CHAPTER 6 - Trends in housing policy and the potential impact on access to housing

Table of content:
INTRODUCTION
I - Housing policy trends in transition countries
1) Freedom of choice
2) Quality of housing
3) Housing shortages
4) Cost of housing
5) The impact of privatisation on the social housing stock
6) The risk of housing segregation
7) Effective exclusion from the "right to buy"
8) The impact of restitution policies
9) The effect of rural-urban migration on housing shortage
10) Multiple sources of housing stress
II - THE RISK OF HOMELESSNESS
1) Defining homelessness
2) The legal framework for homelessness
3) Risks of homelessness
3.1. Shortage of provision for the vulnerable
3.2. Citizenship and access to housing
3.3. Negative public opinion
3.4. Multiple risk factors
4) At-risk groups
5) The effect of residence requirements on persistent homelessness
6) Examples of policies to combat housing marginalisation
III - CONCLUSION
Table 1 Types of housing (Questions 1-4 of the housing questionnaire)
Tableau 2 Types of housing in selected EU countries (not all figures add to 100% as some rentals defined as "other")

This chapter is in three Parts. The first Part reviews housing policy trends, with a focus on the very rapid changes in in the transition countries. The central focus is on the impact of privatisation and decentralisation on housing supply and housing segregation.

Part 2 discusses the risks of homelessness and risk groups. It notes some policy initiatives of governments to combat the risk of exclusion from housing. Part 3 briefly concludes by suggesting that regulation of the housing market is necessary to prevent segregation, but that homelessness is more than a housing problem.

INTRODUCTION 

This chapter on housing focuses on the countries of central and eastern Europe. The chapter first reviews the legal and policy context for adequate secure housing and then considers groups at risk of homelessness. The chapter concludes that there are increasing risks of exclusion from housing for less advantage groups in central and eastern Europe. Key risk factors arise from the impact of privatisation, exacerbated by the negative public perceptions of homeless people. As evident from other chapters, the situation in the central European countries is less severe than in Baltic and Balkan countries. In part this is due to differing levels of wealth and the differing impact of economic transformation, but it is also due to the newness of independence in certain countries. However, it is not possible in this chapter to follow up these differences, and this report will focus on presenting a review of the overarching trends affecting the housing situation of the least advantaged groups.

There is a legal right to housing across Europe, east and west¹, north and south. Nevertheless, with the exception of the UK, Belgium and France, there is no legally enforceable right to housing for the homeless, and in no country is there statutory access to publicly funded housing for those living below the poverty line. Similarly, there is substantial legislation in many countries of central and eastern Europe, including near universal affirmation of the right to housing, and several countries where this is enforceable in law. However, due to lack of resources, in many cases non-implementation is a major problem.

The general trends affecting housing opportunities for poor and disadvantaged groups are similar in many European countries. For the European Union, Eurostat produces data on housing quality and affordability (for example Statistics on Housing in the European Union, 1994). Trends evident in the western European housing markets raise a number of concerns for the least advantaged. For example; the potential impact of the widespread decline in public social house-building, the deregulation of rents, and the decline in affordable small apartments to rent (whether in the public or private sector).

These same trends are very evident, and in some respects more severe, in the post-1989 developments in many central and eastern European countries. Further, whereas in most west European countries the context is one of overall housing surplus and a high level of basic amenities², this is not the case in the central and eastern European countries, (especially, in terms of amenities, the Balkan countries). Thus, whereas in the European Union, the problem of severe housing stress may be confined to what Avramov refers to as ‘a minority of unsuccessful competitors’ (Avramov 1997: 4), the problem of housing stress is more widespread in central and eastern Europe. The chapter indicates that whereas the legal right to housing is everywhere expressed, developments in housing policy can negate the possibility of implementing or accessing that right. Further, changes in other areas of policy, especially employment and social protection, are putting more people at risk in the housing market.

I - Housing policy trends in transition countries 

With respect to access to secure and adequate housing, this section reviews the impact of privatisation in terms of choice, quality and cost of housing, the supply of housing, the impact of restitution and tenure transfer, and the risks of ‘ghettoisation’.

1) Freedom of choice

In western European countries there has long been freedom for citizens to live in a location of their choosing, if they can afford it. However, a number of central and eastern European countries had official restrictions, which in some cases were very severe. Much housing was officially allocated (by state organisations and enterprises), and some citizens were forced to relocate; for example in Albania there was a deliberate policy of placing citizens in rural areas, andwhereas in Moldava it was necessary to have a licence to live in the capital city.

In Romania many villages were destroyed and the population relocated to new villages thought to have economic development potential (Starova 1997: 17; Danii 1997; Zamfir 1997: page 10 of housing section). Rapidly after 1989 barriers were removed and in most cases there is freedom of location. However, the effects of liberalisation have been most beneficial to the well-paid, and in most cases disadvantageous to the poor.

2) Quality of housing

Liberalisation of the housing market in central and eastern Europe has improved the quality of new housing being built, increasing choice and standards for those who have access to it. However, availability and affordability are restricting access to good quality housing for many people; this is reflected in the lower degree of satisfaction with housing circumstances expressed by people in eastern Europe compared to people in western Europe. In a survey of 12,800 respondents in European Union countries, satisfaction with housing ranged from 85% in Greece and Portugal to 96% in Luxembourg (Commission of the European Communities 1993, quoted in Avramov 1997: 2). Compared to this, in Poland, only 40% considered their accommodation good, and 12.6% were not in a position to continue occupying their flat (Dziewiecka-Bokun 1997: 41-42). Only 47% of Latvia’ns population are satisfied with their housing (Rajevska 1997: 23).

