights, the way to address religious fundamentalism, how to account for new ways of social interaction, the impact of globalization, the new information culture and knowledge-based society. Frankly, I would strongly advise my postgraduate students against tackling anything more than a fraction of this agenda in the three or four years of study for a PhD - and we have a little under two days. But the reason why we need to take on board this almost impossible agenda is because all of these issues interconnect in important ways. This connectivity is, indeed, one of the defining features of the sort of culture that we all now inhabit, not just as national or as European citizens, but, as it were, as citizens of a global modernity.

My discussion today, then, is directed at connections. In the time available I am going to attempt to clarify - if only a little - the connection between two general issues which I think bear directly upon the nature of modern European culture. I want to explore what connects the idea of particular, and diverse, cultural identities with the idea of universal - we might say, in an optimistic sense 'cosmopolitan' - cultural values.

Let us begin, then, with the issue of universalism. As we all know, there is a simplifying and potentially vicious form of universalism which is in essence ethnocentric and which consists in simply promoting and projecting one's own culture as the 'obvious' model for the one, the true, enlightened, rational and good way of living. This tendency has deep historical-cultural roots and it is doctrinally and discursively structured into some - not all - religious worldviews, for example in some versions of both the Christian and the Islamic traditions of monotheism.

Because of the recent incidents and threats of terrorism in the West, some have come to associate this sort of universalistic thinking, and the intolerance it spawns, particularly with religious fundamentalism. But I think this is a mistake. Ethnocentric projection is certainly to be found in religious cultures, but it is also extremely widely distributed in modern *secular* cultures as an intuitive, common-sense way of understanding our place in the world. Relativising our particular cultural experience is not in fact an act of common sense. It requires rather difficult efforts of hermeneutic distancing and of intellectual and affective imagination. A non-ethnocentric imagination is in point of fact almost counter-intuitive. It is a cultural stance which demands something like Copernicus' famous cosmological de-centering - the ability to conceive that our own experience is not necessarily at the centre of the cultural universe.

This is something which does not come naturally but that needs constantly to be worked at, argued for and, indeed, educated for.

Moreover, it is important to realise that the claim to universality, far from being restricted to the level of the intuitive everyday lifeworld of individuals, can be seen at the very core of the European Enlightenment. The privileging of the European cultural experience - along with its particular version of rationality and its political values can be seen in 'cosmopolitan' thinkers from Kant onwards. It is Kant, indeed, who in his famous seminal text on cosmopolitanism not only looks back for his model to classical Greece and Rome, but forwards, speculatively, to a time when the continent of Europe, 'will probably legislate ... for all the others'<sup>2</sup> True, such sentiments scarcely flourish in today's liberal-pluralist intellectual-academic culture, sharply attuned as it is to the claims of cultural difference. But we can take a lesson from Kant's example, and it is that the tendency towards universalising often co-exists with otherwise commendable humanistic visions. The ideal of a progressive, cosmopolitan cultural politics - of a 'good' universalism - deserves to be taken seriously.

Indeed, making cosmopolitanism work in a way that does not impose any *one* culturally inflected model is perhaps the most immediate challenge that globalization faces us with. This does not necessarily mean endorsing grand projects for 'global governance'; rather it means trying to reconcile the attachments and the values of cultural difference with those of emergent wider human solidarities and extended 'communities'. Strictly speaking of course, cosmopolitanism refers us to a potential world community. But precisely the same challenge applies to the more immediately imaginable community of the wider 'Europe of the 48'.

However this faces us with a dilemma. On the one hand, there are the attractions of a 'benign' form of universalism, preserving key ideas of human mutuality and underlying the broad discourse of human rights and the hope of wider horizons of solidarity. But on the other, there are the equally attractive principles of respect for the integrity of local context and practices, cultural autonomy, cultural identity and 'sovereignty'. At the heart of the cultural-political problems of our time lies what has been described as the 'divided legacies of modernity'<sup>3</sup>: two sets of strong rational principles pulling in different directions. Universal human rights or the claims of cultural difference? Either are standards to which we might rally. But we often don't know which flag to stand beside because in most cases there seem to be very good reasons to stand beside both<sup>4</sup>

Now I don't suppose there is any easy solution to this dilemma, but I think we can get some way along the road by addressing the question of the formation of 'cultural identity'.

Again let's start with a simplifying approach. Although we may struggle against it, we often fall to thinking, or at least to talking, of cultural identity as something fixed. For example, we often speak of identity as something like a possession, an inheritance, a benefit of traditional long dwelling, of continuity with the past. This is the way we think when we worry about globalization threatening local cultural identities or when we say that cultural identities need to be protected - like some precious anthropological 'treasure'. And this is why we often tend to think of identity as inherently fragile - as a treasure that can be lost. Yet, at the same time that we express these anxieties, we admit that cultures are robust, fluid, permeable and historically changing - and we know that identity is a social construction, not a static 'thing', but an experience in process.

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<sup>2</sup> Kant (1784) *The idea of a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view* quoted in Derrida, J. 2002: *Ethics, Institutions and the Right to Philosophy*. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield: 7.

<sup>3</sup> Anderson, A. 1998: *Cosmopolitanism, Universalism and the Divided Legacies of Modernity*. In P. Cheah and B. Robbins (eds.) *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*. Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 265-289.

<sup>4</sup> Walzer, M. 1994: *Thick and Thin: Moral argument at home and abroad*. Notre Dame Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press; Tomlinson, J. 2002: *'Interests and Identities in Cosmopolitan Politics'* in S. Vertovek and R. Cohen (eds) *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 240-253.

One way to get away from these confusions is to look at identities quite differently: not so much as cultural- psychological categories, but as *formal* social categories which are generated in the very nature of modern life. Indeed one of the defining features of modernity is the tendency to generate these formal categories. Considered in this way, cultural identities are not matters of ancient heritage but are actually specifically *modern* inventions. They are institutional ways of organizing and regulating the cultural practices and imaginings by which we grasp our existential condition, our personal relations, and our attachment to a place or a community.

Identities, then, can be usefully thought of as self-definitions based around specific, almost always politically-inflected, differentiations: gender, sexuality, class, religion, race and ethnicity, nationality. Some of these differentiations of course existed long before the coming of modernity, some - like nationality - are more or less modern imaginings. But when I say that identities are in essence *modern* categories, I mean that they are modern in their institutional *form*: in the way in which they are publicly recognised, codified, regulated and legislated for. Modern societies orchestrate our experience according to tacit but none the less well-policed boundaries. We 'live' our gender, our sexuality, our nationality and so forth within well-defined institutional regimes of belonging. Before the coming of modernity there may have been more amorphous and contingent senses of existential belonging. In modern societies these taken-for-granted intuitions become structured into an array - into what we might think of as a 'portfolio' - of identities. And these codified identities all have important implications for our life-chances, our social regard, and our material and psychological well-being. It is out of this formal differentiation, rather than out of the raw data of experience, that identity politics is born.

And as the globalization process rapidly distributes the institutions of modernity across all cultures, it generates these institutionalised forms of cultural belonging - in some cases where they have not before played any role in traditional cultural life. One rather interesting interpretation of the impact of globalization to flow from this is that, far from destroying it - as many suppose - globalization has been perhaps the most significant force in *creating and proliferating* cultural identity<sup>5</sup> One might even be driven towards the paradoxical conclusion that the real danger of globalization - as witnessed in various episodes of ethnic violence - is that it is producing *too much* identity!

But let me now try to connect these thoughts about the institutionalisation of identity back to the issue of cosmopolitanism. And here I want to inject some optimism into the discussion: to suggest that we may be able, as the British say, to have our cake and eat it. I take cosmopolitanism here to mean identification with wider human communities than the locality, the ethnies, or the nation. But instead of seeing this identification as inevitably *in tension* with the preservation of cultural difference, we can think of it as part of the same formalising tendency of modernity. In short, we can understand cosmopolitan humanism as another type of identity position.

The category of 'Humanity' is, in effect, a specific modern category of identity: it is an 'imagined community' to which people can claim attachment and, indeed, to which specific juridical rights and obligations belong. This is an identity which is universal by definition, but which remains compatible with a huge range of cultural variation, by dint of context. Human rights can be invoked to argue for universal standards of justice, or equality of provision in health care, education and so forth - but in precisely the same way they can be used to defend cultural difference.

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<sup>5</sup> Tomlinson, J. 2003: 'Globalization and Cultural Identity' in D. Held et al. (eds.) *The Global Transformations Reader* (2nd Edition). Cambridge, Polity Press.

So, to be both 'human' in its rich pluralist sense of preserving cultural difference, and 'human' in juridical-universalising terms, is a trick brought off precisely by the framing of *repertoires* of identity which is typical of cultural life in global- modern societies .

In the midst of the proliferation of localisms, sharpened cultural discriminations, in short, *diversity*, global modernity also generates for us a powerful, flexible category of cosmopolitan belonging.

But how does this understanding help with the dilemma we began with, of whether, in concrete cases, to endorse the politics of universal humanism or the politics of cultural difference? Well let's not pretend that it suddenly magics away all of the conceptual tensions, nor the real political problems around putative regimes of global - or indeed regional - governance. What we agree to put inside the box labelled 'human rights' will still be a matter of contention. How, for example, do we reconcile, in hard cases, the contradictory claims of traditional religious observance (for instance, in relation to dress codes) and of gender or sexual equality?

The hard truth is that we can only try to work through these issues in patient dialogue. However, thinking about these issues in terms of identity positions does, perhaps, soften some of the starker intractabilities. What we know about modern identities is that, despite being so crucial to our social being, they are in many ways soft-shelled categories. It is possible - indeed it is common - without contradiction, to hold a repertoire of overlapping identities: to be , for example, at the same time female, Chinese, a Beijinger, a political dissident, a patriot, a Buddhist, and an admirer of western liberalism. And in the same way it is possible to hold human rights which are, as it were, *transferable* across different contexts. The appeal to the level of the human universal can be made in situations where more particular local communal attachments can be reasonably judged to be repressive. But this universality does not need to be understood doctrinally, nor does it need to be seen as always holding precedence, as the card which trumps all 'lesser' rights and duties.

So to conclude. Identities we know are constructs not possessions. Despite the historical tendency for cultures and nations to claim universality as their possession, the appeal to the universal can perhaps be made to work as a *construct*. as one way of understanding our human condition and of relating in constructive dialogue with others. What is clear, finally, is that, faced with a future world of what Clifford Geertz has called 'pressed-together dissimilarities variously arranged, rather than all-of-a-piece nation-states grouped into blocs and superblocs'<sup>6</sup>, this dialogue needs to be resourced with nimble and flexible concepts and ways of thinking. That is part of our task in this colloquium, and I'm looking forward to learning from the diversity of discussions that will follow.

**Mohammed Arkoun, *University Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris:*  
"In praise of subversive reason: beyond dialogue and the quest for identity"**

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

On 20-21 September 2001, the Council of Europe organised a colloquy on the challenge of religious, spiritual and cultural identities. It was my privilege to be there, and to present a paper on inter-religious dialogue and interculturalism. That meeting was one of the first

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<sup>6</sup> Geertz, C. 2000: *Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*. Princeton , New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.226

responses to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001; several participants voiced their personal reactions, and various experts went confidently over the ins and outs of the tragedy which had jarred the world's consciousness. And now here we are again, brought together by the same Council of Europe to discuss the same obsessive question – a question still asked, but rarely illuminated, let alone rendered obsolete, in terms not just of analysis, but also of practical solutions, particularly in the fields of research on, and teaching of, the various cultures and religions which now co-exist in the European political and cultural area. I can go further back than September 2001 and remind you that, on 28-30 May 1991, I acted as rapporteur for a major Council of Europe/UNESCO colloquy on a theme very close to the one we are discussing today. Specifically, we were exploring "The contribution of Islamic civilisation to European culture". As general rapporteur for that colloquy, I made six practical action proposals, which later fed into Assembly Recommendation 1162 and Assembly Order 465. The whole report can be found in document 6497, published by Lluís Maria de Puig. Not only are the points made at that meeting as valid as they were then - events since 1991 have highlighted the responsibility of all those European institutions which spend so much money, mobilise so many people, and are still unable to secure the political backing needed to act on clear-sighted diagnoses and realise epic visions of peace and progress for the future.

Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand why the many researchers, teachers and experts who give their time and commitment to this cause, both as citizens and humanists, end by losing heart. Everything lands in the archives – if indeed any traces are kept of even the most important intellectual and cultural events. The other lesson that past experience teaches us is that today's distinguished speakers – today's first-time contributors – are forcing doors long open, and garnering plaudits for well-worn sentiments repeatedly aired and applauded at a long series of earlier colloquies. My own feeling is that I must - to do justice to the invitations which still come my way – keep insisting on the need for action more in line with the approaches and strategies which the challenges of our history demand.

My long experience of colloquies on Euro-Arab, Islamo-Christian and Judeo-Islamo-Christian dialogue, the clash of civilisations, interculturalism, and so on have led me to adopt a more radical stance, both on the theories, grievances and claims of our Muslim partners, and on the things which the late lamented Pierre Bourdieu attacked so fiercely in eloquently-titled books like *Les Héritiers*, *La Reproduction* and *Les Méditations pascaliennes*. The last opens with a "critique of scholastic reason", which ends by declaring that "radicalising radical doubt" has now become essential. This seeming pleonasm reflects the failures, the omissions, the backings-off, the tiresome redundancies, the forgettings, the systematic elimination and the arrogance of Euro-Western attitudes to everything which has been relegated to the rest of the world since the "end of history" and the "clash of civilisations" were proclaimed in the US. That was immediately after the collapse of one of the two great powers which redrew the world geopolitical map at Yalta. Nominally, of course, there were four great powers, but it was actually the US which gained most when the USSR started to totter and finally disintegrated. The first Gulf War showed that a one-pole world had really arrived – and we all know what came of German and French resistance to the second war against Iraq.

The aftermath of 11.9.01 revealed the full extent of the crisis which now affects modern reason and the "values" trumpeted by the West as it calls for a "just war" - using terms which have much the same ring as those used by the popes who backed the crusaders against an Islam whose intellectual and cultural influence was powerfully felt throughout the Mediterranean. I employ this historical parallel, although I have repeatedly denounced its ritual use as ideological justification by many Arab Muslim intellectuals. What I am thinking of here is the persistence of a certain scholastic strain in Euro-Western thought, which briefly told us in the 1970s that the grand narratives were finished, and that post-modernity had come. What our bold talk of post-modernity actually implies is that modernity itself still thinks and acts in terms of the grand narrative which it constructed as a basis for the joint sovereignty of intellect and politics, which it substituted for the earlier sovereignty of theology

and politics reimagined by Spinoza. Strengthened by the great scientific discoveries and the colonial empires, that grand narrative fed our vision of salvation through scientific progress. As happened with the grand founding narratives of the world's religions, modern reason has - like scholastic reason - profoundly refashioned the conditions in which human existence unfolds in historical terms. The mytho-historical narratives associated with these two stages in the history of reason spoke, first, of values eternal because they were "divine" and, later, of values both secular and universal. But all the time, the really universal aspects of the human condition were (and still are) ignored and suppressed in many countries, even in those which invented modernity - and particularly when women, children and "foreigners" are the issue.

