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Seminar „Jugend und Konfliktlösung“ – Straßburg, 31. März - 2. April 2003
 Hintergrundinformationen zum Zypernkonflikt (Moderator: Dr Ron Fisher) NOTE: This background paper is prepared by the Directorate General of Political Affairs for the seminar “Youth and conflict resolution”, where participants with personal conflict experience are expected to discuss other conflicts, lesser known to them. To serve its purpose, the paper seeks to present fairly the official positions, but also the historic and psychological burdens, the fears and aspirations of the sides in the conflict. In describing the position of one side, the paper contains textual and graphic information, which is not necessarily acceptable and may be offending to the other side. Views are clearly attributed throughout the text. Presenting them does not imply endorsement by the Council of Europe Secretariat. The Cyprus conflict
The island of Cyprus has been partitioned since 1974, when a Greek-inspired coup prompted a Turkish military intervention and occupation of the northern third of the island. The so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) was declared in 1983, but has been recognised only by Turkey itself. The President of “TRNC” Mr Rauf Denktash has been demanding its international recognition ever since. Since 1974 Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been living separately, divided by the so-called “Green Line”, patrolled by the United Nations. The perspective of accession to the European Union of the Southern internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus by 2004 has recently considerably changed the parameters of the conflict. The present stage of the conflict is characterized by the following elements: On the Turkish Cypriot side: The memory of continuous anti-Turkish pressure and violence up until 1974 is still present in the collective mind of the older Turkish Cypriot generation. This still leads many Turkish Cypriots and Turks to believe that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together. The younger generation certainly feels less strongly about Cyprus’ past of ethnic conflict. However any behaviour by the Greek Cypriots of a more assertive nature can relatively easily recall this still close collective memory and revive a Turkish Cypriot feeling of insecurity. Many Turkish Cypriots are afraid that a majority, or a strong and influential minority of Greek Cypriots wants them to live in a reunited Cyprus as a demographically and economically weak and defenceless minority. The “TRNC” leadership has requested since 1983 that the “TRNC” be recognized or treated internationally on the same level as the Republic of Cyprus. Abandoning this demand could be considered as almost unconditional surrender to the Greek Cypriot position. An unsettled Cyprus conflict holds some perks for the acting political elite on the Turkish Cypriot side: International attention (though limited by the lack of international recognition), support by Turkish authorities, full control of their part of the island – all things that may not be in stock for them any longer in a reunited Cyprus. If there was a pretended strategic interest of Turkey in keeping the northern Cypriot coast (hardly less than 70 kilometres away from the Turkish mainland) under its control in order to avoid being surrounded by Greek territory, this argument has been considerably weakened by the EU aspirations both of the Republic of Cyprus and of Turkey. However, holding to Turkish positions in Cyprus may still be a matter of prestige for the Turkish Army. The above factors lead to the following core demands on the Turkish Cypriot side: 1. In case of reunification - restriction of the freedom of movement and settlement and right to property for the Greek Cypriots in Northern Cyprus.
On the Greek Cypriot side The Turkish military intervention of 1974 created a lingering sense of insecurity and threat within the Greek Cypriot community. The fate of hundreds of Greek Cypriots who disappeared in the wake of the anarchy created by the related events remains unresolved. Such a sense of threat was considerably reinforced throughout the years by Turkish immigration from the mainland and by a progressive endangering of the Byzantine Greek element of Cyprus’ rich cultural heritage. This is not so much directed against the fellow Turkish Cypriots as against Turkey and the recent Turkish immigrants. Greek Cypriots do feel insecure as to what the role of these immigrants would be in the case of reunification. They sometimes also attach an irrational fear to these mostly very poor immigrants, seeing them as a potentially dangerous underclass, which could request violently their share in Greek Cypriot prosperity. 1. Compensation or recuperation of lost property - the Greek Cypriot refugees from Northern Cyprus would like to recuperate the possessions they had to leave in the North in 1974 – a position considerably strengthened by the so-called Loizidou judgement of the European Court for Human Rights.