The housing in western European countries is generally of good quality. The vast majority of households have running water, a bath or shower, and are connected to sewage services and the electrical grid. There is not extensive overcrowding; the highest average number of people per room in any country is 1.3 and the mean is 0.6 (Avramov 1997: 3). By contrast, HDSE correspondents reported a fairly consistent picture of inadequate housing. Around one half of Poles questioned stated they were in overcrowded housing, and 58.7% of urban housing, and 74.5% of rural housing lacked basic facilities (Dziewiecka-Bokun 1997: 41). In Estonia 82% do not have hot water always available, and only 83% are connected to sewage services (Narusk 1997: 18). Albania has long had a large housing problem, though because of a strong extended family structure homelessness has not been a particular problem in the past.

However, the urban population has been increasing and simple shacks without sanitation or water have been built in urban areas. Overall, the housing stock is poor, only 30% with running water, 43% with toilets and 38% with sewage connections. Although electricity was in 100% of homes, there is no constant electricity in winter months. Heating is generally by wood or coal (Starova 1997: 16). Nevertheless, it should be noted that in some central European countries amenities are much the same as in northern Europe. For example, in Slovenia only 2.8% of households are now without a bathroom (Novak 1997: 30). However a problem in everywhere transition country is the backlog of maintenance from the state-socialist period.

3) Housing shortages

Housing in central and eastern Europe was inadequate and in short supply before the transition to a market economy. However, whereas the decline in the state-funded construction of public housing is a general trend throughout Europe, the collapse in public house-building in transition countries has been more severe.

The context in western Europe is a surplus of housing, in excess of ten million houses throughout the fifteen countries of the European Union. However, there are most surplus houses in the South, where many of these are second or holiday homes. In Spain, for example, 50% of new houses built are second or holiday homes (Avramov 1997: 5). By contrast, generally, housing stocks in central and eastern Europe are in severe shortage, and construction is actually going down. For example:

The Slovak Republic suffers a severe shortage of flats. In the 1980s 30-40,000 flats were built per year, but by 1990 this had dropped to about 25,000, and in 1994 to less than 7,000. This is mainly due to a large reduction in state funding of housing development (Radicová 1997: 20).

The Czech Republic privatised most state owned housing in 1991, in the 1990s construction reduced substantially. In 1993, the state housing programme terminated, and whereas in 1989 there were 90,000 flats started in the Czech Republic, in 1991, there were 16,800 starts. Since then, most housing starts have been single-family houses and luxury houses for the wealthy of all nationalities (Eskinasi 1995). Kotýnková estimated that there is a housing deficit of 170,000 in the Czech Republic. Part of the problem is due to low rents, which do not encourage investors to build (Kotýnková 1997: 29).

Moldava suffered a massive reduction in house building in the 1990s, reducing by 70% in the years 1991-2 alone (Danii 1997: page 3 of housing questionnaire).

60% of the housing stock in Estonia has been privatised. Construction has fallen from 716,000 in 1981 to 104,900 in 1995. Only 1% of households can afford to build their own house, and 58% have difficulty paying housing costs (Narusk 1997: 17-18).

In Latvia, prior to transition, the state financed 80% of housing construction. Although the private sector has increased construction by 19%, overall construction is down by a factor of nine (Rajevska 1997: 18).

In Poland, despite GDP increasing, housing construction has decreased. There is currently a shortage of two million houses; there are 289 flats per 1000 population, the lowest figure in central and eastern European countries (Dziewiecka-Bokun 1997: 40). State budgets for housing are mainly for repaying loans, only 20-30% going directly to housing. Construction has reduced from 150,000 in 1989 to 68,000 in 1994 and to 60,000 in 1995 (Dziewiecka-Bokun 1997: 40).

4) Cost of housing

In most countries of Europe, the number of households has been increasing faster than the population, and more than matching the increase in house building, due to a variety of factors, including increased numbers of lone parents, and an ageing population with larger numbers of elderly single people, especially women. Much of the housing stock was built for families and the increased demand has raised the cost of small residences.

Consequently the poor pay proportionately more for housing than the better off. In Brussels, for example, a single person on subsistence allowances needs 51% of his/her income for housing, a lone parent with one child on welfare needs 39% (Avramov 1997: 9). The cost of housing in Poland has doubled from one average wage per square metre in 1989 to two wages in 1992, which is two to three times western European values (Dziewiecka-Bokun 1997: 41).

Clearance of poor quality housing, its replacement with higher quality buildings, and an improvement in the wealth of the majority, can make the housing situation worse for the poor. For example, there are fewer cheap houses to rent, and fewer houseowners needing to take lodgers. In some cases the lack of housing is hidden as young people may elect to stay at home with parents (Avramov 1997).

5) The impact of privatisation on the social housing stock

Throughout Europe there has been a general trend away from publicly funded and constructed housing over the last decade. In the Appendix to this chapter, Table 1 illustrates changes in the public-private mix from the 1980s to the 1990s, as reported by HDSE correspondents. For purposes of comparison, Table 2 illustrates trends in the public-private mix for selected European Union countries. The decline in public sector housing as a proportion of the stock has been faster and more dramatic in central and eastern Europe. Privatisation has been the key factor in transforming the housing landscape in transition countries. While privatisation increases choice for some (the better-off) it is associated with reduced construction of cheap housing. The poor have less social housing at their disposal. Furthermore the privatisation of housing, while having a beneficial fiscal effect for governments (less subsidies, no need to maintain properties), passes the cost onto individuals.