In America as in Europe, the "intellectuals" who attracted most media attention after 11.9.01 are fervent supporters of the "just war" which has been waged in the Middle East and the rest of the world since 1945. We have to go back to that date to form a clearer picture (at least in the medium term) of the successive abdications of that reason which we still call modern, although intellectual modernity is still waiting for historians of thought capable of applying to it an anthropological approach which is equally critical of the systems of thought and social constructions of reality generated by all the world's cultures. High-profile philosophers and essayists may focus attention on "the defeat of thought", "disposable" culture and thought, the performance society, compulsive consumption, and commodification of the body and soul, but the market still tyrannises those very countries most radically stripped of their assets, liberties and basic human dignity. In those countries, isolated elites forge ties of solidarity with their western counterparts in a social, economic and cultural environment given over to the implacable forces of structural violence. To avert global collapse of the market, the pace of consumption must be sustained at all costs. This law is simply stated, but it stultifies all the efforts of even the most inventive thinkers to restore primacy of the human person - not just in those rhetorical pronouncements which lend *Machtpolitik* and its priorities an ideological colouring, but in national and international institutions, duly supervised by democratic authorities which have yet to be devised.

This is where the instrumental, managerial and pragmatic reasoning employed by those human resource engineers and experts, who are becoming ever more indispensable, reveals its limitations and its hold on what I would call the rights and duties of subversive reason. I use that term because the term "modern reason" has lost all its conceptual validity, all its links with the intellectual euphoria of Enlightenment reasoning, and all its ability to resist the rise of "disposable thought" and the pleasure/leisure culture - the only things capable of pushing up the TV ratings and generating the profits needed to create jobs. In this connection, I have noticed in the last ten years the growing popularity of French-language women's magazines in the countries of North Africa. In every detail, these are exact clones of their Parisian models. They give advertisers privileged access to the vital women's market, which is why they have succeeded so fast and so durably - although the information and ideas circulated in these societies, where women are still so disregarded, is as superficial, hasty, fragmentary and conformist as in all other parts of the world. Nonetheless, the isolated elite targeted by these publications are proud to have a national magazine as glossily produced as any of its western models. And this lavish outlay - money which could be used to publish theses and scientific works of far more use to far more people - is part and parcel of "disposable culture" in countries where development is otherwise the main priority.

Thus, the things "special" to Europe and the West are both taken for granted and still invoked as a source of identity. Historically, the political and legal revolutions ushered in by new epistemic and epistemological departures in the exercise of reason are, undeniably, one of the main things special to Europe. The industrial and urban revolution, and the later turmoil of our computer age, are also part of that distinctive historical process which has no parallels in other parts of the world. Japan has become a major industrial player by cloning, diversifying and refining products for the market - but never by breaking radically with the Euro-Western approach, which is now revealing its limitations and indeed appearing as a

threat to our species and the planet itself. China and India are both powerful because of their immense human resources, but neither shows any sign of opting out of the race to cut the cost of ordinary consumer items and coming up with an alternative production model. The fact remains that fear of the market's collapsing may paralyse the intellectual and artistic creativity we need to ensure that human beings themselves are not cloned in some future community very different from the one which is hanging on precariously today.

We have got used to the idea that modernity - the intellectual, scientific, cultural, legal and economic adjunct of European history since the 16<sup>th</sup> century - works by regularly plunging set ways of thinking into crisis, allowing us to transcend our assumptions, principles and procedures as soon as they become inadequate, prove ideologically flawed or lose their practical utility. As the processes of history have accelerated and become more complex, so crises have become more frequent and the simultaneous existence of disparate thought systems has increasingly sparked political and social violence. Owing to lack of time, the old rule that the validity of all scientific truths and heuristic theories must be constantly questioned and tested cannot produce all its fruitful effects, particularly in the human and social sciences. This is another constraint specific to our history, which is dominated by omnipresent and omnipotent technology. From the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century on, various subversive thinkers attacked an idealist, mytho-ideological philosophy, in thrall to the metaphysical musings and sociological burdens perpetuated by the still dominant theologians. Philosophy had man standing on his head; Marx arrived and put him on his feet. This marked a break with Enlightenment reasoning, whose knowledge of social and cultural anthropology was too rudimentary and imaginary to offer any clue as to how the intellect really functioned as a social institution.<sup>7</sup> Nietzsche focused on values, and his genealogical survey won consent, even though it was restricted to the Greco-Latin and Christian traditions of a few European societies. Nonetheless, it was Nietzsche who expounded the need for a second Enlightenment. This new break with the past was badly received and badly followed up, but it remains a recurrent strain in all the metamorphoses which modernity has undergone up to our own day. Freud reinforced the philosophy of suspicion by exploring the unknown continent of the psyche and its relationships with consciousness.

Modernity has other emphases which I cannot enumerate here. My purpose is to distinguish the tasks of subversive reason from the other functions assigned to that faculty - always known as reason, although that concept subsumes a whole range of different types of reason. To subvert is to upset an established order, in the field of politics or in that of the modes, channels and content of knowledge. There is a crucial difference between subverting a political system by taking to the streets, and subverting a system of thought by highlighting the ways in which it threatens basic intellectual hygiene (by which I mean optimum functioning of all the faculties which together constitute the human intellect). Street subversion helps by focusing attention on mental disorder, the trampling of legitimate interests and the savage suppression of basic human rights. The people who take to the streets may have legitimate demands, but not always the ability to spell out the conditions of success, or the immediate and long-term effects of action taken in response to those demands. The term "subversion" has negative connotations, insofar as the state, which is responsible for maintaining order, uses the existing system's legal violence to quell the street's illegal violence. Up to 11.9.2001, subversion was everywhere governed by the same socio-political mechanisms, but was always confined within the borders of a given nation-state, kingdom or empire. The Manhattan attacks put it on a new scale: we now have the subversion of *Jihad v. McWorld*, to borrow Benjamin Barber's apt title.

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<sup>7</sup> *L'institution sociale de l'esprit*. Title of an essay by Jean de Munck, PUF 1999. On this question with immense implications for subversive reason, see also Christian Roy: *Sens commun et monde commun*, L'harmattan 2004-09-21 ; Paul Ricoeur, *La mémoire, l'histoire et l'oubli*, Seuil 2000 ; Todorov, Tzvetan: *Le jardin imparfait*, Grasset 1998 ; Max Poty: *L'illusion de communiquer. Le compromis de reconnaissance, théâtre de vie*, L'Harmattan 2004.

This change of scale is crucially important for our own attempt to subvert the world historical paradigms summed up in those two metonyms - *Jihad* and *McWorld* - of such immense historical, anthropological and philosophical suggestiveness. The 11.9.01 terrorists, who are still targeting strategic capitals, declare that they want to subvert, not a local system, but a global order. Undoubtedly, this aim has no roots more explicit than those of the street demonstrations rapidly crushed by the police. To be fair, we should really say that the roots of violent subversion, whether involving street action or terrorism, remain hidden in the unarticulated experience of the dominated, as long as the dominators control free discussion of the issues which predate any clash between established order and disorder, disobedience, rebellion and street violence. It is a constant fact of history that these prelude issues are always controlled (censorship, prosecution, executions, etc.) by a practical alliance between the dominant ideology, which confers legitimacy, and the existing legal system. All the prelude issues dealt with by theologians and philosophers are subject to two limitations, which have never been overcome, and probably never can be: (1) the unthinkable and the unthought, which are part of every system of thought before the dominant ideology and its secular arm become involved; (2) the political system, which is responsible for the established order, and uses its laws to punish anyone who ventures beyond the "thinkable" recognised, and strictly monitored, by the dominant ideology. In the case of Catholicism and Protestantism, dominant ideology has been freed – not by its own choice – of the obligations and concerns of the state. In the case of Islam, however, the state directly controls the management of religious affairs. Judaism, for its part, remains in a state of lively tension with its orthodox elements.

After much violent conflict and many summary executions under monarchical and religious regimes, and later the totalitarian regimes spawned by "modernity", reason gradually made it possible to transcend the limits of the thinkable in the two senses indicated above; but even its most subversive contributions have not so far made it possible to go irreversibly beyond all forms of alliance between dominant ideologies and established orders. Here, we have a right to be hard on modern reason, which has abandoned its critical function and is now exercising an impossible intellectual sovereignty, in constrained or calculated alliance with the various established orders. The recent re-elections of President Bush Jr and Prime Minister Blair have shown how political reason breaks down when it sacrifices democratic legitimacy to electoral manipulation. It is not just the citizens of two great democracies who have been reduced to corrosive scepticism; all the peoples ruled by "truant states" have lost the hopes raised by the world's fight for democratic freedom. In evoking these things, I am evoking the things despairingly said and experienced in all those countries where democracy's torch-bearers have gone the length of waging wars of conquest to install it. Where now can we find credible signs of the autonomy needed to devise new ways of linking *auctoritas* and *potestas*, and so guaranteeing the legitimacy of states in terms of their sovereign peoples? Anthropologists tell us that authority alone creates and sustains debts of meaning between citizens as people, not just abstract individuals, and between civil society and the law-governed state, in which political sovereignty resides. These principles of political philosophy are everywhere disintegrating and giving way to electoral zapping, to electoral demagoguery, to ignorance among those elected by universal suffrage, and to the attention-grabbing antics of leaderships increasingly assailed from the street and stymied by structural violence.

The three great revolutions, English, American and French, took the eschatological hope of eternal salvation and replaced it with a vision of here-and-now happiness and peace through scientific progress and democracy. How much of that new hope remains after the European wars which soon became world wars, the Cold War, the so-called wars of liberation, and the civil wars which have been raging since the post-colonial party-states emerged? The question is a huge one, and is regularly dodged, suppressed, circumvented and transformed by the managers of globalisation into a mirage-version of the right of people and peoples to self-determination. A secular alliance of philosophy, politics and democratic systems has

replaced the alliance of theology and politics which typifies monotheistic religions, and the monarchies and theocracies which some countries still have. The social and political sciences show that what I call the dialectic of forces and residues<sup>8</sup> recurs, and even intensifies, in the two models for the production of the history of man in society.

#### FROM STANDARD DIALOGUE TO SUBVERSIVE THOUGHT

All the types and levels of dialogue practised so far have been constrained, in the course they have followed, in the things their participants have said, and in their agendas, conclusions and aims, by rules accepted as categorical imperatives - rules on listening to others, and on tolerance, self-control, self-protection and silence on anything which might offend, violate a taboo, or prevent the meeting from proceeding smoothly. Meaningless platitudes are the norm as soon as sensitive religious or political issues come up. There are even scientists who feel obliged, in the name of "tolerance", to conceal the implications of any research which seems likely to shake the faith of people who follow other religions. In other words, as scholars, they apply all the rules of critical enquiry to their own religion, and leave other believers to do the same for theirs. Is this intellectual good practice, or simply a case of reason's shirking its primary task of universalising scientific knowledge, which must clearly be subject to debate? What this amounts to in practice is leaving a rubble-strewn wasteland to believers who lack the intellectual and material resources needed for all basic scientific research. This is what many Western experts on Islam have done to Islam itself and to Islamic societies.

It is true that good relations and personal contacts are precious and enriching, and that dialogue promotes them – but their benefits increase if we encourage what I call subversive thought to contribute. So far, I have said nothing of the attitudes of states, civil societies, political parties, and professional groups in Islamic contexts, to the events of 11.9.01 and to the later terrorist acts triggered by the punitive war waged by the new US-led alliance. Although the US and Europe have made intercultural dialogue a necessary concomitant of a tragically unequal and unjustified war, Muslims have persisted in proclaiming their innocence, their eternal victimhood - and thus the need to "defend" themselves by any means available. But there are also many who have chased the mirage of formal dialogue, saying all the right things, swamping the media with "sensible" comment, and roundly condemning all acts of terrorism. They denounce the "false" Muslims who have gone astray and are holding the "real" Islam hostage. Real Islam and modern Muslims have become useful talking partners for Westerners who are deeply convinced that Islam has been nurturing violence ever since it was instrumentalised by lawful (but not legitimate) states, and by inflamed masses left a prey to the blind workings of a global liberalism which extends to even the poorest societies. To call for dialogue between cultures and religions in a situation like this, where radical inequality exists on all levels, is to go on giving *Machtspolitik* and *Réalpolitik* the alibi they need to realise their true designs while posing as friends of humanity. This marks a systemic break with that concern for the human spirit which is still cultivated by various ahistorical abstract spiritualities, and that practical humanism which increasingly isolated European voices are still evoking.

Many facts and examples taken from our history since 1945 could be used to illustrate these hastily made points. However, we would soon lose our way in unmapped jungles of data and practices, if we applied the same critical, searching scrutiny to the immense diversity of the Islamic world, and also of "the West", which is hugely creative - but less and less able to curb the excesses of its own drive for power. Above all, the ideological polarisation of "Islam" and "the West" has hardened to such an extent since 11.9.01 that dispassionate, impartial analysis, which aims to be exhaustive, as well as scientifically and philosophically rigorous, has given way to lumbering erudition, which is itself obstructed by the current heavy

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<sup>8</sup> For the anthropological implications of this dialectic, see my *Humanisme et islam*, chapter 3.

emphasis on "disposable" thought and information. Am I going too far if I say that many of the things said and written on the various forms of dialogue are themselves in this "disposable" category?

