



Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy
Ghent University

T. Vander Beken and K. Verpoest – Risk-Assessments – Sarajevo, 8 October 2005

Risk Assessments and Organised Crime

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“The organisation of crime”
Sarajevo, 8 October 2005



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OVERVIEW

1. Background

2. Use of Risk Assessments for measuring Organised Crime

3. Implementation of Risk Assessments

1. Background (a)

RISK

- > Broad definition
 - = chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives
 - Measured in terms of '**Likelihood**' and '**Consequences**'
- > Working definition
 - = depending on the agency and its requirements
 - negative impact
 - neutral impact

1. Background (b)

RISK ASSESSMENT

- private industry

→ sophisticated risk methodologies resulting in precarious profit margins and reduction of hazardous events

AIM is to provide an understanding of the events or actors that can influence points of interest to responsible parties. Designed as a step to be incorporated within a risk management process



2. Use of Risk Assessments for measuring Organised Crime (a)

Risk Assessment and Organised Crime?

- ⇒ Policy makers do not only need a Situation Report but a document that helps them making choices and setting priorities
- ⇒ Need for a comprehensive tool that assists policy makers in the decision making process about organised crime



2. Use of Risk Assessments for measuring Organised Crime (b)

Risk Assessment IS:

- >management-tool in setting priorities by policy-makers
- >a tool to offer a method to systematise information
- >a tool to identify intelligence gaps and thus to point law enforcement to new areas of action

2. Use of Risk Assessments for measuring Organised Crime (c)

Risk Assessment IS NOT:

- >a tool to provide the one and only solution
- >a tool to provide conceptual clarity in the discussion on the definition of OC

2. Use of Risk Assessments for measuring Organised Crime (d)

>Risk Assessments ⇒ Threat Assessments

>In view of setting PRIORITIES

- >requirement of **indicators** which enable the measurement of certain aspects
- >based on the scores of the indicators a **ranking** can be drawn up according to the risk/threat that is being posed



2. Use of Risk Assessments for measuring Organised Crime (e)

RANKING: Be Aware Of

- >dynamic nature of OC and the ability to accurately measure levels of risk
- >Self-fulfilling prophecy

3. Implementing Risk Assessments (a)


ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS

Klerks (2000), Project Sleipnir (2000)

>development and ranking of salient **attributes** which define the character and **risk** posed by **organised crime groups**

>a matrix of attributes against groups makes it possible to develop a systematic overview of the relative risk posed by OC-groups

3. Implementing Risk Assessments (b)



3. Implementing Risk Assessments (c)

TASK ENVIRONMENT

= the environment in which the criminal groups operate

>Risk=Vulnerability

>Vulnerability studies

- >focus not on the criminal groups but on the environment where the threat is likely to occur
- >not only look for situations in which OC might directly harm the sector, but also for situations in which the sector itself creates, inadvertently or on purpose, opportunities for OC



3.Implementing Risk Assessments (d)

- > Previous vulnerability studies
 - > Diamond sector
 - > Transport sector
 - > Music sector
- > Results are only one part of the threat assessment
 - ⇒ have to be read together with the analyses on OC-groups

3. Implementing Risk Assessments (e)