Some countries of central and eastern Europe had significant privately-owned housing prior to transition. One example is Hungary, 50% of the stock was already in the private sector prior to transition (Lévai 1997: 8). In Slovenia, two-thirds of the housing stock was owner-occupied³. From the 1960s onwards, housing was financed by banks and there was the possibility of ‘solidarity’ housing managed by self-governing housing committees. Enterprises, municipalities and state agencies owned and allocated housing to their employees. About one-third of the stock was publicly owned, with lower rents in the public sector. Housing was scarce and high wage earners were favoured (Novak 1997: 22).

In a 1991 survey, public opinion in Slovenia concerning tenure change was in general favourable, but there was a difference of opinion between owner-occupiers and renters. 31% of owner-occupiers, but 42% of tenants, were negative or undecided. The most important positive rationale was that maintenance standards would improve, but there was no well-articulated objective expressed by the population survey (Mandic 1994: 33). Nevertheless, in 1991 the Law on Housing privatised housing and abolished limits to private ownership. The National Housing Fund got 20% of the sale price and the owner (employer, local authority, etc.), the remaining 80%. Within two years the social housing stock halved (Novak 1997: 23; Mandic 1994: 30). However, the public housing stock was sold very cheap. Through ‘right to buy’ legislation, tenants got discounts which were very generous, a minimum discount of 30% of the original value (usually below the market price).

Residual social housing is that which tenants did not want to buy, and which is covered by low protected rents. In the new situation, social housing is the responsibility of the local authoritiesyresponsibility, they have to find the finance and decide the detailed allocation providers. Given the limited resources of the municipalities, the prospects for building and maintenance of social housing are bleak, and there are likely to be may concentrations of low income households living in badly maintained housing. The problem is likely to be regionally variable, and to be worse in those areas in which stigmatised groups are over-represented. For example, one-tenth of the population of in Sliven in Slovenia, areRoma (around 11,000 people).They , are perceived by others to be responsible for the majority of crimes in the town. Despite widespread unemployment, only 130 Roma are registered out of work (and therefore entitled to any unemployment benefits). An ‘anti-ghetto’ project has been established (Dobreva 1995: 28-29). However, to the extent that it locates problems only within the group rather than also in the context confronting the group, there is little likelihood of sustainable change. The possibility of housing segregation is further discussed below, for the example of Hungary.

6) The risk of housing segregation

In Hungary, tenancy rights remained very strong after 1989, and it would therefore have been difficult to sell the housing to anyone other than the occupant. As with Slovenia, there were strong incentives to buy, with apartments selling for 15% of their market value. This actually improved the fiscal position of the government as subsidies were no longer needed and new housing is no longer given subsidies. It also proceeded equitably, as subsidies had been badly targeted to high income groups, and removing them was seen as a positive move (Lévai 1997: 8-9).

However it is not obvious that equity will be sustained. Inner urban districts contained a higher proportion of public rental housing (over 90% in inner districts of Budapest). Because of the previous housing policy, these districts were quite socially mixed, even within the same blocks, but with a majority of white-collar workers. However, in terms of quality of housing, the lowest 20% of the inner district housing market is most in need of renovation (40% of dwellings classified as in need of immediate rehabilitation), whereas in the upper 20% of the market, only 8% of dwellings need immediate rehabilitation. This sector, which has the majority of higher-income and better-educated households, is privatising fastest (Hegedus and Tosics 1994: 44-48).

Hegedus and Tosics argue that whereas rent subsidies in the past favoured higher-income households, this inequality has remained and deepened due to the ‘value-gap’. The financial gain to the sitting tenant from privatisation rises with the value of the unit and is largest for the immediate buyers, who are usually better-off households. The residual public sector will therefore contain the majority of poor quality housing, inhabited by lower income households. Further, lower income households will gradually get pushed out because they cannot support the increasing burdens of renovation and maintenance.

Compounding the risk of ‘ghettoisation’, the municipal authorities, responsible for the residual public housing, have only one source of finance for renovation and maintenance, which is commercial rent charges. However, even where households could pay, central state laws inhibit charging market rents. Rent controls by location were still in place in the mid-nineties. The Hungarian Condominium Law requires all householders to consent to any renovation proposals, therefore possibilities for rehabilitation are also reduced in practice because of the mix of tenures, even within the same block (Hegedus and Tosics 1994: 50). Finally, municipalities will find it difficult to raise revenue by increasing sales prices later in the privatisation process, since they will be selling the less attractive properties. Since neither lower-income households nor municipalities appear likely to have adequate resources for renovation and maintenance in the near future, one may conclude that there is a strong risk of severe housing stress for many low-income households, particularly in cities. As elsewhere, the problems for low-income households are exacerbated by an overall housing shortage. In 1985, 72,000 dwellings were built, but in 1994, 7000 (6000 financed by well-off individuals) (Udvari 1995).

Some kinds of housing are less likely to keep their value than others, and are also likely to confront municipalities with increasing maintenance costs. For example, since 1959, housing policy in the Czech Republic allowed for ‘co-operative’ building. This enabled citizens to build their own, partly subsidised, houses, but mainly enabled easier access to modern housing for higher income groups, at higher rents, often in suburbs. By 1991, 15% of flats in Prague were in co-operative blocks (Eskinasi 1995: 534). However, apartments built in the 1970s and 1980s were ‘panel-built’, a technique now showing structural maintenance problems. After 1991, state housing was transferred to the municipalities, but whoever owns particular units of housing, whether municipalities or individuals, will face increasing maintenance bills.