Historical solidarity is one fruitful theme which is scarcely mentioned by the many commentators on the Islam/West antithesis. In sermon-like tones, people call for tolerance, peace, understanding, a readiness to listen to others, and respect for their values and achievements. But they rarely suggest ways of making the transition from the instinctive, "natural" forms of solidarity which exist in patriarchal families, clans, tribes, corporations, political parties, trade unions, sects, and religious and/or national communities in a given state, empire or kingdom, to broader forms of solidarity, progressively widening from one's native area to the whole of humanity. This has nothing to do with the universal "values" which are ritually celebrated in inter-religious dialogue necessarily haunted by the eternal teaching of the divine word; or, in secular terms, by the acolytes of the latter-day rationalist "churches". I am thinking of those practical forms of historical solidarity which allowed the EU to transcend the fervent egotism of the secularised state-nations or nation-states and achieve the transnational, transconfessional, cultural and ethnic solidarity which is its hallmark today. We know how the champions of sovereignty resist this move towards solidarity. Also against it are the people who cling loyally to "values" more imagined than lived – values which have never been subjected to that critical scrutiny which all inherited values demand. These are the "sociological" obstacles which delay beneficial changes, or even block them completely if creative imagination and a critical spirit are both lacking. The success of the EU gives us new reason to hope that humanity may yet be emancipated, and that hope rests on sounder historical and cultural foundations than those offered by the history of the US. In Europe, our memory of the past embodies several collective memories, and this plurality enriches our vision and gives us a basis for innovative approaches to global solidarity. It offers us a real possibility of shaking off outworn codes and practices, which fall far short of the challenges the EU has faced, and the things it has ringingly achieved, after the tragic lessons of the intra-European wars, and particularly the 1940-45 war.

All of this ties in with the subversive campaign to violate and transcend the binary opposites: church/state, spiritual/temporal, faith/reason, culture of belief/culture of unbelief, tradition/modernity, conservatism/progress, under-development/development, fundamentalism/tolerance, etc. These opposites still weigh heavily on inter-religious and intercultural dialogue, since European thought - which generated modernity and has managed it so far - is itself far from free of the psycholinguistic and ideological constraints inherent in binary thinking (although it was widely studied and criticised during the brief post-modernist phase). The subversive writings of Michel Houellebecq<sup>9</sup> dissolve our era's disposable values, and discredit deceptive reversions to false distinctions and "murderous identities" - but without offering us alternative paths to creative imagination and to plural thinking, which is obstinately innovative and systematically subversive. In the field of philosophical enquiry, one notes the same discrepancy between the noisy pronouncements of popular authors with high media profiles and thinkers who are less accessible to the general public, more traditional and, above all, confined within the European and American logosphere and systems. This would apply to J. Habermas, P. Ricoeur and E. Lévinas. I single them out because they have worked and thought on the arbitrarily drawn chronological line which leads from the Greco-Latin and biblical heritage up to our own day, without paying the slightest attention to the mediating role played by Arab thought from the 7<sup>th</sup> to the 13<sup>th</sup> centuries. Modish or traditional, many thinkers confirm, by their silence and indifference, the persistence of the ideological boundary traced by the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne in his 1936 book, *Mahomet et Charlemagne*, which has again become topical since the western imagination seized on the Islam/West antithesis.

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. his last, highly suggestive title, *La possibilité d'une île*, Fayard, 2005.

The massive influx of immigrants, who first came to meet industrial Europe's manpower needs in the 1960s-70s, and later as refugees from authoritarian regimes, is now starting to nurture the new forms of historical solidarity of which I spoke just now. Hardly anything is said about these immigrants who are refuting the old paradigms by integrating - not along the lines more imagined than thought out by the integration councils, but within the historical dynamic which has gone into building the EU. Even the most immigrant-friendly political parties have failed to notice, and above all support, these new patterns of personal development, which some writers, artists, researchers and intellectuals have looked at boldly. The many essays and books already published encourage me to say a few words about my own career which, as will be seen, stands for numerous others.<sup>10</sup>

I am one of those new citizens who - with the same convictions, the same commitment and the same critical requirements - simultaneously cultivate several interlocking forms of historical solidarity. My starting point was the little village of Taouririt-Mimoun, 1100 metres up a hill in the Djurdjura. Solidarity there means solidarity with one's physical surroundings, with the collective memory of a community which has shrunk to a minority, and so is united by a powerful sense of identity. Successive enlargements later extended that solidarity to the whole of Algeria, to the Maghreb, the Arab-Islamic logosphere and simultaneously, from my sixth year on, the Francophone and, later, Anglophone logosphere as well. These successive or simultaneous enlargements are so many linguistic, cultural and intellectual paths through the dialectic of forces constituted by the state, writing, academic culture, religious and political orthodoxies, and the residues left by those forces in societies which have no central state, no written tradition, no academic culture and no centralising orthodoxy (oral culture or literature, and animistic or polytheistic beliefs, termed heresies by the orthodox authorities). For me, it was at this point that the transition from the instinctive, unconditional forms of solidarity to historical forms which were thought out, freely accepted, and deliberately reinforced as a basis for new ways of coming to grips with the human condition, took on attractive meanings and fed definite hopes.

Along the way, I had to weigh the humanist implications of each successive level of solidarity. That was why I set out, in addition to my French schooling, to master the intellectual and scientific heritage of what I have called the Arab-Islamic logosphere - that language and culture known as "Berber" since the Romans and, more recently, as *amazigh*, in which all the various forces which have played across North Africa survive in residual form. That was also why the humanist question remained central to my process of thought and enquiry: I wanted to be able to connect my broadening solidarities with that vision, which was capable of becoming universal, but never prematurely proclaimed as such. This same desire to push back the boundaries of solidarity in a critical spirit is the guiding principle behind the things I am fighting and working for in the European area - on paths marked to a greater or lesser degree by Islam and the history of Arab thought. My doctorate thesis at the Sorbonne dealt with "*L'Humanisme arabe au 4e/10e siècle*"<sup>11</sup> and I have recently taken up the same humanist cudgels in "*Humanisme et islam*".<sup>12</sup>

This brief autobiographical excursion seems essential to forestall any misunderstanding concerning the thing I practise under the deliberately provocative name, subversive thought. Why subversive? What am I subverting? And for whom or for what am I subverting it? This is not the place for a detailed account of a philosophy and practice which I have been following as individual and citizen. First of all, subversive thought is a determination to rethink and rewrite the history of all the systems of thought and culture which have marked the Mediterranean area, trying all the time to reconceptualise them. I am not, *a priori*, privileging

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<sup>10</sup> Among many other first-hand accounts, I would like to mention the autobiography, *Al-Ayyâm, Les jours*, of the Egyptian writer and humanist, Taha Hussein, originally published with an introduction by André Gide.

<sup>11</sup> 1st edition Vrin 1970; 3<sup>rd</sup> edition 2005

<sup>12</sup> Vrin, 2005

the Mediterranean area over the other great centres of thought and culture. The fact is, that historically, the intellectual, spiritual, legal and cultural roots of the Europe which became the West lie in that area. The fact is, too, that this is also the area where the two main poles of that lengthy history which we rashly boil down to the merciless conflict of "*Jihad v. McWorld*" (Benjamin Barber's title again) are ranged against each other today. Islam and the West have become portmanteau words filled with bombs, violence, mutual ignorance, and mutual rejections – all of which have been piling up since the days of *Pax Romana* in the *Mare Nostrum*, all the way up to that severance on which I refuse to set a date until the professional historians have done so. At present, public opinion feeds on summary official reports, themselves outrageously simplified by magazines and dailies which supposedly deal in "information". But one cannot speak of some great original divide, of the kind wanted by monotheistic religions, each anxious to keep for itself the eternal privilege of divine election, or, from the 19<sup>th</sup> century on, by the colonialists, who set out to bring the lands conquered by Islam back to the one true faith, and the new hopes offered by modernity.<sup>13</sup>

How can we refocus the attention of the various Euro-Western and Muslim communities on a history spanning a very long period, at a time when disposable thought and the culture of leisure, pleasure and desire so powerfully promoted by the media have more or less wiped their own countries' histories from their memories? We are urged to speak of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue even though forgetfulness of the past, as national historians have recorded it since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, is either semi-irreversible, or likely to remain, for many years to come, an endemic part of the Euro-Western vision of the things now regarded as constituting Europe's identity. Who shapes this vision of an identity distinct from all the others which compete for "universal" recognition? The "new history" proclaimed and practised in the 1970s-80s set out to admit other collective memories, and incorporate them into a critical historical consciousness, focused on achieving a shared knowledge of our various pasts. Since we were told that history had ended and the clash of civilisations had begun, political failures, murderous and devastating violence, the aberrations of economic thought, the arbitrary operations of the great monopolies, and the growing effects of unchecked liberalism have been compromising the first tentative steps towards more effective and more durable forms of liberation.

To complete this outline defence and illustration of subversive reason, we still have to consider its cognitive intervention strategies in the various historical contexts which have so far been left to specialists - "orientalists", "Islamists", "Africanists" and others. This is neither the place nor the time to start discussing such issues. I shall merely propose one possible way of linking themes and processes which may allow us to rethink the history of the Mediterranean area.

#### THE TASKS OF SUBVERSIVE REASON

A) Questions of method: Defining the problems posed by religion. Why start with Islam?

A-1) Knowledge in the human and social sciences, the before and after; combine linear history "from the beginning to our own time", and history read backwards from the present. Rethink long, medium and short-term connections in the light of recent debates on journalistic knowledge, which is constantly expanding, and historical and anthropological knowledge, which is recognised and practised, but scarcely propagated. Examples: from the Hebrew Bible to the state of Israel; from the Koran to nationalist party-states; from the prophets to the culture of unbelief; in reverse, from the present vicissitudes of the State of

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<sup>13</sup> For more on the status and future of the Mediterranean area, in terms of a history remembered and shared by all the protagonists in the conflicts which have marked it, see M. Arkoun and J. Maïla, *De Manhattan à Bagdad. Au-delà du Bien et du Mal*, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris 2003.

Israel to the Hebrew Bible; from post-colonial party-states to the Koran and Islam. The tasks of an applied subversive Islamology.<sup>14</sup>

A-2) Typology of "truth-based" and political regimes set against the topology of knowledge; magical, religious, metaphysical in the traditional sense (theological/philosophico-political); theory of fields and their theoretical and practical articulation.

A-3) The dialectic of forces and residues; the three themes of subversive cognition: the intellect as social institution; images generated by societies and social constructions of reality; meaning and power; *Machtpolitik* and the double criteria discourse exemplified by Robert Kagan after 11.9.01.

A-4) Three examples of critical knowledge: 1) linguistic, semiological and semiotic; 2) history "as anthropology of the past and archaeology of daily life"; 3) anthropology as critique of cultures, coupled with philosophical interrogation of human and social sciences, and the identification of anthropological triads, e.g. violence, the sacred and truth, language, history and thought, etc.

A-5) Is there any escape from institutionalised structural ignorance? Apart from working on "exiting religion", it is urgently necessary to extend to modernity the three subversive operations: transgression, displacement, transcendence.

A-6) The hermeneutic question which arises at all stages, before and after; reading and reception protocols.

A-7) Boundaries of "truth", justice and hope in building the European area.

B) Islam challenged by emergent reason

B-1) The conditions for exercise of emergent reason; critique of the "Islamic exception": from historical-critical enquiry to subversion of mytho-historical and mytho-ideological heritages.

B-2) Loci (*topoi*) of subversion in the full Islamic tradition. Religious discourse and the Closed Official Corpus (COC); the great living tradition. Religion into state and clericalisation of politics: the historical and political scandal.

B-3) Founding thought and the impossibility of founding as subversive counterpart of fundamentalist violence. The destructive genesis of meaning and values.

B-4) Principles of archaeological and deconstructive hermeneutics: language →← history →← thought; violence →← the sacred/the holy →← truth.

B-5) From inter-religious dialogue to the transcending of overvalued heritages, revalued by contemporary mytho-ideologies to compensate for cultural vacuums and regressive behaviour generated by strategies for geopolitical control of material resources and liberties in the world.

B-6) Extension of the critique of Islamic reason to all forms of reason which reproduce, following the logic of belief, ideals, meanings and values which have never been subjected to empirical verification and epistemological critique.

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<sup>14</sup> For this notion of applied islamology see, M. Arkoun, *The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic thought*, London 2003

We are repeatedly told, as self-evident, that Islamic thought today is still at the reformist stage of invoking the ancients, or the rationalistic tinkering of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. There is no denying that these strains – represented by so-called moderate Muslims - do exist. But we need to pay more attention to the bolder attitudes reflected in the writings of young scholars, who are played down, ignored or dismissed unread by the political militants. These brave minority voices deserve a better hearing among Europeans – pending their triumph among Muslims.

## **Panel Discussion:**

### **"Towards a common European cultural identity: reality or ideal?"**

#### **Maria Hadjipavlou, *University of Cyprus***

Thank you for the invitation to be part of this distinguished gathering and it always feels hopeful and empowering to be at the Council of Europe which is dedicated to making our world safer, better, more just and equal for all.

Allow me to make some brief comments on the previous presentations and to pose some questions for all of us to reflect upon.

The issue of identity is indeed a significant topic of discussion not only in the academia and social sciences but also in conflict societies where the issue often constitutes a cause of the conflict. As was mentioned by the previous speakers, identity is a social construct, not a fixed and stable unit, it is fluid and porous and this leads us to understand the multiple identities each one of us acquires in our lifetime. Thus, identity in this sense is always in process. National and ethnic identities refer to some shared cultural and social practices as well as to certain historical memories, issues of collective pride and collective grievances or traumas. In this context we need to address what happens when certain parts of our identities become frozen and rigid in times of social conflict. What are those factors and conditions that threaten our ethnic identity and people are mobilized not only to protect it but also are ready to die for it. Related to this is the dichotomy of "us" and "them" which often leads to "essentializing" the other as well as dehumanizing the other. All these attitudes sustain ethnic negative stereotyping, factors that all lead to deep-rooted and protracted inter-communal conflicts. Thus, I would invite us to reflect on what happens when identities are politicized and are turned into issues of power and control as well as to hegemonic prevalence of one identity or ethnic group over the other or others. In situations like this, issues of diversity and multiculturalism are undermined.

In my field conflict resolution we believe conflict relationships are amenable to change thus with the use of dialogue, problem-solving workshops, negotiation skills and healing processes can overcome many misperceptions, stereotypes, misunderstandings, mutual fears and concerns. Communities then can, through gaining mutual trust, be able to jointly engage in a shared agenda to eliminate the causes of the conflict which often have deep-rooted inequalities both economic, political, historical and cultural. In Cyprus, for instance, I have been involved in building bridges of communication and engaging in deep dialogue for the last twenty-five years. Hundreds of bi-communal dialogue and conflict resolution training groups have been working together and a new community of peace builders and change agents has been formed. What I have learned from this experience is that the micro level efforts, i.e citizens' efforts need to be legitimated and acknowledged as making a contribution to the broader peace building efforts undertaken by the macro level. This linkage will bring the two levels –macro and micro- closer as well as develop a civil society that is active. In this way participatory democracy is strengthened and politics is redefined to mean collective responsibility and public engagement. The partial opening of the Green Line in Cyprus has provided the opportunity for direct face-to-face contacts and visits to and from the north to the south. Thousands of Cypriots from all communities visited their homes and properties

after almost thirty years. This meant coming to terms with past memories and a reality check for the future. Often the emotions were very intense but a new understanding emerged about the self and other. The other became a human being with whom relationships and friendships could be established. Unfortunately this dynamic at the people-to-people levels were not transformed into political initiatives and policies at the macro level. This is an example of the lack of linkages and the acknowledgement of the contribution civil society can make.