Cyprus can pride itself in a civilisation with a history of more than 3500 years. Very rarely, during that long time, had the island been independent. It had successively been governed by Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, by Alexander the Great and his successors, by Romans, Byzantines, the Arabs of the times of the Califs, by French Crusaders, Venetian Merchants, Ottoman Sultans and finally by representatives of the British Empire. In 1960 Cyprus became an independent State. In 1974 the Turkish Army occupied the Northern Part of the island (i.e. around 37% of its territory). The ground for the present Cyprus Question was laid with the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571. The Ottomans settled 20,000 Turkish soldiers and their families on the island. They received lands confiscated from the expelled or killed French/Venetian Catholic elite. These lands were scattered all over Cyprus, thus creating an ethnic settlement pattern of close co-habitation of both communities that by and large lasted until the Turkish military intervention of 1974. Thus the old city centre of Famagusta was exclusively Turkish, while the surrounding villages were exclusively Greek. In some villages the Greeks lived in the upper village, while the Turks lived in the lower village. The Ottoman rule reinforced the role of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which became the main mediator between the Turkish Governor and the Greek Cypriot population, thus preparing its importance for Cypriot political life after 1960. The 307 years of Ottoman government in Cyprus saw a slowly sinking living standard for the whole population of the island, but Greek and Turks lived peacefully together. More or less voluntary conversions to Islam had risen the percentage of nominal Muslims on the island to 56%. The relation between both communities started to worsen in the wake of the Greek War for Independence from the Ottoman Empire from 1821 to 1827. In order to discourage any revolt of his Greek subjects, in 1821, the Ottoman governor of the island had the Cypriot archbishop and 450 of his followers executed. Because of its strategic value as a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean the British Empire coveted and obtained Cyprus at the Berlin Congress of 1878. British rule laid the foundations for Cyprus’ present-day modern infrastructure and initiated material progress for the Cypriot population. However, from the beginning of the British rule, Greek Cypriots never stopped claiming “Enosis” i.e. reunification of the island with the “Greek Motherland”. They evoked the example of the Ionian Islands (Korfu and the surrounding islands), which the British Empire had ceded to the Kingdom of Greece in 1864. These claims became violent in 1931 when a demonstration in favour of “Enosis” led to the burning down of the Palace of the British Governor. At the latest from this point on the Turkish Cypriots, who at that time made up not more than 20% of the population, started to feel concerned about their future on their home island. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, that had put an end to the Post World War I Conflict between Greece and Turkey, had led to the expulsion of Greek minorities from Asia Minor and of the Turkish Minority from Greece. This example lingered as an uneasy question over the heads of the Turkish Cypriots: What would become of them, if “Enosis” would be achieved? Developments accelerated after the end of World War II and of the Civil War in Greece. In January 1950 the Cypriot Church organised a referendum among its members, yielding a result of 96% in favour of “Enosis”. In January 1955 a guerrilla war of Greek Cypriots against British rule started clandestinely supported by Greece, which also took the Cyprus case to the United Nations. The so-called EOKA organised terrorist attacks not only against British officials, but also against members of the Turkish minority, which was seen as an obstacle towards “Enosis”. As a reaction the Turkish Cypriots formed their own paramilitary group, the TMT. EOKA also brutally terrorised or killed left-wing Greek Cypriots suspected of not supporting fervently enough the national cause or the terror against their Turkish fellow citizens. Another decisive development for the future started when, also in 1955, Britain, in order to improve its tactical position, invited Turkey to participate in the Conferences on the future of the island – in spite of the fact that in 1878, 1914, 1920 and 1923 Turkey had progressively lost and finally given up its sovereignty over the island. Because of EOKA terrorism against Turkish Cypriots, the Cyprus Question immediately became a national issue in Turkey where the nationalist propaganda in favour of the Turkish minority on Cyprus became at least as vociferous as the Greek one. In 1955 the Turkish Government used the exalted national emotions about Cyprus to organise pogroms against the Greek minority of Istanbul, which had remained exempt from the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. Around 50,000 Greek Istanbuliots had to leave for Greece. On a geo-strategic level Turkey was concerned about being narrowly surrounded by Greek territory in the West and to the South – should “Enosis” between Cyprus and Greece become a reality. The EOKA terror continued and a risk of war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus loomed in the background. Britain made several attempts to solve the Cyprus Problem1. Finally, in 1959, Britain started negotiations on Cyprus’ future in Zurich, which included Greece and Turkey as well. A state was created in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots were defined as constituting communities within a well-defined power-sharing scheme. Seats in Parliament and public functions were distributed according to a rate of 70% for the Greek and 30% for the Turkish Cypriots. Greece, Turkey and Britain (which maintained three extraterritorial military bases on the island2) were named as the guarantor powers of the agreement. They were given the right of joint or even unilateral action for the purpose of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Zurich Treaty. Cypriots were not consulted. All in all this created a very special kind of independence and limited the sovereignty of the new state. Almost immediately this constitution appeared not to be working. The Turkish Cypriots in 1960, making up not more than 18% of the population, were incapable to fill the full quorum of their positions. Minor conflicts led them to boycott the Parliament thus provoking institutional paralysis. In 1963 the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios proposed an amendment to the constitution demoting the Turkish Cypriots from the status of a constituting community to that of a national minority. The Turkish Cypriots felt threatened, took up arms and constituted self-defence units. The ensuing fights with Greek Cypriot supporters of Enosis took a heavy toll mostly on the Turkish community. At the beginning of 1964 the UN had to send an interposition force (UNFICYP), which remains in Cyprus to the present day. A Turkish military intervention was stopped in the last minute by a US diplomatic intervention. During the violence the Turkish Cypriots had left or were forced to leave their villages where they represented a minority and took refuge in larger enclaves with a clear Turkish majority. The Makarios Government very quickly blocked these enclaves until 1968. So called “strategic materials” (which could even include tyres) were not allowed to enter. Food and medical supplies were only permitted in rations. All this under the pretext that the Turkish Cypriots were still presenting a terrorist danger. The memory of the events of 1963/64 continues to be upheld in Northern Cyprus. A so-called “Museum of Barbarism” is devoted to it in the northern part of Nicosia. The situation changed again when Greece became a military dictatorship in 1967. In order to stabilise their Government the Greek generals wanted to achieve the national goal of “Enosis” between Greece and Cyprus. President Makarios now appearing as the major obstacle to realise that objective, the junta in Athens in July 1974 sponsored a coup d’Etat against the Cypriot President. Makarios was replaced by Nikos Sampson. He had the nickname “the butcher of the Turks” and requested Cypriot reunification with Greece. Turks, but also left wing and democratic Greek Cypriots, were killed. Seeing a real threat to the Turkish minority, Turkey intervened militarily, almost prevailing itself of the legal basis of the Zurich agreements. However Turkey, during the summer of 1974, progressively occupied - for the 18% of the population that comprised the Turkish Cypriots - 37% of the island. This led to a refugee movement of Turkish Cypriots to the North and of Greek Cypriots to the South. In addition, an exchange of population based on a “humanitarian agreemen”t between the North and the South in July 1975 helped to establish by 1976 two almost mono-ethnic zones separated by the UN held Green Line. Progressively since 1974 Cyprus has become the place of a so-called “frozen conflict.” The Greek part of the island assured international recognition as the only legitimate government of Cyprus. The Northern part declared its independence in 1983, an independence that was however only recognised by Turkey. All attempts to reach a solution – mostly sponsored by the UN –foundered on the stern request of the Northern Part to gain international recognition. On the Turkish Cypriot side Rauf Denktash has led these talks since 1974. During the 1980s and 1990s the political context had a deep impact on the economic situation. While the South prospered (mainly due to tourism and off-shore business), the economic development of the North stagnated. Many Turkish Cypriots emigrated, to be replaced by immigrants from Anatolia. Northern Cyprus also remained one of the world’s most heavily militarised zones with up to 35,000 soldiers being stationed there. Contacts across the “Green Line” were made very difficult for the Greek and nearly impossible for Turkish Cypriots - mostly on the initiative of the “TRNC” authorities. Pan-Cypriot Civil Society activities that may have helped to build confidence between the two communities were therefore very rare. A new development started when the Republic of Cyprus submitted its candidature for the EU with the support of Greece, which made Cyprus’ EU membership a conditio sine qua non of its acceptance of the EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe. Turkey and the “TRNC” immediately opposed this development. They argued that the Republic of Cyprus could not speak for the whole island and that under the London guarantee treaty Cyprus could only join the EU with the consent of Turkey. Obviously a Republic of Cyprus geographically limited to the South would as a EU member even more weaken the international position of the Northern part. It would also extremely embarrass the position of Turkey equally aspiring to join the EU. The European Commission however made it clear that if necessary it would even admit a partitioned Cyprus. Admission procedures went ahead. Membership is now expected to become effective in 2004. In January 2002 President Clerides of the Republic of Cyprus and Rauf Denktash