In the Czech Republic, one new measure that is likely to add to risks of ‘ghettoisation’ results from the transfer of housing to the deregulated rent sector. Rents for flats let to foreigners are deregulated. Therefore, rents for Czech citizens average 250 Czech crowns per month, but foreigners may be charged 300-400 Deutsch marks, often in cash (Eskinasi 1995: 542). While it is difficult to evict sitting tenants, at least in the short-term, vacant flats in major cities are likely to be let to foreigners. Even in municipal housing there is a ‘grey market’ in that flats which families are not using can be sub-let to foreigners, and this is not illegal (Eskinasi 1995). Changing domestic housing into office space also enables it to become part of the deregulated sector. Municipalities have had to sell cheaply, and, as elsewhere, the value gap is closed by the new landlord. However, in the Czech Republic, municipalities in some districts were, in 1995, awaiting a new law that would enable them to sell at a higher price.

7) Effective exclusion from the "right to buy"

Those who have not taken up the offer to buy, and therefore the opportunity to acquire capital, have been amongst the poorest and most marginalised, including those who were not previously living in ‘official’ legal housing, in particular, in some countries, Roma. In Slovenia about half of the Roma live in private dwellings that were constructed without legal permission. The authorities tolerate this as there is a general shortage of housing (Novak 1997: 27).

In Estonia, 9% of tenants who can privatise their homes choose not to, and older people are more likely to remain tenants (Narusk 1997: 22).

Widespread privatisation in the context of poverty and housing shortage may also create longer-term problems of exclusion from housing. For example, pPrivatisation in Lithuania was greater in extent than in other parts of the Baltic states, and less than 5% of housing remains in the public sector. GNP collapsed by more than 50% between 1991 and 1992 (to approximately $2,700) (Cépénaité 1995: 59-60). The collapse in GNP has put housing purchase out of the reach of many people for the foreseeable future. The government has responded by introducinged three kinds of financial support to acquire housing; privileged credit, controlled rents in municipal housing, and the right to buy from the municipality with deferred payment. However, apartment prices have risen by a factor of 400 since 1984, and many people have refused the opportunity to buy, even on advantageous terms. Average salaries in 1995 were $100 per month, minimum wages $25, but the purchase price of one-room flats averaged $7,500 (Alisauskiene 1997).

8) The impact of restitution policies

There is a specific problem in central and Eastern Europe that is a consequence of restitution laws, which return property to their pre-communist owners. The Baltic countries have the most extensive restitution laws. In Estonia, 13% of citizens cannot gain from housing privatisation as the restitution laws gave their homes back to pre-1940 owners, who may live outside Estonia (Narusk 1997: 21). In some cases, the new owners have difficulty managing and maintaining the properties, and may sell them on to commercial agencies (Narusk 1997: 22).

In Latvia, only 74% of the original owners are still living in Latvia. Tenants are protected from eviction for seven years, but non-payment of rent is still cause for eviction. Rents and service costs have increased above the retail price index, and the rent limits were abolished in 1996. Increases have resulted in failure to pay. While in principle, there is a facility to help the poor with housing costs, in practice, funds are not sufficient to cover all in needavailable. In winter 1996/7 households in debt had no heating. Even some therefore not only houses but schools and hospitals in debt hadve no heating for some time. 12% of tenants in Riga citizens arewere unable to pay any rent at all in 1996 (Rajevska 1997: 22).

Unlike Baltic countries, in the Czech Republic restitution was restricted to Czech nationals living in the Republic. Nevertheless, as in Baltic countries, restitution laws have caused some problems where the property passed to persons unable to repair and maintain it, who therefore sold it on cheaply to real estate agencies.

Restitution laws are also contributing to housing segregation. For example, because it is older, more property subject to restitution is located in inner-city boroughs. Therefore more properties in these areas, having passed from public to private ownership, have entered the deregulated sector, and market prices can be charged to new owners or tenants. This new situation is likely to ‘quarter’ the citiesy, and to create peripheral areas with narrow income classes in Prague and other cities. While rents for Czech nationals are still regulated, services have been fully liberalised, which in Prague has meant increases of 800%, although the Czech average is 80% (Eskinasi 1995: 540). However, housing allowances (for those earning up to 130% of the minimum wage), for all except pensioners, are limited to two years.

Thus, the impact of the privatisation of the state housing market is likely to be, first, the ‘gentrification’ of those inner boroughs in which a lot of property subject to restitution was located, and, second, the creation of peripheral housing for low income groups in poorer quality industrial-built housing, in what were previously socially-mixed districts. For example, in Albania, 98% of homes are now in the private sector. Tenants became owners for typically about $150, yet a flat in central Tirana can fetch $120,000 today (property in the north is much less valuable) (Starova 1997: 18). To an even greater extent than in central European countries, the private sector is creating and catering for housing for the wealthy. In Albania, the extent of the housing shortage has led the government to extend the period before restitution is effected by three years, to give occupiers more time to find alternative accommodation (Zlatanova 1995: 22). Housing stress is severe, encompassing the ‘self-settled’ in accommodation constructed without a legal permit (mainly older people, poor and Roma), and overcrowding. 30% of dwellings in big cities are ‘overpopulated’, and much recent housing is of unfit concrete construction (Zlatanova 1995: 21).