Another point I wish to raise is with regard to the issue of values and what constitutes a European identity. I believe that the basic values necessary in building a multicultural mentality that would promote diversity are the values of empathy and inclusion. Sensitizing ourselves to the fact that "otherness" is part of us then our mental lens shifts on both the levels of policy-making and the grass-root relationship building. On one level we can work on instilling these values are the formal and informal education and the other is the Mass media and the production of new images, films and the cultural achievements of the other, seeing commonalities and appreciating differences and us. I propose here a dialogue among intellectuals and creative minds from different communities who would undertake the responsibility to transfer to the wider public the Council of Europe's work and visions, materials and ideas produced in the last fifty or so years. We need to build new knowledges based on the above values which in effect promote new attitudes all leading to a culture of peace.

A final point is to ponder over the question of what constitutes a European identity. Does it refer only on the level of values or also on the levels of policies, practices and commitments as well as monitoring mechanisms of the implementation of these shared values and multiple identities? One value and skill related to this question is the development of critical minds as well as self-reflection and self-criticism. Are there, finally, universal standards of what constitutes a new "imagined European community" and who participates in the creation of these standards? This is where participatory democracy and pluralism are very relevant conditions. Do we want a world in which institutionalized or "customary" divisions of any kind are eliminated because they restrict our potential to grow and develop as human beings and as communities? And what is our role of all of us who have gathered here today?

### **Laurent Mazas, *Pontifical Council for Culture, Holy See***

Having been invited at short notice to replace the Archbishop of Strasbourg, who was unable to attend, I refer to the series of colloquies on *The European Identity* organised by the Secretary General during the Luxembourg Chairmanship in 2001. When asked to introduce the first session, I highlighted the tension between the 'particular' and the 'universal' present in every identity: "*While the identity of a people reflects its particularity, it aspires at the same time to universality, through the best of its many qualities and thanks to the fact that it is rooted in human nature. A culture is not truly human unless within it there is an openness towards other cultures and the universal. The requirements of particularity are the basis of the rights for specific cultural identities. The requirements of universality, on the other hand, underlie our consequent obligations towards other cultures and humanity as a whole.*"<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Cf Laurent MAZAS, *The concept of European identity*, statement at the Council of Europe, April 2001. Cf also Pontifical Council of Culture, *Towards a pastoral approach to culture*, para.10, 23 May 1999: "*While the rights of a nation express 'particular' requirements, it is no less important to emphasise universal requirements, with the duties they imply for each nation regarding other nations and humankind as a whole. The primary duty is undoubtedly to live in a spirit of peace, respect and solidarity with others... While nationalism implies contempt or even hatred for other nations or cultures, patriotism is an appropriate particular (but not exclusive) love of and service to one's country and people, as remote from cosmopolitanism as it is from cultural nationalism. Each culture aspires to the universal through the best it has to offer.*"

A question often overlooked is that of the end purpose: why this reflection on the European identity? To enable Europeans to live together more harmoniously in a "European common home" founded on peace, justice and love. The end purpose is mankind!

With reference to John-Paul II, Polish by culture, a great European and a universal man: "*Man is at once the son and creator of his own culture*", I should like to stress the meaning of the Holy See's insistence on recognition of Europe's obvious Christian roots, while pointing out that they have never been thought of as excluding other contributions. When someone offers a fruit to eat, he does not force you also to eat the roots of the tree which gave that fruit. The important thing is not to make false accusations against the Church, but to understand the real reasons for the appeals it makes.

The body for which I work, the Pontifical Council of Culture, set up on the initiative of John-Paul II, is concerned with the Church's contribution to the building of a more humane world through the promotion of a culture of and for man.

Based on my participation in the drafting of the Opatija Declaration, I should like to point out the importance of an awareness, not only on the part of culture ministers, but on the part of all civil authorities, of their role, not in the field of interfaith dialogue as such – it is for clerics to dialogue amongst themselves – but in the conditions governing that dialogue: the important thing is that, in states, interfaith dialogue should not be made impossible because of partisan attitudes by public authorities. The conditions governing dialogue mean, on the one hand, genuine dialogue by the state with individual religious denominations – secularism does not mean ignorance of the components that go to make up the nation – and, on the other hand, a knowledge of religion which depends on education – some countries seem increasingly aware of how dramatic it is for a population to have lost the key to understanding its cultural heritage. In order not to oversimplify, or even distort, curricula must be designed in co-operation with the relevant religious authorities. Lastly, the media are falling short in their role as mediators by giving insufficient coverage to certain extraordinary initiatives in the area of interfaith dialogue, such as the Assisi meetings held on the initiative of John-Paul II, or the Sant'Egidio meetings, which put right certain prejudices concerning the link between religion and violence.

Lastly, I wish to emphasise the role and ability of religions to contribute to the building of a better society. One should not be afraid of religions, but one should be afraid of men and women who manipulate them for purposes other than their true purpose. Religions themselves fear such individuals, who distort their message.

### **René Gutman, *Grand Rabbi of Strasbourg***

Like science, technology, culture, philosophy and politics, our social structures have clearly become secular, in the sense that religion no longer regulates them – but this does not mean that the modern world has lost all sense of the sacred. Indeed, the ideologies reflected in talk of the "end of religions" and "death-of-God theology" are starting to seem poor tools for tackling the complexities of life today. Perhaps they really reflect our inability to decipher signs of a return to the sacred - disillusioned as we are by the crisis of religious practice, and the idea that the sacred is no longer our monopoly.

Religion today is a protest, not so much against our Western societies' indigence, as against their lack of meaning - so much so indeed that it sometimes looks like a kind of counter-culture. Perhaps it embodies, not absence and outworn apprehensions, but a new creativity? To the extent that religion no longer necessarily expresses the quest for false security, but rather – on the profoundest level - man's longings, and also his transcendence of those longings, we must now put a rather simplistic faith/religion antithesis behind us.

Does secularisation mean that the human and divine projects now coincide to a point where religion has a utopian function? In one sense, secularisation may mean disenchantment, since it leaves us alone in a world stripped of the sacred. In another, however, it means re-enchantment, since it makes the world a less frightening place, leaving us full masters of our destiny, but without the hope of some ultimate straightening of accounts. Can we combine the benefits of secularisation and religion by removing the drawbacks of each (lack of transcendence and fear of a last judgment)? For Judaism, this should be no problem, since our relationship with God and our relationship with other humans are never seen as separate. The sacred is not all-consuming, it does not put the faithful on a higher plane, and it is not the prisoner of human religious observance – it is truly present only when we recognise others and welcome them.

### **Catherine Lalumière, Moderator**

Very briefly and without trying to draw conclusions – which would be entirely presumptuous – I shall make three main comments on the things I have heard you say:

The first concerns the various speakers' insistence that identity – any identity, and particularly European identity – is an ambivalent concept. It can be a good thing, since it helps us all to know ourselves better and position ourselves in relation to others. But it can also degenerate into an excessive affirmation of the distinctive features that divide individuals or groups. This may lead to ghettoisation, sectarianism and possibly conflict. Exalting one's own identity can take one a very long way. National identity, for example, has sometimes given rise to the worst of horrors. So beware of asserting identities too strongly, for the risk of "spilling over" dangerously is a real one.

To keep Europe's identity flexible, fluid and capable of changing, we need dialogue, first between Europeans themselves, and then with neighbouring countries (particularly in the Mediterranean) and finally the rest of the world. For the things said here seem to me to make it clear that we must not confine ourselves within narrow geographical limits. Repeatedly, the speakers have insisted that identity, including European identity, is not a function of territory. In other words, Europe's geographical limits are not necessarily the limits of its identity. That is an interesting point for some of the countries on the edges of the European Union, whose Europeanness is being questioned. What is Europeanness? There are plenty of geographical elements – but history and culture are, above all, the things that forge identity.

Second idea: importance of the goal. One uses an identity to do something, to defend something. In this case, when we talk about European identity, we are talking about something we use to build Europe, to defend a certain culture or even civilisation, or something like that. And values too, of course.

The poster inviting us to today's colloquy spoke of humanist Europe. That was a wise choice and a revealing one. Yes, our Europe is primarily founded on humanist values derived from many sources: the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the Greek and Latin heritage, the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, Arab-Muslim influence, etc. And the purpose of the European project is to defend a conception of the individual and society which is rooted in those values. The problem today is that Europe's political leaders, and particularly the EU leaders, seem to have forgotten that, and are not pointing clearly to a goal which can galvanise energies and excite the young. Until we do that, we shall continue to have that generally lack-lustre climate which we have, unfortunately, today. People, and particularly the young, need a goal - if possible, a goal which embodies an ideal and a dream.

And then a third comment: I was very much surprised that so little was said about the humanist content of European identity, as if that went without saying. You will say that we are at the Council of Europe, where it really goes without saying. The cornerstone of European

identity is respect for human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. That is all obvious here. But there may be other contexts and places where it is not so obvious. The European Union, in particular, needs to give its many initiatives and policies a philosophical and cultural basis which is something more than a materialistic scrambling for economic assets.

At the end of our work, I should like to thank the speakers very warmly for the high quality of their contributions and the interest which they have aroused.

## **Theme B: "Diversity and cohesion"**

### **Mikhail Shvydkoy, *Federal Agency for Culture and Cinematography, Russia*: "Protecting and managing cultural diversity"**

I am sorry, my dear colleagues, my English is not Oxbridge, but I try to be understandable. Since my English is not so sophisticated, from time to time, I will be not polite, as is usual in the Council of Europe, and I will be a little bit more direct.

I am sorry, but this is a problem of education, not of tolerance.

Yesterday I talked with my colleague, Minister Filipov – he was the Minister of Education in the same government where I was a Minister of Culture -, and we made a small remark. Here in the audience of this colloquium are about 15 states represented, and at least 10 languages. But we speak just in French or in English. Perhaps yesterday; when we talked about the European identity, this was normal – but what do our German or Italian colleagues say?

But today, when we talk about cultural diversity, we continue speaking French and English. This is not a critical remark, this is a practical remark. This is reality. Because if we talk about the technical management of cultural diversity, we must understand that the management of cultural diversity is absolutely not the same as its protection. Talking about management, we will use two languages, everybody understands that, this will be practical and very simple for everybody. It is normal management, and a fact of social life.

In Russia we have absolutely the same problem. One of the problems for Russia at the beginning of the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, was a very simple and fundamental question: Who are we? During the Soviet time we had a very simple answer, which was ideological and absolutely totalitarian: "We are Soviets." And only after that were we Russian, Tatar, Jew or somebody else.

But after the collapse of the USSR, where we had this Soviet umbrella, Soviet roof – Who were we? Even when we talk about translations, we have one serious problem. The Russian is an ethnic, national term. But at the same time the Russian is a citizen of the Russian Federation. And, for example, Tatar people do not want to be Russians, or Chechen people do not want to be Russian. The question is really important for the whole of Europe.

Yesterday we talked about what it means to be "European". This is the same problem: what does it mean to be a Russian citizen today? What are the common values? Where is the common frame for everybody?

When we talk about protection and management, the answer is very simple. What is necessary for the protection of cultural diversity? A good legal base; a real social policy; democracy; liberty; freedom; and money. And a very important point: the activity of each ethnic group, the self-activity. Here we face the same problem: When we talk about the contemporary situation in the world, a lot of people do not want to be part of a great nation. They want to be part of a small national group.

In 1994 in Russia, there were 130 ethnic groups, not more. Every five years, we have more and more nations in our country. In 2004, we had 190 ethnic groups.

You must understand that people are a bit afraid. In Ukraine, they are a little bit afraid of being Russian, in Russia they are a little bit afraid of being Tatars or Jews; in France they are a little bit afraid of being German; in Netherlands they are a little bit afraid of being Ethiopian or from the Arab world. People try to adapt themselves. That was the main tendency in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. If you look at the general picture of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, you will find that if people lived in another territory or another state, they tried to adapt. They did not want to be separated.

But in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially in the last 30 years, cultural diversity has become a problem. It is a social problem if the Turks in Germany want to be Turks, not Germans. They develop a much more conservative community than the Turkish nation in Turkey, because in the Turkish state the nation develops, whereas in Germany the Turks try to remain an ethnic group of its own and they retain conservative basic values. This leads to a quite complicated situation, because we try to give a very simple answer by saying that everything will be well if we have democracy, if we have a real ethnic national policy. For Russia, however, it is not so simple. I will explain why.

The Caucasus district of Dagestan, for example, is composed of about 100 ethnic groups. In a small country village, the country road may divide two communities speaking two different languages. There are eleven main state languages in this autonomous region; eleven theatres; eleven newspapers; eleven different time slots on television and radio – how can one manage this situation? But many times this is due to history.

If you look at the old street signs here in Strasbourg, you see two languages: French and Alsatian. Everybody agreed that this must be done because the Alsatian dialect is very important. In Brittany, it is the same. At the same time, however, one must understand that if we want to keep all social possibilities for all citizens, they must learn French because higher education, for example, is offered just in French.

The higher education in Russia is mostly in Russian, and this is normal. On the other hand, many radical ethnic groups said, "we want to have national chemistry or national mathematics." We must find the delicate balance between real social management of the state – because you must manage the state, not just cultural diversity – on the one hand; and cultural protection, protection of cultural diversity on the other. This is a very delicate, sensitive point.

In Russia, during all our 20<sup>th</sup> century history and even before, during the monarchist Russian history, the territory and nation were the same. The Tatars lived in Tatarstan; Chukchi live in the autonomous district in the Northeast. The same applied everywhere; territory and nation were the same.

But after the collapse of the USSR the situation changed completely, because a lot of migration occurred from central Asia and from Azerbaijan, Georgia, etc. In Moscow today live about one million Azerbaijanis and they want to have their newspaper, their programmes on radio and television, they want to have schools – and that is normal. This is for us an absolutely unusual situation, but we managed to introduce the law of cultural autonomy, because people living outside their metropolitan territory must have all possibilities for their development. At the same time, however, Azerbaijanis migrating to Moscow must learn Russian language, if they want their children to be educated in high school.

It is a quite complicated situation. If in the beginning of the 1990s we had 100 cultural communities in Russia, now we have 420. Usually we say that in Russia we speak 100 languages, but in reality we speak about 200 languages in Russia.

