

Illegal Markets and the State

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Types of Crimes for Gain

1. **Predatory** (e.g. car thefts, credit card frauds)
 2. **Commercial** (e.g. bankruptcy fraud, insider trading, price-fixing cartels)
 3. **Market Based** (including trafficking)
 - *Regulations* (conditional contraband)
 - *Taxes* (fiscal contraband)
 - *Prohibitions* (absolute contraband)
- Universally drugs trafficking
 - Criminalised vices (country-variable)

Nature of illegal markets

- The focus might seem to be on market offences.
- But predatory and commercial offences can give rise to illegal markets
 - Counterfeiting of documentation
 - Resale of property obtained by theft or fraud
- Market for laundering offences
- Market for corruption
 - Law and rule-making
 - Regulatory/law enforcement interventions

“Weak States” and crime markets

- Criminal act predicates relate to products
- Produced domestically
- In transit and consumed domestically/outside
- How do we explain importance of the State?
 - “Weak state” but is ‘the state’ weak because it is corrupt or because it cannot control all?
- Weak states for either reason become attractors for crime as producers, intermediaries, and laundering routes

Public and private policing

- The mission of the police is “protect the weak, support the fearful and vulnerable, thank the helpful and lock up the bad guys” Sir Ian Blair (*The Observer*, 3 July 2005)
- Police surveillance technology is not self-implementing
- Technological defences are not proof against social engineering by hackers
- Get private sector to act as unpaid army of informants
- Get private sector to pay (again) for policing of those crimes for which they find *public* police powers useful
 - The officer in front is paid for by Toyota!
- Corporate investigation agencies for more complex cases
- Police as business intelligence managers?

Key Issues

- OC / economic crime policy and its intelligence systems co-exist with, and inter-operate with, systems dealing with the international anti-terrorist response, and with local crime and delinquency concerns.
- What are the purposes of strategic intelligence on crime? Recurring themes/purposes: ► policing ► opportunity-reduction ► recovery ► restructuring.
- Sources of intelligence on economic crime:
 - 1 enforcement sources, 2 auditors, 3 regulators, 4 private sector. Some critiques (democratic deficit, disproportionate, market critiques, social construction).
- Are intelligence collections approaches ‘fit for purpose’? Do they stand up to critiques?

Types of Economic Crime Harm

1. **Harm government/taxpayer interests**
 - Direct taxation (income tax)
 - Indirect taxation (VAT and other sales taxes)
 - Excise taxes (alcohol, fuel oil, tobacco)
2. **Harm all corporate as well as individual/social interests**
 - i.e. systemic risk frauds – Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat - that undermine public confidence in the system as a whole; bankruptcy frauds; maritime frauds; payment card frauds; pyramid selling; high-yield investment/advance fee frauds
3. **Harm social & some corporate interests but benefit other ‘mainly legitimate’ ones**
 - some cartels, transnational corruption (in relation to country *paying* the bribe, not *receiving* the bribe);
4. **Harm corporate/governmental interests but benefit mostly illegitimate ones and some consumers**
 - Intellectual Property ‘theft’ and ‘hacking’

What should we count and why?

- **Victimisation, individual and corporate**
 - Where there *are* identifiable victims
 - Because we know little about fear/concern or direct economic or psychological impact of economic or organised crime
 - Impact or just numbers?
 - The problem of materiality/commensurability
 - **Problematic victim definition of ‘crime’**
 - Victim awareness & ‘correct interpretation’ problems
 - Comparison with rape and racial attacks
 - **Crime & Justice Survey, BCS, CVS and ICVS**
 - Need to focus on the ‘new service economy’
 - Globalisation & national unit problems for surveys

What should we count and why

- Single and multiple offence type co-offending
- A less elegant phrasing for ‘organised crime’
 - But perhaps a more meaningful one
 - Counting number of o.c. groups as a proxy measure of harm/threat?
- Why does counting o.c. matter?
 - Measurement of present harm/future risks
 - Understanding of crime displacement/reduction via reduction of *resources* for crime
 - Obligations to EU and CoE annual o.c. reports
 - Between the risk and the reality falls the shadow

Building the Knowledge Base

- Economic crime data are found outside normal Home Office information sources
- Private sector data sources are important, but normally accessible only where corporate sector wants to be seen as a victim e.g. credit frauds, intellectual property, not as an offender e.g. consumer offences, transnational corruption, *some* smuggling of genuine products
- Flexibility needed as ‘new’ social problems emerge and require some harm estimation
- Corporate and individual ‘identity theft/fraud’ risks conflation of all fraud as ID fraud