9) The effect of rural-urban migration on housing shortage

In Romania, there has been a steep decline in housing construction (by a factor of five) between 1980 and 1993. However, the demand for housing had increased due to rural-urban migration and a fall in median household size. The state subsidises housing though long-term credits at low interest rates, and subsidises public sector rents (Pascal 1995: 61-64). In Albania, a reverse migration took place. However, citizens forcibly relocated to rural areas have had confiscated property returned to them, but this has shifted the housing problem onto the current urban residents.

10) Multiple sources of housing stress

Yugoslavia (which is not part of the HDSE study) illustrates all dimensions of housing crisis: lack of housing, particularly in large towns, failure to adapt policies to actual housing need, poorly equipped housing (32% with no running water, 37% with no sewerage), unequal access to housing and social segregation by location (Vujovic 1995: 76). The housing crisis has worsened due to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.

Homeless people include those affected by restitution laws, those in illegally built homes, refugees, squatters, and tenants faced with high rents (25% of housing had been privatised by 1994, and 52% in the capital city). The housing shortage, to a greater extent than in other eastern European countries, was affected by a rapid and massive rural-urban migration, which almost trebled the urban population between 1948 and 1991 (Vujovic 1995: 77). Most towns have a periphery of shacks. In Belgrade there are ‘ghettos’ which are composed almost entirely of Roma. A law of 1995 on illegally built housing enabled people to apply for legalisation, but of an estimated 40,000 dwellings, there were only 2,000 applications for legalisation, as most people could not afford to pay the price demanded (Vujovic 1995: 80).

There are an estimated half-million refugees in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 2.5 million in former Yugoslavia. 83% of adult refugees are women, often heads of households. Rents are very high, and frequently demanded several months in advance. In 1994, apartment rents were greater than average monthly income. Most of the three million-plus refugees and displaced persons reside with family and friends, causing severe housing (and other) stress (Vujovic 1995: 78). In a survey of 1038 refugees in Beograd, only 4% were in refugee centres, the rest with family and friends. Most are unemployed, only 10% have any kind of work, and only 14% contribute to the rent of the household they live in. There is little social help to integrate as refugee status is perceived by the state to be temporary (Mitrovic 1995: 82-86).

II - THE RISK OF HOMELESSNESS 

Homelessness appears to be an increasing problem throughout Europe. In western Europe, there is homelessness on a typical day of about 1.1 million, but 2.3-2.7 million depend on services for the homeless at some stage in the year. At cross-national level data from Eurostat do not directly cover housing market risks, and indeed, as Avramov noted, the 1996 Social Portrait of Europe does not cover homelessness (Avramov 1997: 4). The European Community Household Panel data, which will allow social scientists to track households over time, is based on a sample of registered addresses, and therefore is not particularly useful for identifying the situation of the least advantaged groups.

In western Europe, at national level, the officially recorded problem of homelessness reflects policy decisions rather than the real extent of need. This is even more the case in central and eastern Europe, where recognition of homelessness as a social problem in a market society is only now emerging. Homelessness was less evident prior to 1989 in central and eastern Europe, partly because it was hidden, but mainly also because the state provided universal housing.

1) Defining homelessness

Homelessness is not easy to define, but the definition used establishes the policy parameters. Homelessness can be seen as a continuum, from those ‘living rough’ on the street, through habitation in unconventional buildings (shacks, barns, derelict buildings etc.) without proper amenities, to squatters and to those with housing of a very poor standard. In addition young families share accommodation with parents, for example 60% of those in Poland (Dziewiecka-Bokun 1997: 43). In Hungary, a broad definition of homelessness suggests that homelessness has increased to between 200,000 and 300,000 persons. However, Udvari’s estimates for a definition of homelessness closer to ‘rooflessness’ is about one-eighth of this number (Udvari 1995: 56).

Definitions tend to vary not only with the degree of social and political recognition of the problem, but with the political will and economic means to implement solutions. Whatever definition is chosen, the homeless are difficult to count. Most survey data access only those with a regular domicile. Countries which have no mechanisms to deal with homelessness tend to report small numbers, which are likely to be under-estimates.

In a 1993 document from the Council of Europe Steering Committee on Social Policy, experts defined homeless people as ‘individuals or families socially excluded from lasting occupancy of a suitable personal dwelling (Council of Europe 1993: 23).

The European Observatory on Homelessness of the European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) defined homelessness and homeless people in terms of a range of causes: ‘Homelessness is the absence of a personal, permanent, adequate dwelling. Homeless people are those who are unable to access a personal, permanent, adequate dwelling or to maintain such a dwelling due to financial constraints and other social barriers, and those people who are unable to access and maintain such a dwelling because they are unable to lead a fully independent life and need care and support but not institutionalisation (Avramov 1996: 71, quoted in Avramov 1997: 18, report for the Council of Europe).

These two definitions, accepted at the cross-national level, would encompass many of those severely affected by some of the housing policy trends outlined in Part 1of this chapter.

2) The legal framework for homelessness

In addition to the right to housing outlined in the introduction to this chapter, for those officially accepted as homeless, there is preferential access to housing for the homeless in some western European countries (the UK for example). For central and eastern Europe, four of eight HDSE corespondents stated that there was legally enforceable access to housing, and preferential access to publicly funded housing, (see question 45, Section 11 and question 7, Section 3 of the housing questionnaire results). There is little legislation that is specifically aimed against homeless peopleness. Anti-vagrancy laws have been revoked in all European Union countries (Avramov 1997: 28). Of the HDSE correspondents, no correspondent reported that their country had a law against vagrants (question 22, Section 6 of the housing questionnaire results).