The mainstay of our policy is the law ensuring the free cultural development of ethnic groups. We do not have enough money, but this is the same everywhere. It would be very strange if I said that we had enough money for culture. Maybe in France in the 1970s you had enough money for culture... Now, however, having culture and not having money is a normal situation. In Russia - and I think in Europe - the legal basis is good.

The problem of cultural diversity is a problem of trust. This is a very important point. If people understand that their cultural, their national identity will not be used for limiting their social rights, they will found a new ethnic group in your country. I think that the protection of cultural diversity is the protection of freedom. Protection is the main value, freedom to express yourself.

It is the same as for unique people. In the north, we have ethnic groups comprising no more than 100 people, but they do not want to be Russians, they do not want to be Hunty or Muntsy – they want to be Vozhane, even if there are only 98 persons in this group. For them it is very important. They are not afraid, now. Many new nations reappear, who previously had disappeared in society.

Protection is a problem of the legal base, a social problem of guarantees and social security for people. Expressing their national feeling, their national culture is the main value. Of course, the problem shows itself in the street, among neighbours, not in the offices of the Council of Europe or between politicians who have a debate in the European Parliament. This is a problem that you have here in France just as much as we have it in Russia. You look at the Arab district, or the Jewish district, and you try to provide a secure life for all these people.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we have an absolutely new situation. I made a great mistake when I thought that the 21<sup>st</sup> century would be the same as the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Now, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, I understand we scrutiny all traditional bourgeois values – these values were the spirit of our lives, like a glass of water! – like freedom, liberty, justice. We grew up with these values from the 18<sup>th</sup> or maybe the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Now, however, we say that we already have limited liberty, freedom, justice – we want security. Security is the key word for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. That presents a big problem for national diversity and for cultural diversity, too. When people feel afraid, they do not want to be Muslims, but want to be like everybody.

When we talk about globalisation, of course it is mostly a problem of good economic and social management. When we talk about security, the main value is not liberty, not justice – the main value is the life of the human being. For the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the answer was very simple. Albert Camus once wrote, "People who already limited their freedom, their liberty for safety, never will have freedom, nor safety, nor security." This was very important for the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but the 21<sup>st</sup> century gives an absolutely different answer. We say we need just security.

Culture is not isolated from the questions of contemporary political life. This is a problem, Yesterday, when we talked about the European identity – of course, there is a problem of basic values of Europe. But the basic values of Europe today are not just Christian, although European civilisation has grown out of Christian values. If you want to be European, you must say well I am part of this civilisation. Now, however, this is not enough.

The balance between democracy and security reflects the problem of protecting and managing cultural diversity.

What is the goal? Why is cultural diversity necessary? Is it because we are liberal and democratic, and want to give everybody the chance to develop? No. I think we have a practical reason. Nobody knows which experiences humankind will need in the future.

Nobody knows. Will this be the experience of our civilisation, or maybe of the Chinese, or maybe of Northern ethnic groups – who knows? Nobody knows. The problem will become obvious in the 31<sup>st</sup> century.

The problem of globalisation is the problem of simplification. Everything is simple. The consumer civilisation is the civilisation of the user – not "loser", but "user". From time to time, however, "user" and "loser" means the same, because we lose the variety and the multiple view of the world. Cultural diversity is necessary for everybody and for us too. Because when we reflect with the other nations, you look at the world in a much deeper way and with much more variety and much more sophistication.

Cultural diversity is a practical goal, a very practical subject, because nobody knows which experiences we will need in the future.

### **Gvozden Flego, University of Zagreb: "Inclusion, participation and the role of culture"**

Since I prefer a lively discussion to a monotonous and monological presentation, I will be brief. Being brief, I will express a thesis, in the form of points or labels, instead of detailed argumentation and a long discourse. However, I will not focus merely on the two subjects, mentioned in the title but wish to discuss four points concerning culture. Namely: its very character, the culture of peace, education, and human self-projections.

I. I understand culture in a very broad sense: it is a human invention by which humans believe they have created their own rules about how to live. This very specific *conditio humana* starts the artificial, primarily the non-natural i.e. cultural, human existence. We humans are what we are as defined by our culture.

Culture, understood as a totality of human rules and deeds, thoughts, physical artifacts and social institutions, is the result of many individual efforts and contributions to humanise nature. At the same time, these individual efforts have to be collectively approved or accepted. This is why, by its very character, culture has to be considered as a collective human deed. By its very character, it is cooperation between people and a cultivation of the quality of their lives.

Culture is often attributed to the human capacity to reason which produces a meaningful lingual communication. This meaningfulness, the magic transformation of things, processes and feelings into words has been achieved, thanks to symbolisation. And creating symbols is not exclusively based on reason but is an activity composed of conscious as well as unconscious components of the whole human being.

So presented, culture might be considered as universal, as valuable for all humans, being at work in all recognised human communities. But looking from such a 'systemic point of view', the concrete ways of symbolizing, the arbitrary attribution of a symbol to a meaning becomes the cross-roads, from which particular lingual communities or cultures differentiate. After the tower of Babylon people started to speak different languages, through which they socialised as well as individualised; people, at least at the beginning of their existence, share most views and values of their respective communities, i.e. cultures; based on these views and values, they establish political communities, i.e. nations, they produce art, write literature, become educated. It is inside such cultural frameworks that people wonder about the sense of life, about their existential goals, about ways and means to achieve happiness. We are ever more aware that particular cultures do influence the development of individual character traits and we are ever more and more aware of the existence of collective characteristics of people, of so-called collective identities.

Culture is simultaneously individual and collective. It immediately shows that we humans are living together and it demonstrates that it should remain so. As Hegel claims in his "Philosophy of Right", in a civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) human beings are bound by the "system of needs", by deep and unavoidable interdependence. And this is an additional reason why culture in general and *cultures* in particular, need to be considered as *attempts to reflect on how we live together. And how we can live together.* This was my first point.

II. One cannot get rid of one's own – theoretical and immediate – experiences. Coming from Croatia, almost half of the last 15 years I experienced war: destruction, killings, suffering, misery in addition to existential uncertainty. Following the two diametrical ways of living, namely living in peace and living in war, I am inclined to divide culture into two major groups: the culture of war and the culture of peace, the culture of antagonism and the culture of cooperation, the culture of elimination and the culture of inclusion, the culture of tearing apart and the culture of putting together. War is a crude and violent tool to solve problems or to impose oneself on others. As violent, as crude and as primitive, its manner of relating is much more animal than human and much more natural than cultural. However, I consider this orientation as culture given that a great deal of human effort has been invested into making and winning wars, since nowadays a great part of research and industry is invested and involved in armies and armament, for potential or actual war(s).

There is no question that I am, indeed we are, on the side of peace. Nonetheless, there are still many on the side of war. Some may argue by citing Heraclites, the Greek philosopher who dates back to the dawn of western culture, that war is the mother of all things. They might refer to modern political theory and economic models, showing that competition is the best guarantee for progress, for both individuals as well as political communities. Reference might be made to the economists and their conceptions of the modern market as a place where we are fighting each other in order to achieve the very best results in order to get maximum quality and quantity for minimal expense. One could also argue that there would be no sports without efforts to beat the other and that there would be no profit without attempts to be better than competitors.

While making efforts to eradicate war, I am not trying, even as a professionally deformed professor of philosophy, to neglect diversity and to look for an absolute unity in a world of diversity. As a cultural pacifist, I am not going to plead for any kind of absolute harmony among different people. Nor am I trying to deduce a moral teaching out of the Christian belief that we are all brothers (it should be said: brothers and sisters) and that we should *a priori* love each other in God. I am only trying to draw some lessons out of cultural achievements. Let us focus less on open conflict and more on constructive cooperation! Let us insist less on differences and more on common traits!

The pleading for the *culture of peace* was my second proposal to be discussed.

III. So, I believe culture in general works for peace. It undermines wars and strives towards the predominance of a peaceful and cooperative co-existence. One should remember that modern philosophy started with Hobbes in the form of an anti-war campaign. In spite of this very fact, the question remains open: how to promote peace and how to make it stronger?

Cultural achievements opened new horizons, or at least enlarged the old ones. The process of symbolizing and meaningful communication was a revolution in our long evolution. The invention of learning and teaching was a logical extension of it. And an organised and institutionalised education became another *differentia specifica* of *homo erectus*.

I do not intend to be shocking, but I have to be clear: teaching and particularly schooling imposes meta-physics – it introduces students to something that is behind, or beyond something which is seeable, touchable, smellable. It connects students with others, it introduces them to that which is different. The acquired knowledge opens new opportunities. Put simply, otherness is experienced as a desirable richness. To know means to understand but it also means to practice too. Therefore, learning about others implies that others entered into students' lives. It means that students have started to cooperate with others.

The school system is a very sophisticated and technicized part of our culture. However, learning has become more informal, with self-education or life-long learning commonplace. Using the internet, reading books and journals, travelling, meeting others and otherness – all this brightens our views and enlarges our horizons. And it operates continuously. *We, humans, are learning permanently.*

And this would be my 3<sup>rd</sup> point, but it needs an addendum. The system of formal education is the largest project in every country and as such is politically very important. What's more, this system is extremely influential, both regarding individual and social welfare. However, the way it enables students for their future and the contents through which it is doing so are under national umbrellas. And it seems to me that national education systems in Europe need some changes. It might be of great importance to try again to introduce into secondary schooling some kind of "Bologna process", at least in order to discover some common forms of thinking about common futures.

IV. Cultures have probably been established and developed based on the human ability to memorize, to represent, to symbolize, to reason and to fantasize. The combination of these factors creates amazing results: religions, arts, architecture and urbanism, techniques and technologies, philosophy and science but also projections about better worlds and better human relations. Step by step, besides the present, humans discovered the temporal, divided into past, present and future.

At this final point, I would like to introduce a short reflection on identity. Identity means exactly what it is, the equality to itself, the sameness, and, according to Aristotle, it means what it is to be (*TO TI ÊN EINAI*). Analyzing historical, namely temporal dimensions, Maurice Merleau-Ponty would say that the past is what has already happened and as such it is determined; the present is actually nonexistent since it is just the tinny connection between past and future and whenever I say "now", this very moment becomes past. The only temporality which is undetermined, open, which offers opportunity, which involves possibility, which contains freedom, is the future.

We are very aware that our cultures, our traditions and particularly our life histories determine us. They strongly influence our ways of thinking and of deciding, our ways of planning and of acting. But we have to be ever more aware that, especially in the modern age, and particularly at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the world became dramatically dynamic and "everything flows". So we are. We humans, dreamers, trying to actualize our dreams, we are making of ourselves something new, so we are "in a making". We are in a way of becoming. We are made up of our projects at least as much as of our identities, of our pasts. We are looking into our future much more than into our past. And if we have to keep the concept of "identity", I would prefer to call it "projective identity" or "identity in the making".

If this is the case, we have the chance to rethink the question of how we can live together. Or better: *how should we live together*. Particularly since we are ever more aware that whatever has been made by humans is not so good that it could not be better. And particularly if the possibility for establishing the new would be steered by a peaceful, cooperative synergy.

**Panel discussion:**

**"Turning Europe into an inclusive and cohesive, civic and creative community – future challenges for culture and education"**

**Giovanni Di Stasi, *President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe***

The European Cultural Convention of the Council of Europe is Europe wide, a unique tool for flexible cultural policy and encourages cohesion in the field of cultural activities within 48 European states.

Can we imagine "European citizenship" without Culture?

My answer of course can only be no!

For centuries European heritage as been built up and we now have the opportunity to benefit from its richness and its diversity throughout Europe. This has created, in the people's mind, a growing awareness about the unity and diversity in the field of culture which is mutually complementary.

Not surprisingly, totalitarian regimes tried to use and to abuse culture for the purpose of propaganda, for the glory of their leaders.

The strength of culture is related to shaping people's mind. This is why we insist on the importance of diversity within the European cultural heritage. Diversity is a guarantor for pluralism in the people's mind. Cultural pluralism constitutes the basement on which is build our democratic culture is built, democratic pluralism, respecting the opinions and the visions and the cultural background of the other, constitutes a basic achievement of our modern societies.

Culture is a key to understanding and knowledge.  
Knowledge is the best from of prevention with respect to intolerance.

Together with other European partners and institutions, the Council of Europe was able to shape cultural policy under the terms of the European Cultural Convention. This gives the Council of Europe the means to organise opportunities to exchange knowledge, the pooling of experience and co-operation on joint projects, in order to build concrete aims to be achieved within members states.

The aim is not to improve Europe's cultural reputation or to attempt to pretend for some form of superiority, but to help member states, regions and local communities to provide the necessary conditions to enable cultural life to develop and to flourish beyond national border and regional limits.

The concept of inclusion is vital within the Council of Europe's approach, not only on the level of social and human rights, but also with respect to access to culture and education.

Culture as a from of coherence , a "vehicle of meaning" and tool for understanding, as the agent of individual and collective human development and the embodiment of social values, is vital for education and training in favour active citizenship. Democratic values can only develop where the respect of human rights and the building of confidence must be rooted in the respect of cultural identities.

I would like to thank you all for your valuable contributions and let us use this fascinating opportunity to look into culture diversity as a contribution to increase cohesion among Europeans, from the East and the West and from the North and the South.

Culture was always an asset for Council of Europe's work in general and for the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in particular and has now become an integral part of our common understanding of cultural heritage, as being part of our democratic roots.

Building and relying on these cultural roots enables us, to shape a pluralist society, which helps us to respect the other as an equal partner and an integral part of our society.

Pluralist democracy constitutes one of the core values the Council of Europe. The Congress is representing more than 2000 000 local and regional communities all over Europe. Within its bodies and structures the Congress is applying, also through the implementation of its major conventions in the member states, the principle of subsidiarity, in order to help the citizen make up his mind, to formulate and express his political will and then to bring it to the appropriated political level for decision.

We all benefit from the achievements realised within the framework of the European Cultural Convention, promoting new forms of cultural interaction and the knowledge of other cultures.

Intercultural dialogue is one of the main commitments made on the occasion of the 3rd Summit in Warsaw, let us all strive to make it happen.

### **Katerina Stenou, UNESCO**

This session on cultural diversity and social cohesion is of the highest interest to UNESCO which considers that this theme represents one of the major challenges of our time.

These early years of the third millennium have shown noticeable signs of the forces of globalisation and fragmentation working as a duo to produce a more and more standard world globally and a more and more heterogeneous one locally.

In other words, our societies must cultivate the "right to difference", while communities claim the "right to resemblance", the builder of their identity. UNESCO is secure in this realisation and from its foundation onwards has sought to promote respect for "the fruitful diversity of cultures" of the world. UNESCO has entered on a new area of work with the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity adopted in 2001, and has prepared a draft Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions for submission to the next session of the General Conference.