resumed their direct talks under the auspices of the UN; by October 2002 these talks had not yielded any result. In November 2002 the Secretary General of the United Nations presented a peace plan to both Cypriot sides, the implementation schedule of which was tightly linked with the schedule of the Republic of Cyprus’ accession to the European Union. The European Union at the same time reconfirmed its position that if the agreement was not signed, it would admit the Republic of Cyprus, while the “acquis communautaire” would no longer apply to Northern Cyprus. Political observers agreed that this was perhaps the last chance in a long time for the Turkish North to come to an agreement that would try to accommodate almost all its concerns (cf Appendix 4) While the major Greek Cypriot parties accepted by and large the Annan Plan as a basis for negotiation, Rauf Denktash – after a long hesitation – came out against it during the EU Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 where Cyprus was accepted as a future member State. This triggered immediately mass demonstrations in the Turkish part, requesting that he either sign (the Annan Plan) or resigns. In particular, on 14 January 2003 the biggest mass demonstration ever in the history of Cyprus was held in favour of the Annan Plan. All experts of the Cyprus Conflict agree that the draft of the Annan Plan presented perhaps the best possible compromise Since its presentation, however, the Greek Cypriots saw themselves suddenly confronted with the real possibility of reunification. More than the usual concerns over restitution of property, the return of refugees, the sort of missing person etc. financial questions started to overshadow the way to a solution. What would be the final cost of the implementation of the Annan Plan and the rebuilding of a decaying North? Many Greek Cypriot bi-communal activists saw this political development as a consequence of the decade long unwillingess from the Greek Cypriot side to encourage confidence-building measures. This might have been a reason why the Greek Cypriots decided on 16 February 2003 to vote for the leaders of the conservative DIKO party (supported by the communist AKEL), Tassos Papadopoulos, as new President. Mr. Papadopoulos in the past had come out on several occasions against the UN Plan. Transformations of the Cyprus conflict Although Cyprus is often quoted as the main example of “a frozen conflict” the parameters of this conflict have changed profoundly during the 1990s - in particular since the accession to the EU has become a realistic perspective both for the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. Nationalistic hate speech so overwhelmingly present in Cypriot, Greek and Turkish media in the past has almost disappeared. With EU accession on the horizon, “Enosis” is no longer on the Greek Cypriots’ agenda. They have realised that they are far better off with independence than with the status of a far province or region of a highly centralised Greece. The living standard in the Republic of Cyprus is nowadays higher than in Greece. Fear of “Enosis” no longer even plays a significant role in the statements of the Turkish Cypriot leaders. The partition is no longer accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, who feel isolated in their part of the island and left out of the economic and social progress the EU membership could bring. The recent presidential elections of 16 February 2003 on the contrary indicate that partition seems to be better accepted by a considerable number of Greek Cypriots (others simply would like to get the best possibe deal out of any peace plan). Over recent years efforts have been made to organise common actions over the Green Line. In the municipal elections of 2002 the pro-European CTR party won a majority in the main cities of Northern Cyprus. The politics of Mr Denktash came under increasing pressure. The Republic of Cyprus has also become very eager to prove a spotless Human Rights record. More important still, the expectation of Cyprus becoming a EU member has for the first time in 70 years created a political perspective that almost certainly may benefit all Cypriots. No present EU state has a record of ethnic strife similar to the one in Cyprus’ past, but all have an impressive record of prosperity. Greece and Turkey have achieved a notable détente between them – a new development that became obvious after the election of the party of Tayip Erdogan in November 2002. The Cyprus question is now a major obstacle for Turkey’s European ambitions. Mr Denktash – in particular after the mass demonstrations against him – has lost the support of Turkish public opinion. However, with the election of Tassos Papadopoulos as President of Cyprus the chances for a quick settlement of the Cyprus Question have again diminished. The election of this former EOKA member has comforted the position of Mr Denktash in spite of the fact that in February 2003 even 70,000 Turkish Cypriots have demonstrated against him. The deadline of 28 February 2003 for finalizing the UN Agreement was not respected in spite of a visit of UN Secretary General Annan to the island and his direct talks with the respective leaders. Annan has now tried to circumvent them and to put his Plan directly to popular referendum on both sides of the Green Line. Both Cypriot leaders had until 10 March 2003 to give their agreement to this proposal. Lawrence Darrell
Jean-François Drèves
UN Plan for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict (November 2002)
Outline of the UN Plan - A common state made up of two equal component states in "indissoluble union"
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