However, in some countries, homelessness as a social phenomenon is not well defined in law. One example is Albania. Consequently, there are no statistical data on homelessness, and no model for collecting it. Imposed ‘living together’ (overcrowding) of two or more couples or families in one home is not considered a criterion for homelessness. Before 1990, eviction was very restricted, which meant that landlords were reluctant to rent out their property, one cause of overcrowding (Zlatanova 1995: 19). A factor specific to Albania, is that widespread homelessness is likely to result from the pyramid investment scandal, where many citizens sold their houses to invest in the fraudulent schemes, and have lost their homes and life savings. Clearly, lack of legal or statistical measures does not mean there is no problem. In Albania, currently, wider definitions of homelessness result in a figure of about 160,000 homeless (Starova 1997: 18).As elsewhere, homeless people in Lithuania include, ex-prisoners, orphans, divorced people, and those who put money into property and other financial ‘scams’ (Cépénaité 1995: 59-60).

3) Risks of homelessness

3.1. Shortage of provision for the vulnerable

With regard to ‘roofless’ homelessness, institutions for homeless people in central and Eastern Europe are run by public and other (e.g. charitable) organisations and funded mainly by public organisations (questions 33-38, Section 8 of the housing questionnaire results). Very few figures are available for beds for the homeless in most countries. However, as one example, in Lithuania, in a capital city of 590,000 people, the municipality of Vilnius had fourteen flats and ten dormitory beds for 70 orphans. Despite the impact of restitution, which extended to broader categorised than in the Czech Republic, only twenty flats were built in Vilnius for those affected (Cépénaité 1995:59-60).

Clearly, there are some homelessness risks which are more specific to countries in transition. For example, as elsewhere, homeless people in Lithuania include, ex-prisoners, orphans, divorced people, but also those who put money into property and other financial ‘scams’ (Cépénaité 1995: 59-60).

A further important source of risk of homelessness in countries of central and eastern Europe, is the privatisation of worker hostels. In the past, these hostels might be considered a source of ‘invisible’ homelessness, if people got ‘stuck’ in them and were not able to move to other kinds of accommodation. However, Iclosure n Hungary this has led to an increase in ‘visible’ homelessness; because since these hostels were were often used by divorced and young people. Another factor is evident in the Czech Republic; low unemployment (below 5%), for groups other than Roma, has encouraged ‘gastarbeiten’ or ‘guest-workers’ from Poland, Ukraine, Slovakia. If they lose their work, they may become homeless (Hradecky 1995: 49). Homelessness has also arisen from an absolute shortage of housing, and property speculation, such as turning worker hostels into hotels: a ‘specific and fairly major source of homelessness in comparison with countries in western Europe’ (Hradecky 1995: 49). ‘Nadeje’ (‘Hope’) estimated that 80% of homeless are Czech, 15% Slovak (Hradecky 1995: 51). A further factor (similar to Hungary), has been the disintegration of big enterprises, especially in construction, which employed a lower-skilled and less ‘stable’ work-force (frequently Roma), and which were providers of workers’ hostels; the consequence of closure is both a direct and indirect loss of housing (Horáková 1995: 33), and loss of employment concentrated in least advantaged groups.

Further, Udvari also suggests that in pre-transition Hungary, there were ‘invisible’ homeless in prisons. Penal legislation allowed the criminal detention of ‘workshy individuals constituting a public danger’, of whom several thousand have been released, and police regulations preventing people from residing in certain areas have been abolished (Udvari 1995: 54-5). Udvari estimated homelessness at 25,000-35,000 of which 12,000-15,000 were in Budapest, 80% of them from the provinces (Udvari 1995: 56). Local authorities have the responsibility to provide for the homeless, although 90% of the finance comes from the central state. Facilities range from the ‘wooden bench’ (night-shelter) to the ‘warm spot’ (day-shelter), to a limited number of communal kitchens. There are also temporary shelters, where people can stay for up to six months, and special accommodation for mothers who are victims of domestic violence.

As in most countries, the visible homeless in the Czech Republic are male, but older, aged 40-60 (Horáková 1995: 34; Hradecky 1995: 51), but there are also, less visible, female homeless living with occasional partners.. For the Czech Republic, Horáková has attributeds some visible homelessness to ‘human rights protection’, by which is meant removal of the former obligation to work, and the ending of ‘social employment’ of the idle or unwilling or unable. As in Hungary, this has been exacerbated by a 1991 general amnesty of prisoners, many with no homes to go to. A further factor similar to Hungary, has been the disintegration of big enterprises, especially in construction, which employed a lower-skilled and less ‘stable’ work-force (frequently Roma), and which provided workers’ hostels; the consequence of closure is both a direct and indirect loss of housing (Horáková 1995: 33), and loss of employment concentrated in least advantaged groups. The homeless are further disadvantaged by disapproving public attitudes which mean that private giving is rare, and most NGOs are funded by the state (Horáková 1995: 33).

3.2. Citizenship and access to housing

The examples below, from the Czech Republic, illustrate the particular difficulties faced by those without full citizenship. Homeless Czech citizens, de jure, cannot exist, since they must all have an officially recognised place of residence, which also entitles them to job help, unemployment benefit and social assistance. Nevertheless, Horáková has estimateds that there are between 4000 and 8000 homeless Czech citizens (Horáková, 1995: 35).