Cultural diversity is more than just a patchwork of multiple identities, it is the power and the principle at work wherever there is transmission of a heritage to be made fruitful by each individual's and each group's creative efforts which can be varied ad infinitum. Cultural diversity brings us back to the multiplicity of the forms whereby cultures of groups and societies find expression. It reveals the capabilities of the human intellect for conceiving new forms of truth, beauty, and justice. In this way, cultural diversity becomes the factor that pushes memory, imagination and innovation to the limit of their power.

Culture does not predetermine individuals, much less their behaviour. It can nevertheless become a means of identification *a posteriori* when economic, social or political exclusion selectively strike certain particular groups. It becomes a haven for "disaffiliated" individuals.

In a final analysis, culture is not intrinsically a factor of division, because it is not a frozen, static entity.

For the wager of "living together" to be won, it must be underpinned by a society adaptable enough to redefine the foundations of its social and cultural contract whenever necessary. Every political community is built on certain common values. These values are not fixed simply because they correspond to a given historical moment; a society must be capable of revisiting and redefining them. What is at stake underneath the issues addressed is the construction of a civic community which is not only plural but pluralist.

The paramount goal of social cohesion is to be attained through dialogue planned along the lines of a major work project. This should take in not only the historical foundations of each culture but also an up-to-date analysis of individual and group aspirations. In this way, the increasingly constant practice of seeking cultural cures for democratic shortcomings or social ills will find its full justification. Culture, with all its diversity, too often regarded as a cause of conflicts when used as a means to factional ends whether ethnic, religious or otherwise, must become an instrument of peace according to a purposive construction founded on permanent dialogue.<sup>16</sup>

**Cézar Bîrzéa, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest**

Education for citizenship has been one of the Council of Europe's flagship activities, particularly since the nineteen-nineties. The project has been divided into three separate stages:

a) *From 1997 to 2000*, attention was focused on establishing EDC as the ultimate aim of educational policies. It therefore concerns the education system as a whole and not just a single school subject (civic education). It follows that all the components of the education system (the curriculum, management, non-formal education and teacher training) must provide the necessary support for the teaching of democracy. The desire to make EDC the ultimate objective was taken into account in two political documents at the European level: the Declaration of the Krakow Ministerial Conference (October 2000) and a Committee of Ministers resolution.

b) *From 2000 to 2004*, the main activity was a European survey on progress toward the ultimate aim of educational policies. The main conclusion was that there was a compliance gap between statements of intention and practical measures or, more exactly, between the texts adopted at the political level and what was happening in practice.

c) The third stage, the *European Year of Citizenship through Education*, is a direct response to the conclusions of the European survey. The underlying idea of the European Year (2005) is to encourage practitioners and public authorities to work out suitable ways of fostering citizenship through education and to provide practical support. To this end, the team responsible for co-ordinating the Year (the CAHCIT and the Secretariat) has prepared a set of educational tools (the "EDC pack") for direct use by practitioners. These tools are comprised of a handbook on quality assurance and self-evaluation for schools (for the

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<sup>16</sup> "Dialogos": this Ancient Greek term is a compound word, in general poorly translated and understood owing to confusion between "dyo" and "dia". It does not mean that two persons or two groups converse, but that two or more persons agree to match their respective logics to the finish. Dialogue thus constitutes a hazardous exercise as it involves the risk for the speaker of seeing his thought transformed and thus having his identity put to the test. The prefix "dia" is equivalent to the prefix "trans", which denotes a considerable shift in space, time, substance and thought. With Plato, who codified dialogue as a tool for common seeking after truth, the term acquired its full meaning, its shape and its limitations. And so dialogue, the instrument for testing the validity of a thought, can be an individual exercise too: one can carry on dialogue with oneself and it is not a barren monologue. Dialogue does not purport to arrive at a final conclusion. Dialogue carries a paradox in its latent oral quality, which shows through even in its written form and guarantees its vitality. Thus it becomes the eternally renewed means of restarting the thought process, challenging certainties and advancing from one discovery to the next.

attention of head teachers and school administrators), a compilation of teacher training methods (which encourages school-based teacher training) and a methodological guide to non-formal education (designed particularly with youth trainers and civil society in mind). These tools are based on three principles of EDC, which are participation, the management of diversity, and the direct exercise of rights and responsibilities.

**Simon Mundy, *International Policy Institute, King's College, London***

Identity has become a word with dangerous and conflicting connotations. Individuals are freer than ever before to adopt elements that contribute to their sense of identity, social and ethnic groups use the concept of identity to justify their special treatment. In the meantime governments are obsessed by identity – their own (the importance of their flags, anthems and symbols of dignity) and that of the inhabitants of their territory. Governments are desperate to be able to answer the question 'who are you?' They attempt to do so by all the technological controls on offer – cards, photos, fingerprints, DNA, retinal scans, bar codes. If the public authorities could reduce us all to a bar code and pass us across the supermarket until they would be happy indeed.

However much physical definitions may tell security services in fact, though, they are utterly misleading in predicting how people react, to whom they owe allegiance and how they construct their personal world identity. Often, to the confusion of governments, the identity is non-territorial, non-geographical. The identity will have more to do with communities of interest (professional, social, sexual or of pastime) than with where people live and what is printed on their passports. Surfers or philatelists have more to say to their fellow enthusiasts than they do to their next-door neighbours. Identities are always multiple – a combination of ancestry, habitation, work, personal experience, belief, taste, love and inclination. They cannot be regulated or pinned down and they change through life, often rejected, often resurrected.

Real globalisation, rather than the corporate or trade variety, allows us to become cosmopolitan, to choose the elements of our identity we wish to emphasise and explore. We can belong wherever we choose and hold our multiple identities simultaneously without threatening our neighbours, the government or the cohesion of society, and at the same time enjoying their respect. That can be defined as cultural security – individual, not endowed by membership of an official tribe, and mobile.

Uncomfortably for bureaucracies, cohesion is not conformity and it cannot be achieved by passing a law or restricting the freedom of movement of dissenters. Angry and excluded people will not be assuaged by having their identities denied, neither will peaceable citizens be reassured for long by governments with fixed ideas. Protectionism against other people works in the long run no better for societies than it does for trade. It leads to stagnation, insularity and paranoia. Security is always relative and should not be confused with comfort. There is, in the end, no more absolute security than there is absolute safety or health.

To make the most of people's identity, to enable them to use all its elements creatively, we need to realise that in societies, as in music, counterpoint is always more rewarding than static harmony. However perfect harmony looks in a chord, without counterpoint it is merely part of a progression without dynamic movement.. We must educate for a global age, investing people as they emerge into citizenship with the ability to argue, the agility to harvest ideas and the adhesiveness to accrete new components to their mental costume. We must let people design their own flags, not assume that the national, regional or city flag under which they stand, gives more than a hint of their true identity.

## **Michael Raphael, Tel Aviv**

Diversity and Cohesion was the name given to today's session, I would like to give it a little bit of a youthful spin. In yesterday's session we acknowledged the fact that in today's globalized and digital world many factors influence the formation of cultural and social identities. We have also acknowledged that more than in the past, today's youth identify themselves through many complex identities including subcultures and virtual culture. The discussion of cultural diversity in Europe must become inclusive and relevant to the new generation who perceive culture in a different way.

Cultural identity is more fluid and dynamic today than it ever was. Intercultural dialogue is happening across Europe through the internet and other digital means. Traditional cultural borders are disintegrating and losing their relevance, even the language barrier one of the cultural signifiers, is slowly disappearing. In today's Europe, youth interact and connect more and more without the mediation of institutions and a formal education system. At rock concerts, tourist sights, and large-scale raves, a multi cultural youth meet. What can we do in youth work that will support a healthy and positive cultural interaction? How does intercultural learning stay relevant in a fast paced and dynamic cultural orientation?

Historical narratives played an important role in the old cultural paradigm but historical debate or consensus on major events is no longer the first relevant issue for youth. The youth today is interested in building social relationships that are relevant to today's new, borderless Europe. The majority of youth today understand that personal and social success depends on their ability to interact and to understand other cultures. Those left behind and isolated because of cultural orientation, be it an immigrant to the west or due to geographical alienation, need to be included in the discourse. Failure to do so could lead to choices of cultural chauvinism or religious fanaticism to compensate the feelings of exclusion.

Intercultural learning fundamentally is teaching skills that improve relationship building. Intercultural learning is not learning about the "different" culture, as an anthropologist or historian, but experiencing the "other" through an existing interactive and dynamic social relationship. The cultural historical narrative is no longer about a perceived truth, but a reflection of a perceived relationship between cultures. The quality of social relationships therefore is at the center of the cultural dialogue.

One of the members of this panel mentioned young Turkish immigrants in Germany turning to fanatic Islamic ideologies and asked if we should be tolerant of these movements in our societies? For me the question that should be asked is, "What are the needs of these young men and women who choose these ideologies?" Should we not examine our own relationships with the immigrants who feel alienated and denied social mobility?

We must open up a transparent dialogue within our communities and understand the needs of other ethnic and religious groups within European societies. Only a true process can create a diverse and cohesive European community. Those religious and cultural groups who feel confused, vulnerable and unsafe should be invited to express their concerns before channels of communication breakdown. This vulnerability needs to be addressed by creating space throughout the communities especially for youth to meet and exchange cultural ideas. Spaces like this exist at the Council of Europe Youth Centers. One is here in Strasbourg and the other in Budapest. These model centers need to be replicated in every country in Europe as an investment that will contribute greatly to the social and economic development of those countries.

Young people should be part of the process and have free and equal access to intercultural education both in the formal and informal system. The process must be inclusive and reach out to the young religious and ethnic minorities. Communities must be empowered to take part of the process by creating incentives and offering a real change in dynamics.

Recognition of wrongdoing and transgressions in the relationship will be a strong base to develop a real dialogue. Confronting both racism and islamophobia in public campaigns like "All different All equal" of the Council of Europe help those in Europe who feel threatened by growing suspicion and alienation. A diverse and cohesive Europe is possible only through a process where all sides will feel their needs have been satisfied.

### **Jacques Toubon, Moderator**

To close today's discussion, I should simply like to say a few words. First of all, the point just made by the former Russian Minister of Education is totally obvious, but cannot, in my view, be emphasised enough. Economic and financial resources are essential to realising objectives – national objectives, local objectives or the Council of Europe's objectives. It is absolutely clear that conventions may remain mere empty scraps of paper unless they are backed by resources.

Now I would like to make four or five comments on some of the things other speakers have said.

First of all, this whole debate is basically about creating or maintaining the possibility of choosing, and the freedom to do so. That, primarily, is what cultural diversity is: freedom, which has often been mentioned, means freedom to choose.

Secondly, freedom to choose may well put an end to segregation – which actually means being confined by others or oneself.

Thirdly, if we have freedom to choose, action against discrimination, which is central to all our discussions, will become real and not merely theoretical. Discrimination, of course, is the inequality suffered by those who cannot escape from a given state or idea. Thus the freedom to choose is fundamental.

I was also struck – and there is nothing surprising about this at the Council of Europe – by the importance you all attached to knowledge, learning and education. It is true, as someone said just now, that there may be educated people who are against diversity and tolerance. On the whole, however, it is clear that knowledge makes for tolerance and acceptance.

I shall give you a topical example: in our own country, at President Jacques Chirac's suggestion, we are planning a museum of the primary or primitive arts - call them what you will. The idea here is to show that civilisation, art and culture are not just the things you see in the Louvre or the *Musée d'Art Moderne*. People all over the world have been creating for centuries, and are still creating today, things which are works of art, which are meant to be works of art or which can become works of art. Realising this strikes me as vital.

History (our Greek friend said something very interesting about this a short time ago) is a path we absolutely must follow. Because history is a bit like painting: you put on one layer, then another, then you add another colour, and so on – and all these very different colours add up to give you the final colour. Telling the story of the past is like that too. I am very anxious, for example, to make the history of immigration part of the history of France, which is recounted today as if it were only the history of those who were French from the outset. The fact is that the French include many men and women who were not French to start with. Telling the story of immigration is telling the real story of France, and not the story invented at the end of the 19th century or even since Michelet.

Knowledge makes for integration, but so does language and history. In this way, we can ensure that the colours do not clash, but blend to give us the new colour - the new colours - of our societies. We are fighting to maintain, promote and protect that diversity (i.e. freedom),

but also to ensure that the present and future beneficiaries of that freedom, both individuals and groups, use it in a way which allows us to build harmonious societies. Knowledge, education and culture will teach them to use freedom to promote the things which unite, not those which divide.

## Closing Session

**Lynne Chisholm, *General Rapporteur, University of Innsbruck***

Where meaning escapes our grasp, personal lives and social life lose sight of their purpose. Meaning lends reason to life, and values underpin the meanings we attach to and derive from our lives. Cultures comprise recognisable *Patterns of Meanings*, to use the title of anthropologist Ruth Benedict's classic analysis. These, in turn, provide frameworks for constructing, positioning and amending identities together with the scope for diversity amongst them. In other words, culture lends coherence to the ways in which we come to understand ourselves and others as both autonomous subjects and members of shared communities, which may – and today largely do – encompass considerable internal diversity. The fields of both productive and negative tension between identity and diversity in contemporary European culture are visibly and palpably restructuring the challenges facing cultural cooperation policies and programmes. How should Council of Europe perspectives and activities respond?

The colloquium placed dialogue and exchange at the centre of its agenda, with the aim of fostering a positive balance between, on the one hand, enhancing social cohesion through shared identity in Europe and, on the other hand, supporting social inclusion through affirming diversity in Europe. Cultural cooperation itself covers a broad, diverse spectrum of contexts and activities. This colloquium accorded particular priority to education as a field of cultural practice – a crucial context for the formation of identity and community, for building commitment to active participation, respect for human rights and a confident approach to living with difference and diversity. The reflections that follow do not summarise the content of the individual contributions – these speak for themselves – but they rather draw inspiration from the dialogue and exchange between those contributions and the discussions these prompted amongst all colloquium participants.

### MULTI-LAYERED EUROPEAN IDENTITIES

Enlightened cosmopolitans living in 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe regard multi-layered identities as a desirable state of affairs, an emblem of high social status and an attribute of the 'good citizen' in a post-modern polity. Such identities are by no means a post-modern invention, but the value and meaning we attach to them are culturally more salient than in the past. They are also socially and economically more widely available than they have probably ever been before: formal education (officially) underwrites the aims of open democracies; non-formal learning via exchange and mobility programmes reaches more young people than ever before; informal learning in the everyday life of multi-cultural, multi-ethnic societies is becoming part of common culture.

And yet it was only four decades ago that R. D. Laing's boundary-breaking phenomenological-existential study of the social genesis of schizophrenia – *The Divided Self* – was published. One of the key features of Laing's analysis lay in the effects of conflicting messages about the balance between the freedom and constraint to be oneself, one's whole-self-in-the-world, and to be able to act accordingly. Laing thus places schizophrenia in relation to what he terms a 'sane schizoid way of being in the world' – in other words, he normalises multi-layered identities. At the time, this was a radical approach to the formation of subjectivity in a European intellectual and political environment that assumed discrete and coherent forms of identity based on apparently self-evident, unchanging social and cultural foundations. Today, it appears theoretically unremarkable.

Being sanely schizoid might then be seen as a core feature of post-modern European existence – and it implies the capacity to juggle Irving Goffman's *Presentation of Self in*

*Everyday Life* as seemingly effortlessly as possible. Above all, good jugglers have to practice constantly: their performative competence lies in an astute combination of skills and experience, of knowledge-in-action. Acquiring, handling and acting out multi-layered identities are not unlike the ongoing process of becoming and being a good juggler. The problem is that the opportunities to do so are not equally available to everyone, whereas the capacity for flexible coordination and rapid response may not be evenly distributed either. In practice, it is not necessarily helpful to rent people out of their carefully, often painfully set-down *roots* in order to embark on *routes* for which they have no maps and no vehicles. If acquiring a European dimension to our 'portfolios of codified identities' (John Tomlinson, this colloquium) is, in principle, a desirable voyage, then the voyage must have a purpose. That purpose can only be described in terms of learning to live not only productively but also joyfully together – and in as much peace as we can sanely manage. We have to concede that the value of this purpose is not self-evident to everyone (whether living in Europe or elsewhere) and so making this self-evident to as many people as possible is a key challenge facing cultural cooperation in the future.

#### THEORY AND PRACTICE

The foundations of Council of Europe activities ultimately reside in a set of democratic, humanitarian and solidary values. These are high-level abstractions, and they can be readily understood and implemented in diverse ways. Opening up opportunities for dialogue and exchange at abstract level may be an intellectual feast, but it is also a Cartesian feast, a feast of the Enlightenment, a feast of Ulrich Beck's first modern era or Anthony Giddens' high modernity. We are all attached to this kind of feast, we know and trust the cuisine, and we have good reasons for our preferences.


The difficulty is that we no longer live ontologically in a Cartesian world, whereas there is good reason to suppose that its epistemology has lost at least persuasive cultural force and arguably its practical utility. Today's transitive and dense world is much more amenable to understandings derived from chaos theory, which can locate highly complex order in apparently random events and processes. We are moving into much more process-oriented, action-based and open-ended heuristic frameworks for making sense of the world and ourselves within it. The chaos theory core concept of sensitive dependence is much more useful in such contexts, whilst the notion of initial conditions can only be arbitrary. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, given the speed and complexity of contemporary change? How could it be otherwise, in the light of democratisation and informalisation processes in society and culture, albeit so imperfectly realised in practice?

Both the diversification of identities and the democratisation of cultures – that is: processes of change and development – are *rooted* in the capacity to act or, in other words, to participate actively and equitably in *la vie de la cité*. Educational and cultural *practices* should be the foundation for future Council of Europe programmes and activities. Perhaps nothing very new is needed in this respect. Rather, we need to put what we know and value more effectively into good practice, and we need to include – in the sense of inviting in – a much wider range of people of all ages into the frame.

#### CULTURAL COOPERATION'S MAGIC TRIANGLE

The symbolic cultural power of the triangle is no secret: in its double form as a six-point star, it resonates with the deepest roots of ancient European cultures. From the point of view of dialogue and exchange, triangulation is culturally and communicatively so powerful because it creates internal space for structured consensus and conflict. Georg Simmel's *Web of Human Affiliation* cleanly elucidates the difference between dyads and triads in this respect: triads demand negotiation to maintain their common space, whereas dyads – though ultimately more fragile – can make do with domination if necessary. Triads are more difficult

to manage, but they are structurally more stable. The colloquium themes can be set into a triangle made up of three lines, or *routes*, between its points, which create an internal 'open space'.



The three points of the cultural cooperation triangle represent interlinked issues of cultures, politics and identities as discussed at the colloquium:

#### Cultures

Cultural production (or creation) as a democratic, plural, interactive and dynamic process:

- a human invention and collective product, rooted in diversity as an empirical fact;
- a hybrid process in constant flux, holding the tension between similarity and difference;
- the practice of interpretation and translation between communities and discourses.

#### Politics

Political culture, cultural politics and the politics of culture:

- focusing on the dialectic between inclusion and exclusion;
- insisting on social cohesion as a matter of political will;
- recognising social power relations as shapers of cultural development.

#### Identities

Identities as chosen future projections:

- emerging from historically-specific generational movement creating values and meanings for European identity;
- emerging demands to shift the paradigms forward from a static discourse, embedded in the past, towards intergenerational dialogue and exchange;
- within a commitment to the freedom to choose and connect roots and routes.

The internal space between the points of the triangle represents the space for dialogue and negotiated commitment, played out in a productive tension between local responsibilities (*roots*) on the one hand, and cosmopolitan de-compartmentalisation (*routes*) on the other hand.

The challenge for the Council of Europe is simply to continue doing what it has long been doing: providing structured and structuring spaces for negotiation between local responsibilities and cosmopolitan de-compartmentalising, to do so as far as possible in an action-oriented way, and to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of impact and value-added.

## EDUCATION AS CULTURAL PRACTICE

Education is more than a vehicle for the acquisition and transmission of culture. Such metaphors imply that education's task is to adopt and convey externally specified values, aims and contents. It may do so in different ways – that is, using disparate vehicles – but its commission is conveyance. This view of education is misleadingly partial. Education in all its guises does not only transmit, that is, reproduce culture, although it certainly does so and this quite intentionally, as a glance at any educational policy document will immediately confirm. Education equally creates, that is, produces culture, not only in its capacity to shape individual subjectivities and generational perspectives but also because it is embedded in everyday experience and action. It is no secret that visualising and understanding the dialectic between production and reproduction in education and society is the core theoretical problematic for educational sociologists. In this context, few would place the thesis of relative autonomy in question, which in essence argues that education is simultaneously dependent on and independent of wider economy, society and culture.

Cultural cooperation policies cannot simply assume that education can and will act as a mere vehicle for the aims and contents that policy aims may wish to promote and enroot. All we know about educational change, innovation and reform tells us otherwise: this vehicle comes with its own drivers and enormous passenger diversity. At the very least, then, educational and cultural policies and programmes need to develop closer forms of critical partnership in order to work effectively together in the interests of furthering the core values upon which the Council of Europe's Cultural Convention is based.

Modern educational systems represent national-cultural traditions in a variety of ways. Behind their formal structural surfaces (which increasingly reflect a small number of related options), their substance rapidly becomes highly complex and mutually opaque. Paradoxically, modern education in Europe has achieved not only high levels of standardisation within national borders but also high levels of differentiation between nation-states. This holds not only for curriculum content, qualifications structures and achievement profiles, but also for patterns of identity formation. The concept of the 'good citizen' may have changed over time, but the point of reference continues to be the nation-state in which the citizen lives: a good citizen is inevitably and above all a good national citizen. This is indisputably what national education systems essentially convey, and this is what national educational policies intend that they should convey. This is, in other words, very much an example of how education acts as a vehicle for cultural reproduction: the idea of the nation-state has become deeply entangled with those of culture, ethnicity and language. Ideally, all these are supposed to concur: within individuals, amongst the territorial population at large, and by extension for those who were 'born and brought up' – *educated* – in a given country but subsequently move to live elsewhere. The formal, legal expression of such idealised congruence is, of course, holding national citizenship.

In reality, we know that congruence is socially constructed and sometimes consciously enforced, not least by means of educational policies that specify the cultures, ethnicities and languages for which educational provision does and does not cater. In practice, we know that citizenship is not coterminous with holding a given passport and that the values upheld by the Council of Europe perforce characterise 'good democratic citizenship' in terms of respect for cultural diversity. National educational policies have long begun to open up to these issues: most education systems recognise cultural diversity within the societies they serve, many cater specifically for it (in diverse ways and to varying extents) and some have traditionally provided specifically for recognised national minorities. Cultural cooperation programmes can and should deliver stronger support to the educational world, faced as it is with the increasingly pressing challenge of re-creating the balance between identity and diversity in today's Europe.

Achieving 'education for all' in today's Europe is not only a matter of widening access throughout education and training sectors and levels. It also implies reviewing content and method in order to make learning attractive to the full range of the population, whatever their backgrounds and circumstances. To do so, we need to shift the accent towards a different kind of educational provision and experience, in which active, self-directed, experiential and intercultural learning stand at the centre. This too is no new insight, but rather, in these instrumentally rational times, a rediscovery of the importance of fostering intrinsic engagement with learning as a process of personal development in active interaction with the social and cultural world, a world that inspires the human imagination precisely because of its intrinsic diversity. This is *the treasure within* of which Jacques Delors and his colleagues so eloquently expressed, and it is this that can incite the joy of learning which too many people living in Europe still miss the opportunity to discover for themselves. At the colloquium, it was astutely remarked that acquiring the joy of learning must no less imply acquiring the capacity to cope with the pain of knowledge. Nowhere is this more acute than in critically reflecting on and learning from Europe's historical incapacity to hold a peaceful and humanitarian balance between identity and diversity.

Developing the capacity to create and hold that balance in today's Europe demands the creation of educational contexts – formal, non-formal and informal – which not only invite diversities in on equal terms, but which also foster a critical, agile, engaged, confident and active citizenry with the shared purpose of making the European mosaic a worthwhile and satisfying space for all its diverse elements to live together. Cultural cooperation arguably here offers a space for exploring and negotiating coherence that is more important than ever, enabling ongoing mutual creation of meaning and purpose. The challenge for cultural cooperation in the future is precisely this: in a highly complex and wonderfully diverse world, to ensure that the engagement and inspiration of the European mosaic do not escape our common grasp.

#### **Cultural cooperation: foundations and challenges**

- Making it self-evident for all that living productively, joyfully and peacefully together is the foundation for identifying with Europe as an *open cultural expression*.
- Anchoring cultural cooperation in cultural and educational *practices, open to active participation by all* and seeking to capitalise on what is known to work.
- Continuing to provide action-oriented cultural cooperation *spaces for negotiation* between local and cosmopolitan perspectives and priorities, accompanied by more systematic monitoring and evaluation.
- Developing closer forms of *critical partnership* between educational and cultural policies and programmes in order to work effectively towards shared aims.
- Delivering stronger *support to the educational world* for re-creating a balance between identity and diversity in today's Europe.
- Offering cultural cooperation spaces for exploring and negotiating coherence in order to enable ongoing *mutual creation of meaning and purpose*.

### **Christian Ter Stepanian, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe**

Five key words stand out from the discussions held over the past two days, which are Europe, culture, identity, diversity and dialogue.

Where "Europe" is concerned, we have seen once again what a complex concept it is and how difficult it is to define. To the public at large, Europe means the 25 European Union member countries. We at the Council of Europe know that Europe is much wider than that. Eleven years ago, in October 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly, in drawing the Council of

Europe's territorial boundaries, based itself on the political concept of the desire to participate in the European process, rather than on a strictly geographical reality. This concept, reminiscent of the "wish to live together" on which Ernest Renan and Charles Péguy founded the French nation, made it possible to realise the original political project conceived in the post-war years. It also made it possible for my country, Armenia, to accede to the Council of Europe in 2001.

With regard to "culture", there have been many attempts to define this notion, which is just as complex as that of Europe. The definition adopted by this colloquy, namely that culture is "the set of values which give human beings their reason for being and doing", is based on the Council of Europe's basic aims, so I fully subscribe to it.

As for the concepts of "identity" and "diversity", they are often presented as opposites. Our proceedings have shown that this is not the case. For us Europeans, cultural diversity is an inherent part of our historic heritage, which has not prevented our peoples and nations from forging a strong identity. Through European integration, we have learned to combine identity and diversity in order to join together in building a plural identity.

Lastly, where the concept of "dialogue" is concerned, this is the key instrument which we can use to blend Europe, culture, identity and diversity into a harmonious whole. Dialogue must be understood in the sense that the humanists of the Renaissance gave to it, namely "accepting that the other has a share of truth which I do not have". It is no coincidence that the great philosopher Erasmus was chosen as the figurehead for the Cultural Convention's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations.

Our colloquy is drawing to a close. Allow me, as Chair of the Committee of Ministers Rapporteur Group on Culture, Education, Youth and Sport, to attempt to draw a few conclusions from it.

The colloquy has been particularly interesting. The intellectual riches that have emerged from the contributions will "fuel" the discussions of the Committee of Ministers and steering committees in future and lead to new approaches.

Although it is dealt with at the Council of Europe as an administrative unit, "culture" (with its education, culture and heritage, youth and sport components) sometimes seems a very mixed field. This colloquy has shown, however, that there are a number of main thrusts which link together all these themes and programmes: the paramount importance of individual and collective values; cultural practices and expectations; political and social challenges. The discussions have shown that there can be no culture without education; that formal and informal education form a whole; that past and future are closely linked; and that dialogue with other cultures is both enriching and necessary.

The framework offered by the European Cultural Convention, which is celebrating its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary, has enabled us in the past to collaborate on a large number of activities and programmes. Needless to say, our resources were not always in keeping with our aims. But we have progressed. Reading the convention today, we realise that the world of culture has changed significantly. Having said that, what new directions will our cultural co-operation take in the years ahead? This colloquy has provided some valuable pointers which will need to be assessed in the weeks to come to produce practical proposals and priorities.

The colloquy forms part of a political process and schedule which started with the ministerial conference in Wroclaw last December and will end with a further ministerial conference in a few weeks' time, in Faro in Portugal. The Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe has meanwhile been held on 16-17 May in Warsaw.

Further work will, at all events, be based on the series of decisions taken at the Summit, in particular those relating to the objectives in the Action Plan concerning culture and intercultural dialogue: “Protecting and promoting cultural diversity” and “Fostering intercultural dialogue”.

I should like to take a closer look at these two objectives. Our heads of state and government expressed their profound conviction that respect for, and promotion of, cultural diversity on the basis of Council of Europe values are essential conditions for the development of law-based, democratic and socially cohesive societies founded on solidarity. The Council of Europe will therefore develop strategies to manage and promote cultural diversity. In this context, our governments undertook the task to foster dialogue on the role of culture in contemporary Europe and define ways to support diversity and artistic creativity, defending culture as a purveyor of values. Steps will be taken to enhance access to cultural achievements and heritage by promoting cultural activities and exchanges.