Those with weak citizenship claims are in a more risky worse position. In the Czech Republic, citizenship is inherited from parents, and Roma are particularly at risk of housing stress because of a weak legal position. One quarter of Czech Roma (gypsies) have lost citizenship (World in Action 1997). Further, Slovak citizens born in the Czech Republic must apply for Czech citizenship. Applicants must pay, the administrative procedure is complicated and Roma are most at risk; many have no valid ID or official place of residence, as they live in illegally constructed dwellings (Horáková 1995: 41-2).

The homeless are often without identity documents and other personal documents and therefore cannot utilise state social assistance. There is a particular problem with asylum seekers. They are legally resident if they request asylum status as soon as they arrive, in which case they are placed in humanitarian centres, and provided with food and health care. Between 1989 and 1994, 2000 persons in the Czech Republic were given temporary refuge, many from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other asylum-seekers go to refugee centres and if they leave, lose rights to citizenship, both in the Czech Republic and elsewhere (since refugees must apply in the first country they enter). Since the centres keep their documents, they are without any claims in the Czech Republic, and can become homeless in this way. Nor can NGOs legally assist them, since they are now illegals (Horáková 1995: 38-9).

3.3. Negative public opinion

Hradecky reported that in Prague, where his NGO is active, 80% - 90% of the homeless are sick or disabled, but since they lack health insurance, are entitled to only emergency care (Hradecky 1995: 52). Despite these circumstances, a sample survey by the Institute of Public Opinion (1995) found that while 60% of respondents thought homelessness an urgent problem, 74% of people felt negative towards the homeless, 42% felt it to be a lifestyle choice, 84% said the homeless should seek assistance by themselves and only 15% believed that all homeless should receive any assistance (Hradecky 1995: 52). NGOs in Moscow experienced hostility from the police, who were concerned that assisting those homeless living around railway stations, for example, would lead to a greater influx of homeless people (Farquharson 1995: 68).

3.4. Multiple risk factors

Russia (for which there was no correspondent not included in the HDSE study) exhibits all the factors that create severe risks of homelessness. Economic and social change and military conflict are ‘push’ factors into homelessness in Russia. For the same reasons, there are simply not enough resources to combat the problem effectively. Places in care institutions are in short supply, and living conditions in them have declined due to a rise in costs by a factor of 100, and the consequent closure of some institutions (Matchulskaia 1995: 65-6). 20,000 people passed through NGO night-shelters in Moscow in 1994. Children are a bigger proportion of the homeless in Moscow than in cities in most other European countries.

The other categories who are over-represented amongst the homeless are similar to those at risk in the countries of central and eastern Europe: ex-prisoners (anyone convicted to a term of more than six months is automatically evicted, with no right to re-housing) and refugees (who are not entitled to any benefits) and rural youth (Farquharson 1995: 68). Elderly persons have also fallen into homelessness, as in Lithuania, through selling their homes at a profit later wiped out by hyper-inflation, and children have had their homes sold from under them by their parents. Charities operate in a difficult environment, with no legal and tax status. There have been some improvements since 1992, in that people can be hired without a registered address, and the homeless receive priority for public works, but Farquharson believes homeless people are unaware of these changes (1995: 70).

4) At-risk groups

A good salary, or two moderate salaries, are needed to purchase a residence in many countries of the European Union. Some of the risk groups have been discussed in the previous section. The poor, especially the unemployed, or lone parents on low incomes, are unable to buy property and are forced to rent. Thus there are two types of rental properties, high quality tenure, and low quality at disproportionately high prices. Unlike high earners who often rent for convenience, and do not seek security of tenure, the poor are in a potentially perilous position. They need only to become unemployed, especially long-term unemployed, or to experience unexpected illness while working casually (i.e. with no sickness pay) or some other catastrophe to push them from poverty to homelessness (Avramov 1997).

While women are generally better protected against homelessness, While fewer women than men are homeless, according to Avramov, there has beenis an increase in female homelessness in the European Union. Women who are homeless are more likely to suffer from mental illness than men. Families are better protected than single people (Avramov 1997: 22).

In questions 12-21, Section 5 of the housing and homelessness questionnaire, HDSE correspondents agreed in their identification of particular at risk groups, who are :
· low-income familes
· the unemployed, especially long term
· alcohol and drug dependent persons
· ex-offenders
· those with poor education

Also frequently mentioned were :
· lone parents
· large families
· Roma (Gypsies)
· the mentally ill
· young people with parental support

However, it does not seem that there is much research evidence about the risks faced by these groups. On the positive side, family support, good community care and a functioning welfare system can mitigate against homelessness. In the south of Europe strong family connections have in the past offset the lack of official state pensions, but the culture of the south is changing and family solidarity may be declining.

The homeless may be said to be engaged in a musical chairs game, where every time a chair is removed (cheaper housing goes off the market, boarding houses become less common, state benefits are reduced) it is the homeless who are left standing (Avramov, 1997: 22). The likelihood of becoming homeless increases as more handicaps are accrued, an educated sober unemployed person may be able to solve his/her housing problem; an alcoholic, mentally ill, unemployed person with few education qualifications is much less likely to find and sustain accommodation by him or herself.

5) The effect of residence requirements on persistent homelessness

There is no data on duration of homelessness. However, factors such as proof of domicile can inhibit not only re-entry to the housing market, but broader opportunities for integration. In many countries, residence requirements are necessary to get access to social funds, to vote, for education and to obtain personal documents. This can lead to a cycle whereby the homeless cannot gain entitlement to benefits or employment, which are precisely what they need to get out of the homeless state. Only emergency health care is available without proof of domicile.

The homeless can often get free food and temporary shelter but not more permanent solutions. Questions 28-32, Section 7 of the housing questionnaire results indicate that in most countries of central and eastern Europe, an official domicile or proof of address is a requirement for access to health care, non-contributory social assistance, education and training. Not only social rights, but also human rights are affected. In ten countries, these proofs are required for the issue of personal documents and to exercise the right to vote.

A comprehensive welfare system may reduce the determinants of homelessness to socio-psychological factors (FEANTSA, 1995). Housing the homeless breaks the cycle whereby a domicile is needed to obtain employment, and a salary is needed to obtain residence. While there is a widespread belief that citizens will deliberately make themselves homeless to get subsidised housing, and thus attempting to house the homeless will not reduce the figures, the Finnish experience suggests otherwise. Finland reduced rooflessness (those sleeping outdoors or in night shelters) to a third of its original figure by special targeting of the homeless for assistance (Avramov 1997: 24). In many countries transfer payments or grants are used to allow the poor to obtain affordable accommodation. The alternative, previously favoured in central and eastern Europe, was to freeze rents.

6) Examples of policies to combat housing marginalisation

The HDSE correspondents reported many and varied examples of policies to combat the negative consequences of marketised housing and increasing income inequality, for example:

Slovenia has a system of low cost credits to allow low earners to buy flats or build homes. Many of the at-risk groups are said not to be endangered because of the social protection in force (Novak 1997: 26).

The Slovak Republic has new policies to support new building, to afford state insurance of mortgages, and to give tax incentives to builders of new homes (Radicová 1997: 22).

The Czech Republic builds "simple houses" for rent defaulters, thus keeping them away from homelessness, but giving an incentive to other tenants to continue paying rent (Kotýnková 1997: 13).

In Estonia when housing costs exceed 30% of income, subsidies come into force (Narusk 1997: 21).

Latvia affords housing rights to ex-offenders, however they need personal documents and a residence record (Rajevska 1997: 19)
In Albania the state subsidises 30-50% of the value of a flat for a homeless person (Starova 1997: 18).

These policies variously target risk factors for housing marginalisation, and the groups at risk. They also, variously, aim at prevention or amelioration of housing exclusion. However, if one refers to chapter 3 on employment, which described social exclusion in terms of the push from the centre to the margins, then these policies are most effective at the margins. They do not tackle the central feature of the dynamics of the free market in housing, which generates housing stress for the less advantaged, and under-provides housing for the poor and disadvantaged, in every country in Europe.

III - CONCLUSION 

This chapter has considered the trends to a more plural housing market, not from the point of view of those citizens who can benefit from increased choice and quality, but from the point of view of the poorer and less advantaged groups. The longer-term effects of privatisation seem likely to increase competition amongst the less advantaged for a smaller stock of less attractive housing, increasingly segregated in poor inner quarters and outer suburbs. In poorer countries it seems likely that some rural housing will continue to be without certain utilities. This competition for housing of poor quality, will increase the risks of homelessness for those already disadvantaged who meet life-crisis.

Any individual may be regarded as being connected potentially to :
· a legal structure
· a family and social structure
· an employment structure
· a health structure

An individual connected to all of these is at little risk of homelessness, a lost connection to one structure increases risk, but multiple fractures in the mesh supporting the individual in society places him or her at a massive disadvantage. Therefore, multidimensional policies will be required to combat risks and experience of homelessness and severe housing stress.

However, the marketisation and liberalisation, to a greater or lesser extent, of the health, employment, social protection and education sectors, will put greater burdens on the family and personal networks of the poor and disadvantaged (networks that are likely to be already weak in central and eastern Europe). Therefore the liberalisation of markets in a variety of sectors simultaneously may generate complex, multi-dimensional risks of exclusion. A ’one-club’ solution of relying on labour markets to meet the challenge of integration for all, may well prove inadequate.

Table 1 Types of housing (Questions 1-4 of the housing questionnaire)

Country	% Owner occupied housing		% publicly funded housing for rent		% non-profit housing for rent		% private rental dwelling		Comment
	1980s	1990s	1980s	1990s	1980s	1990s	1980s	1990s
Czech Republic	4.8	44.0	42.1	27	13.1	19.0	0.01	10.0	1990s figures 1995
Estonia	30.0	49.0	70.0	51.0	not given	not given	not given	not given
Latvia	29.7	44.4	67.0	48.3	none	none	no data	no data	figure for 1980 and 1996
Lithuania	40.23	84.10	39.77	15.9	no data	no data	no data	no data	1990s figures for 1994
Romania	6.3	29.4	93.7	70.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1987 and 1994 data
Slovenia	63.8	88.6	29.7	8.4	3.5	2.6	3.0	0.4

Tableau 2 Types of housing in selected EU countries (not all figures add to 100% as some rentals defined as "other")

Country	% Owner occupied housing	% Owner occupied housing	% Rental of property 1980		% Rental of property 1991
	1980	1991	private	social	private	social
Belgium	59	65	18	82	18	82
Denmark	52	51	35	55	40	44
Finland	61	65	39	61	51	49
France	47	54	33	65	44	53
Ireland	76	78	53	47	55	45
Netherlands	42	46	58	41	66	34
United Kingdom	55	66	71	29	73	27

Source: Statistics on housing in the European Union, 1994, European Commission DGV.