Where intercultural and interfaith dialogue is concerned, it will be systematically encouraged at all levels. This dialogue will be based on universal human rights and serve as a means of promoting awareness, understanding, reconciliation and tolerance, as well as preventing conflicts and assuring integration and the cohesion of society. Civil society will be actively involved, and women and men will be able to participate in it on an equal basis.

At the Council of Europe, we will strengthen co-operation and co-ordination both within the Organisation and with other regional and international organisations. A co-ordinator for intercultural dialogue will be appointed for this purpose. We will also make use of the North-South Centre, whose mission is to foster European awareness of intercultural and development issues.

The Summit decisions form the framework for our action over the months and years ahead. As I have already mentioned, the next stage will be the ministerial conference in Faro at the end of October, whose main theme will be intercultural dialogue not only within European societies, but also between Europe and the neighbouring regions. Special emphasis will be laid on the southern Mediterranean, and the culture ministers of the five North African countries will join their European counterparts on this occasion. The results of this colloquy's recommendations will be on their agenda. I am sure that they will not fail to arouse their interest. Beyond that, they will provide material for the future Council of Europe white paper on intercultural dialogue, which is to be launched at the Faro conference.

I am sure that you will be interested in following future developments, and both the Director General, Ms Battaini, and I will be ready to assist you in this.

***Joaquim Duarte, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the Council of Europe***

Although I have been unable to attend the entire proceedings because of work commitments, I am very grateful to have been given the opportunity to make a few comments at the end of this colloquy on behalf of the Portuguese chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers.

Like several other speakers (in particular my colleague and friend Ambassador Ter Stepanian, who spoke just before me), I think that this colloquy has been held at a particularly well-chosen point in the celebrations for the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the European Cultural Convention. It follows on from two significant events which took place in Poland, the country from which Portugal has taken over the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers – the Conference of Ministers of Culture which took place in Wroclaw in December 2004 and the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, held in

Warsaw in May 2005 – and precedes the ministerial conference to be held in Faro, in my own country, at the end of October to mark the end of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary.

The main subject for discussion at the Faro Ministerial Conference will be the need to devise a Council of Europe strategy for fostering intercultural and inter-faith dialogue, not only within our societies but also between Europe and its neighbouring regions, in particular the southern shore of the Mediterranean. This dialogue, the importance of which was already underlined at the Warsaw Summit, is one of the priorities of the Portuguese chairmanship of the Council of Europe, for, like many others, we believe that we must face up to the threat which cultural and religious tensions pose not only to the cohesion of our societies but also to the peaceful cohabitation of the different peoples and countries of this planet. We also believe that, among others, the North-South Centre in Lisbon could play an important role in organising such a dialogue.

On account of its geographical position, at the westernmost point of the European continent, opening on to an ocean which, as the poet Fernando Pessoa said, should unite and not divide the world - the character of its people, its traditional mix of cultures and its long-standing belief in the universality of values, Portugal sees the dialogue between civilisations as a vocation, not to say its main vocation. The Portuguese nation is a composite one, shaped by various influences, all of which we value. Although Portugal belongs to the Neo-Latin family and has always maintained a strong loyalty to Rome (as reflected in the titles given to kings in bygone days), it had close links with Islamic culture for centuries

The Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to arrive in sub-Saharan Africa, India, China, Japan and Brazil, are too familiar with the diverse nature of the world to be unaware of the extraordinary things that peoples from other corners of the world have to offer. We have too many years' practical experience of interdependent interests to believe in the inevitability of a "clash of civilisations". We sincerely believe that, beyond the cultural and religious differences that enrich the world while seeming to cause divisions among human beings, there is a common humanity which only mutual knowledge and dialogue can – I would even say must – reveal.

However, we do not believe in multicultural tolerance without values. The protection of human rights and, in particular, the principle of the rule of law and respect for democracy are European values which we believe to be universal. They are not incompatible with tolerance but, on the contrary, a prerequisite for it. We have a common duty to uphold these "core values", to use Council of Europe jargon, and this includes fostering intercultural and inter-faith dialogue. I am sure that your discussions yesterday and today, and your commitment, in many cases a long-standing one, will have gone a long way towards answering the question of how this should be done.

## Biographical notes

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### **Cézar BÎRZEA**

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### **Lynne CHISHOLM**

Professor at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Expert in the sociology of education, work and youth.

### **Terry DAVIS**

General Secretary of the Council of Europe.

### **Giovanni DI STASI**

President of Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) of the Council of Europe, since 2004.

### **Joaquim DUARTE**

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the Council of Europe. Chairman of the Ministers' Deputies.

### **Gvozden FLEGO**

Philosopher. Professor at the University of Zagreb, Croatia. Minister of Research and Technology of Croatia (2002-2003). President of the Council for Education, Science and Culture of the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia (2004).

### **René GUTMAN**

Chief Rabbi of the Consistory of the Lower Rhine (Bas-Rhin), France. PhD in religious sciences. Member of the Standing Committee of the Conference of European Rabbis (NGO) and co-author of *“Juifs, chrétiens, musulmans en dialogue”* (Ed. du Signe 2002)

### **Maria HADJIPAVLOU**

Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Cyprus. Expert in inter-community dialogue, conflict resolution and gender studies.

### **Fabienne KELLER**

Mayor of Strasbourg and Senator of the Lower Rhine (Bas-Rhin), France.

### **Catherine LALUMIERE**

Former Minister of France (1981-1986). General Secretary of the Council of Europe (1989-1994). European Deputy and Vice-President of the European Parliament (1994-2004). Since 2003 President of the “Europe House” in Paris.

**Jacques LEGENDRE**

Senator of the North (Nord-Pas-de-Calais), France, and Vice-President of the Senate Committee on culture. Chair of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

**Laurent MAZAS**

Reverend Father. Pontifical Council for Culture, Holy See.

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Director of cultural policies and international affairs, Ministry of Culture and Communication, France.

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Trainer in inter-cultural learning for about 15 years and expert in mediation and conflict management. Consultant for the Council of Europe in the “Democratic Leadership Programme”.

**Mikhail SHVYDKOY**

Head of the Federal Agency for Culture and Cinematography of Russia. Former Minister of Culture of Russia (2000-2004).

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Director of the Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue, UNESCO.

**Christian TER STEPANIAN**

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe. Chairman of the Rapporteur Group on Education, Culture, Sport, Youth and Environment of the Committee of Ministers.

**John TOMLINSON**

Professor of Cultural Sociology at the Nottingham Trent University. Director of the Institute for Cultural Analysis, Nottingham (ICAn).

**Jacques TOUBON**

Deputy of Ile-de-France, France. Member of the European Parliament, Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democrats) and of the European Democrats.. President of EURIMAGES.

# List of participants

## Speakers, moderators, general rapporteur

- Prof. MohaMrsd ARKOUN**, Professor Emeritus of the History of Islamic Thought, Sorbonne (Paris 3), *Morocco*
- Mrs Gabriella BATTAINI-DRAGONI**, General Director of the General Directorate 4, Council of Europe, *France*
- Mr C ezar BIRZ EA**, Vice-Chair of CDED, Director of the Institute for Educational Sciences, *Romania*
- Univ.-Prof. Lynne CHISHOLM**, Director of the Institute of Educational Sciences, Leopold-Franzens-University Innsbruck, *Austria*
- Mr. Terry DAVIS**, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, *France*
- Mr Giovanni DI STASI**, President, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, *France*
- Mr Joaquim DUARTE**, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the Council of Europe, *France*
- Prof. Gvozden FLEGO**, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, *Croatia*
- Mr Ren  GUTMAN**, Grand Rabbi of Strasbourg, *France*
- Prof. Dr. Maria HADJIPAVLOU**, Department of Social and Political Science, University of Cyprus, *Cyprus*
- Mrs Fabienne KELLER**, Mayor of Strasbourg, *France*
- Mrs Catherine LALUMIERE**, President of the "Europe House", Paris, *France*
- Mr Jacques LEGENDRE**, Chair of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, *France*
- Reverend Father Laurent MAZAS**, Pontifical Council on Culture, *Holy See*
- Mr Simon MUNDY**, Director, Centre for the Cultural Environment, King's College London, *United Kingdom*
- Mr Beno t PAUMIER**, Director for development and international affairs, Ministry of Culture and Communication, *France*
- Mr Michael RAPHAEL**, *Israel*
- Prof. Mikhail SHVYDKOY**, Head of the Federal Agency for Culture and Cinematography, *Russia*
- Mrs Katerina STENOU**, Director of the Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue, UNESCO, *France*
- Ambassador Christian TER STEPANIAN**, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe, Chair of GR-C, *France*
- Prof. John TOMLINSON**, Director, Nottingham Institute for Cultural Analysis NICA, Nottingham Trent University, *United Kingdom*
- Mr Jacques TOUBON**, President of EURIMAGES, Council of Europe, *France*

## Experts

- Mr Jos  Maria BALLESTER**, Programme Director "Heritage and Territory", Marcelino Botin Foundation, *Spain*
- Mr Ion CARAMITRU**, Director of the National Theatre « I.L.Caragiale », *Romania*
- Prof. Daniel COSTE**, Professor Emeritus of the *Ecole normale sup rieure*, Art and Human Sciences, Lyon, *France*
- Mr Vladimir FILIPOV**, Rector, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, *Russia*
- Mr Abdelhafid HAMDI-CHERIF**, *France*

**Prof Vjeran KATUNARIC**, University of Zagreb, Department of Sociology, *Croatia*

**Mr. Shalva KHAKHANASHVILI**, *France*

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**Prof. Christina KOULOURI**, Professor of Modern History, Department of Social and Educational Policy, University of the Peloponnese, *Greece*

**Mrs Ritva MITCHELL**, ERICarts Institute, Cable Factory, *Finland*

**Mr Guy NEAVE**, Director of Research, International Association of Universities, *France*

**Mr Necil NEDIMOGLU**, Head of Department, General Directorate for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Turkey*

**Mrs Nina OBULJEN**, Culturelink (IMO), *Croatia*

**Prof. Mirjana PESIC**, Educational Department, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, *Serbia and Montenegro*

**Mr Jean PETAUX**, Institute for Political Studies, University of Bordeaux, *France*

**Dr Roberto RUFFINO**, General Secretary, INTERCULTURA, *Italy*

**Mr Tonu SEIL**, Head of the Sport Department, Ministry of Culture of Estonia, *Estonia*

**Mr Dick STANLEY**, Former Director of Research, Department of Canadian Heritage, *Canada*

**Mr. Michel THOMAS-PENETTE**, Director, European Institute of Cultural Routes, *Luxembourg*

**Mr. Angelos VALLIANATOS**, School Advisor, *Greece*

**Prof Jerzy WIATR**, *Poland*

**Prof. Dr. Andreas WIESAND**, Executive Director, ERICarts Institute, *Germany*

**Prof. Howard WILLIAMSON**, Professor of European Youth Policy, University of Glamorgan, *United Kingdom*

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**Mr Ryūichi SHOJI**, Consul General of Japan, Permanent Observer to the Council of Europe, *France*

### **Steering Committees of the Council of Europe**

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**Mr Ibrahim SPAHIC**, President, International Peace Centre, *Bosnia-Herzegovina*

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### **Other international organisations, NGOs, foundations etc.**

**Dr. Mongi BOUSNINA**, Director General of ALECSO, *Tunisia*

**Mr Philippe CARMEL**, Director of the Brussels Office, Conference of European Rabbis, *Belgium*

**Mr Ali GEDIKOGLU**, President of the European Cojep Platform, *France*

**Mrs Nadège MOREAU**, Development officer, Franco-Polish Association POLART, *France*

**Mrs Annelise OESCHGER**, President of the Liaison Committee of NGOs to the Council of Europe, *Germany*

**Mrs Monika SIELSKA**, POLART, *France*

### **Invited guests from Strasbourg and the region**

**Mr Jean-Yves BAINIER**, Advisor on international affairs, Regional Directorate for Cultural Affairs – Alsace, *France*

**Mr Stéphane BRAUNSCHWEIG**, Director of the National Theatre Strasbourg, *France*

**Mr Gérald CHAIX**, Rector of the University of Strasbourg, Chancellor of Universities, *France*

**Mr Bernard FLEURY**, Director of the theatre “Le-Maillon”, Strasbourg, *France*

**Mr François LAQUIEZE**, Regional Director for Cultural Affairs - Alsace, *France*

**Mrs Johanna LEHR**, National Theatre Strasbourg, *France*

**Mr Bernard REUMAUX**, Director of “Editions de la Nuée Bleue”, *France*

**Père Bernard XIBAUT**, Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Strasbourg, *France*

### **Other participants**

**Mrs Christiane ANDOLFATTO-RUEBRECHT**, *France*

**Mr Lovis BLOCH**, *France*

**Mr Georg BOLDT**, *France*

**Mr Jacob BRENCIC**, *France*

**Prof. Andrea CARTENY**, University “La Sapienza”, *Italy*

**Mr Angelos MARCOPOULOS**, *France*

**Mr Waldemar MARTYNIUK**, *France*

**Mrs Noella NKUNDWA**, *France*

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**Mrs Alison CARDWELL**, Cultural Action Division, DG4

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**Mr Gabriele MAZZA**, Director, Directorate of School, Out-of-school and Higher Education, DG4

**Mrs Kathrin MERKLE**, Cultural Policy Division, DG4

**Mrs Tatjana MILKO**, Section for History Teaching, DG4

**Mrs Olöf OLAFSDOTTIR**, Head of Department of School and Out-of-School Education, DG4

**Mrs Johanna PANTHIER**, Language Policy Division, DG 4

**Mr Domenico RONCONI**, Head of Cultural Action Division, DG4

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**Mrs Françoise TONDRE**, Cultural Routes, DG4

**Mrs Natalja TURENNE**, Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers

**Mr Ralf-René WEINGÄRTNER**, Director, Directorate of Youth and Sport, DG4

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#### Organisation

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#### Interpreters

**Mrs Sally BAILEY**  
**Mrs Barbara GRUT**  
**Mr Philippe QUAINÉ**

## Abbreviations

ALECSO	Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
CAHCIT	Ad hoc Committee of Experts for the “European Year of Citizenship for Education”
CDCS	European Committee for Social Cohesion
CDCULT	Steering Committee for Culture
CDED	Steering Committee for Education
CDEJ	European Steering Committee for Youth
CDPAT	Steering Committee for Cultural Heritage
CLRAE	Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe
CODBP	Committee for the activities of the Council of Europe in the field of biological and landscape diversity
EDC	Education for Democratic Citizenship
DG	Directorate General
DGAP	Directorate General of Political Affairs
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization